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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/Ot8lMxDSb34

 

About the Event: This paper addresses a single question: What explains the lack of civil war recurrence in El Salvador since the 1992 Chapultepec Accords? This lack of recurrence presents a unique puzzle given the fact that the civil war’s underlying causes remain unresolved. A well-established body of scholarship has identified a host of variables critical in explaining civil war recurrence, but much less ink has been spilled to explain non-recurrence. As such, I examine the factors identified in scholarship to be correlated with civil war recurrence to determine what they might tell us about civil war non-recurrence. I argue that the civil war non-recurrence in El Salvador rests not only on the durability of the agreement’s coercive/military and political provisions but also on the rebel group’s organizational design. To test this argument, I process trace along the recurrence variables and find support for my argument.   

 

About the Speaker: Meg K. Guliford is a Penn Provost Postdoctoral Fellow in residence at Perry World House. Her broad research agenda reflects an interest in political violence, conflict processes, and U.S. foreign policy. Her research has been supported by the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Eisenhower Institute. Guliford’s career in the federal government began as a Presidential Management Fellow for the U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters and has included a civilian deployment to Iraq and work for the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Guliford will receive her Ph.D. in International Relations from Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. She received her M.P.P. from the Harvard Kennedy School and a B.A. from the University of Pennsylvania.

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Meg K. Guliford Provost Postdoctoral Fellow University of Pennsylvania
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Eileen Donahoe
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The incoming Biden-Harris administration will face many urgent and competing priorities as it seeks to signal a distinct shift from the Trump presidency. In the technology policy realm alone, there are many challenges to confront. Chief among them is the urgent need to solidify international support for a values-based vision of “the internet” and a compelling democratic approach to governance of digital society.

Solidifying an open democratic vision of digital society will require robust diplomacy in three areas. First, we must rebuild global commitment to an open, interoperable, secure and reliable internet and to international norms in the cyber realm. Second, we must lead the development of a shared understanding of what democratic, human rights-based governance of digital society entails. Third, we must bring our democratic allies together around a shared strategic technology agenda.

As context for these efforts, we must start by acknowledging that the original U.S. vision of a global, open, interoperable, internet has been clouded by two big trends: first, heightened anxiety within democracies about the myriad risks associated with connectivity and digitization, and second, perhaps more importantly, competition from a much darker vision of digital authoritarianism.

The digital transformation of society has brought profound change to every aspect of connected society and dramatically altered the context for democratic governance. “The internet” has become the infrastructure of society, moving well beyond its early core function of facilitating instantaneous global communication. The wide array of advanced technologies that are now intertwined with all sectors of society have created new vulnerabilities for many aspects of public and private life.

While digitization obviously has yielded substantial benefits, democratic governments are struggling to meet their basic obligations to protect the liberty and security of citizens in this radically changed context. Digitization has created security risks for personal data, confidential communications, and connected infrastructure. Democratic governments are now seized with the fact that digital information platforms have been exploited by malign actors to spread propaganda and disinformation, wreaking havoc on democratic elections and eroding trust in the digital information realm. These threats are testing the ability of democratic governments to protect fundamental freedoms like privacy, free expression, freedom of assembly and association and the right to democratic participation in digitized society. At the same time, the malign actors who have capitalized on these vulnerabilities to attack democracy generally have escaped consequences.

All of this is eroding confidence in democratic governance in the digital realm. The sense of radical insecurity has led some democratic governments to undertake security measures or enact regulations that are inconsistent with their human rights commitments, such as unchecked collection of data in violation of privacy or restrictions for online content that undercut free expression. Furthermore, trust between democratic allies has been eroded by competing assessments of what human rights principles and democratic values actually require in the digital context. In particular, a transatlantic rift has emerged over a broad portfolio of digital policy challenges, ranging from cross-border data transfers; unchecked digital surveillance by governments; private sector “surveillance capitalism;” monopoly power of U.S. platforms; and tech regulations that fail to conform with democratic values. These digital policy tensions between democratic allies have had the unintended effect of undermining global confidence in the feasibility of adhering to international human rights norms and democratic values in digitized societies.

While democratic governments have been inwardly focused and preoccupied with their own tensions, a digital-authoritarian model of control through data and technology has gained traction globally. This digital authoritarian model, which rests on a concept of “cyber sovereignty,” now competes with the open democratic vision of the internet and society. Authoritarian governments, most notably China, have become increasingly adept at using digital technology for repressive purposes at home, role-modeling these practices to the world. They also have capitalized on the growing export-market for surveillance and censorship technologies, spreading these capacities for others to follow their repressive lead.

