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Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Japanese "nationalism" (if such a term is even applicable) depended less on imagined similarities among Japanese than it did on their contrived customary differences from foreign peoples such as the Ainu. The boundaries of the early modern Japanese realm were ethno-geographical, and Ainu identity and difference was critical in constructing the borders of Japan.

After 1799, the Tokugawa shogunate and, later, the Meiji state, undertook policies of deculturation and assimilation toward the Ainu, because the Meiji strategy toward state building relied less on difference than on myths of internal homogeneity. The Meiji state conscripted Ainu into the myth of Japanese homogeneity through assimilation; but earlier forms of Ainu autonomy and difference first had to be destroyed.

Interestingly, wolf eradication offers one vantage point from which to view the process of Ainu deculturation and assimilation in the context of the colonization of Hokkaido and the creation of the modern myths that provided the foundation for Japan's ethnic nationalism. Ainu origin mythology held that the Ainu people were born from a union of a wolf and a goddess, and so when Ainu tracked and killed wolves and wild dogs under state bounty programs legitimized as "imperial grants," they committed mythological patricide, replacing their origin myths with Japanese ones that, over the course of the late Meiji period, served as the foundation of Japan's modern nation.

Japan Brown Bag Series

Co-hosted with the Center for East Asian Studies

Philippines Conference Room

Brett Walker Professor of History Montana State University
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Hosted by the Stanford Project on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE) as part of their Greater China Forum which meets first Tuesday of each month.

Joseph Y. Liu

President, CEO, and member, Board of Directors, Oplink Communications, Inc.

Oplink designs, manufactures, and markets fiber optic products and services that increase the performance of optical networks, including its photonic foundry with manufacturing activities in Zhuhai and design and engineering in San Jose.

Sam T. Wang, Ph.D.

President, SMIC Americas, the US operations of Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC)

With an IPO in March 2004 (and current market cap of $3.6 billion), SMIC is China's most advanced pure play IC foundry company, with wafer fabs located in Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin, including its Fab 1 named "Top Fab of the Year for 2003" by Semiconductor International.

Tien Wu, Ph.D.

President, ASE Americas, Europe and Japan, Board of Directors and Corporate Vice President, Worldwide Marketing and Strategy, ASE Inc., and Chief Executive Officer, ISE Labs Inc (An ASE Test Company)

The ASE Group is the world's largest provider of independent semiconductor manufacturing services in assembly and test with $2.9 billion sales revenue in 2003, 29,000 employees worldwide, and facilities across Asia, including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

Philippines Conference Room

Joseph Y. Liu President, CEO, and Member, Board of Directors Oplink Communications, Inc.
Sam T. Wang President, SMIC Americas the US operations of Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation
Tien Wu President, ASE Americas, Europe, and Japan, Board of Directors and Corporate Vice President, Worldwide Marketing and Strategy, ASE Inc., and Chief Executive Officer, ISE Labs Inc (An ASE Test Company)
William F. Miller Co-director Moderator SPRIE
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In a San Jose Mercury News op-ed, APARC fellow Robert Madsen writes that internal conflict have paralyzed the Bush administration policy, leaving N. Korea unchecked in its pursuit of a nuclear arms program.

Neither the Bush nor the Kerry campaign has chosen to make U.S. policy toward North Korea a central part of its election platform -- and for good reason. Both sides recognize that it may no longer be possible to peacefully resolve the dispute over that country's nuclear-weapons development, and a debate over whether to wage another controversial war would hardly appeal to the electorate.

The fundamental problem is that North Korea believes it needs a sizable nuclear arsenal. Politically, such an asset would transform the country into a regional power whose views on international issues must always be taken seriously. Militarily, the possession of a large number of atomic weapons would bolster North Korea's security by discouraging intimidation of the sort Washington employed in 1994, when it forced President Kim Jong Il to shut down his plutonium-based arms program.

Most compelling, however, is Pyongyang's financial situation. The North Korean economy is so dysfunctional that it cannot reliably generate enough wealth to sustain the state. Kim and his colleagues have dabbled in reform, but they apparently realize that the degree of liberalization necessary to produce strong GDP growth would coincidentally release a wave of popular animosity sufficient to wash the government away. Thus, the safest course of action is to leave the economy unreconstructed while securing a constant stream of foreign aid.

