How do military allies come to find each other more dependable on security issues, instead of less comfortable with mutual reliance? How do rival nations manage to build confidence and shared expectations for a collaborative future, rather than fall into a spiral of suspicions over each other's strategic intentions? Leif-Eric Easley, the 2010-11 Northeast Asian History Fellow at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC), addresses these key questions in his recently completed dissertation, Perceived National Identity Differences and Strategic Trust: Explaining Post Cold-War Security Relations Among China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Examining post-1992 Northeast Asia, and drawing from a broad range of source materials in four languages, Dr. Easley argues that differences in how the policymaking elite in two countries perceive the national identity of one another determines the level of strategic trust between their governments. This ultimately affects patterns of cooperation on national and international security matters.

With a background in both political science and mathematics, and paying close attention to historical issues in East Asia, Dr. Easley earned his Ph.D. in Government from Harvard University in 2010. While at Shorenstein APARC, he is revising his dissertation into a book and will teach a course about nationalism and security relations in Northeast Asia. In a recent interview, Dr. Easley discussed his research and future plans.

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What is one of the most interesting and timely case studies that you examined?

Japan and China have had a very difficult time improving the level of strategic trust between them. The reasons for this are numerous. There are, of course, the historical legacies of Japanese colonialism, the Pacific War, and indeed hundreds of years of disagreements between China and Japan.

Even though those were largely papered over in favor of normalizing relations in the 1970s and then building up an economic relationship—China is now Japan's largest trading partner—a lot of that historical baggage was not fully unpacked. The Chinese say there are a lot of things the Japanese have not apologized for. The Japanese say that Beijing tends to use anti-Japanese nationalism for its own domestic purposes. At various points of time in the post-Cold War era—whether it has to do with the way that textbooks are being revised or how the Japanese prime minister periodically pays homage to Japan's war dead at the Yasakuni Shrine—Chinese nationalism has found expression in anti-Japanese protests.

My argument is that such historical antagonisms, among other things, bring to light the perceptions of identity difference between the two sides. The more severe the perceptions of difference, the more of a gap that elites in one country see between their national identity and the national identity of the other side, and the less trust the two sides are going to have. So these historical issues really weigh down on the level of strategic trust between Tokyo and Beijing. This is problematic—not just for dealing with pressing hard security issues like North Korea or trying to advance regional security architectures like the ASEAN Regional Forum—but also because strategic trust is very important for facilitating cooperation and avoiding conflict. Without a decent measure of trust, you do not have much margin for error when some unforeseen things happen, such as the recent incident over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

Based on your dissertation, what steps would you recommend for governments to build strategic trust?

A lot of work in both academic and policy circles has pointed to mechanisms like increasing exchanges and trying to cooperate on so-called "easy" issues to establish a pattern of cooperation. Meanwhile, politicians and diplomats tend to be concerned with different forms of political theater to produce positive headlines.

My theory suggests that if trust-building efforts do not actually change the deeply-held perceptions that each side maintains about the other's national identity, then you are not going to see a meaningful and lasting effect on the level of strategic trust. That is not to say that exchanges and trying to rack up points on easy issues is not worth doing or will not ultimately have some positive effect. But the sorts of events and actions that really change perceptions and then can allow for meaningful changes in strategic trust are those that help redefine the relationship or the way that one side looks at the other.

For example, if Japan were to have an entirely different memorial site where its leaders could remember and honor Japan's veterans, separate from a shrine that has a certain view of history associated with it that is very objectionable to its neighbors, this could be something that would help change perceptions. Contrast that to a carefully worded speech by a prime minister. Japan has actually apologized dozens of times and yet the problem is still there. Those apologies, as well-meaning as they may be, have not significantly changed identity perceptions and hence we do not see much improvement in strategic trust between Beijing and Tokyo.

