A multitude of corporate governance reforms were enacted in Japan from 1997-2005. As a result of one of those reforms, beginning in 2003 Japanese companies had the option of choosing a committee system of corporate governance, one partially modeled on the American system, rather than the auditor system.

On May 14, SPRIE Researcher Robert Eberhart spoke at a SPRIE seminar about his current research assessing the effect of the Japanese reforms and the question of whether the corporate system in Japan will ultimately be converging with the Western model.

We compared two groups of committee system and auditor system companies and found that the firms using committee system governance, the so-called American model, were significantly valued higher as measured by Tobin's q--thirty- and forty-percent higher.

In researching the performance of Japanese companies under the committee system, Eberhart's current study has found significantly (30%-40%) higher Tobin's q scores for those companies following the committee system over those following the auditor system. This observation seems independent of other financial variables differentiating these companies. The research focused on 63 companies in the pharmacueuticals, electronics, and machine industries.

Tobin's q is the ratio of a firm's market cap to the replacement value of its assets. Since the change in Tobin's q was immediate, based on monthly data, this suggests a change in market evaluation, Eberhart noted, since the asset value would not have changed so quickly.

One possibility, Eberhart ventured, is that by opening themselves up to the committee system, management is indicating a confidence in the veracity of the firm's fiscal monitoring system, and the market is responding to that confidence.

Eberhart concluded by noting that these results are preliminary and further research is necessary to precisely determine the nature of these performance differences.

The diplomatic initiative launched by President Bush in the wake of North Korea's nuclear weapon test in October 2006 has made substantial progress in rolling back the nation's drive to become a nuclear power.

That success, however, will be for naught if the administration fails to follow through on promises it made to encourage the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to destroy its nuclear weapons programs. The United States must honor its commitments in order to begin normalizing relations with North Korea.

Unfortunately, a recent barrage of criticism against the administration's policy aims to derail this process. Even as Pyongyang has taken more than 80 percent of the required steps to disable its Yongbyon nuclear weapons facilities, the fulfillment of US obligations has stalled.

The critics who want to stymie all forward movement, are, for the most part, the same specialists who can take credit for jettisoning in 2003 the agreement with North Korea, known as the 1994 Agreed Framework, which had stopped its plutonium production for almost a decade. Only after the collapse of the Agreed Framework did the North Koreans process the fissile material needed to build and test nuclear weapons. Three years later, in 2006, the president adopted a more realistic policy that is now under attack.

Many of the policy's critics denounce a declaration of the North's nuclear programs that has not yet been finished and argue that we must have clarity about North Korea's role in the construction of a Syrian nuclear facility and its uranium enrichment path to nuclear weapons.

Whatever the role of Korea in the Syrian reactor project, that facility no longer exists. Israel destroyed it last September.

Last year, the United States downgraded from medium to low its confidence level that North Korea continues to pursue a uranium enrichment program. In October, Pyongyang allowed US inspectors into a missile factory, where it said that aluminum tubes suspected of being used in that program were being remade into missile parts. North Korea handed over aluminum samples that later showed traces of enriched uranium, but analysis was inconclusive.

The United States apparently has secured Pyongyang's agreement to pursue these types of "clarifying" activities. Moreover, China has agreed on the importance of a verification regime aimed at assuring a "complete and correct" declaration, and a key goal of the next round of talks would be to fashion that regime.

Recent developments are even more impressive. On May 8, the North Koreans passed to a US State Department official a trove of 18,822 pages of operating records for the Yongbyon 5MWe reactor and reprocessing plant, which date back to 1986. That is 18,822 pages more than we ever had before, and begins a verification process previously impossible.

Also, the International Atomic Energy Agency and US nuclear experts have overseen the shutdown and continuing disablement of all key plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon. Discussions have been held to ship out the monitored unused reactor fuel rods.

If diplomacy is to succeed, Washington needs to begin delivering on some of the promises it has made as part of the Six-Party agreements. It must move toward normalizing relations with Pyongyang: That means beginning "the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism" and starting to "advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK."

We know that North Korea seeks better relations with the United States to create the environment essential to facilitate economic recovery, give it more diplomatic space, and smooth the way for an upcoming political succession. Since the New York Philharmonic concert in Pyongyang last February, it has begun portraying the United States in a more positive light to its own people, laying the groundwork for a major breakthrough in relations with the United States.

This breakthrough is needed if the United States is to achieve its ultimate objective: to cap, roll back, and completely eliminate the North's nuclear weapons program.

Critics in Washington, like those in Pyongyang, are afraid of exploring the future and only want to cling to the past. That isn't the way out.

John W. Lewis, professor emeritus at Stanford University, is coauthor of "Negotiating with North Korea: 1992-2007."

In the third of three Payne Distinguished lectures under the heading of "Can the Poor Afford Democracy? A Presidential Perspective" former president of Peru Alejandro Toledo tackled "Economic Growth, Poverty, Populism, and Democracy."  Toledo told a rapt audience that it was time to move from theory and analysis to action, and said that he personally planned to devote the rest of his life to ending poverty and social exclusion in Latin America.  Twelve former presidents from Latin America have joined Toledo to develop a social agenda for democracy for the next 20 years and construct a matrix of key indicators to measure progress toward concrete goals, such as access to education, healthcare, adequate food, clean water, and technology. In addition to economic growth, investment, and trade, the group will monitor employment, salaries, income distribution, and povery reduction. Toledo expects to launch the social agenda for democracy, and a secretariat to monitor progress, in September when the presidents' group meets in Sao Paulo, Brazil under the leadership of Henrique Cardoso.