Join members from the Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age for a panel discussion and Q&A, moderated by Frank Fukuyama, Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), on the opportunities and challenges for electoral integrity created by technological innovations. The panel will explore the challenges to electoral integrity arising from the global spread of digital technologies and social media platforms, policy measures that can address these challenges, and opportunities that technological innovation offers for strengthening electoral integrity and political participation.

About the Commission:

Kofi Annan was a lifelong advocate for the right of every citizen to have a say in how they are governed, and by whom. He was adamant that democratic governance and citizen empowerment were integral elements to achieving sustainable development, security and lasting peace, and this principle guides much of the work of the Foundation, most notably the Electoral Integrity Initiative. As one of his last major initiatives, in 2018 Mr. Annan convened the Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age. The Commission named Stephen Stedman, senior fellow at FSI and deputy director of CDDRL to serve as its Secretary General. The chair of the commission is former president of Costa Rica, Laura Chinchilla. They are joined by Nathaniel Persily, Stanford Law Professor, and Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the former president of Estonia who is now an affiliate of FSI’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and other members from civil society and government, the technology sector, academia and media.

RSVP: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/elections-and-democracy-in-the-digital-age…

Abstract:

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This is part 2 of a talk presenting how innovative large Japanese companies are harnessing Silicon Valley. It is a review of the fireside chats and panels presented at the Silicon Valley – New Japan Summit last November at Stanford, which was in Japanese. The talk adds some historical context, and introduces through many of the company cases from the summit, including Panasonic, Fuji Film, Itochu, Rakuten, Obayashi, Nomura Holdings, Sourcenext, Komatsu, SMBC, and Toyota Research Institute.

The current surge of large Japanese companies into Silicon Valley is focused on firms aiming to identify new opportunities to collaborate with the startup ecosystem in order to understand future technological and industry trajectories, to facilitate new forms of “open” innovation within the company, and in some cases to even redefine how to add value to their core offerings. However, given a vast differently economic context from their core operations in Japan, many of the large Japanese firms’ initial forays tend to fall into patterns of “worst practices” that are ineffective. Yet, a small but growing number of innovative Japanese companies are producing novel and valuable collaborations with a variety of Silicon Valley firms, investors, and ecosystem players. The talk will survey a range of strategic options available to Japanese companies, with implications for how to better adapt companies from Japan to Silicon Valley, and more broadly from different political economic systems.

SPEAKER:

Kenji Kushida, Research Scholar, Shorenstein APARC Japan Program and Stanford Silicon Valley-New Japan Project Leader

BIO:

Kenji E. Kushida is the Japan Program Research Scholar at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University (APARC), Project Leader of the Stanford Silicon Valley – New Japan Project (Stanford SV-NJ), research affiliate of the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (BRIE), International Research Fellow at the Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS), and Visiting Researcher at National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA). He holds a PhD in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, an MA in East Asian studies and BAs in economics and East Asian studies, all from Stanford University.

Kushida’s research streams include 1) Information Technology innovation, 2) Silicon Valley’s economic ecosystem, 3) Japan’s political economic transformation since the 1990s, and 4) the Fukushima nuclear disaster. He has published several books and numerous articles in each of these streams, including “The Politics of Commoditization in Global ICT Industries,” “Japan’s Startups Ecosystem,” “Cloud Computing: From Scarcity to Abundance,” and others. His latest business book in Japanese is “The Algorithmic Revolution’s Disruption: a Silicon Valley Vantage on IoT, Fintech, Cloud, and AI” (Asahi Shimbun Shuppan 2016).

He has appeared in media including The New York Times, Washington Post, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Nikkei Business, NHK, PBS NewsHour, and NPR.

He is also a trustee of the Japan ICU Foundation, a fellow of the US-Japan Leadership Program, an alumni of the Trilateral Commission David Rockefeller Fellows, and a member of the Mansfield Foundation Network for the Future.

AGENDA:

4:15pm: Doors open
4:30pm-5:30pm: Talk and Discussion
5:30pm-6:00pm: Networking

RSVP REQUIRED:

Register to attend at http://www.stanford-svnj.org/12819

This event is co-sponsored with The Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies.

Abstract:

Severe polarization is a global threat that has detrimental effects on democracy and well-being. What can citizens and collective actors such as political parties do to reverse polarization and to sustain democracy in affected polities? The triggers of current polarizations across the world often are political and thus intentional: they exemplify various forms of “the politics of transforming through polarizing,” which are aimed at achieving wide-scale transformations in political-economic institutions and policies. Yet, as these polarizations take a life of their own, the causal mechanisms that render them pernicious gain a structural nature. They lock in both the incumbents and the oppositions in a downward spiral of polarization-cum-democratic erosion, generating many unintended consequences. With comparative examples from various polities, this talk will discuss a political and relational notion of polarization, the dilemmas faced by opposition actors who want to reverse polarization and democratic backsliding, and implications for theory and policy.

Speaker Bio:

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Murat Somer is a Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Koç University and a Visiting Scholar at the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies at Stanford University. His research on democratization and autocratization, polarization, ethnic conflicts, religious and secular politics, political Islam, and the Kurdish question have been published in books, book volumes and journals such as Comparative Political Studies and Democratization. His book on the Turkish and Kurdish Question won a Sedat Simavi Social Sciences Prize in 2015 and he recently co-edited two special journal volumes on polarization, democracy and democratic erosion across the world. Among other visiting appointments, Somer was a Democracy and Development Fellow at Princeton University, a Senior Visiting Scholar at Stockholm University, and a Visiting Scholar at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. He has been a frequent contributor to Turkish and international media and he is working on a research and book project that explores the multiple paths through which polarizing politics lead to authoritarianism, and what pro-democracy citizens and political actors can and cannot do to sustain democracy.

