APARC announces the inaugural recipients of the APARC (Takahashi) Fellowships for 2004-2005
After an intensive selection process, the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford Institute for International Studies at Stanford University has selected the first class of its APARC Fellowships for pre-doctoral scholars. Kaoru Shimizu and Joo-Youn Jung will be in residence during the 2004-2005 academic year. They will be named Takahashi Fellows in honor of Takahashi family whose generous gift made this fellowship possible.
Kaoru (Kay) Shimizu is a Ph.D. candidate in the department of political science. Her dissertation topic is "The Political Dynamics of Capitalism: Barriers to Reform in Japan and China" in which she adopts a political economy approach to compare the causes and resolution of non-performing loans in China and Japan.
Joo-Youn Jung is a Ph.D. candidate in the department of political science. In her dissertation she will be examining how and why the powerful bureaucratic states of China, South Korea, and Japan have changed in response to the powerful forces of financial crisis, non-performing loans, and banking reform and what impact these changes have had on efforts to implement urgently needed policy changes.
APARC looks forward to their joining us in the fall.
APARC announces the 2004-2005 Shorenstein Fellows
The Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford Institute for International Studies at Stanford University announces the winners of the 2004-2005 Shorenstein Fellowship. Drs. Jennifer Amyx and Soyoung Kwon will join APARC in the fall.
Jennifer Amyx received her Ph.D. from Stanford in 1998. An assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, she is an expert on the politics of financial regulation and reform in the Asia-Pacific region. During her residence at APARC, she plans to complete her manuscript that analyze the regulation and reform of government-backed financial institutions in Japan.
Soyoung Kwon received her Ph.D. from University of Cambridge in 2003. Her doctoral dissertation focuses on the evolution of the North Korean political elite. It is a much under-researched topic and her work looks into different socialist societies, comparing different courses of change (and lack of change) in the state socialist societies. While in residence she will be focusing on developing her doctoral thesis into a monograph that will focus on the North Korean political leadership and its policy orientation.
APARC looks forward to their joining us in the fall.
The Korean Studies Program at APARC announces the inaugural recipients of the Pantech Fellowships for Mid-Career Professionals for 2004-2005
After an intensive selection process, the Korean Studies Program (KSP) at the Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford Institute for International Studies at Stanford University has selected the first class of its Pantech Fellowships for Mid-Career Professionals. Philip W. Yun and John Feffer will be in residence during the 2004-2005 academic year and collaborate with the faculty and fellows at KSP and APARC. The fellowship was made possible by generous gift from Pantech Group.
Philip Yun received his law degree from Columbia University and was a Fulbright Scholar at the Yonsei University Graduate School of International Studies. Yun has had a remarkable career working both in the private and the public sector. While holding high-level positions at the U.S. Department of State, Yun worked closely with the Secretary of Defense, Dr. William Perry, to develop broad expertise on international negotiations, strategic planning and problem solving. He has practiced law both in Korea and in the U.S., worked in private equity investment, and provided comments and opinions for the media on North Korean issues. While in residence, he will work on developing an outline of a comprehensive roadmap that will lead to a secure and prosperous Northeast Asia that would include North Korea.
John Feffer is an accomplished writer and editor who has written on numerous topics such as the politics of food, Asia, Eastern Europe, Russia, foreign policy, economics, and nationalism. As a frequent traveler to North Korea (and to South Korea), he has a rare knowledge of and balanced perspective toward North Korea. His most recent publication is "North Korea/South Korea: U.S. Policy at a Time of Crisis". He is a former associate editor of World Policy Journal and has worked for the American Friends Service Committee, most recently as an international affairs representative in East Asia. He serves on the advisory committees of the think tank Foreign Policy in Focus and the Alliance of Scholars Concerned about Korea. While in residence, he will concentrate on examining food policy on the Korean peninsula.
KSP and APARC look forward to their joining us in the fall.
Boost-phase missile defense debate continues
The article by Daniel Kleppner, Frederick Lamb, and David Mosher (Physics Today, January 2004, page 30) summarizes the results of the excellent American Physical Society study released in July 2003 on boost-phase options for national missile defense.1 The study represents one of the most authoritative analyses to date on the subject and will enhance the quality of the public debate on missile defense for years to come. However, although I agree with many of the study's conclusions, the overall assessment is somewhat pessimistic, especially with respect to the feasibility of intercepting solid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles.
