The Democratic Party platform states that Democrats believe that the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons should be to deter and—if necessary, retaliate against—a nuclear attack. Presidential candidate Joe Biden has said the same. The sole purpose would mark a significant change in U.S. nuclear policy, eliminating ambiguity that preserves the option to use nuclear weapons first in response to a conventional attack. Adopting the sole purpose is a sensible step that would foreclose an option that no president has ever chosen . . . or ever would. 

Extreme Circumstances 

The U.S. government has long taken the position that it would use nuclear weapons only in “extreme circumstances” in which the vital interests of the United States, its allies or partners were at stake. That formulation leaves ambiguity as to whether an American president might in some cases decide to use nuclear weapons first. Indeed, it explicitly preserves that possibility.

When the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact held large numerical advantages in conventional military forces during the Cold War, U.S. and NATO officials maintained an explicit option for deliberate escalation to nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict where they were losing at the conventional level. That might have contributed to the deterrence of a conventional conflict, but such escalation would have entailed enormous risks: once the nuclear threshold was crossed, where would matters stop? Many analysts question the ability to control escalation once nuclear weapons enter into use. As reported by Fred Kaplan in The Bomb, in 2017, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis asked a group of senior Pentagon officials if they believed that nuclear war could be controlled; only one thought that it was possible. 

The Obama administration’s 2010 nuclear posture review sought to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy. The document stated that “the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.” If such a non-nuclear weapons state attacked America or an American ally or partner with conventional, chemical or biological weapons, this negative security assurance meant that the U.S. military response would not be nuclear. (The review did contain a footnote to the effect that developments in biological weapons might lead Washington to revisit the negative security assurance.)

The 2010 nuclear posture review also stated that the United States would resort to nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances and that the “fundamental purpose” of U.S. nuclear arms was to deter a nuclear attack on America, its allies or its partners. That language left open the possibility of a nuclear response to a conventional attack by a nuclear weapons state or another country not covered by the negative security assurance. The review added that the United States would “continue to strengthen its conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks” with the goal of making deterring nuclear attacks the sole purpose of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

The Trump administration’s 2018 nuclear posture review reflected continuity with its predecessor in some ways but diverged in others. Instead of reducing the role of nuclear weapons and rejecting new nuclear weapons, the 2018 review called for new “supplemental” nuclear capabilities: a low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead and low-yield warhead for a sea-launched cruise missile. While reiterating that the United States would use nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances, the review said that those circumstances included “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks” on U.S., allied and partner civilian populations, U.S. and allied nuclear forces, nuclear command and control systems, or warning and attack assessment capabilities. Many observers believed that the language broadened the circumstances for nuclear use, at least compared to Obama administration policy, particularly given President Donald Trump’s threats, some veiled and others more explicit, to use nuclear weapons. 

The Trump administration’s nuclear posture review did restate the Obama administration’s negative security assurance, though its version reserved an unnecessarily broader right to reconsider the assurance. (The Obama administration’s footnote, which focused solely on developments in the biological weapons field, is more appropriate.) 

Nuke a Nuclear Weapons State? 

The Obama/Trump negative security assurance covers 95 percent of the nations in the world. The possibility of the United States using nuclear weapons relates to just a handful of countries: nuclear weapons states and countries which Washington judges not to be in full compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations (only Iran and Syria are thought of in this context). The countries of greatest relevance boil down to Russia, China and North Korea. 

Of the two major potential adversaries, China has long had a declared policy of no first use of nuclear arms, though some question whether Beijing would abide by this declaration in all scenarios. Russian declaratory policy states that Russia would resort to nuclear weapons only if nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction were used against Russia or a Russian ally, or if there were a conventional attack on Russia that put the existence of the state at stake. 

What scenarios might lead to U.S. consideration of nuclear first use? One could be a conventional NATO-Russia conflict in the Baltic region in which the Russian military attains or is on the verge of attaining victory given its regional advantages. NATO overall has more powerful conventional forces, but marshaling them would take time. In this scenario, would an American president really decide to launch a nuclear attack on Russian forces on a NATO member’s territory or Russia itself? He or she would have to weigh the high probability of nuclear retaliation, including against the U.S. homeland. The president almost certainly would set aside the nuclear option, opting for time to build up American and NATO conventional forces for a counter-offensive.

Another scenario could involve a conflict with China in which the Chinese military, using its large arsenal of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles, pushes back U.S. naval and air forces. How successful a Chinese offensive might be given the spectrum of U.S. conventional capabilities, perhaps augmented by those of U.S. allies, is unclear. However, going nuclear would mean striking China directly. Again, the president would have to consider the very real prospect that Beijing would respond with a nuclear attack against American military bases in the Pacific, such as Guam, or against the United States. Again, he or she almost certainly would look for conventional options, even if they would take time. 

