Prospects for Peace on the Korean Peninsula
Philippines Conference Room
Philippines Conference Room
Dr. Sáez's recent paper offers a new perspective on the relationship between ex ante barriers to entry and ex post second-generation reforms. Building upon theoretical insights from the literature on new entry, the paper will show why some types of barriers to entry exist in transitional economies. The paper will then show how market segmentation imposes structural barriers to entry will likely affect the level of political opposition that builds during the implementation of second generation reforms. In order to provide empirical support for this theoretical construct, the paper will specifically highlight the experience of financial services reform in India in order to develop an argument about the existing challenges and likely success of second-generation reforms that stemmed from initial barriers to entry.
Lawrence Sáez is a senior associate member at St. Antony's College, Oxford and he teaches international politics at the School of Oriental and Asian Studies in London. Prior to living in England, Dr. Sáez was an assistant research political scientist at the Institute of East Asian Studies and visiting scholar at the Center for South Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley. He was also the associate editor for South Asia at Asian Survey. He holds a B.A. in political science from the University of California, Berkeley; an M.A.L.D. in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago.
His research is focused around comparative political economy and fiscal federalism in developing countries. He is currently working on trying to understand how globalization has affected subnational economic growth and the provision of public goods in emerging markets. He is the author of Banking Reform in India and China (Palgrave MacMillan 2004).
Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room
Japan Brown Bag hosted with the Center for East Asian Studies
Philippines Conference Room, Encina Hall
APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, Room E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Harukata Takenaka is an associate professor of political science at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo. He specializes in comparative politics and international political economy, with a particular focus on Japanese political economy. His research interests include democracy in Japan, and Japan's political and economic stagnation since the 1990s. He is currently working on aborted democratization in prewar Japan, the politics of Japan's financial crisis since the 1990s and the role of the Japanese Senate (House of Councilors) in postwar Japanese politics.
He received a B.A. from the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo and an M.A. and Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University. He is the author of Senze Nihon ni okeru Minshuka no Zasetsu [Aborted Democratization in Prewar Japan], (Bokutakusha, 2002), and the co-editor of Akusesu Kokusai Seijikeizai [Access to International Political Economy],(Nihon Keizai Hyoronsha, 2003).
Beijing tries to read mixed U.S. signals in Korea diplomacy By John W. Lewis
For the past year China has led the quest for a negotiated solution to the Korean nuclear crisis. It facilitated and hosted three-way talks with the United States and North Korea a year ago this week and two sessions of the six-party talks (adding South Korea, Japan and Russia) in August and February. Its officials crisscrossed the globe to explore potential areas of common interest and compromise and this week hosted North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to explore options for the beleaguered Korean Peninsula. Yet, in each of the formal talks, the Chinese have been discouraged by the minimal results. They are now questioning U.S. intentions toward Korea and, in the longer term, toward China.
Beijing considers the unchecked expansion of North Korea's nuclear weapons to be a real possibility, and its reasoning starts with the record of U.S. policies toward nuclear proliferation. That record, the Chinese argue, is mixed and often contradictory. As a result, China worries that Washington might continue to tolerate the program so long as Pyongyang did not cross key red lines, such as the transfer of nuclear materials to terrorists.
Whatever Beijing's past position on nuclear matters, many senior Chinese now regard nuclear weapons on their border to be a direct threat to their national security and suspect Washington of downplaying that danger. For them, it is no great leap to the conclusion that the unfettered growth of the Korean program might embolden others in Asia, including Taiwan, to acquire nuclear weapons despite verbal opposition from Washington. Beijing's leaders can easily imagine how that nightmarish turn of events would undermine the nation's drive toward modernization and end strategic cooperation with the United States.
Despite the fact that all parties at the six-party meeting in February endorsed the dismantling of the North's nuclear weapons program, the Chinese fear that the talks may be dead in the water. Following that meeting, they began to debate other ways to resolve the crisis. They had already reorganized the leadership team responsible for North Korean affairs, and that team had begun acting to prevent the worst case, including offering further inducements to Kim Jong Il this week. Whereas last fall the talk of deepening U.S.-China cooperation on Korea pervaded the news, now, especially after Vice President Dick Cheney's uncompromising stand on Korea and Taiwan last week, the reverse is occurring.
