At a SPRIE seminar on September 20, Autodesk's Jack Gao and Array Networks' Michael Zhao spoke on the challenges of creating leaders in China's high tech firms.
Stanford University
Encina Hall, Room E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Paul Y. Chang is the Tong Yang, Korea Foundation, and Korea Stanford Alumni Association Senior Fellow at Shorenstein APARC; Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; and Professor by courtesy in the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures. Chang also serves as the Deputy Director of the Korea Program at Shorenstein APARC and Co-Editor of The Journal of Korean Studies. Before joining Stanford, Chang served on the faculty at Harvard University, Yonsei University, and the Singapore Management University. His current work examines the diversification of family structures in South Korea.
GWS (Gi-Wook Shin): Dr. Hecker, could you please briefly explain the technical dimensions of what has happened? North Korea is claiming great success, but there are some questions about whether this presumed nuclear test was really successful or meaningful.
SH (Siegried Hecker): At this point, as I understand it, the North Koreans have conducted what they call a nuclear test.
South Korea has said seismic signals appear to indicate a 0.5 kiloton, or sub-kiloton, explosion. From reports I have seen, the Australians and the French believe the blast was about 1 kiloton. Thus, three countries have given assessments on the power of the underground explosion, ranging between 0.5 kilotons and 1 kiloton, or 500 and 1000 tons. This likely indicates a nuclear explosion of a relatively low yield, compared to what one would typically expect. Although the Russian defense minister has apparently commented that the explosion was between 5 and 15 kilotons, I have not heard any other nation estimate in this range.
By comparison, the Nagasaki bomb was approximately 20 kilotons, and the initial tests of the five major nuclear powers were all quite large, on this order. Also, when both India and Pakistan tested multiple devices in 1998, some of these tests were of a substantial yield, at least 20 kilotons. But each country also tested three devices that were said to result in explosions of less than a kiloton. Whether these devices did not work or were experimental in nature is still unknown. So, a test on the order of that conducted by North Korea is not unheard of, but it is apparent that the North Korean device produced an explosion considerably smaller than most countries' first nuclear tests.
Regarding the technical dimensions of this event, I would offer two provisos: first, we must give scientists more time to analyze the seismic signals, and second, we must allow more time for analysis of how those seismic signals translate to the yield of the device. This latter task involves a thorough understanding of relevant geology - scientists make models to predict this, but there is always some uncertainty.
GWS: Given the relatively low yield of the test, is it possible that what North Korea has "tested" is not a nuclear device but very powerful conventional weaponry?
SH: It is most likely that this was indeed a nuclear device. There are two plausible explanations for why this test resulted in a relatively low yield. One possibility is that the North Koreans attempted to test a relatively simple nuclear device that was meant to be large, but it did not work quite right. There are two reasons the test of such a device might not have gone as planned. First, the detonators might not have exploded at exactly the right time or the explosive might not have been of the right quality, thus producing a lower yield. Second, if the timing of the "initiator" (additional neutrons that are introduced) was not quite right, this could also decrease the expected yield of the device.
Another possibility is that North Korea was actually trying to test a smaller, much more sophisticated nuclear device, one with a lot of instrumentation to monitor implosion. North Korea could have learned a great deal from such a test, but I would be surprised if the country had really designed the device to be that small.
GWS: This test marks the failure of the disparate policy approaches of South Korea and the United States - neither nation was successful in arresting DPRK nuclear development. But just how advanced North Korea's nuclear program is remains unclear. In the Korean media, there has been debate over whether North Korea's nuclear test was a success or a failure. What do you think?
SH: I would not say that the test failed. It is simply too early to judge, and we do not know exactly what North Korea had hoped to achieve. If North Korea wanted to use this test as a demonstration, then perhaps it was not very successful. It may be the case that the test did not work as well as anticipated if the device in question was a simple nuclear device. If North Korea was testing an advanced designed that was very well instrumented and monitored, it may have learned a great deal from this test.
It is important to wait to see an accurate yield for this test and then to look at the range of possibilities for why it might have been executed. From a scientific perspective, it is important not to overreact and not to go beyond what is actually known.
GWS: You said previously that when India and Pakistan tested nuclear devices in 1998, they both set off multiple explosions. Is it correct that North Korea has set off a single explosion?