Unfortunately, China’s leadership also recognized earlier than most that dominance in technology brings significant geopolitical, diplomatic and normative influence. Their massive strategic investments in technology already have translated into the ability to embed and spread China’s authoritarian values globally, particularly within tech standard and protocol setting bodies like the International Telecommunications Union. Sadly, China’s digital authoritarian influence has also shown up in more traditional norm setting arenas, such as the UN Human Rights Council, where absurd declarations of support for China’s repressive use of technology in Xinjiang and in Hong Kong have succeeded. Finally, the digital authoritarian concept of “cyber sovereignty,” which is antithetical to a global open interoperable internet and justifies its fragmentation, also serves as support for a more conventional authoritarian stance – rejection of external criticism based on internationally recognized human rights – now applied in the digital realm. 

Democracies must recognize that we are in a geopolitical battle over the governance model that will dominate in the 21st century digital context. This presents an existential threat not just to U.S. economic and national security, but also to our values-based vision for the internet and open democratic digital society. Strong U.S. leadership is needed to develop a compelling democratic conception of digitized society and to rebuild the democratic alliance around a shared strategic technology agenda.

To achieve these aims, the incoming administration should focus on five practical priorities.

First, we must “get our own house in order” by ensuring that U.S. digital technology policy is consistent with human rights and democratic values. The level of attention to the normative dimensions of technology policy, as well as to investment in emerging technology, must adequately reflect its strategic importance to our security.  

Second, the digital policy rift with our transatlantic partners must be healed: without U.S.-EU alignment, other democratic partners will lose confidence that a democratic model for digital society is a realistic goal.

Third, the democratic alliance must be rallied around a shared model for democratic governance of digital society and a strategic technology agenda. This democratic model must incorporate institutional constraints on both public and private sector use of data. It also will require further articulation of how government and technology companies apply and adhere to international human rights law and norms in the digital context.

Fourth, we must compete with the digital authoritarian model of governance and develop a comprehensive strategy to combat it. Robust diplomacy in the international normative arena will be essential, both with respect to technical standards and protocols, and with respect to norms on use of data and technology.

Fifth, the U.S. must reclaim the internet for citizens and humanity by investing in innovation and entrepreneurship in regions that have not been included in the digital revolution, both domestically and internationally. Investment in “E-Government” capacities to provide secure and efficient public services should be uncontroversial, as should investments in digital security tools for citizens, consumers and civil society actors. Expanding access to internet connectivity domestically and abroad should also be an early, uncontroversial priority.

This is a full plate. But early attention to these aspects of the democracy and technology portfolio will pay huge dividends for the Biden-Harris team, the U.S. and the democratic world. 

Recommendations for the Biden-Harris Administration:

I: Recognize the normative dimensions of digital technology policy as a strategic concern distinct from cybersecurity. Ensure coherence between domestic and foreign policy and adherence to international human rights law and norms.

Building a democratic approach to digitized society must start at home. U.S. domestic digital technology policy must not undermine our vision of an open internet or our commitment to core human rights principles. “To get our own house in order,” we need to assess the use and regulation of data and digital technology by the U.S. government, with reference to fundamental rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and other basic liberties. Accordingly, U.S. policies, applications and regulations related to data, digital platforms, artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies must be evaluated for consistency with human rights principles. Furthermore, the strategic importance of technology policy to democracy should be reflected through higher-level coordination across agencies and greater coherence between domestic and foreign policy. The most basic point is that the normative dimensions of technology policy must be seen as a strategic issue and be adequately reflected in both domestic and foreign policy.

The administration should start by strengthening mechanisms for values-based technology policy development and coordination with the USG.

  • The National Security Council must focus on normative and diplomatic challenges in the digital realm, as distinct from more traditional cybersecurity concerns. Three focal points include establishing processes to: 1) resolve tensions with allies over how to apply existing international human rights law in the digital context; 2) develop doctrine related to application of international norms in the cyberspace related to cross-border harms and malign activity; 3) evaluate human rights impacts of U.S. government use of data and technology across agencies, as well as of the impact of domestic digital technology policies on global internet freedom.
     
  • The U.S. profile in international technology-related diplomacy must be raised, potentially by establishing an ambassador-at-large for global digital affairs. The ambassador would elevate U.S. participation in bilateral, multilateral and multistakeholder digital and cyber policy development and in international norm-setting arenas. As a first step, U.S. leadership should be dramatically reinvigorated within the Freedom Online Coalition (FOC), including by seeking to chair the coalition. Robust U.S. diplomacy also is needed at international fora where technology standards and protocols are set, such as the International Telecommunications Union, and in arenas where norms of responsible state behavior in the cyber realm are developed, such as the UN Government Group of Experts. Among the first set of initiatives, the Ambassador could engage the U.S. in the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace.
     
  • The new Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technology Bureau at the Department of State announced on January 7, 2021 should be quickly built  to serve the goals outlined in the Cyber Diplomacy Act. The Bureau should cover the full spectrum of technology policy challenges, including development of international norms for cyberspace, tech standard-setting, human rights-based analysis of government and private sector use of data, democratic export controls on technologies of repression, and democratic regulation of digital platforms. The office should take responsibility for developing more robust export controls for repressive technologies and appropriate democratic institutional constraints with respect to government use of data and technologies. 
     
