'Survival' editor's note:

In the June-July 2009 issue of the journal 'Survival,' Scott D. Sagan argued the current case for the United States to adopt a declaratory policy of nuclear no first use. 'Survival' invited four experts from Europe, Asia and North America to comment on Sagan's argument. The author concludes the debate with his own final thoughts.

Note from editor of Survival:

In the June-July 2009 issue of Survival, Professor Scott D. Sagan argued the current case for the United States to adopt a declaratory policy of nuclear no first use. Survival invited four experts from Europe, Asia and North America (listed below) to comment on Sagan's argument, with a final conclusion from the author:

Morton H. Halperin worked on nuclear issues in the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Clinton administrations in the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and the State Department. He is a member of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States and senior advisor to the Open Society Institute. He has written numerous books and articles on nuclear policy.

Bruno Tertrais is a senior research fellow at the Paris-based Foundation for Strategic Research and a contributing editor to Survival. He is the author of War Without End (New York: The New Press, 2005).

Keith B. Payne is president and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, head of the Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies of Missouri State University, Washington, D.C. campus, a member of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Review of the United States, Policy Panel chairman of the U.S. Strategic Command's Senior Advisory Group, and a member of the Department of State's International Security Advisory Board.

K. Subrahmanyam is an Indian strategic analyst and journalist. He served as the director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses and has held a number of other government positions, including chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Scott D. Sagan is professor of political science at Stanford University and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

On September 7th and 8th, 2009, SPICE director Gary Mukai visited three public high schools in Okinawa as well as the Okinawa AmerAsian School. Most of the students at the Okinawa AmerAsian School have American fathers and Okinawan/Japanese mothers. While visiting the four schools, Gary had the chance to talk with many classes of students about what they would like American high school students to know about Okinawa. SPICE plans to develop a short documentary on AmerAsians during the next year and a comprehensive curricular unit on U.S.-Okinawan relations in the near future.

In a new Stanford endeavor, FSI's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law has joined with the Bowen H. McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society to launch an interdisciplinary Program on Human Rights. Introducing CDDRL's latest program, Director Larry Diamond noted that "today's human rights interact with a number of other urgent global issues including climate change, immigration, security, women's rights, poverty, and child soldiers" to name but a few. The campus-wide Human Rights Program builds on the work of CDDRL's Program on Global Justice by bridging the normative and the empirical.

The October launch featured an interdisciplinary panel on human rights, "Bridging Theory and Practice", combining the work and insights of Senior Law Lecturer, FSI Senior Fellow and Human Rights Program Coordinator Helen Stacy, who also served as moderator, Political Science Professor Terry L. Karl, Stanford Law School Professor Jenny Martinez, Anthropology Professor Jim Ferguson, and Civil and Environmental Professor Ray Levitt.

Observing that each of the panelists works adeptly across several disciplinary fields, Program Coordinator Helen Stacy noted that "they dynamically cycle between high theory and everyday action in a constant arbitrage between principle and practice."

Invoking the French philosopher Michel Foucault, Jim Ferguson observed that "the world is a dangerous place" and we need to be careful, watchful, vigilant, and realistic. Just as "If you want peace, work for justice," he said, "If you want human rights, work to overcome economic inequalities."

A second session featured Philosophy Professor Debra Satz, Director of the McCoy Family Center for Ethics in Society, who introduced the new Undergraduate Human Rights Summer Fellowships, which will allow four undergraduates to immerse themselves in a summer-long internship with a leading human rights organization.

A final keynote address by pediatrician Paul H. Wise, the Richard Behrman Professor in Child Health and a core faculty member of the FSI's Stanford Health Policy center, addressed the aspirational, "Between the Concrete and the Clouds: Living Your Human Rights Principles."

Wise's professional life has been devoted to the real human rights of real children by improving child health-care practices and policies in developing countries. Active in child health projects in India, South Africa, and Latin America, Wise spends each summer in an indigenous village in Guatemala, where he teaches and provides needed care at the village clinic.

Joseph C. Martz, a nuclear materials scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), has been named the inaugural William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at Stanford University.

Stanford established the fellowship in 2007 to celebrate the 80th birthday of William J. Perry, the 19th U.S. Secretary of Defense from 1994 to 1997 and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) from 1988 to 1993. Perry, the Michael and Barbara Berberian professor, and CISAC Co-Director Siegfried S. Hecker currently lead the center's Preventive Defense Project, which seeks to forestall dangerous security developments before they require drastic military intervention.