Since Pyongyang needs leverage to obtain this support, it is determined to amass a big nuclear force. The international community would then have no means of persuading North Korea to abandon its weaponry short of risking catastrophic war and would consequently be reduced to bribing the Kim government not to use its new capabilities.

Moreover, if the flow of aid were interrupted, Pyongyang could garner the foreign exchange it requires by selling its new technology, fissile materials or even a few of its bombs.

What this implies is that despite its rhetoric to the contrary, North Korea does not really want to trade its nuclear program for economic assistance and a security guarantee. Pyongyang would plainly prefer to embark on diplomatic talks with nuclear weapons in hand. This is why it cheated on the 1994 agreement by enriching uranium and why it resumed reprocessing plutonium in early 2003. But to realize his strategic aspirations, Kim must still prevent the United States, China, Japan and South Korea from forming a coalition that imposes crippling sanctions before his armament effort has reached fruition.

Driving wedges between the other regional powers is not as difficult as it might seem. Paradoxically, perhaps, the United States is the only relevant country that views the achievement by North Korea of significant nuclear status as absolutely unacceptable.

Tokyo and Seoul are worried about that eventuality but conversely fear the geopolitical instability and refugee crisis that would ensue if economic or military pressure caused the Kim regime to collapse. Beijing shares these immediate concerns and additionally worries about the longer-term possibility that a united Korean Peninsula might incline toward the United States.

Only by alleviating these anxieties can the U.S. government unite East Asia against North Korea.

Washington, however, is constrained by its own internal rift. On the one hand are those doves who want to exchange aid and a security arrangement for the termination of North Korea's nuclear projects, on the other are the hawks who oppose all diplomatic contact with the Kim government. The conflict between these two camps has paralyzed Bush administration policy, leaving Pyongyang more or less free to proceed with its nuclear gambit.

If the doves err in overestimating Pyongyang's flexibility, the hawks are guilty of the more serious mistake of thinking that a refusal to negotiate with mendacious states is an actual diplomatic strategy.

In fact, the talks advocated by the doves are an essential step toward the application of coercive force. It is only by offering reasonable deals, and having the Kim government reject them, that Washington can demonstrate to Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul that Pyongyang cannot be bought off with money and a verbal guarantee of its security. This recognition, in turn, is critical both to building a coalition against North Korea and, alternatively, to reducing the political costs of unilateral U.S. military action.

The better course has therefore always been to negotiate earnestly with Pyongyang in the hope that it would accede to a peace agreement while knowing that its failure to do so would facilitate the adoption of more assertive measures, if necessary, at a later date.

Yet rather than taking every opportunity to interact with Kim's representatives, the Bush administration has limited its diplomacy to desultory exchanges at multilateral conferences and only put forward a detailed settlement proposal in June. Pyongyang has exploited the opening created by this stubbornness fairly effectively. It has capitalized on anti-American sentiment in South Korea by persuading Seoul to cooperate economically and militarily while also prevailing upon Tokyo to resume large-scale food aid and seek an early exchange of ambassadors.

In the occasional six-party talks with delegations from China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States, Pyongyang's objective has been to stall for time. Its diplomats have postponed specific meetings many times; then behaved so egregiously that the other participants were relieved when the North Koreans consented merely to engage in future negotiations. Those too, however, would soon be rescheduled.

Washington has inadvertently abetted these tactics through thoughtless insults -- canceling, for instance, informal exchanges between U.S. and North Korean officials at the last minute -- which Pyongyang could then cite as proof that the United States was not acting in good faith.

North Korea has also benefited from the awkward developments that inevitably arise when sensitive dialogues are delayed. Seoul's recent declaration that it had reprocessed a small volume of nuclear material is one such event; Pyongyang may use that admission to complicate the next round of six-party discussions. Thus the Kim government buys more time for its nuclear technicians to continue their work.

It is true that North Korea has committed some blunders over the past two years, but it has played its cards more adroitly than the United States. The members of a potential coalition are largely going their own way now, and the odds that those countries will unite behind any U.S. strategy, peaceful or otherwise, have diminished considerably.

So, unless the winner of the November election acts quickly and with better judgment than Washington has so far, the United States may soon be forced to choose between launching military strikes without foreign support and letting Kim attain the nuclear status he desires.

ROBERT MADSEN is a fellow at the Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford Institute for International Studies. He wrote this article for Perspective.