  • Establish a Department of State unit in Silicon Valley, comparable to the Defense Innovation Unit created by the Department of Defense. Its mandate should include exploration of technology innovations related to more effective use of data and technology in governance and provision of public services, as well as technologies that enhance citizens’ privacy, digital security, digital literacy and civic engagement—innovations that the State Departments could then help diffuse worldwide. The office should also be tasked with engaging on policy development with digital platforms and other technology companies, particularly with respect to private sector responsibilities to respect human rights as outlined in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The unit should also lead in multistakeholder digital policy development processes that bring civil society voices into democratic technology policy development.

 

II: Resolve the transatlantic digital policy divide, particularly with respect to cross-border data transfers and digital platform regulation.

Any prospect of building a shared democratic technology agenda will require resolution of current tensions between the U.S. and the EU over technology and data. Without U.S.-EU alignment, other democratic partners will lose confidence that a democratic model for digital society is a realistic goal.

Among the most urgent issues to be address are substantial divisions over cross-border data transfer arrangements, digital surveillance by both governments and the private sector, and regulation of digital platforms consistent with democratic values. These disagreements have already placed $7 trillion in transatlantic digital trade at risk and led some members of the EU toward a vision of digital sovereignty that could undermine any potential for a shared democratic approach to digital society.

The first step in healing the transatlantic digital policy divide must be an early concerted dialogue with the EU on three priority issues:

  • Rapid development of an alternative to the Privacy Shield data arrangement. This agreement, negotiated between the U.S. and Europe during the Obama-Biden administration, was struck down in July 2020 by the EU Court of Justice as inconsistent with fundamental rights. Rectifying this problem will require high level negotiations about adequate institutional constraints on government surveillance and appropriate restraints on data-sharing between government and private sector platforms.
     
  • Agreement on a transparency and accountability regime for digital information platforms applicable to U.S. platforms operating in the EU. This framework should emphasize users’ procedural rights and control of data. Recommendations from the Transatlantic high-level working group Transparency and Accountability Framework can provide a starting place. Instead of content-based regulation that place liability on platforms for user-generated content and put freedom of expression at risk, (as seen in some EU country regulations), transparency and accountability mechanisms enhance democratic oversight in ways that are consistent with free expression principles. In addition, greater platform transparency can help educate users, regulators and researchers about algorithmic information systems and build civic resilience to disinformation.
     
  • A process for resolving conflicting U.S.-EU approaches to fundamental rights in the digital policy realm. This new process should serve as a vehicle for resolving tensions over conflicting interpretations of how to protect substantive human rights, how to apply international process principles of necessity, proportionality, and how to assess government regulation of digital platforms so that they are consistent with human rights.

 

III: Galvanize the democratic alliance around a shared values-based vision of digital society and a comprehensive digital technology agenda.

The U.S. should lead a process of renewal for the democratic alliance that inspires optimism and confidence in the superiority of a democratic approach to governance of digital society, as well as commitment to an open internet.

To start the process, the administration should:

  • Capitalize on the opportunity provided by the Summit for Democracy by bringing concerted focus to challenges related to democratic governance of digital society and the strategic importance of values-based digital technology policy for the future of democracy. The Summit setting will provide a vehicle to jump start the process of developing a more strategic digital technology agenda. It will also provide an early opportunity to help heal democratic divisions over tech regulation, align responses to tech-related security threats, and expand tech-based partnership. The Summit should cover the full spectrum of technology policy challenges, including strategic tech R&D investment, tech standard-setting, human rights-based analysis of government and private sector use of data, democratic export controls on technologies of repression, democratic regulation of digital platforms, and civic education on responsible use of social media. In addition to policy, a coordinated plan among trusted democratic partners should be initiated to protect the supply chain for essential technologies, such as semiconductors and 5G infrastructure, as well as strategic commitments from democratic partners for increased R&D investments in emerging technologies. Top policy priorities must include development of a mutually beneficial data sharing arrangement among democracies, and shared norms on government surveillance consistent with human rights principles.
     
  • Following the summit, an ongoing process for developing a shared democratic approach to technology and digital society should be instituted.  The process could be divided into different work streams with different “Digital Technology” (DT) partner-groupings:
  • DT-10:  to develop a strategic technology investment agenda.

Many different configurations are possible. This cohort could be comprised of the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Sweden, Finland, South Korea, Japan, plus Taiwan perhaps as an observer-participant. Its primary aim would be to advance a plan to secure supply-chains for critical tech and joint strategic investments in emerging tech.

  • DT-12: to resolve democratic tensions and seek harmony on digital technology policies.

This group could be comprised of the G7, the EU, Australia, New Zealand, India, and Brazil. Its aim would be to resolve tensions between democratic allies over appropriate checks on government and private sector used of data, as well as harmonious regulatory approaches to private sector platforms.

  • DT+: to defend democratic, human rights-based governance of digital society

This group should include all FOC members (Australia, Austria, Canada, Costa Rica, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Maldives, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, UK, U.S.), and be open to other democratic allies. The focal point will be to reinforce commitment to freedom in the digital context and development of a democratic human-rights based approach to governance of digital society.