In a statement announcing Martz's selection as the first Perry Fellow, Hecker said CISAC supports scholarship on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, particularly at the intersection of science and policy-making. "Your background in understanding the configuration, manufacturing, design and certification of nuclear systems [that] support deterrence and the accompanying weapons complex is of timely relevance to the evolving policies in these areas," Hecker wrote. "Of particular interest is your evaluation of the elements of agility and confidence of the weapons complex and nuclear stockpile that will facilitate further reductions in nuclear weapons, and what effect these may have on international arms control initiatives."

The new Perry Fellowship honors an early or mid-career researcher from the United States or abroad with a record of "outstanding work in natural science, engineering or mathematics...who is dedicated to solving international security problems." Martz, 44, will spend a year at CISAC conducting research on how the United States might be able to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal by configuring the nation's weapons stockpile more securely and strategically.

"I am honored to serve as the first Perry Fellow, in particular to salute Dr. Perry's extraordinary career and dedication to making the world a safer place," Martz said.

The scientist said his work dovetails with Perry's efforts to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons around the globe. Perry, alongside former secretaries of state George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn and Stanford physicist Sidney Drell have joined together to promote this far-reaching objective, which President Barack Obama and the U.N. Security Council endorsed in a unanimous vote last month. "Dr. Perry's focus is a world with fewer weapons," Martz said. "My goal is to find a roadmap to that world."

At LANL, Martz led projects related to nuclear weapons design and maintenance, plutonium storage and disposal, stockpile life extension and plutonium aging, nuclear operations and nuclear systems analysis. He also directed New Mexico's team in the 2005-2007 nationwide Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) design competition sponsored by the federal government.

Martz said he was first drawn to nuclear issues during his senior year of high school. He grew up in Los Alamos -- his father worked at the lab. In 1983, Martz and a group of science-minded students were invited to join a gathering marking the lab's 40th anniversary. For three days, renowned scientists from the Manhattan Project, which developed the atomic bomb, returned to Los Alamos. Martz said one of them, Nobel-winning physicist Hans Bethe, told the students about his generation's atomic legacy and that it was up to Martz's generation to find a way out of what he characterized as the nuclear trap.

Today, Martz is interested in what he calls "capability-based deterrence." As he explained in the March 2008 issue of Currents, LANL's employee magazine: "If we are extremely competent and demonstrate the capability to reconstitute nuclear weapons -- convincing both allies and adversaries that the capability is assured and agile -- that capability in and of itself becomes a component of deterrence. It's a compelling idea. Our security rests not so much on the products of our work, but on our work itself." Martz, who has worked at LANL for 26 years, plans to pursue and refine this argument at CISAC and produce a manuscript during his year in residence. Martz holds a doctorate in chemical engineering from the University of California-Berkeley.

William J. Perry and the Perry Fellowship
Perry earned bachelor's and master's degrees in mathematics from Stanford in 1949 and 1950, and a doctorate from Pennsylvania State University. He went on to found the Silicon Valley electronics company ESL, build a venture capital company and pursue a distinguished career in public service. At the heart of Perry's work is a commitment to bring the rigors of science to international security issues. The William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at Stanford University will pursue this commitment.

The coming to power of a new party in Japan, with a strong mandate to rule, is unprecedented in the postwar era. In the aftermath of the Japanese elections in August of this year, there has been much discussion, particularly in the Japanese media, about the foreign policy orientation of the new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led administration. Some commentators see an “anti-American” tilt—evidenced by differing views on the relocation of U.S. bases in Okinawa and the renewal of Japanese naval refueling operations in the Indian Ocean.

This viewpoint misses the foreign policy forest for its trees. The paradigm-shifting potential of this change lies much more in the DPJ’s desire to re-center Japan’s foreign policy on Asia. Across the spectrum of the DPJ, from former socialists on the left to those who came out of the conservative Liberal Democratio Party (LDP), there is broad agreement on the need to put much greater emphasis on Japan’s ties to the rest of Asia, particularly to China and South Korea.