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In a San Francisco Chronicle op-ed, CISAC fellow Laura K. Donohue writes that California's Proposition 69 -- which would expand the state's DNA database to include all those arrested for any felony -- would give the government too much control over citizens' genetic information and provide too few safeguards against misuse.

Our DNA contains the most intimate details of who we are -- including secrets even we don't know about ourselves. Should the government have control over our genetic information, when we have not been found guilty of any crime?

Proposition 69 would do just this. Privacy advocates from across the political spectrum have begun to raise red flags about this potential expansion of government power.

Six years ago, California's DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act gave the state the authority to collect the genetic material of felons convicted of violent crimes, such as murder, rape and other sexual offenses. The idea was to establish a database like the fingerprint and criminal record information bank that already exists.

California was not alone in incorporating DNA provisions into its penal code -- every state introduced DNA databases for the most serious crimes. But California's version lacked protections guaranteed elsewhere. Many states retained only the DNA "fingerprint" or profile and destroyed the original sample. California not only kept the full genetic information, but it also has steadily expanded the number of qualifying offenses.

Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger signed a ballot argument in support of Proposition 69 in July. If approved by voters on Nov. 2, it would unleash the government to gather this information to a degree and among unprecedented numbers of people. Proposition 69 extends collection to every felonious offense and, within five years, requires every adult and juvenile in California arrested for -- but not convicted of -- a felony to provide the government with cells containing his or her complete genetic structure.

Proposition 69 does not stop there. It would apply retroactively, empowering the government to seek out individuals previously arrested for a felony but found not guilty, and require them to turn over their DNA.

The extension to all felony arrests means a radical expansion in the number of citizens deprived of control over their genetic material. Felonies range from computer hacking and shoplifting, to writing bad checks and fraudulently procuring services.

The numbers are significant. In his advance release of Crime in California 2003, state Attorney General Bill Lockyer reported in July that there were just over half a million felony arrests -- not convictions -- in the state. Under Proposition 69, all 507,081 would be required to relinquish their genetic material -- even though statistics show that approximately one third of those arrested would have the charges dismissed or be found not guilty in a court of law.

The idea that you could easily retract your DNA from this felony database is fiction. Once an individual is found to be innocent, he or she could apply to have material removed, but the state would not be required to do so. Following the initial hearing, no appeal would be allowed.

Perhaps of greatest concern is the very real possibility of error. A recent Stanford University study showed that even sophisticated laboratories exhibit up to a 3 percent error rate in the handling and coding of genetic material. Of the half a million citizens from whom DNA would be collected annually, 15,000 might have their name associated with the wrong sample. Even if the error rate was significantly less -- 3/10 of a percent -- there would still be 1,500 people associated with the wrong DNA sample. And it would be extremely difficult for citizens to find out about, much less rectify, such mistakes.

Proposition 69 shrouds the system in secrecy. It prevents citizens or the courts from obtaining information about the structure of the data bank or database, or the software program in operation. Simultaneously, it makes information available to private laboratories, third parties assisting with statistical analysis, auditing boards, attorney general offices, local law enforcement and federal DNA databases.

The safeguards against misuse are inadequate. The initiative limits the ceiling of liability and exempts government employees or third parties from further civil or criminal penalties. It fails to protect against the threat of felony arrests as a tool for interrogation or the use of felony charges as a way to collect DNA from particular populations.

Behind the immediate and obvious privacy concerns lie deeper issues: We don't yet know how genetic information can -- or will -- be used. So we don't know the full extent of the rights we will relinquish.

We know that genes provide information about parentage and familial relationships, propensity for particular diseases, and biological vulnerabilities. We don't yet know the link between genes and personality, how to clone individuals, or how genetic structures can be altered once their content is known. When these and other discoveries are made, and efforts are made to take advantage of them, it will be too late.

Even seemingly innocuous information appears different depending on context: Within two days of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Census Bureau provided the military with a list of the number of Japanese Americans in specific neighborhoods. In less than 90 days, the Army "evacuated" 110,442 citizens from the West Coast. DNA contains far more information than simple ancestry.

Even as science wrestles with the implications of the Human Genome Project, there will be repeated efforts to create a universal database that catalogs our biological inheritance. But every attempt to expand this awesome power should be met with skepticism and careful discussion about the implications of giving up control over the very essence of our being. We need to think hard about where we draw the line. A system that captures innocent citizens' DNA, lacks transparency, and fails to adequately protect the gathered information against future misuse goes too far.