The Trump administration’s nuclear posture review raised another scenario: a significant non-nuclear strategic attack. Say that Russia launched a cyber strike on the U.S. electric power network, bringing down most of the grid from Boston to Washington, DC. That could prove a calamity, but would a U.S. president conclude that using nuclear weapons against the attacker, and then absorbing a nuclear counter-attack, would improve the situation? No, he or she almost certainly would order conventional and cyber counter-strikes, especially if there was the slightest doubt about correctly attributing the attack—a real question in the murky cyber world. 

As for North Korea, if struck first by U.S. nuclear weapons in a conflict, is there any doubt that Kim Jong-un would strike back with his nuclear arms? 

Escalating a conflict by introducing the use of nuclear arms is a scary, if not terrifying, proposition. It entails opening a Pandora’s box of unpredictable and potentially catastrophic consequences—especially when U.S. nuclear weapons would be used against a country that could strike back with its own nuclear arms. 

A Declaratory Policy That Lacks Credibility 

Those opposed to the sole purpose argue that the current ambiguity about U.S. readiness to use nuclear weapons first contributes to the deterrence of adversaries and the assurance of allies. That is a serious argument, but it made far more sense during the Cold War when the choice that might confront U.S. and NATO leaders was to use nuclear weapons or lose the war. Maintaining that ambiguity carries risks. Given the prospect of nuclear escalation once any nuclear weapons are used, and the changes in conventional force balances over the past thirty years, the chance that an American president would choose to use nuclear weapons first is vanishingly small. In virtually every conceivable scenario, he or she would look for other options, since the likely nuclear retaliation for a first-use effort by the United States would inevitably turn a bad situation into something much worse. 

Does it make sense to continue a declaratory policy aimed at deterring adversaries and assuring allies and partners that, on serious examination, neither foes nor friends would find credible? As America’s allies and partners see the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons first lacking credibility, that could undermine their confidence in the U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack on them. 

Eliminating the ambiguity by adopting the sole purpose might not provide a huge security bonus, but it would have a positive security impact. Russia likely would not follow, at least not in the near term. However, the change could help defuse the current situation, in which both Washington and Moscow believe that the other seeks to lower the nuclear threshold and thus is adjusting its own nuclear policy accordingly. It is not in the U.S. interest that the Russians believe America might go nuclear first and develop (or further develop) a posture to beat Washington to the nuclear punch. That fosters conditions that could be very dangerous in a conventional crisis or conflict and make nuclear use more likely.

Adopting the sole purpose would send an interesting signal to China. Some analysts question whether Beijing will continue to adhere to a no first use policy, but the Pentagon reports that “China almost certainly keeps the majority of its nuclear force on a peacetime status—with separated launchers, missiles, and warheads,” a posture consistent with that policy. Adoption of the sole purpose could open the path to a strategic security dialogue with Beijing that has eluded Washington for years. It would raise the political costs to China of abandoning its no first use posture. A change in American policy might even help avoid the development of a U.S.-China nuclear standoff somewhat similar to that between Washington and Moscow during the Cold War. 

The adoption of a sole-purpose policy would reduce the ability of a U.S. president to use nuclear weapons for saber-rattling. But giving up the option to rattle a saber that the adversary believes Washington would never draw seems to give up little.

A Nuclear Taboo?

It has been seventy-five years since the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan at the conclusion of World War II. Since then, neither America nor any other country has used nuclear arms in anger. Some suggest a taboo against nuclear use has developed. 

The taboo is informal, not fixed by international agreement. It would benefit U.S. and allied security were non-use of nuclear weapons to become a widely accepted and entrenched international norm. The United States has powerful conventional forces, favorable geography and the world’s largest network of allies, so reducing the possibility of nuclear use seems very much in the U.S. interest, reducing one of the few existential threats to America’s existence. Sole purpose would help bolster that norm.

Adopting sole purpose would mark a significant change in U.S. policy. Washington should do so only after consulting with NATO and key allies in the Pacific region. Importantly, the sole purpose would not close the U.S. nuclear umbrella; it would mean that U.S. nuclear weapons would be used in an ally’s defense only after the other side had gone nuclear. Unlike nuclear first use, the threat of nuclear retaliation after a nuclear attack is credible. 

The next U.S. nuclear posture review should, following such consultations, adopt sole purpose as the reason for U.S. nuclear weapons. That would change a dynamic that now has possible adversaries designing potentially dangerous policies and postures in a belief that the United States is lowering its threshold for use of nuclear weapons and could go nuclear first. It would boost the establishment of an international norm against any nuclear weapons use. It could help make Americans safer. And the only cost: abandoning an option that an American president would never use and whose threat has little credibility.

Steven Pifer is a William Perry Research Fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a retired U.S. Foreign Service officer.

Originally for The National Interest

Applications opened last week for the China Scholars Program (CSP), Sejong Korea Scholars Program (SKSP), and Reischauer Scholars Program (RSP) on Japan—three intensive online courses offered by SPICE, Stanford University, to high school students across the United States. All three applications can now be viewed at https://spicestanford.smapply.io/. Interested students must submit their completed application (including an essay and letter of recommendation) by the deadlines listed below.

