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North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on Tuesday, prompting President Barack Obama to call the detonation of a miniature nuclear device a “highly provocative act” that threatens U.S. security and international peace. It is the third nuclear test by Pyongyang since 2006 and is escalating concern that the isolated Stalinist state is now closer to building a bomb small enough to be fitted on a missile capable of striking the United States and its allies. The test was conducted hours before Obama’s annual State of the Union speech.

North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency said the test was conducted, “in a safe and perfect way … with the use of a smaller and light A-bomb, unlike the previous ones, yet with great explosive power.” The statement said the nuclear device did not impose “any negative impact” on the environment.

North Korea said the atomic test was merely its “first response” to what it called U.S. threats and said there would be unspecified “second and third measures of greater intensity” if the United States remains hostile to the North. Washington had led the call for more U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang after the North launched its first rocket and put a satellite into obit in December. While the North said the launch was for its civilian space program, the Obama administration believes it was part of a covert program to develop ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear warheads.

We ask two Stanford experts on North Korea to weigh in: David Straub, the associate director of the Korean Studies Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), and Nick Hansen, an affiliate of the Center for International Security and Cooperation who is an expert in foreign weapons systems.   

Q. Why conduct the test now?

Straub: Since the two previous North Korean nuclear tests took place on American holidays and the North Korean themselves have announced that their moves are "targeted" at the United States, many observers have concluded that the this test was especially timed to coincide with President Obama's State of the Union address. It is also possible that, as others have speculated, the North Koreans also took into account that Feb. 16 is the birthday of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's father, Kim Jong Il, the man who is said to have instructed North Koreans to proceed with the nuclear weapons and missile programs. Others have speculated that the North Korean leadership wanted to test the device before the Feb. 25 transition in South Korea from the current president Lee Myung-bak, to the president-elect, Park Geun-hye. The timing could be intended to punish Lee, whom the North Koreans say they despise, while, the argument goes, making it a little easier for Park to reach out to the North before her inauguration.

Q. What message is North Korea’s young and relatively new president, Kim Jong Un, trying to send to the world with this test?

Hansen: Kim seems to be saying: I’m going to do what I say I’m going to do – and nobody is going to dissuade me. The North said they were going to launch a satellite, and by God they did. They said they were going to touch off a nuclear test after that, and by God they did. Now we have to wait and see what’s next.

Straub:  The North Koreans themselves are saying that the test is a response to the military threat posed to it by the United States and to U.S.-led UN sanctions imposed on North Korea after its rocket test in December. The North Koreans have complex motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons. Many North Koreans may actually believe that having nuclear weapons will defend them against the United States. But the fact of the matter is that the United States and South Korea have never attacked North Korea over the decades, while the North Koreans have repeatedly attacked South Korean and American targets, most recently killing 50 South Koreans in 2010. North Korea's top leaders see nuclear weapons and missiles as a panacea. Fearful of opening up to the outside world because of the lies they have told their people, Pyongyang wants to believe that it will eventually maneuver the United States and the international community as a whole into accepting its possession of nuclear weapons and forcing the removal of sanctions against it. That won't happen, but even if it did, it would not resolve Pyongyang's basic problems, which stem from the totalitarian nature and history of its regime.

Q. What concerns you most in the wake of this test?

Hansen:  The thing I’m worried about now is that they also said they’re going to launch more satellites and long-range missiles. They displayed one in the military parade of 2010, an intermediate-range missile that can probably go 2,000 miles. When you think about that, 2,000 miles, or maybe a little bit longer, it puts just about every U.S. base in Asia under its threat, including Guam, Okinawa, Taiwan and everything in Japan. It’s a threat if they could put a warhead on it. The KN-08 is a bigger, three-stage rocket and is more of a threat, with the potential of hitting at least Alaska, Hawaii and maybe the U.S. West Coast. But remember, the North has tested neither.

Q. The test was in defiance of Pyongyang’s chief ally, Beijing, which had urged Kim not to risk confrontation and said the North would “pay a heavy price” if it proceeded with a test. How will China respond?