My analysis of airborne intercept options suggests that first-generation airborne boost-phase interceptors (ABIs) carrying 90-kg kinetic-kill vehicles should be effective against liquid-propellant ICBMs. It also suggests that second-generation ABIs with 50-kg KKVs could be effective against solid-propellant ICBMs, provided the ABIs can get within approximately 500-600 km of the ICBM launch site, which is possible for relatively small states such as North Korea.2
ABIs have the advantage that they can contribute to an effective theater missile defense--an important mission given the widespread proliferation of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. In fact, ABIs are the only form of terrestrial boost-phase intercept that can be effective against very short burn-time ICBMs or short-range ballistic missiles because, if necessary, ABI launch platforms can fly over an opponent's territory. Neither ground-based nor naval-based interceptors have that option.
One should also note that ABI systems pose very little threat to the strategic nuclear forces of the five major nuclear powers; hence, they are not nearly as destabilizing as other forms of missile defense. To the extent that one takes seriously the rhetoric of sharing US ballistic missile defense technology, ABI systems can be transferred because they do not threaten US or allied strategic forces.
The difference between my conclusions and those of the APS study arises from different technical assumptions that result, in my case, in greater intercept ranges. In particular, I assumed that an airborne X-band radar can be built within the next decade, which, for favorable geographies like North Korea, can reduce target-detection and tracking delays by as much as 10 to 15 seconds compared to those in the APS study. I also made the assumption, based on the burn times for existing US and Russian solid-propellant ICBMs, that solid-propellant ICBMs have a nominal burn time of 180 s; the APS study assumed a 170-s burn time based on US solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile technology. Also, airborne missiles can accelerate faster; hence, they can have higher average flight speeds compared to surface-based interceptors (on which the APS study focused) because the drag force is lower at high altitudes.
Nevertheless, solid-propellant ICBMs are very difficult targets. Successful intercept will require sensor architectures that push the limits of target detection and tracking, and large (1500 kg), high-speed (6.0 km/s ideal velocity) two-stage airborne interceptors carrying lightweight KKVs. While 50-kg KKVs stretch the limits of what currently is possible, solid-propellant ICBMs stretch current offensive threat possibilities. Neither may be far-fetched 10 years from now.
ABIs do have drawbacks. However, none of them are so severe as to eliminate ABIs from consideration as a viable component of a future US missile defense architecture. In fact, airborne intercept is probably the most attractive boost-phase missile defense option.
Preferences regarding boost-phase ballistic missile defense often have more to do with different threat assessments, operational and political issues, and cost than with technical disagreements. I see no serious technical barrier to an effective ABI system. Nevertheless, the decision to proceed with any form of ballistic missile defense, ABIs included, should be based on an assessment of the system's priority relative to such other important US security concerns as countering terrorism and modernizing conventional forces. From this perspective, the US currently is spending too much on ballistic missile defense.
References
1. D. K. Barton et al., Report of the APS Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues, July 2003; available at http://www.aps.org/public_affairs/popa/reports/nmd03.cfm.
2. See D. A. Wilkening, Science and Global Security, (in press).
New study on the future of Bay Area jobs
San Francisco -- Offshoring is just one of many global forces impacting job creation and destruction in the Bay Area and cannot be viewed in isolation from the key trends enabling it, such as globalization, technology-driven improvements in productivity and business disintermediation. Efforts to prevent offshoring will not be successful and are likely to come at considerable economic cost, according to a new study released today.
Sponsored by Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network, the Bay Area Economic Forum and the Stanford Project on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (SPRIE), with research and project support from global management consulting firm A.T. Kearney, the study analyzed global trends, regional capabilities and the Bay Area job market.
Findings from the study, the first regionally focused on the Bay Area, were based on 120 interviews, analysis of 9,000 job listings and other primary and secondary research.
The Bay Area already has more experience with globalization and offshoring than other parts of the U.S., the study reports. Bay Area manufacturers earn almost 60 percent of their revenues in overseas markets. Analysis done as part of the study revealed 94 percent of companies in the semiconductor and semiconductor equipment manufacturing and software clusters - two driving sectors in the Bay Area in terms of employment and payroll contribution - are already using offshore resources.