What China can do in these circumstances is quite limited. Its influence on North Korea is largely determined by what the United States does or doesn't do. By refusing to negotiate on a staged process leading to the eventual dismantlement of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons, Washington has tacitly allowed the North's program to proceed. It has rejected proposals for a temporary freeze, technical talks and any interim steps short of the unconditional and complete ending of the program. The result is virtual paralysis.
Beijing has been able to work with North Korea only when it could find areas of potential compromise between Washington and Pyongyang. It cannot or will not act
alone to exert pressure because this would jeopardize its influence on the North. Contrary to a widely circulated story, Beijing did not cut off energy shipments to North Korea for three days in 2003. Beijing would not take such a counterproductive action when its main influence with the North lies in the kind of quiet diplomacy being practiced this week with Kim Jong Il.
Many in Beijing are beginning to question whether there might be a more promising approach with Pyongyang. Should the Chinese, South Koreans and Russians conclude that making progress toward the common goal of the North's complete nuclear disarmament is out of reach, for example, they reluctantly might translate their joint offer of aid in February into a quid pro quo for a partial agreement, such as a limited freeze, that would allow the situation to stabilize. China could worry that such an independent action could endanger the common front with Washington. At the same time, it could calculate that the United States would be sufficiently pleased with any solution that halted the North Korean nuclear program.
None of these developments may come to pass, of course, but who could have imagined a year ago that Washington would have permitted the situation to deteriorate to the present point?
Dr. Levite has served as the Principal Deputy Director General (Policy) of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) since September 1, 2002. Dr. Levite has extensive experience dealing with issues of nuclear proliferation as both a scholar and practitioner. Prior to his current position, Dr. Levite was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) from 2000-2002, where he also served as co-leader of the CISAC Discriminate Force project. His previous jobs include Deputy National Security Advisor (Defense Policy) and Head of the Bureau of International Security at the Israeli Ministry of Defense.
Dr. Levite will update his argument ("Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security, Winter 2002/2003) regarding government decisions to slow or stop officially sanctioned nuclear weapons programs in light of recent developments in Libya, North Korea, and Iran.
Readings attached. Limited copies available at Alice Chen's cubical, Encina Hall (C206-7).
Tea & Cookies will be served at 3:15.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
The conference seeks to take a fresh look at the geopolitical consequences of a major shift to natural gas in the coming decades; indeed by most estimates global consumption of gas will double by 2030. But in the ares of highest projected demand - North America, Europe, China, and South and East Asia - demand is expected to outstrip indigenous supply. This implies the need for a huge amount of investment in the expansion of cross border gas transport infrastructure to bring gas from supply centers - particularly Russia and the Middle East.
What are the geopolitical implications of a more gas-intensive world? What can the history of cross-border gas infrastructure investment tell us about the political, economic, and legal issues we are likely to face as we become more dependent of natural gas? Is there a "resource curse" for gas? What is the likelihood that gas producers form a cartel to control prices - a Gas OPEC?
Hosted by former Secretary of State James Baker, the Geopolitics of Gas: From Today to 2030 conference will bring together experts from industry and academia to discuss these questions and more. PESD and the Baker Institute will present results from historical case studies of major cross-border gas infrastructure investments and results from the first integrated global gas trade model; keynote speakers include the Minister of Energy and Mines for Algeria.