Another example would be dealing with some of the recent maritime disputes. If the China-Japan relationship had more strategic trust, it might be able to encapsulate those issues and not let them derail the relationship. But this is not yet the case. Coming to a greater level of agreement about how to deal with economic zones and how to pursue joint development of underwater gas deposits could really do a lot to improve perceptions on both sides. This would ameliorate Japanese perceptions of an aggressive Chinese identity, and help resolve a hot-button nationalist issue between the two populations. Real improvement in identity perceptions, such that each side thinks better of the other's international role and national characteristics, would allow Japan and China to realize a more stable, trusting relationship.

What is the course that you will offer at Stanford and what approach will you take to teaching?

The course will be about nationalism and security relations in Northeast Asia. I am hoping to engage these issues with some fresh perspective. What I want to do is provide students with background on the different forms of nationalist conflict in Northeast Asia to help them understand where these historical legacies and identity frictions come from. These are really contemporarily relevant issues. I will ask students to write on a very specific topic—a nationalist issue of their choice—and develop not only their own analysis, but also some of their own suggestions. This is a lot to expect, but I anticipate that the students are going to be up to the challenge. The students will probably come from different fields—including political science, history, sociology, and Asian studies. I think that with their diverse backgrounds, they will benefit from the environment here at Shorenstein APARC.

Shorenstein APARC is really special among centers—nationally and even internationally—in the way that it brings together academic rigor, policy relevance, and policy experience. We have top-flight academics, and we also have very distinguished policymakers, who bring a wealth of experience to the table. With more exchange between the academic and the policymaking communities, both sides stand to benefit tremendously. Shorenstein APARC is one of the few places that is doing this, and doing it so well. 

Do you hope to work in academia or government, or serve in both fields?

I plan to pursue an academic career, but at the same time to produce research and publications with policy relevance. Teaching is incredibly important because there is more and more demand among students with interest in Asia, and increasing demand across sectors for people who have expertise in Asian history and political economics. Teaching is an opportunity, not only to help prepare the next generation of experts, but also to improve my research and writing through interaction with students. Likewise, being able to take a sabbatical to serve in an advisory role at the U.S. Department of State, the Pentagon, or National Security Council would be a great opportunity to have real-world impact on the incredibly pressing issues in U.S.-Asia relations. Policy work is also a chance to expand one's own skillset and basis of research. 

Take for example, Thomas Christensen of Princeton University and Victor Cha of Georgetown University. Both are strong academics, who publish in top academic journals and produce academic books. They also served in the State Department and National Security Council respectively. After making positive contributions on the policy side, they returned to their universities with firsthand knowledge of the complex relationship between theory and practice. I hope to one day have an opportunity for public service and then return to academia with experience that is of value to my research and of value to my students.

Studies show high levels of anemia, nearsightedness, intestinal worms, and poor health and sanitation among children in China’s rural boarding schools. This project will measure initial health and nutrition levels of students in a randomized control setting, and deploy a set of affordable and sustainable interventions in treatment schools that includes multivitamins, eyeglasses, deworming medication, and nutrition and sanitation training. The project will then assess what works and what does not by comparing improvements in academic performance in treatment and control groups. The results of this experiment are intended to inform education and nutrition policy in China at the central and provincial levels.

Co-Principal Investigators on the project include Paul H. Wise, professor of pediatrics, FSI senior fellow, and Patricia Foo, MD/PhD student, economics. The grant, one of six offered by FSI, is intended to jumpstart early-stage multidisciplinary research projects that tackle the persistent problems of global under development.

Relations between the United States and South Korea today are stronger than ever, as reflected in President Barack Obama's recent announcement of his commitment with President Lee Myung-bak to ratifying the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) free trade agreement, the United States' largest free trade agreement since NAFTA. At the same time, the North Korean government's increasing aggressiveness amidst an impending leadership change in Pyongyang poses a serious challenge to the U.S.-South Korean longstanding alliance. Just one week after North Korea attacked the South Korean island of Yeonpyong, killing four people, Northeast Asia experts from the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) met in Seoul with scholars and former senior officials from the United States and South Korea to discuss the alliance, policy toward North Korea, and regional dynamics within Northeast Asia.