Straub: China is key in dealing with the North. China provides North Korea with most of its external support, including vital food and energy supplies. Chinese leaders are certainly not happy with their North Korean counterparts, as China would prefer peace and stability in the region, so it can focus on its own economic development. But Chinese leaders are fearful that putting a great deal of pressure on North Korea might result in chaos, with unpredictable and possibly very dangerous repercussions for China and the region. Thus, before North Korean nuclear and rocket tests, typically the Chinese press Pyongyang not to proceed. But immediately after a test, the Chinese begin to urge "all parties" to exercise restraint. In the United Nations, where China has a veto on the Security Council, it reluctantly agrees to the minimum condemnations of and sanctions against North Korea. After the dust settles, however, China doesn't seriously implement the sanctions. In fact, since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, Chinese trade with North Korea has dramatically increased as a result of a PRC government decision to support North Korea. China may agree to a stronger resolution this time, but ultimately this pattern will almost certainly repeat itself.

Q. The North Koreans have said the test poses no risks to the environment or its people. Is this accurate?

Hansen: It takes a while for the particles that are released from the test to get released from the cracks in the rock and get into the atmosphere. My guess is that because of this very hard rock, they probably don’t have much of a radiation release problem. It probably will just seep through naturally and should not be of any danger. Engineers seem to have done a good job from a security and safety standpoint; the way the tunnels make right-handle turns and then there are the blast doors and piles of dirt to soak up any release.

North Korea Timeline

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A soldier stands guard in front of the Unha-3 (Milky Way 3) rocket sitting on a launch pad at the West Sea Satellite Launch site, April 8, 2012.
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Abstract:

In light of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) electoral resurgence in Taiwan, it is well worth reconsidering the election that initiated its time out of power. In this talk, I draw on comparative evidence to challenge two narratives about the 2000 presidential election: one emphasizing the KMT’s declining resource advantages as the primary cause of its defeat, and the other placing the blame on personality conflicts within the party or on other idiosyncratic factors unique to Taiwanese politics. Instead, the KMT’s defeat had much to do with the simple fact that presidential elections are higher-variance than parliamentary ones. Thus, we should not be surprised either that the KMT lost or that it has subsequently returned to a position nearly as dominant as it was in prior to 2000.

 

Speaker Bio:

Kharis Templeman received a BA (2002) from the University of Rochester and a Ph.D. in political science (2012) from the University of Michigan. For the 2012-13 academic year he is a post-doctoral Research Fellow at the Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies at the University of Michigan’s International Institute. A fluent Mandarin speaker, he has lived, worked, and traveled extensively in both Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China. His dissertation is a comparative study of the origins and decline of dominant party systems, in which incumbent parties hold power for an extraordinary period of time despite facing regularly, contested elections. 

Current interests include democratization, party system development in newly-contested regimes, and political institutions, with a regional focus on the new and transitioning democracies of Pacific Asia. He is also engaged in collaborative research on constitutional design for divided societies, on the effects of regime change on how client states manage the arms-allies trade-off, and as a regional manager for the Varieties of Democracy project.

In addition, he has taught a wide array of courses while at Michigan, ranging from an introduction to college writing to a senior seminar in the International and Comparative Studies program; in 2010, he won the political science department’s Kingdon teaching award for outstanding graduate student instructor.   

 

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Kharis Templeman Research Fellow Speaker Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies at the University of Michigan's International Institute
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Gregory Poling will begin with a multimedia presentation highlighting the most important aspects of the South China Sea disputes, including the competing legal claims, recent clashes, and the oil, fisheries, and trade interests that help feed the conflict. He will then examine recent actions by the various claimants and the motivations behind them, including the Philippines' recent decision to take China's claims to a UN arbitration tribunal. He will show why commentators have been too quick to dismiss Manila's case. During the Q&A he will field questions on any aspect of the disputes, including what they imply for Asia and US-Asian relations.

Gregory Poling’s work at CSIS includes managing projects focused on US foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific, especially in Southeast Asia. In addition to the South China Sea, his research interests include democratization in Southeast Asia and Asian multilateralism. Before joining CSIS he lived and worked in China as an English language teacher. He has an MA in international affairs from American University, earned his BA in history and philosophy at Saint Mary's College of Maryland, and has studied at Fudan University in Shanghai.

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Gregory Poling Research Associate, Sumitro Chair for Southeast Asia Studies Speaker Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC
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REAP-China director Linxiu Zhang discusses China's emphasis on rural-urban integration and accelerating agricultural modernization as outlined in the country's first policy document for 2013. Issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council annually, the document is an indicator of the country's policy priorities.

To listen to the CRIENGLISH.com broadcast, click here.

