WASHINGTON, D.C.-On the eve of President Obama's first meeting with South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, former Ambassadors Michael H. Armacost, Thomas C. Hubbard, and Charles L. "Jack" Pritchard, and other top U.S. experts today presented recommendations to the Obama administration for revitalizing and expanding the United States' alliance with the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea).

"New Beginnings," a nonpartisan group of ten former senior U.S. government officials, scholars, and experts on U.S.-Korean relations co-sponsored by The Korea Society and Stanford University's Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, praised the Obama administration for getting off to a good start in its relations with South Korea. They said that the election of new leaders in Seoul and Washington provided an opportunity to transform the vitally important alliance into a broader and deeper regional and global partnership. They noted that South Korean President Lee Myung-bak is committed to this goal and they urged the two presidents to take steps toward making that vision concrete at their upcoming meeting.

After briefing Obama administration officials, the group today released the report ''New Beginnings'' in the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Recommendations to the Obama Administration at a forum sponsored by the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Following is a summary of the group's observations and recommendations on key U.S.-ROK issues:

North Korea: The regime appears increasingly unlikely to give up its nuclear capabilities. While Six Party Talks should be continued, the United States should consider bilateral talks with North Korea to explore whether a new mix of inducements and pressures might achieve U.S. and South Korean goals. Close coordination with the ROK and Japan is essential. China and Russia will apply only limited pressure to North Korea. The Obama administration should stress that the United States will never "accept" a North Korea with nuclear weapons. The United States must have a consistent, long-term strategy to encourage North Korea's "transformation." The United States, ROK, and Japan should seek a high-level understanding on how to deal with possible future instability in the North and offer to include China in such consultations.

Military Cooperation: The United States should fully implement the Bush administration initiatives to realign U.S. Forces Korea and transfer wartime operational control of South Korean forces to the ROK as scheduled in 2012.

Economic Cooperation: Congress needs to approve in a timely manner the bilateral free trade agreement with South Korea (KORUS FTA). This is especially important in light of the ROK's impending conclusion of a similar agreement with the European Union. Such approval will demonstrate the United States' commitment to free trade as a generator of growth, particularly during times of financial crisis and economic recession.

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center is pleased to announce that Matthew R. Augustine has been awarded the Northeast Asian History Fellowship for 2009-2010. This Fellowship is made possible through the generosity of the Northeast Asian History Foundation in Korea. The Fellowship supports a scholar to conduct research and writing on a historical subject that has an impact on modern and contemporary Northeast Asia.

Matt received his BA from the Politics Department at Princeton University and MA from the History Department at Columbia University. After two years of research at the University of Tokyo, he is currently preparing to defend his doctoral dissertation at Columbia University in May 2009. He specializes in the history of modern Japan and Korea.

Matt's research focuses on international and comparative history of military occupations, especially U.S. occupations in Japan, Korea, and Okinawa; Japan's colonial empire in the Asia-Pacific; and the history of race, migration, and border controls.

He recently published an article that explores the interaction between the cross-border smuggling and reversion movement with Japan as acts of resistance by Okinawans against U.S. military rule in the Ryukyu Islands after World War II. Matt's dissertation, "Crossing from Empire to Nation: Repatriation, Illegal Immigration, and the Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952," examines the relationship between migration and border controls, as well as the redefinition of nationality and ethnicity in post-imperial Japan.

While at Shorenstein APARC, Matt will research and write on the history of war reparations that continue to affect relations between Japan and its neighbors in Northeast Asia. He will also teach a course that covers such issues as war, empire, postcolonialism, and U.S. military occupations in the region.

Management Science and Engineering Professor Siegfried S. Hecker, an expert on nuclear weapons, recently returned from a visit to North Korea, where he frequently checks on the country's denuclearization process. Hecker has researched extensively in fields of plutonium science-he served as director of Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986 through 1997, and remains an emeritus director to the Laboratory. Through a series of Track Two, non-governmental, non-official visits to North Korea, Hecker has worked closely with the previous and current administration's North Korean negotiations team. The Daily spoke with Hecker about his experiences in the country, and his insight into nuclear issues in North Korea and elsewhere.

The Stanford Daily (SD): This is your sixth visit to North Korea. You made one each year from 2004 to 2009. How is this trip different from the previous ones? Any change in North Korean society, diplomacy?

Siegfried Hecker (SH): We visited North Korea from Tuesday, Feb. 24 to Saturday, Feb. 28, and first of all it was quite a relief from Beijing in that the air was quite clear and that the weather was beautiful. In Beijing, it went day to day from being smoggy to being almost impossibly smoggy. So the first thing that we found when we got off at Pyongyang, was the relief of having reasonably clean air.