SH: From what we have learned so far, it appears that North Korea has tested one device. This is what the North Koreans announced they would do. Scientists will have to carefully analyze the seismic signals to be sure, however, as for example, when India tested, it set off two devices simultaneously. We have not yet seen all the seismic evidence.
GWS: If North Korea were to use such a "low yield" device as a weapon in a major metropolis like Seoul, what kind of impact would it have?
SH: A 1 kiloton bomb in a major metropolis, though a relatively "low-yield" nuclear device, would still be devastating and catastrophic. Many thousands would experience instant death, and due to radioactivity, there would also be many delayed deaths. A device of this size would not wipe out the entire city, as was largely the case in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but it would cause major, significant damage.
GWS: Based on the scale of the explosion, was this device something that even terrorists could assemble?
SH: One kiloton in terrorist hands would indeed be catastrophic. I am very concerned that North Korea's nuclear material might fall into terrorist hands.
GWS: The possible marriage of this demonstrated nuclear capability and North Korean missiles is extremely dangerous. With reference to the North's nuclear and missile capabilities, is testing useful for making smaller nuclear devices - devices small enough to be placed on a missile?
SH: If North Korea is intent on making a nuclear warhead, this test could be a step in that direction. Making smaller nuclear devices by nature means making more complex nuclear devices. For much of the Cold War, this was a major goal for both the Soviets and the Americans. For North Korea, at this point we cannot say that the test was successful in terms of this aim of miniaturization, though again, North Korean scientists may have learned a lot in this regard. It is extremely difficult to say how soon North Korea could achieve miniaturization with the limited information we have about this test.
Miniaturization is a very big step, and it cannot be accomplished without nuclear testing. This could have been one of the most important reasons that North Korea undertook this test. It must be noted that their missiles are the other part of this equation, and there is not great confidence in the reliability of these missiles, especially those that performed poorly during the July test.
GWS: North Korea has certainly made a political statement with its nuclear test, but from a technical perspective, do you expect additional testing? What is your assessment of North Korea's technical capabilities, in light of your recent visits to the nation?
SH: At this point, North Korea could want another test for two technical reasons. First, if this was a simple device, they will want to fix the problem and demonstrate an explosion of a higher yield. If this was a more advanced design, they may have learned a lot but would still desire another test in order to gain an appropriate level of confidence in the device.
In January 2004, I visited the Yongbyon nuclear reactor and in August 2005, I visited Pyongyang. On the basis of those visits, I would estimate that North Korea has enough plutonium for 6 to 8 nuclear devices, though there is some degree of uncertainty in that estimate. Overall, I estimate the North has 40-50 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, and generally 6-8 kilograms are required for each weapon. I also estimate that North Korea could gain one additional weapon per year, given the current rate of reprocessing.
In terms of skilled people and facilities, North Korea has very good capabilities, up to the point of and including reprocessing plutonium. However, to go from reprocessing plutonium to building the device itself takes a whole new set of engineering and physics skills.
GWS: Given North Korea's limited amount of weapons-grade material, its government would presumably want to conserve as much as possible, right?
SH: Yes, and this is probably one of the reasons North Korea did not set off multiple explosions like India and Pakistan did. North Korea has very limited material, and therefore it will want to be judicious. With this conservation imperative, North Korea will want to fully assess what has been learned from this first test before it attempts a second test.
GWS: From a technical perspective, is it difficult to say how long it may be until North Korea conducts a second test?
SH: Yes, it is very difficult to say, because it depends on factors related to this test about which we are still uncertain. If North Korea was satisfied with this test and all preparations have already been made, a second test could take place within a few days. Yet if the findings from this test surprised North Korea, the device may have to be rebuilt, and that could take weeks or months. One thing we know for sure is that they do not have a lot of weapons-grade material, and they will have to carefully judge how to use it.
GWS: You have said that a major danger from the North Korean nuclear program is the possibility of plutonium transfer. How serious is this possibility? Are you also concerned about transfer of nuclear technology?
SH: Well, a test does mean that there is now less material that could possibly be transferred.
I feel strongly that the principal danger from the North Korean program is the plutonium itself, and the possibility it would find its way to a third party, perhaps into terrorist hands or into the hands of other nations. The reason I believe this is the biggest danger is that North Korea could be restrained by its neighbors from ever actually using a nuclear device, but a third party, especially a non-state actor, may not be "restrainable."