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After an intensive selection process, the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford Institute for International Studies at Stanford University has selected the first class of its APARC Fellowships for pre-doctoral scholars. Kaoru Shimizu and Joo-Youn Jung will be in residence during the 2004-2005 academic year. They will be named Takahashi Fellows in honor of Takahashi family whose generous gift made this fellowship possible.

Kaoru (Kay) Shimizu is a Ph.D. candidate in the department of political science. Her dissertation topic is "The Political Dynamics of Capitalism: Barriers to Reform in Japan and China" in which she adopts a political economy approach to compare the causes and resolution of non-performing loans in China and Japan.

Joo-Youn Jung is a Ph.D. candidate in the department of political science. In her dissertation she will be examining how and why the powerful bureaucratic states of China, South Korea, and Japan have changed in response to the powerful forces of financial crisis, non-performing loans, and banking reform and what impact these changes have had on efforts to implement urgently needed policy changes.

APARC looks forward to their joining us in the fall.

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The Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford Institute for International Studies at Stanford University announces the winners of the 2004-2005 Shorenstein Fellowship. Drs. Jennifer Amyx and Soyoung Kwon will join APARC in the fall.

Jennifer Amyx received her Ph.D. from Stanford in 1998. An assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, she is an expert on the politics of financial regulation and reform in the Asia-Pacific region. During her residence at APARC, she plans to complete her manuscript that analyze the regulation and reform of government-backed financial institutions in Japan.

Soyoung Kwon received her Ph.D. from University of Cambridge in 2003. Her doctoral dissertation focuses on the evolution of the North Korean political elite. It is a much under-researched topic and her work looks into different socialist societies, comparing different courses of change (and lack of change) in the state socialist societies. While in residence she will be focusing on developing her doctoral thesis into a monograph that will focus on the North Korean political leadership and its policy orientation.

APARC looks forward to their joining us in the fall.

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San Francisco -- Offshoring is just one of many global forces impacting job creation and destruction in the Bay Area and cannot be viewed in isolation from the key trends enabling it, such as globalization, technology-driven improvements in productivity and business disintermediation. Efforts to prevent offshoring will not be successful and are likely to come at considerable economic cost, according to a new study released today.

Sponsored by Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network, the Bay Area Economic Forum and the Stanford Project on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE), with research and project support from global management consulting firm A.T. Kearney, the study analyzed global trends, regional capabilities and the Bay Area job market.

Findings from the study, the first regionally focused on the Bay Area, were based on 120 interviews, analysis of 9,000 job listings and other primary and secondary research.

The Bay Area already has more experience with globalization and offshoring than other parts of the U.S., the study reports. Bay Area manufacturers earn almost 60 percent of their revenues in overseas markets. Analysis done as part of the study revealed 94 percent of companies in the semiconductor and semiconductor equipment manufacturing and software clusters - two driving sectors in the Bay Area in terms of employment and payroll contribution - are already using offshore resources.

This does not mean all jobs are going offshore. The study also found one-in-four job postings for large companies in those sectors during April 2004 was for positions in the Bay Area.

"The research makes clear that global trends will force continued creation and destruction of jobs in the Bay Area. These trends can't be reversed. Policies and investment should be directed toward helping the region strengthen its core capabilities to compete effectively on a national and global basis" said Sean Randolph, President & CEO of the Bay Area Economic Forum.

The study calls for policymakers to maintain strong support for basic research, invest in education to ensure a competitive local workforce and to address vulnerabilities in the regional business environment including housing, transportation and business regulations that hinder local job creation. Business leaders need to support transition programs and consider investment in local employee development to meet their future job needs.

The study found the Bay Area is losing ground to other regions in the U.S. and overseas in three competitive capabilities: mass production, back-office (transactional) operations and product and process enhancement. The competitive erosion in the latter is new. It appears that the Bay Area is rapidly losing out to other regions in occupations associated with engineering focused on cost reduction, fine-tuning processes and expanding product features. These engineering jobs, along with manufacturing and administration-related occupations, are expected to decline as the skills required for those functions are sourced more cost effectively in other regions of the United States and abroad.

The study also identified five competitive capabilities that investors and business leaders believe are key strengths of the Bay Area. In addition to three capabilities traditionally linked to the region (entrepreneurship/new business creation, research in advanced technologies and bringing new concepts to market), the analysis pointed to two other competitive capabilities not always in the spotlight:

  • Cross-disciplinary research - coordinating and integrating advanced learning across industries and scientific disciplines.
  • Global integrated management - managing and coordinating globally distributed business functions and networks.