The Stanford scholars and experts visited Seoul in connection with two Shorenstein APARC initiatives by director Gi-Wook Shin, the Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum and the New Beginnings policy study group. Not surprisingly, their discussions focused on how to interpret and counter North Korea's recent heightened belligerence, including not only the Yeonpyeong attack but also the sinking of a South Korean navy vessel in March of this year with the loss of 46 sailors.

David Straub, associate director of Shorenstein APARC's Stanford Korean Studies Program, notes that this was the first time since the Korean War ended in 1953 that North Korea has attacked South Korean territory. "This [attack on Yeonpyeong Island] is something that frightened the South Koreans," he says, "It was unexpected and unprecedented. With North Korea moving toward putting Kim Jong-il's son in place as his successor, people in South Korea assume there is a lot of potential instability in the North and that this may be driving some of North Korea's actions. There is a lot of concern among the average South Korean now about what North Korea might do."

Shin initiated the West Coast Strategic Forum in 2006 to give greater voice to the many prominent Korea experts on the U.S. West Coast on Korea-related issues, and to serve as an ongoing forum for the exchange of views on issues of significance to the U.S.-South Korea alliance. This most recent meeting of the Forum was the fifth session. Strategic Forum workshops are held semi-annually, alternating between Stanford and Seoul. The Sejong Institute is Shorenstein APARC's Korean counterpart organization. In addition, American and Korean participants maintain frequent contact among themselves via telephone and e-mail, and they travel individually to each other's country on a regular basis to keep abreast of alliance developments.

The New Beginnings policy study group was established in 2008, after a decade of rocky U.S.-South Korea relations, with the promise of new presidential administrations in both countries. "We were optimistic that relations could be improved and wanted to contribute to that effort," says Straub. The ten members of New Beginnings, leading scholars and experts on Northeast Asian affairs throughout the United States, usually meet as a group for workshop discussions once or twice each year, and travel together occasionally for on-site discussions in Seoul, Washington, D.C., and New York. Shorenstein APARC has partnered with The Korea Society of New York City on this project. The group annually prepares a report for the U.S. administration with recommendations for strengthening its alliance with South Korea.

During the meetings in South Korea, discussions about the alliance focused, in part, on how to deter future attacks from North Korea, and how to better respond-individually and jointly-in the event of another assault. The intended ratification of the KORUS FTA was also discussed. According to Straub, the KORUS FTA is generally viewed favorably in South Korea and is likely to be ratified despite resistance from South Korea's opposition party. With South Korea's total future trade with China soon expected to amount to more than its combined trade with the United States and Japan, the FTA will not only significantly bolster U.S.-South Korea trade, it will also broaden and deepen the alliance relationship. "From a South Korean perspective it helps to maintain some balance in overall relations between the United States and China," states Straub, "It also serves as a precedent for South Korea's intended negotiations with other countries for free trade agreements. In the United States, President Obama has linked it to his plan to double export growth by 2015."

Shorenstein APARC plans to continue holding meetings of both the West Coast Forum and New Beginnings. "Even though overall government-to-government relations are at their best ever," says Straub, "there are continuing political divisions in South Korea on issues of importance to the relationship and North Korea's behavior is getting increasingly worse. We think that there is reason to continue the New Beginnings project for some time to come." In addition to better informing policymakers in the United States and South Korea, the meetings of the Forum and of the New Beginnings policy group strengthen the scholarship of the participants, and all public documents, including the annual reports to the U.S. administration, are published on the Shorenstein APARC website.

 

CISAC scholars made international news in November after North Korean scientists revealed to them that they had started construction on a small light-water reactor and completed a new uranium enrichment facility. The revelation dramatically changes the security calculus in Northeast Asia. In a Foreign Affairs article, Siegfried S. Hecker argues that denuclearization remains the goal. But that will take time. Now Washington should pursue a policy that begins with what he calls "the three no's -- no more bombs, no better bombs, and no exports -- in return for one yes: Washington's willingness to seriously address North Korea's fundamental insecurity." In a piece in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Hecker said "this approach may just be enough to get Beijing to take a much more aggressive stance to help shut down Pyongyang's nuclear import and export networks."