This does not mean all jobs are going offshore. The study also found one-in-four job postings for large companies in those sectors during April 2004 was for positions in the Bay Area.
"The research makes clear that global trends will force continued creation and destruction of jobs in the Bay Area. These trends can't be reversed. Policies and investment should be directed toward helping the region strengthen its core capabilities to compete effectively on a national and global basis" said Sean Randolph, President & CEO of the Bay Area Economic Forum.
The study calls for policymakers to maintain strong support for basic research, invest in education to ensure a competitive local workforce and to address vulnerabilities in the regional business environment including housing, transportation and business regulations that hinder local job creation. Business leaders need to support transition programs and consider investment in local employee development to meet their future job needs.
The study found the Bay Area is losing ground to other regions in the U.S. and overseas in three competitive capabilities: mass production, back-office (transactional) operations and product and process enhancement. The competitive erosion in the latter is new. It appears that the Bay Area is rapidly losing out to other regions in occupations associated with engineering focused on cost reduction, fine-tuning processes and expanding product features. These engineering jobs, along with manufacturing and administration-related occupations, are expected to decline as the skills required for those functions are sourced more cost effectively in other regions of the United States and abroad.
The study also identified five competitive capabilities that investors and business leaders believe are key strengths of the Bay Area. In addition to three capabilities traditionally linked to the region (entrepreneurship/new business creation, research in advanced technologies and bringing new concepts to market), the analysis pointed to two other competitive capabilities not always in the spotlight:
- Cross-disciplinary research - coordinating and integrating advanced learning across industries and scientific disciplines.
- Global integrated management - managing and coordinating globally distributed business functions and networks.
Jobs aligned with these five regional strengths, such as high-level research, strategic marketing and global business and headquarter management activities, are expected to experience solid growth.
"The findings confirm that the region should continue to attract talent and foster innovation, start-up activity and job creation, as technology companies are launched and commercialized," said Russell Hancock, President and CEO of Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network.
The Bay Area's strengths make the region a leader in job creation in early stages of the business lifecycle, but its weaknesses lead to job growth outside the region in the later stages. As a result, the study says, the Bay Area will continue to incubate and develop new businesses, a process that has historically been the core growth engine for the local job market.
"Companies founded in the Bay Area will typically maintain the majority of their workforce in the region until their first products or services gain market traction and key business processes stabilize," said John Ciacchella, Vice President with A.T. Kearney. "However, as these companies expand and mature, many of the new jobs that stay local will focus on management of expanding business operations that are outsourced, offshored and distributed to other regions."
The Bay Area also is well positioned in the industries likely to spawn new technology
start-ups, according to the study's job market analysis and interviews. Beyond its leading role in information technology, the Bay Area has the highest concentration of biotechnology firms in the country and more nanotechnology firms than all countries except Germany.
"How jobs in a region are affected by global trends depends on the competitiveness of the region's capabilities," said Marguerite Gong Hancock, Associate Director of SPRIE. "Despite a rise in the capabilities of other entrepreneurial regions globally, the Bay Area continues to lead in many of the capabilities considered most necessary for innovation and new business creation"
The study findings will be presented at a public event on Thursday, July 15, at Stanford University, where a panel of business and community leaders will discuss the report's findings and implications and take questions from the audience. The panel will be moderated by Paul Laudicina, managing director of A.T. Kearney's Global Business Policy Council, and includes:
- Edward Barnholt (Chairman, President & CEO, Agilent Technologies)
- William T. Coleman (Founder, Chairman & CEO, Cassatt Corporation, and Vice Chairman, Silicon Valley Manufacturing Group)
- Anula K. Jayasuriya (Venture Partner, ATP Capital LP)
- William F. Miller (Professor Emeritus, Stanford Graduate School of Business)
- The Honorable Joe Nation, California State Assembly
BAY AREA ECONOMIC FORUM
Bay Area Economic Forum (www.bayeconfor.org) is a public-private partnership of senior business, government, university, labor and community leaders, develops and implements projects that: support the vitality and competitiveness of the regional economy, and enhance the quality of life of the regions residents. Sponsored by the Bay Area Council a business organization of more than 250 CEOs and major employers, and the Association of Bay Area Governments, representing the region's 101 cities and nine counties, the Bay Area Economic Forum provides a shared platform for leaders to act on key issues affecting the regional economy.