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University
A buffet lunch will be available to those who RSVP to Rakhi Patel at rpatel80@stanford.edu by Tuesday, May 5. Only recently have scholars begun to invest a substantial amount of effort in researching the history of the "forgotten" region of P'yóngan Province in Korean historiography. These works, which focus mostly on the period before the Hong Kyóngnae Rebellion of 1812, mainly investigate particular historical experiences of this region that culminated in the cross-class rebellion. These works are extremely valuable for a number of reasons. They represent the first comprehensive historical research on the northwestern region of the Korean peninsula, currently a part of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea). Most of these studies start with the notion that there was no yangban aristocracy in P'yóngan Province -- a prevailing perception of late Chosón literati, and one that rationalized social and political discrimination against people from this region. One of the main goals of this study is to challenge this perspective through a close reading of the writings of Paek Kyónghae (1765-1842), a literatus from P'yóngan Province, to illuminate his perceptions and responses to regional discrimination and his cultural identity as a man from a politically and socially condemned region. This discussion offers a microscopic examination of the bilateral relations between the center and the periphery through Paek's life experiences. Particularly because Paek Kyónghae lived as a yangban official through the major social and political disruption posed by the Hong Kyóngnae Rebellion -- to which regional discrimination against the people of P'yóngan Province in terms of political advancement by the central court provided an ideological justification -- his views and personal choices partly explain how the existing regime survived the rebellion.
Philippines Conference Room, Encina Hall
Francis Fukuyama is Dean of Faculty and Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University.
Dr. Fukuyama's book, The End of History and the Last Man, was published by Free Press in 1992 and has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. It made the bestseller lists in the United States, France, Japan, and Chile, and has been awarded the Los Angeles Times' Book Critics Award in the Current Interest category, as well as the Premio Capri for the Italian edition. He is also the author of Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995), The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order (1999), and Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (2002). His book State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century will be published by Cornell University Press in the spring of 2004.
Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues relating to questions concerning democratization and international political economy. He has, in recent years, focused on the role of culture and social capital in modern economic life, and on the social consequences of technological change.
Bechtel Conference Center
Encina Hall, C148
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a faculty member of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). He is also Director of Stanford's Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, and a professor (by courtesy) of Political Science.
Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues in development and international politics. His 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. His book In the Realm of the Last Man: A Memoir will be published in fall 2026.
Francis Fukuyama received his B.A. from Cornell University in classics, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in Political Science. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, and of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State. From 1996-2000 he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, and from 2001-2010 he was Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He served as a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics from 2001-2004. He is editor-in-chief of American Purpose, an online journal.
Dr. Fukuyama holds honorary doctorates from Connecticut College, Doane College, Doshisha University (Japan), Kansai University (Japan), Aarhus University (Denmark), the Pardee Rand Graduate School, and Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland). He is a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Rand Corporation, the Board of Trustees of Freedom House, and the Board of the Volcker Alliance. He is a fellow of the National Academy for Public Administration, a member of the American Political Science Association, and of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is married to Laura Holmgren and has three children.
(October 2025)
When Larry Diamond left for Baghdad in January as an adviser to the U.S. occupation authority, he took all the equipment he believed he needed to help construct a hopeful new nation out of the ashes of dictatorship: the academic models he had crafted over the years as an authority on building democracies, and confidence those models would work.
But the jarring reality of Iraq, with its escalating violence and collapsing civic order, forced Diamond to look for a few new tools beyond those listed in the textbooks. When he speaks now of the models for building democratic countries, he stresses a different set of equipment, which he found in short supply: body armor, armor-plated cars, a huge military presence.
The story of Iraq, this onetime optimist believes, is a tale of missed opportunities.
"We just bungled this so badly," said Diamond, a 52-year-old senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. "We just weren't honest with ourselves or with the American people about what was going to be needed to secure the country."
Diamond was a senior adviser to the Coalition Provisional Authority and spent several initially hopeful months in Iraq -- lecturing on democracy, even in mosques, encouraging people to participate and helping shape laws that embodied his vision. He returned to Palo Alto in early April for a short break, then ran into an emotional brick wall, he said, when he contemplated the mess he had left behind.
Last Thursday, when it came time for Diamond to return, he did not get on the plane.
Instead, he was in his office at the Hoover Tower, disillusioned over the desperate turn of events he had witnessed and what he feels was a country allowed to spin out of control, in large part, he says, because of the Bush administration's unwillingness to commit a big enough force to protect Iraqis from militias and insurgents.
"You can't develop democracy without security," he said. "In Iraq, it's really a security nightmare that did not have to be. If you don't get that right, nothing else is possible. Everything else is connected to that."