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The governor of the Bank of Japan, the country's central bank, recently announced he will be stepping down before his term expires. Stanford economist Takeo Hoshi spoke with Quartz on the future of Japan’s monetary policy.
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In Singapore the People’s Action Party has held power continuously since 1959, having won 13 more or less constrained legislative elections in a row over more than half a century. In Malaysia the Alliance Party and its heir, the National Front, have done nearly as well, racking up a dozen such victories over the same 54-year stretch. These records of unbroken incumbency were built by combining rapid economic growth with varying degrees and types of political manipulation, cooptation, and control. 

In both countries, as living standards improved, most people were content to live their lives quietly and to leave politics to the ruling elite. In the last decade, however, quiescence has given way to questioning, apathy to activism, due to policy missteps by the ruling parties, the rise of credible opposition candidates, increasing economic inequality, and the internet-driven expansion of venues for dissent. 

As the ground appears to shift beneath them, how are the rulers responding? Will their top-down politics survive? How (un)persuasive have official warnings against chaotically liberal democracy become? Are ethno-religious and even national identities at stake? Are comforting but slanted historical narratives being rethought? And how principled or opportunistic are the agents of would-be bottom-up change? 

Sudhir Thomas Vadaketh is the author most recently of Floating on a Malayan Breeze:  Travels in Malaysia and Singapore (2012) and The End of Identity? (2012). Before joining The Economist Group in Singapore in 2006 he was a policy analyst on foreign investment for the government of Dubai. He has written for many publications, including The Economist, ViewsWire, and The Straits Times, and been widely interviewed by the BBC and other media. He earned a master’s degree in public policy from the Kennedy School (Harvard, 2005) after receiving bachelor degrees in Southeast Asian studies and business administration (UC-Berkeley, 2002). His service in the Singapore Armed Forces in the late 1990s took him to Thailand, Taiwan, and Australia.

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Sudhir Thomas Vadaketh Senior Editor Speaker Economist Intelligence Unit, Singapore
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Motoshige Itoh, Professor, Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo. He has served as President of the National Institute for Research Advancement since February 2006, and held the post of Dean at the Gradual School of Economics from 2007 to 2009. He was professor of the Graduate School of Economics and the Faculty of Economics since 1993, and Assistant Professor in Economics since 1982. He has served in various government committees, including the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning Agency, Fair Trade Commission, and others and was a member of Economic Strategy Council in 1998-1999. He has been an advisor to the Statistical Division at the Bank of Japan, and a visiting scholar at various institutions, including the Department of Economics at Harvard University, the Australia-Japan Research Centre, Australian National University, and Research Institute at the Bank of Japan. He has published numerous books and papers on Japan’s economy and finance. He received his BA from Tokyo University and PhD from University of Rochester, both in Economics.

Hideaki Miyajima, Director, Waseda Institute for Advanced Study(WIAS), Professor of Japanese Economy, Graduate School of Commerce, Waseda University. He teaches Japanese Economy, and Corporate Governance in Japan.  He stayed at Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University as a visiting scholar for 1992-94 and 2004-05. He was asked to consult by several institutions such as the World Bank, Hawaii University, Hebrew University, and Korean Development Institute. He was also appointed to numerous positions: Faculty Fellow, Research Institute of Economy, Trade & Industry, a Special Research Fellow of Policy Research Institute (Ministry of Finance), Research Fellow of EHESS (Paris), and an Adjunct Professor of Chung-Ang University (Seoul). He wrote several books and numerous papers including: Corporate Governance in Japan, Oxford University Press, 2007 (co-edited), Changes and Continuity in Japan, Curzon Press, 2002 (co-edited), Policies for Competitiveness, Oxford University Press, 1999 (co-edited), He received his Ph.D in Economics from the University of Tokyo.

Takeo Hoshi, Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Senior Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, and professor of finance (by courtesy), Stanford Graduate School of Business. Prior to joining S/APARC, he was Pacific Economic Cooperation Professor in International Economic Relations at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS) at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD). Hoshi also serves on the Board of Directors at Union BanCal Corporation. He is also a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and at the Tokyo Center for Economic Research (TCER). His main research interests include the study of the financial aspects of the Japanese economy, especially corporate finance, banking, and monetary policy. He received numerous awards for his publications including Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The Road to the Future (MIT Press, 2001), co-authored with Anil Kashyap (Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago), and his other publications include, “Japanese Government Debt and Sustainability of Fiscal Policy” (with Takero Doi and Tatsuyoshi Okimoto), Journal of the Japanese and International Economies,2011; “Corporate Restructuring in Japan during the Lost Decade” (with Satoshi Koibuchi and Ulrike Schaede), Japan’s Bubble, Deflation, and Long-term Stagnation, MIT Press, 2011 (Koichi Hamada, Anil K Kashyap, and David E. Weinstein, eds.) He has been the editor-in-chief of the Journal of the Japanese and International Economies since 1999. Hoshi received his BA in social sciences from the University of Tokyo in 1983, and a PhD in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1988.