JOINT VENTURE: SILICON VALLEY NETWORK
Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network (www.jointventure.org) is a nonprofit organization that provides analysis and action on issues affecting the economy and quality of life in Silicon Valley. The organization brings together new and established leaders from business, labor, government, education, non-profits, and the broader community to build a sustainable region that is poised for competition in the global economy.
STANFORD PROJECT ON REGIONS OF INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The Stanford Project on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship (http://sprie.stanford.edu), or SPRIE, is dedicated to the understanding and practice of the nexus of innovation and entrepreneurship in the leading regions around the world. Current research focuses on Silicon Valley and high technology regions in 6 countries in Asia: People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, Singapore and India. SPRIE fulfills its mission through interdisciplinary and international collaborative research, seminars and conferences, publications and briefings for industry and government leaders.
America's Alliances in Northeast Asia
Wednesday, January 14
Welcoming Remarks
2:00 Michael Armacost, Shorenstein APARC
Security Dimension of the Alliances
2:10-4:00
Chair: Daniel Okimoto, Senior Fellow, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC
The Changes in the US's Strategic Doctrine
Kurt Campbell, Senior Vice President & Director, International Security Program, Center for Security and International Studies
What key elements of change in American strategic doctrine have been introduced by the Bush Administration? What implications do they have for US alliances in Northeast Asia?
The China Dimension
Michael Lampton, Director, China Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University
What implications would improved Sino-US relations have on America's alliances in Asia?
Jing Huang, Associate Professor of Political Science, Utah State University
How have Chinese attitudes and policies toward America's Northeast Asian alliances changed over the past five years or so? What accounts for those changes? What implications have they for the future of these alliances?
Discussant: William Perry, Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor, School of Engineering, Stanford University and the 19th Secretary of Defense for the United States
4:30-6:00 The Future of America's Alliances in Northeast Asia
Admiral Thomas Fargo, Commander, US Pacific Command
Keynote and Public Address
Introduction to be made by William Perry
Bechtel Conference Center, Encina Hall, first floor
Thursday, January 15
Changing View of the Regional Security Environment and the Alliances
8:00-10:15
Chair: Michael Armacost, Shorenstein APARC
The Japanese Government's Views on the Alliance
Kuriyama Takakazu, Ambassador, retired
How have the views of the Japanese government changed in recent years with respect to the regional security environment and the mission and strategic focus of the US-Japan alliance? How have they changed with respect to the security responsibilities? Should Japan be prepared to shoulder on these responsibilities on its own outside the contours of the alliance?
The View of the Republic of Korea's Government of the Alliance
Kim Won-soo, Visiting Scholar, Shorenstein APARC & former Secretary to the President of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Office of the President, Republic of Korea
How have South Korean government perception and policies changed in recent years vis-à-vis the regional security environment and the mission and strategic focus of the US-ROK alliance? How have they changed with respect to the security responsibilities that South Korea is expected to shoulder on its own, outside the contours of the alliance?
The US Government's Views on the US-Japan Alliance
Rust Deming, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, National Defense University & Ambassador, retired
How have American government perceptions and policies changed in recent years vis-à-vis the mission and strategic focus of the US-Japan alliance?
The US Government's View on the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance
Victor Cha, D.S. Song Associate Professor of Government and Asian Studies, Georgetown University
How have American government perceptions and policies changed in recent years vis-à-vis the mission and strategic focus of the US-Japan alliance?
Discussant: Christopher LaFleur, Cyrus Vance Fellow in Diplomatic Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
The Changing Domestic Politics of the Alliance
10:30-12:15
Chair: Gi-Wook Shin, Director, Korean Studies Program, Shorenstein APARC
Japanese Domestic Views of the Alliance
Nakanishi Hiroshi, Professor, Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University
Since the mid-1990s, what noteworthy changes have surfaced in domestic support or opposition to the US-Japan alliance? What changes in support or opposition to the bilateral cooperation on security issues in Asia and elsewhere?