Even though it was in February and still quite cold, the greatest impression left is that Pyongyang and the people just looked more prosperous this time than I have seen them look in the past. There were more cars on the road; there were more tractors, especially when we got off into the countryside. The people were better dressed.

Particularly, one of the things I look for is color. Years ago, North Korea, like the Soviet Union, was all drab, gray and black. Now you see lots of colors; lots of down jackets, for example, on little children and women with bright colors from yellow to green to red. There was more construction in Pyongyang. We've seen many cranes working on the ground.

All the way around, while some people believed that North Korea and its economy is sinking, we've actually seen it rising and looking better than we've seen in the past. I would say this is the starkest observation of how it struck differently as the previous times.

[Diplomatically,] we've seen a change of attitude since October 2006, when they conducted a nuclear test. Even though, by technical standards, that nuclear test was of limited success, politically for them it was very successful. So the principal attitude change is one of greater confidence on their part. They now tell us, you must deal with us as a nuclear weapon state. We have demonstrated that we have nuclear weapons. We've tested a nuclear weapon, and so we expect to be treated as a state that has nuclear weapons. That confidence will most likely harden their negotiating position. Then, of course, they're also still trying to get a sense of what the new administration will do. They are entering the negotiations with a new administration from what they considered to be a position of strength.

SD: How is North Korea's disablement process of its nuclear facilities going?

SH: In July 2007, they stopped operations and began disabling the nuclear facilities. When I was there almost exactly one year ago, they showed me the nuclear facilities, allowed me to take photographs of the nuclear facilities to demonstrate that they are disabling those facilities that produce the bomb fuel-the plutonium. Disabling the facilities means making it more difficult to restart. They have finished most of the disablement actions, but still need to complete the unloading of the fuel from the nuclear reactor.

They made the decision last year to slow down the unloading because the other parties did not meet their obligations of providing heavy fuel oil or equivalent energy aid. At this point, Japan and South Korea have not finished their obligations, so the slow-down continues.

If the other parties complete their obligations, then I believe North Korea is prepared to complete the disablement. However, the next important step is to dismantle the facilities-that is, take them apart. The terms of that dismantlement have not yet been negotiated. Subsequently, they will need to give up their nuclear weapons. That seems a long way off now based on their comments.

SD: In one of your reports, you discussed the idea of a scientific fingerprint that could deter North Korea from exporting its plutonium. This is very interesting. Can the method have wider use?

SH: One of the concerns with North Korea would be the possibility of them selling or exporting plutonium or nuclear technologies. We know enough about the North Korean plutonium that we have what you call a scientific fingerprint. The makeup of plutonium is determined by the type of reactor and by how long it was in the reactor. We know that about the North Korean plutonium so we can identify North Korea's plutonium. This should be a deterrent for North Korea ever exporting its plutonium because we would know it came from North Korea.

We, of course, don't know whether or not North Korea would ever want to sell its plutonium, but just in case, the fingerprint represents a deterrent. This fingerprinting of plutonium is not as useful for plutonium from the rest of the world, because there are so many different types of reactors and we know less about their fuels and operating schedules.

SD: Do you think the example of North Korea contributes much to a solution of nuclear problems in other regions-for example, Iran?

SH: Right now, the second nuclear hot spot is Iran, and the difference between North Korea and Iran is that North Korea has declared its nuclear program now to be a weapon's program and has demonstrated that at least it can detonate a nuclear device, even though it wasn't fully successful. Iran, I believe, is developing an option for nuclear weapons but under the umbrella of doing it strictly for civilian purposes. They say, "We're not a nuclear weapon state and we have no intention of developing nuclear weapons," but they are continuing to put most of the capabilities in place should they decide to build weapons.

The dividing line between military and civilian is a very fine line, so North Korea and Iran are two very different problems. However, those countries certainly watch each other and look at the diplomatic responses during each other's negotiations.

SD: Are you advising anyone in the new administration?

SH: We work very closely with the U.S. government on this, although our visits are strictly track two visits, which means non-governmental, non-official visits. I don't go as an official, but rather as a Stanford University employee. In the past, we worked very closely with the previous North Korean negotiations team led by Ambassador Christopher Hill. We have now begun to work with the new team that is just being put in place.

SD: During your visits, you met with North Korean officials in education, public health, and explored possibilities of cooperation in these areas. How do you envision these future exchanges?

SH: We met with officials from the ministry of education and one of the economic universities to discuss potential cooperation in educational and technology exchange. In the past, we have also met with officials from the health ministry. So, in addition to working the nuclear issues, we're very interested in trying to engage the North Korean community in a broader set of activities than simply nuclear, and technology is one of those. They're very interested in material science, biotechnology, information technology, and so we explored the possibility of exchange visits and particularly having some Stanford professors go to North Korea and lecture on those topics.