Few people would seem better prepared for the job in Iraq than Diamond. He is coordinator of the Democracy Program at Stanford's Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, and he has been co-editor since 1990 of the Journal of Democracy. He has done extensive fieldwork in Taiwan and Nigeria.
He said he had initially opposed the war in Iraq because he felt the United States needed broader international support before attacking, but after the main ground fighting ended last April, he was ready to help.
"Once the war was over, I felt we had a moral and political obligation to the Iraqis to try and help build something better," he said. "That was clear in my mind. I didn't agonize over that. I really had something to contribute."
So late last year, after the Bush administration and the provisional authority outlined their plans for writing an interim constitution and handing over sovereignty on June 30, Diamond said he began to speak with officials about playing a role and implementing some of the ideas he had spent his career developing.
Arriving in Baghdad in early January, he said, he was sober-minded about the challenges but encouraged by much of what he found.
"When I got there on the ground, I was actually hopeful as I met some of the young people, women, civic groups, and their eagerness for change," he said.
"It was mind-blowing, really,'' he added. "There were people who wanted to know how to make democracy work. There were so many positive signs. Civil society was very weak, as you'd expect, but it was beginning to reconstitute itself. There was a lot of energy, a lot of passion, a lot of creativity and a lot of desire to learn. I even had a good experience with some mullahs who supported us."
Diamond said that he had some successes. He said he sought to provide female representatives a guaranteed number of seats in the provisional parliament and helped secure for them a 25 percent stake.
He helped strengthen some of the provisions in the interim constitution supporting the development of civic groups to organize people at a grassroots level, and worked to make the new government structure somewhat decentralized as a way of giving minority groups more of a voice and providing opportunities for grassroots participation. And he instructed, while learning.
In January, he outlined the four basic principles of democracy in a speech at Hilla University, discussing such issues as checks and balances and the rule of law. In February, at a conference in Baghdad on decentralization, he presented a 12-point description of how civil society helps build a stronger democracy.
In another address to Iraqis in late March, Diamond called the transitional law, as the interim constitution is called, the right path to "a true democracy," praised the spirit of compromise he found and promised the Iraqis that their nascent democracy would lead the Arab world.
But Diamond said it was around that time that the insurgency grew bolder, that more Americans and Iraqis began to die and that security appeared to be collapsing. He said he shuddered as he began to see other advisers getting killed on the same roads he traveled.
And then he had what he describes as a painful, transforming experience.
"I had one of those moments when you cut through all the bull," he said. "I was speaking to this women's group, and one woman got up and asked, 'If we do all these things, who's going to protect us?' " Diamond recalled. "That was the moment when I said to myself, 'Oh my God, some of these women are going to be assassinated because they are here listening to me.' It just struck me between the eyes."
As the violence spread, Diamond said, he felt ever more painfully the mistake the United States had made by not sending in more troops to keep the insurgents at bay.
The American policies basically encouraged Iraqis to stand up -- only to face the threat of being mowed down for doing so, he said.
"It was totally hypocritical of us to do one and not the other," Diamond said of the lack of security.
As a result, he said, democratization suffered potentially fatal setbacks. He was angry, he added, not just because optimistic Iraqis were being killed, but because the downward spiral was preventable.
His recommendations for rescuing the situation run counter to some of the policies that the Bush administration insists it will not alter. Diamond said that, in his view, the United States must more than double its current military force of about 135,000 and confront the violent Iraqi militias consistently, while offering political benefits to those who lay down their arms and accept democratic institutions.
The best he can say about the prospects in Iraq now is that, as he puts it, "civil war is not inevitable."
Diamond said that, realistically, he never expected a flawless democracy to emerge in just months. It was more likely, he said, that the legacies of traditional Arab society and dictatorship would have produced some rigged elections, corruption and sporadic violence. But with greater security, there would have been, at the least, a constitution and a more flexible and responsive government.
None of that is likely to happen now, he said, without significantly more American troops and a more assertive military stance.
"The literature stresses the overwhelming need to get the security under control," Diamond said. "Nothing that happened could not have been anticipated. I don't think we were applying the lessons of the past as systematically as they should have been, to put it as politely as possible."