IV: Combat the emerging digital authoritarian model of governance.

As the U.S. and our democratic allies struggle to address tensions between ourselves and to reconcile our conflicting digital technology policies, we must not lose sight of the threat posed by authoritarian export of technology and norms. A top priority for the U.S. and our democratic allies must be to develop a comprehensive strategy to combat the rise of digital authoritarianism.  To this end, the U.S. must:

  • Renew global advocacy for a free and open internet with an updated vision for how to protect it.
  • Rejoin the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) to rebuild the global normative consensus around internet freedom. The U.S. should lead in developing an advocacy strategy to counter authoritarian influence at norm setting bodies and normalization of authoritarian applications of digital technology that violate human rights.
     
  • Invest in coordinated international diplomacy at multilateral and multistakeholder fora where technology standards and protocols are developed.  

 

  • Resist export of authoritarian digital information infrastructure and support a stronger export control regime for authoritarian surveillance and censorship tools
  • In particular, restrict China’s access to technology and equipment that facilitates domestic semiconductor manufacturing.  

 

  • Prioritize development of civic resilience to cross-border information operations and the spread of propaganda and disinformation by authoritarian governments. Rebuilding trust in information will be essential for civic engagement in democratic digital society. To date, democratic governments have been inadequately prepared to combat these challenges and need significant improvements to stay ahead of adversaries.
     
  • Build a multistakeholder mechanism for developing best practices to combat disinformation, modeled on the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), including a vehicle for information sharing between government, civil society, the research community and the private sector. 
  • Build stronger transnational information sharing mechanisms between democratic allies, to counter foreign malign information operations and share best practices in building civic resilience.;

  • Advocate for new norms for professional reporting on hacked material and disinformation, as proposed in the Stanford Guidelines for reporting on disinformation and hacked material.

  • Increase Investments in building civic resilience to digital disinformation, including public education on norms of civic discourse, media literacy and digital literacy.

  • Advocate for the Transatlantic Commission on Election integrity Election Pledge to strengthen norms and expectations for political candidates and parties to reject and denounce propagation of disinformation around elections should be a normal practice expected of elected officials. 

 

V: Reclaim digital technology for civil society and humanity.

To rally the democratic world around a democratic vision of digital society, the U.S. must help restore a positive vision of how technology can support democracy activity, civic engagement and the enjoyment of human rights. The new administration should invest in innovation and access to technology to empower citizens. To this end, the U.S. should:  

  • Support development of artificial intelligence (AI) applications to achieve the SDGs and advocate for inclusion in the benefits of AI, the data used to feed AI, the coding community that builds AI and in AI policymaking. 
     
  • Role-model inclusivity in the U.S. domestic context, by pledging to provide Internet access for all Americans, with particular focus on access for minorities, vulnerable communities, women, and economically disenfranchised citizens. Invest rural & urban broadband in unserved areas and commit to ensure internet connectivity across the U.S. and advocate for universal internet access internationally. 
     
  • Provide digital security education and tools for U.S. citizens and global civil society and funding for digital and media literacy education and create a fund to invest in emerging technologies to support and encourage civic participation.
     
  • Invest in “E-government” technology innovations that enhance efficiency, security and accountability in government provision of public services. Explore the use of public data trusts, secure digital ID, technology platforms that enhance citizen communication with elected representatives.
     
  • Support global technology innovation and entrepreneurship particularly in the Global South. A genuinely inclusive and democracy-sustaining global internet must entail some “home-grown” digital platforms and services emerging in the developing world, especially in countries where internet adoption is growing fastest.
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Eileen Donahoe

Executive Director, Global Digital Policy Incubator
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Now is the time to rally the world around a democratic vision of digital society.

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Social media and digital technologies have come under fire for their contribution to the development of the groups that ultimately stormed the U.S. Capitol on January 6. Following the insurrection attempt, Facebook, Twitter, Google and other major platforms have banned or suspended President Trump’s accounts. Google and Apple removed Parler from their app stores, while Amazon removed the site from its cloud hosting service, putting an indefinite end to Parler’s reach. This panel will discuss the role of social media during the Trump presidency, including the role of platform policies in fomenting or responding to the recent violence, the benefits and risks posed by steps subsequently taken, and what this means for the future of speech online.

Panelists include:

  • Nate Persily, faculty co-director of the Stanford Cyber Policy Center, director of the Center’s Program on Democracy and the Internet, and Professor at Stanford Law School
  • Daphne Keller, Director of the Cyber Policy Center’s Program on Platform Regulation
  • Alex Stamos, Director of the Cyber Policy Center’s Internet Observatory
  • Renee DiResta, Research Manager at the Cyber Policy Center’s Internet Observatory
  • Moderated by Kelly Born, Executive Director of the Cyber Policy Center

 

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Renée DiResta is the former Research Manager at the Stanford Internet Observatory. She investigates the spread of malign narratives across social networks, and assists policymakers in understanding and responding to the problem. She has advised Congress, the State Department, and other academic, civic, and business organizations, and has studied disinformation and computational propaganda in the context of pseudoscience conspiracies, terrorism, and state-sponsored information warfare.