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Motoshige Itoh Professor, Graduate School of Economics Panelist University of Tokyo
Hideaki Miyajima Director, Waseda Institute for Advanced Study(WIAS), Professor of Japanese Economy, Graduate School of Commerce, Waseda University Panelist
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Former Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Former Professor, by courtesy, of Finance at the Graduate School of Business
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Takeo Hoshi was Henri and Tomoye Takahashi Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), Professor of Finance (by courtesy) at the Graduate School of Business, and Director of the Japan Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), all at Stanford University. He served in these roles until August 2019.

Before he joined Stanford in 2012, he was Pacific Economic Cooperation Professor in International Economic Relations at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS) at University of California, San Diego (UCSD), where he conducted research and taught since 1988.

Hoshi is also Visiting Scholar at Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and at the Tokyo Center for Economic Research (TCER), and Senior Fellow at the Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER). His main research interest includes corporate finance, banking, monetary policy and the Japanese economy.

He received 2015 Japanese Bankers Academic Research Promotion Foundation Award, 2011 Reischauer International Education Award of Japan Society of San Diego and Tijuana, 2006 Enjoji Jiro Memorial Prize of Nihon Keizai Shimbun-sha, and 2005 Japan Economic Association-Nakahara Prize.  His book titled Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The Road to the Future (MIT Press, 2001) co-authored with Anil Kashyap (Booth School of Business, University of Chicago) received the Nikkei Award for the Best Economics Books in 2002.  Other publications include “Will the U.S. and Europe Avoid a Lost Decade?  Lessons from Japan’s Post Crisis Experience” (Joint with Anil K Kashyap), IMF Economic Review, 2015, “Japan’s Financial Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis” (Joint with Kimie Harada, Masami Imai, Satoshi Koibuchi, and Ayako Yasuda), Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 2015, “Defying Gravity: Can Japanese sovereign debt continue to increase without a crisis?” (Joint with Takatoshi Ito) Economic Policy, 2014, “Will the U.S. Bank Recapitalization Succeed? Eight Lessons from Japan” (with Anil Kashyap), Journal of Financial Economics, 2010, and “Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan” (Joint with Ricardo Caballero and Anil Kashyap), American Economic Review, December 2008.

Hoshi received his B.A. in Social Sciences from the University of Tokyo in 1983, and a Ph.D. in Economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1988.

Former Director of the Japan Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
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Takeo Hoshi Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Senior Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Panelist Stanford University
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WE ARE AT FULL CAPACITY - PLEASE ARRIVE EARLY FOR A SEAT

In China Goes Global, eminent China scholar David Shambaugh delivers the book many have been waiting for—a sweeping account of China's growing prominence on the international stage. Thirty years ago, China's role in global affairs beyond its immediate
East Asian periphery was decidedly minor and it had little geostrategic power. As Shambaugh charts, though, China's expanding economic power has allowed it to extend its reach virtually everywhere—from mineral mines in Africa, to currency markets in the West, to oilfields in the Middle East, to agribusiness in Latin America, to the factories of East Asia. Shambaugh offers an enlightening look into the manifestations of China's global presence: its extensive commercial footprint, its growing military power, its increasing cultural influence or "soft power," its diplomatic activity, and its new prominence in global governance institutions. But Shambaugh is no alarmist. In this balanced and well-researched volume, he argues that China's global presence is more broad than deep and that China still lacks the influence befitting a major world power—what he terms a "partial power."

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David Shambaugh is professor of political science and international affairs and director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, as well as a nonresident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. His most recent books include Tangled Titans: The United States and China; Charting China's Future: Domestic & International Challenges; and China's Communist Party: Atrophy & Adaptation.

 

**Books will be available for purchase at the talk.**

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David Shambaugh Director, China Policy Program Speaker George Washington University
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