Offensive cyber operations have become increasingly important elements of U.S. national security policy. From the deployment of Stuxnet to disrupt Iranian centrifuges to the possible use of cyber methods against North Korean ballistic missile launches, the prominence of offensive cyber capabilities as instruments of national power continues to grow. Yet conceptual thinking lags behind the technical development of these new weapons. How might offensive cyber operations be used in coercion or conflict? What strategic considerations should guide their development and use? What intelligence capabilities are required for cyber weapons to be effective? How do escalation dynamics and deterrence work in cyberspace? What role does the private sector play?

In this volume, edited by Herbert Lin and Amy Zegart—co-directors of the Stanford Cyber Policy Program—leading scholars and practitioners explore these and other vital questions about the strategic uses of offensive cyber operations. The contributions to this groundbreaking volume address the key technical, political, psychological, and legal dimensions of the fast-changing strategic landscape.

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Dr. Herb Lin is senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University. He is chief scientist emeritus for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board at the National Academies. He served on President Barack Obama’s Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity.

Dr. Amy Zegart is the Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and professor of political science, by courtesy, at Stanford University. Her previous books include Political Risk: How Businesses and Organizations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity, with Condoleezza Rice; and Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11.

ABOUT THE EDITORS

Dr. Sameer Bhalotra is the Co-founder & Executive Chairman of StackRox, and is a CISAC affiliate. He is also affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), UC Berkeley’s Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity (CLTC), and Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. He previously worked in cybersecurity at Google and as COO at Impermium (acquired by Google). In government, he served as Senior Director for Cybersecurity on the National Security Council staff at the White House, Cybersecurity & Technology Lead for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and in various roles in the Intelligence Community.

Abstract: My research focuses on the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster and on the release of radioactive contamination throughout Japan. Based on 14 months of fieldwork in Japan, the research examines the crisis of expertise that ensued when many citizens became wary of state institutional experts, especially in their capacities to explain and manage the problems engendered by residual radioactivity.In this context of public skepticism, I ask the following: how does the Japanese state attempt to govern the hazards of radioactive contamination, and ultimately, the reconstruction of normality in the aftermath of a nuclear disaster? I argue that the management of radiation hazard after Fukushima includes an important reorganization of state expertise, which now moves beyond traditional forms of risk communication and institutional experts.My research advances policyand public-relevant understandings of repliesto radioactive contamination by highlighting the needs of appropriate educational infrastructure around radiation risk, while emphasizing democratic opportunity for citizen-government collaboration. Within post-Fukushima Japan, anthropological investigations of the governance of radiation hazards are essential for understanding the configurations of cultural schemas, social relationships, and technological interplays that led individuals to “accept” life amidst toxicity and other to refuse it.

Speaker's Biography: Maxime Polleri is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Anthropology at York University. His current research focuses on the 2011 Fukushima Dai’ichi nuclear disaster and on the crisis of expertise that ensued, in which many citizens have become wary of state institutional experts, especially in their capacities to manage the problems engendered by residual radioactivity. In such a context, his dissertation is concerned with how the Fukushima crisis has participated in the formations of new forms of expertise and consequently, new means of governing toxicity. It asks: How is radioactive hazard being governed in the wake of a crisis of legitimacy against state institutional expert? Based on 14 months of ethnographic fieldwork throughout Japan, the dissertation argues that averting the crisis of expertise and managing the reconstruction of what “normality” involves in a post-Fukushima Japan include a fundamental reorganization of state governance, where the dissemination of radiation hazards cannot simply rest on dry, clinical manner in which government-packaged expertise about radiation was initially promulgated to a former lay public. In particular, these shift in the governance of radioactive risk are increasingly being enacted by promoting a state-sponsored affective embodiment toward nuclear matter, as well as by encouraging the endeavor of citizen science, where former lay citizens now track and monitor residual radioactivity in their environment. His fieldwork was funded by the Japan Foundation and the Canada Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. His work has been published in Anthropology Now, Anthropology Today, and Medical Anthropology Quarterly Second Spear.

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Abstract: Nuclear disarmament treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them towards a treaty partner’s obligation. A team of scientists working at MIT has developed two novel concepts which leverage isotope-specific nuclear resonance phenomena to authenticate a warhead's fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template.  Most actinides such as uranium and plutonium exhibit unique sets of resonances when interacting with MeV photons and eV neutrons. When measured, these resonances produce isotope-specific features in the spectral data, thus creating an isotopic  "fingerprint" of an object. All information in these measurement has to be and is encrypted in the physical domain in a manner that amounts to a physical zero-knowledge proof system. Using Monte Carlo simulations and experimental proof-of-concept measurements these techniques are shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. These new methodologies can dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.  The talk will discuss the concepts and recent results, and will give a general overview of nuclear security research pursued at MIT.

Bio: Areg Danagoulian is an Assistant Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering at MIT.  He did his PhD research in Experimental Nuclear Physics at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Areg’s PhD thesis focused on experiments that used real Compton scattering on the proton at 2-6 GeV, allowing to probe the proton's internal structure and understand how it couples to external excitations. After his PhD Areg worked at Los Alamos as a postdoctoral researcher, and then as a senior scientist at Passport Systems, Inc. (PSI). At PSI Areg focused on the development of Prompt Neutron from Photofission (PNPF) technique, which allows to rapidly detect shielded fissionable materials in the commercial cargo traffic. Areg's current research interests focus on scientific applications in nuclear security, such areas nuclear nonproliferation, technologies for treaty verification, nuclear safeguards, and cargo security. Current specific research areas include:  warhead verification using nuclear resonances;  use of nuclear reactions for high precision radiography in nuclear security applications.