The nuclear test will not have an impact on how marketable the plutonium is. Yet, for the export of nuclear technical know-how, a successful test could make a big difference in the appeal of North Korean technology, especially to a nation like Iran.
GWS: The current nuclear crisis erupted in October 2002, when U.S. officials confronted North Korea about its possession of a uranium enrichment, or HEU, program. North Korea has thus far denied having such a program. I understand this type of program is much more difficult to detect. Would a uranium-based device require testing?
SH: North Korea has stated that it does not have an HEU program. My own opinion is they have some type of enrichment program, owing to Pakistani President Musharraf's statements that his nation provided Pyongyang with some of the required technology and equipment. We simply do not know how far North Korea has progressed in this program.
The HEU program is very difficult to detect - there are fewer signatures than for a nuclear reactor and this type of program is easier to conceal, given the smaller size of the facilities required. However, if we assume statements made by A.Q. Khan and President Musharraf are accurate, it may be some time before North Korea can produce significant quantities of HEU.
Once North Korea has accomplished this, a uranium bomb will be easier to make, and North Korean scientists will have more confidence in this type of device without testing.
GWS: All indications are that North Korea will be further isolated after this test. Will this increased isolation impact the country's continued nuclear development?
SH: At this point, from what I saw at Yongbyon, current North Korean operations do not depend on external help or supplies. Thus, isolation makes little difference in this regard. For the uranium program, technical isolation would probably cause a slowdown, because North Korea would benefit from additional technical purchases from the outside world. But the uranium program does not appear to be a centerpiece of North Korea's nuclear efforts.
GWS: After this nuclear test, is the situation more dangerous?
SH: I believe the major threat came around 2003 when North Korea reprocessed a major amount of plutonium, thus crossing the threshold to become a major threat. I have always taken the North Korean threat very seriously, and I believe all the governments and peoples involved should take it very seriously as well. First and foremost, the imperative should be to make sure that nuclear materials stay in North Korea and are not transferred to third parties.
Transcript prepared by Kristin Burke, Shorenstein APARC Research Associate
North Korea's announcement this week of plans to test a nuclear weapon is hardly surprising. The six-party talks to negotiate an end to its nuclear program are dead, and the North faces escalating financial and economic sanctions by the United States and its allies.
Experts have long debated the real motivations of the North in developing nuclear weapons. Some contend that the nuclear program, even the latest pronouncement, is simply a bargaining chip to gain security guarantees and economic aid. Others see a long determination to become a nuclear state.
The North Korean leaders may have begun the nuclear program as leverage. But the U.S. invasion of Iraq seems to have hardened their conviction that the only way to protect their nation and their regime is to join the nuclear club. The North Koreans want to become a Pakistan rather than an Iraq.
Still, officials in Pyongyang hesitated to cross the provocative line of visibly demonstrating their capability. Pressure is being mounted to get them to back down from their pledge. But for a variety of reasons, they apparently believe the timing for a test is now optimal.
First of all, they hope to blame the Bush administration for their decision. In the statement issued this week, the North Korean government argued that alleged American war plans justify a nuclear test, a position that reflects the views of the North Korean military.
Second, the North anticipates the test will be successful. Although a plutonium weapon is more complicated than a uranium bomb, it is quite likely that the North now has sufficient confidence in a Nagasaki-style primitive bomb. This success would be an object of pride for an otherwise failing state, and bolster its claim to the status of a world-class military power.
Third, the North Koreans see their potential enemies tied down and unable to respond effectively. The Bush administration is locked into a disastrous war in Iraq, and about to be weakened even more if the Republicans lose the upcoming midterm elections. In South Korea, the government of President Roh Moo Hyun is already a lame duck and politically paralyzed.
Fourth, Pyongyang may bet that China and South Korea, the two principal sources of trade and economic aid, would not join the United States and Japan in any real sanctions against the North. The July missile tests by North Korea provoked international uproar and led to a U.N. resolution. But the real impact has been minimal.
Finally, the North may calculate that testing will facilitate Japan's efforts to become a "normal'' nation with a broader military role in the region. That prospect could increase tensions in Northeast Asia, especially between Japan and China, and that, the North may believe, is not necessarily bad for it.