You can see a full list of Renée's writing and speeches on her website: www.reneediresta.com or follow her @noupside.

 

Former Research Manager, Stanford Internet Observatory
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Daphne Keller is the Director of Platform Regulation at the Stanford Program in Law, Science, & Technology. Her academic, policy, and popular press writing focuses on platform regulation and Internet users'; rights in the U.S., EU, and around the world. Her recent work has focused on platform transparency, data collection for artificial intelligence, interoperability models, and “must-carry” obligations. She has testified before legislatures, courts, and regulatory bodies around the world on topics ranging from the practical realities of content moderation to copyright and data protection. She was previously Associate General Counsel for Google, where she had responsibility for the company’s web search products. She is a graduate of Yale Law School, Brown University, and Head Start.

SHORT PIECES

 

ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS

 

POLICY PUBLICATIONS

 

FILINGS

  • U.S. Supreme Court amicus brief on behalf of Francis Fukuyama, NetChoice v. Moody (2024)
  • U.S. Supreme Court amicus brief with ACLU, Gonzalez v. Google (2023)
  • Comment to European Commission on data access under EU Digital Services Act
  • U.S. Senate testimony on platform transparency

 

PUBLICATIONS LIST

Director of Platform Regulation, Stanford Program in Law, Science & Technology (LST)
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James B. McClatchy Professor of Law at Stanford Law School
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute
Professor, by courtesy, Political Science
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Nathaniel Persily is the James B. McClatchy Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, with appointments in the departments of Political Science, Communication, and FSI.  Prior to joining Stanford, Professor Persily taught at Columbia and the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and as a visiting professor at Harvard, NYU, Princeton, the University of Amsterdam, and the University of Melbourne. Professor Persily’s scholarship and legal practice focus on American election law or what is sometimes called the “law of democracy,” which addresses issues such as voting rights, political parties, campaign finance, redistricting, and election administration. He has served as a special master or court-appointed expert to craft congressional or legislative districting plans for Georgia, Maryland, Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.  He also served as the Senior Research Director for the Presidential Commission on Election Administration. In addition to dozens of articles (many of which have been cited by the Supreme Court) on the legal regulation of political parties, issues surrounding the census and redistricting process, voting rights, and campaign finance reform, Professor Persily is coauthor of the leading election law casebook, The Law of Democracy (Foundation Press, 5th ed., 2016), with Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, and Richard Pildes. His current work, for which he has been honored as a Guggenheim Fellow, Andrew Carnegie Fellow, and a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, examines the impact of changing technology on political communication, campaigns, and election administration.  He is codirector of the Stanford Program on Democracy and the Internet, and Social Science One, a project to make available to the world’s research community privacy-protected Facebook data to study the impact of social media on democracy.  He is also a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a commissioner on the Kofi Annan Commission on Elections and Democracy in the Digital Age.  Along with Professor Charles Stewart III, he recently founded HealthyElections.Org (the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project) which aims to support local election officials in taking the necessary steps during the COVID-19 pandemic to provide safe voting options for the 2020 election. He received a B.A. and M.A. in political science from Yale (1992); a J.D. from Stanford (1998) where he was President of the Stanford Law Review, and a Ph.D. in political science from U.C. Berkeley in 2002.   

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This event is being held virtually via Zoom. Please register for the webinar via the following link: https://bit.ly/3nNdqhW

With President Biden’s inauguration, a new era of US-Japan relations starts on January 20. Now that the cozy personal relationship between President Trump and Prime Minister Abe is in the rearview mirror, what can we expect in the Biden-Suga era? While the Biden administration is widely expected to drop Trump’s America First foreign policy and return to multilateralism and alliance-based diplomacy, its foreign policy priorities in the Asia-Pacific are still largely unknown. What role will the US-Japan alliance play in the new geo-political landscape in the region, and how would it handle the growing influence of China and build partnerships with other players in the region? This panel, featuring a leading expert on US politics and US-Japan relations, Fumiaki Kubo (University of Tokyo), and a rising star in the Liberal Democratic Party and an alum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rui Matsukawa (House of Councilors), examines these questions, moderated by the Director of APARC Japan Program, Kiyoteru Tsutsui.