SD: What classes do you currently teach at Stanford? How do you like being a professor at Stanford?

SH: I have a terrific time-that's one of the reasons why I'm at Stanford. The two classes that I teach are both Management Science and Engineering classes. They both focus on the intersection of technology and policy. One is a very large class, MSE 193/293, that Professor William Perry, former Secretary of Defense, and I teach together. We cover everything from history of technology and warfare to modern times and what the current challenges are in the security arena. Both Prof. Perry and I try to teach that in the spirit of our own experiences in these areas. It's a very, very large class-over 200 students.

Then I teach a course by myself in spring that's exactly the opposite. It's a sophomore seminar, MSE93Q, and I have approximately 16 students. The title is "Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Terrorism," and in essence, it's everything nuclear. So I cover in that 10 weeks the whole nuclear problem. I try to get students to understand the basics of nuclear technology and how that interfaces with the policy issue of nuclear weapons, energy, proliferation and terrorism. We cover topics such as: If you develop nuclear energy, why do you have to be concerned about nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation? What is the connection between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons? That's what we cover in 10 weeks' time, and I've enjoyed the interaction with students immensely.

SD: What do you aim to teach students in the classroom and outside?

SH: Particularly, I want students to understand the intersections of technology and policy. The nuclear field is a very good one to do that because you must understand the basics of nuclear technology to make good policy. And we also now have 60 years of very rich history of the interplay of those two in so many different countries and so many different ways. For example, in both of my classes the students have to write policy papers that show they have at least a basic understanding of the technology, even though they may be social science, political science, international relations majors, but I want them to understand the difference between plutonium and uranium, between fission and fusion, between weapons and energy. That's what I like to be able to contribute to the University.

What I like about the students is how truly interested and dedicated they are and how experienced so many of them are in the international arena. In addition, what's also fascinating is that we have students from all over the world. Whether it is a physics major from Palestine, or somebody who grew up in Iran, Pakistan, India or in China, Vietnam, Africa, they bring a totally different outlook on the world to the table, which then of course helps the rest of the students to understand that this world is much more than just about the United States of America, and Stanford is a great place to do it.

The Asia Health Policy Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center is pleased to announce that Brian K. Chen has been awarded the %fellowship1% for 2009-2010.  Brian is currently completing his Ph.D. in Business Administration in the Business and Public Policy Group at the Haas School of Business, University of California at Berkeley.  He received a Juris Doctor from Stanford Law School in 1997, and graduated summa cum laude from Harvard College in 1992. 

As an applied economist, Brian’s research focuses on the impact of incentives in health care organizations on provider and patient behavior.  For his dissertation, Brian empirically examined how vertical integration and prohibition against self-referrals affected physician prescribing behavior.  His job market paper has been selected for presentation at the American Law and Economics Association’s Annual Meeting in 2009.

Brian comes to the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center not only with a multidisciplinary law and economics background, but also with an international perspective from having lived and worked in Taiwan, Japan, and France.  He has a particularly intimate knowledge of the Taiwanese health care system from his experience as an assistant to the hospital administrator at a medical college in Taiwan.

During his residence as a postdoctoral fellow with the Asia Health Policy Program, Brian plans to conduct empirical research on cost containment policies in Taiwan and Japan and how those policies impacted provider behavior. His work will also contribute to the program’s research activities on comparative health systems and health service delivery in the Asia-Pacific, a theme that encompasses the historical evolution of health policies; the role of the private sector and public-private partnerships; payment incentives and their impact on patients and providers; organizational innovation, contracting, and soft budget constraints; and chronic disease management and service coordination for aging populations.

John Van Reenen, Professor of Economics and Director of the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics, and the Denning Visiting Professor in Global Business and the Economy at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business, offered an FSI Director’s seminar on March 4, looking at “Management Matters: Firm Level Evidence from Around the World.” Finding a dearth of empirical evidence on international management practices, and how they affect business performance and productivity across firms and across countries, Van Reenen and colleagues Nick Bloom, Christos Genakos, and Rafaella Sadum set out to remedy that deficit.

Van Reenen and colleagues developed a new methodology to measure global management practices, scoring firms in three areas: how well they track what goes on inside their firms, how they set targets and trace outcomes, and how effectively they use incentives to address and reward performance. Drawing on interview data from 5,000 firms in 15 countries across the Americas, Asia, and Europe, the researchers found that better performance is correlated with better management.  U.S. firms had the highest average management practice scores followed by Germany, Sweden, and Japan.

Asking why management practices vary so much, they found that multinational firms and firms operating in highly competitive markets have better management practices, while family owned firms and firms facing extensive labor market regulation have the worst. These four factors accounted for half of the variation in management practice scores across firms and across countries.