The Changes in South Korean Domestic Views of the Alliance
Lee Chung-min, Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Yonsei University
How have domestic political dynamics and public attitudes toward the US-ROK alliance and bilateral cooperation on security issues changed in recent years? What accounts for those changes? What implications do they have for US alliances in Northeast Asia?
American Domestic Views of the US-Republic of Korea Alliance
Donald Gregg, President, The Korea Society
How have American public attitudes (as reflected in public opinion polls, press reporting, and Congressional actions) evolved toward the US-ROK alliance and bilateral defense cooperation in recent years? What accounts for these changes? What are their implications for the future of the alliance?
Discussant: Daniel Okimoto, Senior Fellow, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC
Adjustments in the Operational Arrangement for Defense Cooperation
1:30-3:45
Chair & Discussant: Henry Rowen, Senior Fellow Emeritus, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC
Japanese Adjustments in US-Japan Defense Cooperation
Yamaguchi Noboru, Major General, Japan Ground Self Defense Force
What adjustments have occurred in recent years in the operational arrangements underpinning US-Japan defense cooperation? What further changes would the Japanese Government like to promote?
US-Japan Defense Cooperation
Ralph Cossa, President, Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies
What adjustments have occurred in recent years in the operational arrangements underpinning US-Japan defense cooperation? What additional changes is the Bush Administration likely to promote?
US-Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation
William Drennan, Deputy Director, United States Institute of Peace
What adjustments have occurred in recent years in the operational arrangements underpinning US-Japan defense cooperation? What additional changes is the Bush Administration likely to promote?
US-Republic of Korea Defense Cooperation
Kim Jae chang, General, Joint Korea-US Command, (retired) and Co-Chairman, Council on ROK-US Security Studies
What adjustments have occurred in recent years in the operational arrangements underpinning US-ROK defense cooperation? What further changes would the Republic of Korea like to promote?
Where Do We Go From Here? Conclusions
4:00-5:00
Michael Armacost, Shorenstein Distinguished Fellow & Ambassador, retired
Daniel Okimoto, Senior Fellow, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC
Henry Rowen, Senior Fellow Emeritus, SIIS and Shorenstein APARC
Robert Scalapino, Robson Research Professor of Government, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley
Oksenberg Conference Room
At climate symposium, Kennedy posits global warming as most serious worldwide threat
- Read more about At climate symposium, Kennedy posits global warming as most serious worldwide threat
I begin with a proposition. There are a great many pressing problems in the world. There is population growth and economic development, with attending pressures on resources - including food and that other essential, water. There is a continuing global security crisis, augmented by the rise in terrorism. There is the chronically inequitable distribution in resources between the rich nations of the North and the poor nations of the South. And there is the steadily growing body of evidence for a major reorganization of the global climate regime.
My proposition is that the last of these is the most serious threat - not only because it will profoundly affect the lives of our children and our grandchildren in a direct way, but also because it will interact powerfully with every single one of the other problems I have listed.
Let me begin with the science underlying climate change. Last week I helped organize a symposium and briefing session on climate science for press, policy-makers, and the public, supported by the Hewlett Foundation and with co-sponsorship from the Conference Board. We had ten of the most distinguished climate scientists in the United States, led off by Sherry Rowland, the Nobel Laureate in Chemistry. The purpose was to make a careful assessment of the science - what we know for sure, what we think likely, and what are interesting but unproven possibilities.
So here is a short summary of what we know. General Circulation Models - climate models that take into account variations in the sun's energy, volcanic activity, and other natural phenomena - explained fluctuations in average global temperature very well over most of the past thousand years. But for the past hundred years, these same models faithfully reproduce global temperature history ONLY if they include the greenhouse gases - carbon dioxide, methane, and chlorofluorocarbons - that are by-products of human economic activity. That is why the average temperature of the globe has risen by about one degree F, and the sea level has risen by between 10 and 20 cm., in the last century. The primary causative agent is carbon dioxide, which in preindustrial times was about 280 ppm/v and has now reached 380ppm/v. It is rising continually as the activities that produce it are proceeding on a business as usual basis. That is because the failure of the Kyoto protocol - a failure both because its targets were inadequate, and also because they were unattainable by many of the participating nations - has left us without any basis for meeting the goals of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change. Just to remind us, the US is a signatory and a party to that agreement, under which we are committed to limit atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases to avoid "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system."