SPEAKERS

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Portrait of Fumiaki Kubo

Fumiaki Kubo (University of Tokyo) 

Fumiaki Kubo has been the A. Barton Hepburn Professor of American Government and History at the Graduate Schools for Law and Politics, the University of Tokyo since 2003. He is affiliated with the Nakasone Peace Institute as the Executive Research Director, the Japan Institute for International Affairs as a Senior Adjunct Fellow, the 21st Century Public Policy Institute as the Director of the US Studies Project, as well as with the Tokyo Foundation as a Senior Research Scholar. He studied at Cornell University in 1984-1986, at the Johns Hopkins University in 1991-1993, and at Georgetown University and the University of Maryland in 1998-99. He was also an Invited Professor at SciencesPo in Paris in the spring of 2009, and a Japan Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in 2014. Kubo received his B.A. in 1979 and Ph.D. in 1989 from the University of Tokyo. He is the author of many books which include: Modern American Politics (with Hitoshi Abe), Ideology and Foreign Policy After Iraq in the United States ( editor ), A Study on the Infrastructure of American Politics( editor ). In 1989, he received the Sakurada-Kai Gold Award for the Study of Politics and the Keio Gijuku Award. Kubo was the President of the Japanese Association for American Studies from 2016 to 2018.

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Portrait of Representative Matsukawa

Rui Matsukawa (House of Councilors)

Rui Matsukawa is a Member of the House of Councilors (Liberal Democratic Party), and her current responsibilities include Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense, Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Cabinet Office. She graduated from the University of Tokyo, Faculty of Law and earned an MS in Foreign Service from Georgetown. She joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1993, where she won the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case at the International Court of Justice, negotiated free trade agreements with Thailand, Philippines, and other countries, and worked on the negotiations for disarmament as a first Secretary of the Japan Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. She was in charge of analysis of China and the Korean Peninsula in the Intelligence and Analysis Service. She also promoted cooperation between Japan, China, and South Korea as Counsellor of the Embassy of Japan in Korea. In 2014, Ms. Matsukawa established WAW! (World Assembly for Women) to promote women’s empowerment and gender mainstreaming as the first Director of the Gender Mainstreaming Division in the Foreign Policy Bureau. In 2016, she left MOFA, and was elected to represent Osaka in the House of Councilors.

MODERATOR 

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Kiyoteru Tsutsui

Kiyoteru Tsutsui (Stanford University) 

Kiyoteru Tsutsui is Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Senior Fellow in Japanese Studies at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, where he is also Director of the Japan Program, a Senior Fellow of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and a Professor of Sociology. He is the author of Rights Make Might: Global Human Rights and Minority Social Movements in Japan (Oxford University Press, 2018), co-editor of Corporate Responsibility in a Globalizing World (Oxford University Press, 2016) and co-editor of The Courteous Power: Japan and Southeast Asia in the Indo-Pacific Era (University of Michigan Press, forthcoming 2021). 

Via Zoom Webinar.

Registration Link: https://bit.ly/3nNdqhW

Fumiaki Kubo, University of Tokyo
Rui Matsukawa, House of Councilors
Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Stanford University
Panel Discussions
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/JqN4Ga4DVss

 

About the Event: 

Much of the imagery and remote sensing analysis in the Open Source Community pertains to North Korea’s nuclear weapons pathway and military capability. However, many questions remain regarding economic and agricultural health in a nation known for denial of access to outside observation. But by applying emerging analytical and processing technology of satellite imagery and data, we can address the challenge of examining economic and environmental patterns in the North.

Machine Learning technology has been used to analyze rudimentary objects like roads or buildings on satellite imagery for years, but has yet to be successfully employed to better understand nuanced patterns of life. In our partnership with the analytics company Orbital Insight, we have undertaken a project of counting thousands of objects in satellite images taken over the past five years to uncover North Korea’s trade relationship with China.

This project includes counting number of trucks at each side of the Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge as a measure of trade activity between North Korea and China. By applying artificial intelligence to more than 300 satellite images, we observed fluctuations of truck counts, which peak during the month of November. A significant drop in the truck counts during the year of 2020 is noticed as a result of restricted traffic from the global pandemic, although as much as 30 trucks were observed in the month of June on both sides of the border. The project demonstrates the utilities of machine learning in analyzing emerging datasets. Careful monitoring of trade between the two states can aid in better understanding the China-North Korea economic relationship and how it evolves over time.

CISAC is also partnering with international organizations and geospatial systems specialists to apply data derived from public space mapping systems to better understand macro-environmental, agricultural, and water security trends over the past twenty years in North Korea. For decades, scientists of every discipline have been analyzing remotely-sensed images and data sets to extract otherwise-imperceptible insight pertaining to broad aspects of environmental health including coastal erosion, deforestation, land subsidence, and global thermal changes. But because of a post-war technology vacuum and broadly-applied sanctions against space-derived information, North Korea has never had access to this data or the advanced software and data storage architecture necessary to support it. The potential for direct collaboration with the North on environmental analysis may enhance North Korea’s ability to mitigate its own agricultural risk and potentially facilitate informal international collaboration.