The United States, South Korea and China must act together to show that these calculations are misguided and that the North will pay a painful price if it goes ahead. Certainly this severely tests the troubled American alliance with South Korea and the emergent partnership with China. But Pyongyang's miscalculations also offer an opportunity to repair the strained alliance and create a new structure of security cooperation in Northeast Asia.
It is no secret that Seoul and Washington have been at odds over how to deal with North Korea. But the test announcement has already accelerated a shift in South Korean opinion. Rather than holding the United States responsible for the current impasse, most Koreans now see North Korea as the instigator of crisis.
South Korean officials understand that without reinforcing the alliance now, no policy toward the North can be effective. The United States and South Korea should urgently agree on common action plans -- including a shutdown of investment and economic assistance from the South to the North -- and make those consequences clear to Pyongyang.
The planned visits of newly installed Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to Beijing and Seoul next week offer a similar opening to turn threat into opportunity. Abe intends to repair tattered ties to those Asian neighbors. Now the three Northeast Asian powers can demonstrate that a nuclear test will not lead to increased tensions but to the complete isolation of the North.
The danger of escalating actions that could lead, again, to war on the Korean peninsula is grave. The North Koreans should be assured that the door to a diplomatic solution remains open to them. But they must also understand that by profoundly misreading this moment, the North Korean leadership now stands completely alone in Northeast Asia.
Reprinted by permission.
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David is our inaugural, and hopefully annual, fellow in CDDRL's new Democracy in Taiwan program. He is finishing a cross-country comparative study entitled The Social Basis of the Third Wave: Class, Development, and the Making of the Democratic State in East Asia. He looks in particular at late authoritarian Taiwan and contemporary Singapore. David is interested in the social basis of pro-democratic opposition movements and the political implications of various developmental strategies - corporatist versus pluralist, for example. David has been advised on his thesis by Lynne White, and Atul Kohli at Princeton, as well as Andy Nathan and Sheri Berman at Columbia and Barnard respectively. Before entering the doctoral program at Princeton, David completed an MBA in Economics and International Business at NYU, and a BSc in Computer Science at Brown.
Pamela Constable is the deputy foreign editor of The Washington Post. Previously she covered South Asia for The Washington Post for several years from April 1999, with extensive coverage of Afghanistan as well as both India and Pakistan.n She continues to visit and report from Afghanistan.
Before arriving in New Delhi in 1999, Constable worked for The Post from 1994 to 1998 covering immigration and Hispanic affairs in the Washington area, and reported from Honduras, El Salvador, Haiti and Cuba.
Prior to joining The Post, Constable worked for The Boston Globe as deputy Washington bureau chief and foreign policy reporter from June to September 1994. From 1983 until 1992, she was The Globe's roving foreign correspondent, Latin America correspondent and diplomatic correspondent. During this time she reported from Haiti, Chile, Peru, Argentina, Cuba, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico, South Korea, the Philippines, the Soviet Union and Brazil, as well as in Washington.
Her latest book is Fragments of Grace: My Search For Meaning in the Strife of South Asia. She is the co-author with Arturo Valenzuela of A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet and has written articles for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, Current History and other publications. She was awarded an Alicia Patterson Fellowship in 1990 and the Maria Moors Cabot Prize for coverage of Latin America in 1993. Constable is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. She received a B.A. from Brown University.
CISAC Conference Room
In this conversation, Huang and Diamond will talk about a variety of issues associated with notable challenges confronting democracy in Taiwan. Specifically, their topics will include Taiwan's democracy and China's democratic development, Taiwan's relations with the U.S., Cross-strait relations, and Taiwan's diplomacy.
The Honorable James C. F. Huang is Minister of Foreign Affairs of Republic of China (Taiwan). Before he was appointed Foreign Minister, Huang served as Deputy Secretary-General (2004-2005) and Director-General of Department of Public Affairs at Office of the President (2002-2004). He also served as Deputy Director-General (2001-2002) of Department of Information and Liaison and Senior Researcher (2000-2001) at Mainland Affairs Council of Executive Yuan.
Larry Diamond is Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy. At Stanford University, he is professor by courtesy of political science and sociology, and he coordinates the democracy program of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), within the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI).