Why, a dozen years later, is there some doubt about the dangers of this interference? The C02 we add to the atmosphere will stay there; its average residence time is a century. There is no disagreement about whether average global temperature will rise; it will. The scientific debate is about how much. For the future we depend again on the General Circulation Models. It's reassuring that when applied to past climates in "back-casting" efforts, like the example I gave a moment ago, these actually predict climate history so accurately. Perhaps more interesting, they regularly somewhat underestimate the magnitude of the real climate changes - that is, Nature regularly turns out to be harsher than the models suggest. Projecting the models into the future, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and an evaluation by the National Academies prepared at President Bush's request, estimate that by the end of this century, the increase in average global temperature will be between 1.4 and 5.8 degrees Centigrade.
Why such a range? These models, like most, contain some uncertainties. Some of these are scientific: how increased cloud cover might affect the outcome, since clouds can either cool the climate by reflecting sunlight from above, or warm it by trapping heat that is leaving from below; how changes in the earth's albedo due to melting ice might accelerate heating, and so on. Aerosols produced by volcanic eruptions have a cooling effect, as the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo did in giving us two unusually cool years in the early 90's. Other uncertainties are economic and social: we don't know how national policies and international agreements will serve to restrain the amount of greenhouse gases we are adding.
These uncertainties - about half due to the models themselves, and the rest to social and economic unknowns -- have provided arguments for those who prefer to postpone economically difficult approaches for controlling greenhouse gas emissions. But it is important that even at the very lowest estimates, there will be substantial changes in the nature of human life on the only planet we currently occupy. The rather modest impacts of the past century have already produced profound changes in regional climate dynamics. Substantial ice-sheet melting and retreat is taking place both in the Arctic and in the West Antarctic ice sheet. In the Arctic, where climate warming has been extreme, sea ice is sharply diminished and rivers become ice-free much earlier. Low latitude mountain glaciers are shrinking; the famous snow-capped summit of Kilimanjaro will be bare within fifteen years, converting hundreds of old African safari shots into historic treasures.
Biological cycles are experiencing the effects of warming, with upward extensions of the range of Alpine flora and advances in the time of flowering or breeding by an average of 5 days per decade. The models have all also predicted more frequent and severe weather events, and we have had heat waves in the upper Midwest and Paris, accelerated beach erosion on coasts all over the world, and disastrous floods and landslides in Central America.
That is now, but of course we are more interested in the future. What the models tell us unambiguously is that the climate system is headed for further disruption. The standard scenario foresees a steady, ramp-like increase in average global temperature, with a concomitant rise in sea level, but records of past climate tell us that it is riddled with abrupt changes - something that the models fail to predict well. A possible alternative involves a change in major ocean circulation patterns - especially in the North Atlantic, where a clockwise gyre brings warm equatorial water up via the Gulf Stream. As it flows Northward and then crosses Eastward, it is cooled by the atmosphere, becomes more saline through evaporation, and then sinks to return as a cold deep current. If large discharges of fresh meltwater or rain made this water less dense, it could fail to sink and thus disrupt the entire cycle.
A fictionalized version of such a scenario appears in the disaster film "The Day After Tomorrow," which you should see only for amusement. Beyond that silliness lies a real prospect that a gradual change in average global temperature could intercept the threshold for some non-linear, dynamic process, triggering abrupt changes in either direction. Of course there is uncertainty: we are engaged in a large-scale, uncontrolled experiment on the only planet we have.
Let's consider some collateral impacts. A group of us at Stanford was asked by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict to look - among other things -- at ways in which environmental change might alter the circumstances under which human populations might be placed. Climate change was an important variable. One example we looked at was the impact of sea level rise, along with storm surges from extreme weather events, on the Ganges-Brahmaputra delta. Flood disasters already occur there regularly. 15 million people live within 2 meter above sea level, and are vulnerable to abrupt displacement. We know they will have to go somewhere; in the past they have fled in much smaller numbers to Bengal. The security problems arising from a massive influx of a traditionally hostile population, combined with an almost certain high level of cholera infection, are not difficult to imagine.