 

 

About the Speaker: Allison Puccioni has been an imagery analyst for over 25 years, working within the military, tech, media, and academic communities. After honorably serving in the US Army as an Imagery Analyst from 1991 - 1997, Allison continued the tradecraft as a civilian augmentee to US and NATO operations in the Kosovo airstrike campaign, and as a Senior Analyst and Mission Planner for Naval Special Warfare Group One. After earning her Master’s Degree in International Policy, Allison established the commercial satellite imagery analysis capability for the British publication company Jane's. In 2015, Allison joined Google to assist with the establishment of applications for its commercial small-satellites. Today, Allison is the Principal and Founder of Armillary Services, providing insight on commercial imaging satellites and associated analytics to the governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the commercial sector. Concurrently, Allison manages the multi-sensor imagery analysis team at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Virtual Seminar

Not in residence

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Allison Puccioni has been an imagery analyst for over 25 years, working within the military, tech, defense, media, and academic communities. After honorably serving in the US Army as an Imagery Analyst from 1991 - 1997, Allison continued the tradecraft within the Defense Industry: augmenting US and NATO operations in the Kosovo airstrike campaign, and as a Senior Analyst and Mission Planner for Naval Special Warfare Group One. After earning her Masters Degree in International Policy, Allison established the commercial satellite imagery analysis capability for the British publication Jane's, publishing Open Source imagery analysis for six years. In 2015, Allison joined Google to assist with the establishment of applications for its commercial small-satellites. Today, Allison is the Principal and Founder of Armillary Services, providing insight on commercial imaging satellites and associated analytics to the governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the commercial sector. Concurrently, Allison manages the multi-sensor imagery analysis team at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

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Allison Puccioni Principal and Founder Armillary Services
Seminars
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/TV8ye_OVdzY

 

About the Event: Proof that France had become the world’s fourth nuclear power exploded above the Algerian Sahara in February 1960, during the Algerian War for Independence (1954–62). Sixteen more blasts would take place before France abandoned its Saharan test sites in 1966, which had continued to host French explosions underground during the first years of Algerian Independence. Well before the first airborne detonation, and even after French testing went below ground, the likelihood that radioactive debris (known as fallout) would contaminate the desert environment and its human inhabitants animated an international controversy. Saharan fallout loomed at once as a new threat to Algerian and African sovereignty and to Cold War negotiations that promised to limit weapons testing, revealing historical intersections between African decolonization and the nuclear arms race.

 

About the Speaker: Austin Cooper is a Predoctoral Researcher at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and a PhD Candidate in History and Sociology of Science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Virtual Seminar

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Austin R. Cooper is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He completed his PhD in History and Sociology of Science at the University of Pennsylvania. He has held fellowships at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation and SciencesPo’s Nuclear Knowledges Program.

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Austin Cooper Predoctoral Researcher Stanford University
Seminars
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/trpJJ0-nJzE

 

About the Event: In the middle of the twentieth century, geophysical science and new technologies pried open three of Earth's most remote and inhospitable regions: Antarctica, the ocean floor, and the exosphere—that is, outer space. As human activity in these frigid zones increased, so too did their status as “global commons,” domains belonging to all, and therefore none. This presentation examines how one issue in particular, nuclear weapons, galvanized the politics of the global commons from the 1950s to the 1970s and sheds light on how the United States navigated the new spaces as part of its Cold War foreign policy.

 

 

About the Speakers: 

Stephen Buono is a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC. He earned his PhD in History from Indiana University. At Stanford, he is at work on his first book, The Province of All Mankind, a history of how outer space became a realm of American foreign policy and international law in 1950s and 1960s. Before arriving at CISAC, Stephen was an editor for the journal Diplomatic History and an Aerospace History Fellow with the American Historical Association and the National Aeronautical and Space Administration.

 

Ryan A. Musto is a MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at CISAC. He holds a PhD in history from The George Washington University and master’s degrees in international and world history from Columbia University and the London School of Economics. Prior to joining CISAC, Ryan served as a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at MIT. His work has been published in Diplomatic HistoryDiplomacy & StatecraftPolar RecordBulletin of the Atomic Scientists, and Americas Quarterly, amongst other outlets. Ryan is currently writing a book manuscript on the international history of regional denuclearization.

Virtual Seminar

Stephen Buono and Ryan Musto Stanford University
Seminars
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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/zrDq0xRWnhk

 

About the Event: Determination and verification of the nuclear activities of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are critical to ongoing disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. This study assesses the complete nuclear fuel cycle of the DPRK, from its capacity to produce fissile material precursors at mining and milling facilities in Pyongsan, to activity at the main Nuclear Scientific Research Center in Yongbyon. An interdisciplinary approach is used to analyze the different stages of the DRPK’s nuclear fuel cycle. In investigating the uranium ore grade and ore production capacity at the mining and milling facilities, we combine analysis of archival geological maps, geological field survey reports, and first-hand collection and geochemical analysis of comparable rock samples from the Korean Peninsula. In analyzing the ongoing activities at fissile material production facilities, we integrate satellite imagery analysis with machine learning algorithms, allowing for automated analysis of large image sets.