Spring 2021 Online Course Application Deadlines

China Scholars Program: October 16, 2020
Sejong Korea Scholars Program: October 16, 2020
Reischauer Scholars Program: October 16, 2020

All three online courses are currently accepting applications for the Spring 2021 term, which will begin in February and run through June. Designed as college-level introductions to East Asia, these academically rigorous courses present high school students the unique opportunity to engage in a guided study of China, Korea, or Japan directly with leading scholars, former diplomats, and other experts from Stanford and beyond. High school students with a strong interest in East Asia and/or international relations are especially encouraged to apply.

“U.S. relations with East Asia is prominently featured in the news daily,” says Naomi Funahashi, instructor of the Reischauer Scholars Program. “SPICE is incredibly fortunate to have Stanford faculty conducting cutting-edge research on Korea, Japan, and China who are willing to help our students interpret key historical events and understand contemporary topics related to security, trade, and politics.”

Rising high school sophomores, juniors, and seniors in the United States are eligible to apply to any of the three programs. Students who are interested in more than one program can apply to two or three and rank their preferences on their applications; those who are accepted into multiple programs will be invited to enroll in their highest-preference course.

For more information on a specific course, please refer to its individual webpage at chinascholars.org, sejongscholars.org, or reischauerscholars.org.

The RSP, SKSP, and CSP are SPICE’s online courses for high school students. In addition, we offer online courses for high school students in Japan (Stanford e-Japan) and China (Stanford e-China). To be notified when the next application period opens, join our email list or follow us on Facebook, Twitter, or Instagram.

Amidst the hectic year known as 2020, I started and finished SPICE’s Sejong Korea Scholars Program (SKSP), an online program offered through Stanford for high school students interested in Korea. The program was challenging but also rewarding; I honestly loved every moment of it.

My interest in Korea began when I was in elementary school. Growing up in Queens, New York, a New York City borough with a diverse population, Korean culture was introduced to me in the form of food. Although some may think all Asian food is the same, as a Chinese American, I know how vastly different Korean food can be from Chinese food. My Korean American classmates would bring in Korean foods for lunch—kimchi, gimbap, galbi—and because I had never seen it before, I’d always want to know how it tasted. Luckily for me, Queens had a sizable ethnic Korean population and with that came great Korean restaurants. I was a frequent visitor to these tasty restaurants. Through this, I became interested in learning more about Korea, but outside of food, a few videos I had watched, and some information from my classmates, I didn’t know much, if anything at all, about Korea.

Heading into the SKSP, I was worried I didn’t know as much as my classmates. When I started the SKSP, all of my worries subsided. You didn’t need a strong background on Korea or in Korean. I was told that the most important thing to have is a genuine interest or curiosity about the topic, which was something I did have. I also have to say that my classmates were some of the most motivated students I’ve ever met.

And during our biweekly meetings, we would attend lectures with experts on Korea and professionals who worked with Korea. Something interesting I learned from a lecture was that the “BBC Dad” Professor Robert Kelly is a political analyst on Korean affairs, which I don’t find to be a coincidence; instead, learning the fact that Professor Kelly is an expert on Korea shows how widespread and important the study of Korea today is.

We explored a bit of pre-nineteenth century Korean history and then explored more on religions in Korea, colonial Korea, the division of Korea and the Korean War, post-war Korea, the divergence of North and South Korea, and trends in South Korean culture including bits about chaebols and the Hallyu wave. I found a particular interest in the Korean diaspora in Japan, which I learned about when learning about Korea in its colonial period. And because the SKSP has a research component, I wrote my paper on that and enjoyed my time so much because it was a topic I genuinely wanted to learn more about. After completing my paper, I was led to Min Jin Lee’s novel Pachinko, a historical fiction about a Korean family in Japan, and found myself so invested because I had some background knowledge.

Starting the course before the pandemic and completing it during the pandemic was interesting, to say the least. When the coronavirus situation took a turn for the worse, my high school courses scrambled to finish the year, but the SKSP went on normally, and I was able to invest more time into learning about Korea. I have to give props to the course instructor, Dr. HyoJung Jang, and the program coordinator Jonas Edman for keeping the course running smoothly through a worldwide crisis and helping us students with any questions and issues we had.

I participated in the SKSP as a senior in high school, and having taken it right before college has been incredible. This course has helped develop my self-driven learning skills, which I believe will be unimaginably beneficial for me as I head off to begin my first year of college. The SKSP is a college-level course that teaches in the same way college courses are taught, and right now, I find that my experience with the SKSP has prepared me for my college classes that I have only recently started.

The SKSP has furthered my interest in international relations, which I hope to major in at the University of Pennsylvania where I am a freshman this fall. I am definitely looking forward to furthering my knowledge of Korea and hope I am able to visit one day after traveling is safe once again. For me, as someone who came into the SKSP with a curiosity and left with even more, I can’t wait to continue on my path of learning. For those interested in the SKSP, I say go for it. It has changed not only how much I know about the world, but also how I perceive it. I hope SPICE continues to offer this terrific opportunity and students take this opportunity, so they can make a difference in the world.