Water is a desperately important resource in most parts of the world, and drought is often followed by famine or emigration. Here in the US, warmer winters threaten mountain snowpacks and will soon demand the revision of interstate and international water allocation agreements. Maritime rivers are already undertaking management steps to deal with saline intrusions due to sea level rise or storm surges. In Great Britain, the barrier that protects London from occasional flooding of the Thames estuary is now being used six times a year compared to less than once a year in the 1980's.
Agriculture, of course, is the most essential of human activities. The regional distribution of global warming impacts may be at least temporarily kind to temperate-zone food production. But the models all predict an increased incidence of mid-continent droughts as climate change progresses, and we know that the American Midwest has in the past experienced droughts both deeper and longer than the one in the 30's that led to the Dust Bowl migrations. Irrigation is an answer to drought, but in the six High Plains states, dryland wheat production depends upon the Ogallala Aquifer, a buried ice-age storage well that is being so rapidly depleted that it is already unusable in its southern portion. And in the tropics, where people are poorest and capacity to adapt is minimal, the consequences of even modest warming will be far more serious.
Infectious diseases are spread by vectors, like the Anopheles malaria mosquito, that have their own patterns of reproduction, movement, and climate sensitivity. In parts of Africa where vertical topography dominates, warmer and rainier seasons cause malaria incidence to rise in higher-altitude locations. In a warmer and wetter world, more of the same can be expected.
So climate change is not an isolated problem. Instead, it is likely to interact with most of the other problems humans face all over the world. Thus I hope that this meeting will help encourage us to prepare a sound portfolio of risk-reducing measures. These will not, I must tell you, bring us out of the woods. Our destiny is partly built in -- to the heat that is already locked into our oceans, to the greenhouse gases that are already in our atmosphere and will increase by another 50% or more no matter what we do, and to the justified economic appetites of the developing world. What we will be talking about, it should be clear, are ways of limiting the damage to manageable levels, NOT preserving the status quo. We lost that years ago.
So the contemporary policy challenge amounts to a bet about risk: are the consequences of business as usual likely to entail costs greater than those of beginning to mitigate those consequences now? Other nations - the UK, several EU countries, and Japan - are making substantial commitments. Some industries - British Petroleum, Royal Dutch Shell, and Swiss Re, for example - have undertaken steps of their own. The insurance burden from the exploding rates of coastal erosion and storm damage has pushed the insurance industry to lead. If companies fail to participate in emissions reduction and join with others to resist such measures, questions are already being raised. If you believe so strongly that climate change is a myth, Swiss Re might say, then surely you won't mind a climate-related events exclusion from your Directors and Officers insurance policy.
But we can't count on voluntary actions, and the United States so far has only announced a long-range research program that, although it looks reasonable, makes NO current commitments to mitigate our contribution, about a quarter of the world's, to the global warming problem. We must have a more aggressive national policy to purchase insurance against this risk.
It will not be cheap. We have old, coal-fired power plants in this country; it may take subsidies to replace them with modern, less carbon-intensive facilities that run on natural gas. States like mine are already driving the transportation sector to ultra-low emission, and that may move the domestic industry in a positive direction. Some of us will have to give up our reflex opposition to nuclear power and begin comparing its risks realistically against those of global climate change. Although the room for alternative energy sources (photovoltaic, wind, geothermal) is limited, these options need encouragement. Energy conservation measures have, at several times in the past, turned economic predictions on their head by their success, and the right incentives could yield real benefits there.
The portfolio I have just described is needed, but will not be enough. We know that market-based mechanisms for emissions control can work, because they did in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments that limited SO2 emissions. The bill proposed by Senators McCain and Lieberman would mandate a cap-and-trade program for controlling carbon dioxide emissions. Similar systems are being considered by regional assemblages of states in the Northwest and the Northeast, and that may encourage the development of a national system - which could then build trading relationships with other nations that are moving toward similar regimes. A case for this approach is elegantly made in the Council on Foreign Relations Policy Initiative on Climate Change, by my colleague David Victor.
The United States is in a position of natural leadership here. It is the most powerful nation - and the world's leading producer of greenhouse gases. Plainly it is in its own national interest, in multiple ways, to reduce its consumption of fossil fuels. To see it failing in this most vital, globally sensitive matter is a national embarrassment.
U.S. softened stance on North Korea is right policy, but late, Madsen says in column
- Read more about U.S. softened stance on North Korea is right policy, but late, Madsen says in column