 

About the Speaker: Sulgiye Park is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at CISAC, Stanford University, where she focuses primarily on investigating the front-end of uranium pathway in North Korea. She looks at the uranium mining and milling processes for disarmament and nonproliferation efforts. Prior to joining CISAC, Sulgiye was a postdoctoral scholar at Stanford Geological Sciences and Stanford Institute for Materials and Energy Sciences, where Sulgiye studied materials' behaviors at extreme environments.

Virtual Seminar

Sulgiye Park Stanton Postdoctoral Fellow Stanford University
Seminars
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**Please note all CDDRL events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone

About the Event: The paradox of analyzing politics in Myanmar is never knowing whether or not events should surprise us. What Myanmar’s traumatic political history tells us is likely to happen is often diametrically opposed to what comparative and theoretical perspectives tell us is likely to happen. This presentation will consider Myanmar’s past decade of experimenting with reversible political reforms – which at least for now seems to have culminated in the military coup of February 1st – from both of these divergent perspectives. It will then draw upon those perspectives to offer several optimistic scenarios, before puzzling over how to assess the relative likelihood of the main optimistic and pessimistic scenarios coming to pass.

 

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Dan Slater
About the Speaker:  Dan Slater is the Ronald and Eileen Weiser Professor of Emerging Democracies in the Department of Political Science and Director of the Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies (WCED) at the University of Michigan. He specializes in the politics and history of democracy and authoritarianism, with a regional focus on Southeast Asia. His most recent articles can be found in the Annual Review of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, Democratization, Government and Opposition, Journal of East Asian Studies, Perspectives on Politics, and Social Science History.   

Online, via Zoom: REGISTER

Dan Slater Ronald and Eileen Weiser Professor of Emerging Democracies in the Department of Political Science and Director of the Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies (WCED) at the University of Michigan
Seminars
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Title: Research in Progress: Doug Owens - Development of the New USPSTF Guidelines on Screening for Lung Cancer and Colorectal Cancer

Brief Abstract: 

Discuss the development of the two new draft guidelines from the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force.  Screening for lung cancer and colorectal cancer are two of the most complex and important cancer screening guidelines in the USPSTF portfolio.  Describing the methods the USPSTF uses, including the evidence reviews and modeling that helped us create these new recommendations.

 

Zoom Meeting 

Register in advance for this meeting: 
https://stanford.zoom.us/meeting/register/tJcuf-2sqzkoE93jEPn9deZKTTBJoze-2d6u 

After registering, you will receive a confirmation email containing information about joining the meeting.

Encina Commons, Room 201 
615 Crothers Way Stanford, CA 94305-6006 

Executive Assistant: Soomin Li, soominli@stanford.edu
Phone: (650) 725-9911

(650) 723-0933 (650) 723-1919
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Henry J. Kaiser, Jr. Professor
Professor, Health Policy
Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Professor, Management Science & Engineering (by courtesy)
doug-headshot_tight.jpeg MD, MS

Douglas K. Owens is the Henry J. Kaiser, Jr. Professor, Chair of the Department of Health Policy in the Stanford University School of Medicine and Director of the Center for Health Policy (CHP) in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He is a general internist, a Professor of Management Science and Engineering (by courtesy), at Stanford University; and a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Owens' research includes the application of decision theory to clinical and health policy problems; clinical decision making; methods for developing clinical guidelines; decision support; comparative effectiveness; modeling substance use and infectious diseases; cardiovascular disease; patient-centered decision making; assessing the value of health care services, including cost-effectiveness analysis; quality of care; and evidence synthesis.

Owens chaired the Clinical Guidelines Committee of the American College of Physicians for four years. The guideline committee develops clinical guidelines that are used widely and are published regularly in the Annals of Internal Medicine. He was a member and then Vice-Chair and Chair of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, which develops national guidelines on preventive care, including guidelines for screening for breast, colorectal, prostate, and lung cancer. He has helped lead the development of more than 50 national guidelines on treatment and prevention. He also was a member of the Second Panel on Cost Effectiveness in Health and Medicine, which developed guidelines for the conduct of cost-effectiveness analyses.

Owens also directed the Stanford-UCSF Evidence-based Practice Center. He co-directs the Stanford Health Services Research Program, and previously directed the VA Physician Fellowship in Health Services Research, and the VA Postdoctoral Informatics Fellowship Program.

Owens received a BS and an MS from Stanford University, and an MD from the University of California-San Francisco. He completed a residency in internal medicine at the University of Pennsylvania and a fellowship in health research and policy at Stanford. Owens is a past-President of the Society for Medical Decision Making. He received the VA Undersecretary’s Award for Outstanding Achievement in Health Services Research, and the Eisenberg Award for Leadership in Medical Decision Making from the Society for Medical Decision Making. Owens also received a MERIT award from the National Institutes on Drug Abuse to study HIV, HCV, and the opioid epidemic. He was elected to the American Society for Clinical Investigation (ASCI) and the Association of American Physicians (AAP.)

Chair, Department of Health Policy, School of Medicine
Director, Center for Health Policy, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
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