Jobs aligned with these five regional strengths, such as high-level research, strategic marketing and global business and headquarter management activities, are expected to experience solid growth.

"The findings confirm that the region should continue to attract talent and foster innovation, start-up activity and job creation, as technology companies are launched and commercialized," said Russell Hancock, President and CEO of Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network.

The Bay Area's strengths make the region a leader in job creation in early stages of the business lifecycle, but its weaknesses lead to job growth outside the region in the later stages. As a result, the study says, the Bay Area will continue to incubate and develop new businesses, a process that has historically been the core growth engine for the local job market.

"Companies founded in the Bay Area will typically maintain the majority of their workforce in the region until their first products or services gain market traction and key business processes stabilize," said John Ciacchella, Vice President with A.T. Kearney. "However, as these companies expand and mature, many of the new jobs that stay local will focus on management of expanding business operations that are outsourced, offshored and distributed to other regions."

The Bay Area also is well positioned in the industries likely to spawn new technology

start-ups, according to the study's job market analysis and interviews. Beyond its leading role in information technology, the Bay Area has the highest concentration of biotechnology firms in the country and more nanotechnology firms than all countries except Germany.

"How jobs in a region are affected by global trends depends on the competitiveness of the region's capabilities," said Marguerite Gong Hancock, Associate Director of SPRIE. "Despite a rise in the capabilities of other entrepreneurial regions globally, the Bay Area continues to lead in many of the capabilities considered most necessary for innovation and new business creation"

The study findings will be presented at a public event on Thursday, July 15, at Stanford University, where a panel of business and community leaders will discuss the report's findings and implications and take questions from the audience. The panel will be moderated by Paul Laudicina, managing director of A.T. Kearney's Global Business Policy Council, and includes:

  • Edward Barnholt (Chairman, President & CEO, Agilent Technologies)
  • William T. Coleman (Founder, Chairman & CEO, Cassatt Corporation, and Vice Chairman, Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group)
  • Anula K. Jayasuriya (Venture Partner, ATP Capital LP)
  • William F. Miller (Professor Emeritus, Stanford Graduate School of Business)
  • The Honorable Joe Nation, California State Assembly

BAY AREA ECONOMIC FORUM
Bay Area Economic Forum (www.bayeconfor.org) is a public-private partnership of senior business, government, university, labor and community leaders, develops and implements projects that: support the vitality and competitiveness of the regional economy, and enhance the quality of life of the regions residents. Sponsored by the Bay Area Council a business organization of more than 250 CEOs and major employers, and the Association of Bay Area Governments, representing the region's 101 cities and nine counties, the Bay Area Economic Forum provides a shared platform for leaders to act on key issues affecting the regional economy.

JOINT VENTURE: SILICON VALLEY NETWORK
Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network (www.jointventure.org) is a nonprofit organization that provides analysis and action on issues affecting the economy and quality of life in Silicon Valley. The organization brings together new and established leaders from business, labor, government, education, non-profits, and the broader community to build a sustainable region that is poised for competition in the global economy.

STANFORD PROJECT ON REGIONS OF INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The Stanford Project on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (http://sprie.stanford.edu), or SPRIE, is dedicated to the understanding and practice of the nexus of innovation and entrepreneurship in the leading regions around the world. Current research focuses on Silicon Valley and high technology regions in 6 countries in Asia: People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore and India. SPRIE fulfills its mission through interdisciplinary and international collaborative research, seminars and conferences, publications and briefings for industry and government leaders.

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Wednesday, January 14

Welcoming Remarks

2:00 Michael Armacost, Shorenstein APARC

Security Dimension of the Alliances

2:10-4:00

Chair: Daniel Okimoto, Senior Fellow, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC

The Changes in the US's Strategic Doctrine

Kurt Campbell, Senior Vice President & Director, International Security Program, Center for Security and International Studies

What key elements of change in American strategic doctrine have been introduced by the Bush Administration? What implications do they have for US alliances in Northeast Asia?

The China Dimension

Michael Lampton, Director, China Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University

What implications would improved Sino-US relations have on America's alliances in Asia?

Jing Huang, Associate Professor of Political Science, Utah State University

How have Chinese attitudes and policies toward America's Northeast Asian alliances changed over the past five years or so? What accounts for those changes? What implications have they for the future of these alliances?