Bechtel Conference Center
CDDRL
Stanford University
Encina Hall, C147
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Larry Diamond is the William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a Bass University Fellow in Undergraduate Education at Stanford University. He is also professor by courtesy of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford, where he lectures and teaches courses on democracy (including an online course on EdX). At the Hoover Institution, he co-leads the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region and participates in the Project on the U.S., China, and the World. At FSI, he is among the core faculty of the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, which he directed for six and a half years. He leads FSI’s Israel Studies Program and is a member of the Program on Arab Reform and Development. He also co-leads the Global Digital Policy Incubator, based at FSI’s Cyber Policy Center. He served for 32 years as founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy.
Diamond’s research focuses on global trends affecting freedom and democracy and on U.S. and international policies to defend and advance democracy. His book, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency, analyzes the challenges confronting liberal democracy in the United States and around the world at this potential “hinge in history,” and offers an agenda for strengthening and defending democracy at home and abroad. A paperback edition with a new preface was released by Penguin in April 2020. His other books include: In Search of Democracy (2016), The Spirit of Democracy (2008), Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (1999), Promoting Democracy in the 1990s (1995), and Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria (1989). He has edited or coedited more than fifty books, including China’s Influence and American Interests (2019, with Orville Schell), Silicon Triangle: The United States, China, Taiwan the Global Semiconductor Security (2023, with James O. Ellis Jr. and Orville Schell), and The Troubling State of India’s Democracy (2024, with Sumit Ganguly and Dinsha Mistree).
During 2002–03, Diamond served as a consultant to the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and was a contributing author of its report, Foreign Aid in the National Interest. He has advised and lectured to universities and think tanks around the world, and to the World Bank, the United Nations, the State Department, and other organizations dealing with governance and development. During the first three months of 2004, Diamond served as a senior adviser on governance to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. His 2005 book, Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq, was one of the first books to critically analyze America's postwar engagement in Iraq.
Among Diamond’s other edited books are Democracy in Decline?; Democratization and Authoritarianism in the Arab World; Will China Democratize?; and Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy, all edited with Marc F. Plattner; and Politics and Culture in Contemporary Iran, with Abbas Milani. With Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, he edited the series, Democracy in Developing Countries, which helped to shape a new generation of comparative study of democratic development.
Download full-resolution headshot; photo credit: Rod Searcey.
Ambassador James E. Goodby is a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a research affiliate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has held several senior government positions dedicated to arms control and nonproliferation, including deputy to the special adviser to the president and secretary of state on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 2000-2001; special representative of President Clinton for the security and dismantlement of nuclear weapons, 1995-1996; chief negotiator for nuclear threat reduction agreements, 1993-1994, and vice chair of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty talks, 1982-1983. He served as U.S. ambassador to Finland in 1980-1981.
Bart Bernstein is a Professor of American history at Stanford University. He has written very widely on post-World War II American history, including the surrender of Japan at the end of World War II, economic policy, diplomacy, nuclear history, and scientific discovery.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
The supermarket revolution has arrived in China and is spreading as fast as or faster than anywhere in the world. As the demand for vegetables, fruit, nuts and other high valued products has risen, urban retailers are handling increasingly more of these high value commodities. The experience of many developing countries suggests that there could be serious distributional impacts of the emergence of supermarkets. And, in China, as elsewhere in the world, there is concern among policy makers and academics that poor, small farmers might be excluded from the market for horticulture commodities.
The main goal of our paper is to understand what types of farmers have been able to participate in the horticultural revolution, how they interact with markets and how supply chains affect their production decisions and incomes. We also want to understand if (and if so, then how) the rise of supermarkets have changed supply chains. Our analysis uses spatially sampled data from 200 communities and 500 households in the Greater Beijing area and supplemented by data collected in Shandong Province, China's fruit and vegetable basket. In contrast to fears of some researchers, we find small and poor farmers have actively participate in the emergence of China's horticulture economy. Moreover, there has been almost no penetration of modern wholesalers or retailers into rural communities. We also conducted surveys and interviews in wholesale markets and with procurement agents in Beijing supermarket chains and document the fact that supply chain shifts have only affected the downstream segments of food markets and China's wholesale markets (midstream in the food supply chain) are only being affected marginally.