Discussant: William Perry, Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor, School of Engineering, Stanford University and the 19th Secretary of Defense for the United States

4:30-6:00 The Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia

Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander, US Pacific Command

Keynote and Public Address

Introduction to be made by William Perry

Bechtel Conference Center, Encina Hall, first floor

Thursday, January 15

Changing View of the Regional Security Environment and the Alliances

8:00-10:15

Chair: Michael Armacost, Shorenstein APARC

The Japanese Government's Views on the Alliance

Kuriyama Takakazu, Ambassador, retired

How have the views of the Japanese government changed in recent years with respect to the regional security environment and the mission and strategic focus of the US-Japan alliance? How have they changed with respect to the security responsibilities? Should Japan be prepared to shoulder on these responsibilities on its own outside the contours of the alliance?

The View of the Republic of Korea's Government of the Alliance

Kim Won-soo, Visiting Scholar, Shorenstein APARC & former Secretary to the President of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Office of the President, Republic of Korea

How have South Korean government perception and policies changed in recent years vis-à-vis the regional security environment and the mission and strategic focus of the US-ROK alliance? How have they changed with respect to the security responsibilities that South Korea is expected to shoulder on its own, outside the contours of the alliance?

The US Government's Views on the US-Japan Alliance

Rust Deming, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, National Defense University & Ambassador, retired

How have American government perceptions and policies changed in recent years vis-à-vis the mission and strategic focus of the US-Japan alliance?

The US Government's View on the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance

Victor Cha, D.S. Song Associate Professor of Government and Asian Studies, Georgetown University

How have American government perceptions and policies changed in recent years vis-à-vis the mission and strategic focus of the US-Japan alliance?

Discussant: Christopher LaFleur, Cyrus Vance Fellow in Diplomatic Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

The Changing Domestic Politics of the Alliance

10:30-12:15

Chair: Gi-Wook Shin, Director, Korean Studies Program, Shorenstein APARC

Japanese Domestic Views of the Alliance

Nakanishi Hiroshi, Professor, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University

Since the mid-1990s, what noteworthy changes have surfaced in domestic support or opposition to the US-Japan alliance? What changes in support or opposition to the bilateral cooperation on security issues in Asia and elsewhere?

The Changes in South Korean Domestic Views of the Alliance

Lee Chung-min, Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University

How have domestic political dynamics and public attitudes toward the US-ROK alliance and bilateral cooperation on security issues changed in recent years? What accounts for those changes? What implications do they have for US alliances in Northeast Asia?

American Domestic Views of the US-Republic of Korea Alliance

Donald Gregg, President, The Korea Society

How have American public attitudes (as reflected in public opinion polls, press reporting, and Congressional actions) evolved toward the US-ROK alliance and bilateral defense cooperation in recent years? What accounts for these changes? What are their implications for the future of the alliance?

Discussant: Daniel Okimoto, Senior Fellow, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC

Adjustments in the Operational Arrangement for Defense Cooperation

1:30-3:45

Chair & Discussant: Henry Rowen, Senior Fellow Emeritus, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC

Japanese Adjustments in US-Japan Defense Cooperation

Yamaguchi Noboru, Major General, Japan Ground Self Defense Force

What adjustments have occurred in recent years in the operational arrangements underpinning US-Japan defense cooperation? What further changes would the Japanese Government like to promote?

US-Japan Defense Cooperation

Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies

What adjustments have occurred in recent years in the operational arrangements underpinning US-Japan defense cooperation? What additional changes is the Bush Administration likely to promote?

US-Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation

William Drennan, Deputy Director, United States Institute of Peace

What adjustments have occurred in recent years in the operational arrangements underpinning US-Japan defense cooperation? What additional changes is the Bush Administration likely to promote?

US-Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation

Kim Jae chang, General, Joint Korea-US Command, (retired) and Co-Chairman, Council on ROK-US Security Studies

What adjustments have occurred in recent years in the operational arrangements underpinning US-ROK defense cooperation? What further changes would the Republic of Korea like to promote?

Where Do We Go From Here? Conclusions

4:00-5:00

Michael Armacost, Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow & Ambassador, retired

Daniel Okimoto, Senior Fellow, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC

Henry Rowen, Senior Fellow Emeritus, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC

Robert Scalapino, Robson Research Professor of Government, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley

Oksenberg Conference Room

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