The new Asianism in Japanese foreign policy was on display at the October 10 triangular summit of the Chinese, South Korean, and Japanese leaders, held in Beijing. It was only the second time these three have met on their own and the meeting was substantive, covering everything from coordinating on North Korea and economic stimulus policy to taking initial steps toward formation of a new East Asian Community. “Until now, we have tended to be too reliant on the United States,” Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama told reporters after the meeting, adding that “The Japan-U.S. alliance remains important, but as a member of Asia, I would like to develop policies that focus more on Asia.”

The dominant foreign policy camp in Japan has been what Hitoshi Tanaka, a former senior foreign ministry official and close advisor to the DPJ, calls “alliance traditionalists,” whom he defines as those who “place the maintenance of a robust alliance with the United States above all other foreign policy priorities.” In the view of some DPJ policy advisors, the previous conservative governments mistakenly tried to cope with the challenge of a rising China by getting as close to the United States as possible. The decision to send troops to Iraq and the Indian Ocean was prompted not by any deep support for those causes but rather by the belief that this would ensure U.S. support in any tensions with China, and with North Korea.

All this took place as Sino-Japanese relations descended into their most troubled phase in the postwar period, prompted by former Prime Minister Koizumi’s provocative visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead. High-level contacts with China were frozen, tensions rose over territorial issues in the East China Sea, and rising nationalism on both sides culminated in the outbreak of government-sanctioned anti-Japanese riots in 2005 and a Chinese campaign to block Japan’s permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council.

There was an attempt by Koizumi’s conservative successors to roll back some of these tensions. But those signals were always mixed with the persistence of anti-Chinese views and the powerful camp of rightwing nationalists in and around the LDP who cling to a revisionist view of Japan’s wartime role, some even indulging in a vigorous defense of Japanese imperialism.

In the view of DPJ policy advisers, this pseudo-containment strategy is doomed to failure. Given the increasing economic interdependence between the United States and China, and their overlapping strategic interests, the United States will never form an anti-China front. Japan cannot rely solely, these advisers argue, on the U.S.-Japan security alliance to deal with China’s bid for regional hegemony.

Nor can Japan afford to indulge fantasies of confrontation with China, given its own extensive ties to its economy and society. Rather, the greater threat, in the view of many Japanese analysts, is being abandoned by the United States through the formation of a U.S.-China “Group of Two” that effectively excludes Japan, or relegates it to second-level status in the region.

Japan, those policymakers argue, needs to preempt that threat by engaging Asia on its own—not only China, but the entire region, from India back to Korea. The DPJ’s own policy vision, articulated by Prime Minister Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, and party strongman Ichiro Ozawa, remains vaguely defined but has three clear elements:

• The U.S.-Japan security alliance remains the cornerstone, but with limits.
• Japan plays a leadership role in East Asian regionalism.
• The “history” question must be resolved.

What does this mean? There should be little question, particularly after the initial meetings between the new government and the Obama administration, that the DPJ seeks to back away from the security alliance. Over the past fifteen years, the DPJ leadership has not only supported, but even led, the expansion of Japan’s security role, beginning with the passage of the 1992 law permitting Japanese participation
in peacekeeping operations and including the initial dispatch of naval forces to the Indian Ocean in response to 9/11. Though the DPJ has made commitments to reduce the U.S. presence in Okinawa, it is already realizing how difficult that is to accomplish; some kind of compromise on this issue is imminent. Similarly, Foreign Minister Okada’s visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan demonstrated a willingness to contribute, mostly through economic aid, to the security effort in both countries.

Prime Minister Hatoyama presented his somewhat romantic desire to reproduce the European experience to create an East Asian Community in September before the United Nations General Assembly. Hatoyama has indicated that he understands this is a long process, and has been careful to make clear that Japan has no intention of excluding the United States’ role in the region, nor the use of the dollar as a reserve currency. As Hatoyama put in his UN address:

Today, there is no way that Japan can develop without deeply involving itself in Asia and the Pacific region. Reducing the region’s security risks and sharing each other’s economic dynamism based on the principle of “open regionalism” will result in tremendous benefits not only for Japan but also for the region and the international community.

Given the historical circumstances arising from its mistaken actions in the past, Japan has hesitated to play a proactive role in this region. It is my hope that the new Japan can overcome this history and become a “bridge” among the countries of Asia.

I look forward to an East Asian community taking shape as an extension of the accumulated cooperation built up step by step among partners who have the capacity to work together, starting with fields in which we can cooperate—free frade agreements, finance, currency, energy, environment, disaster relief and more. Of course, Rome was not built in a day, so let us seek to move forward steadily on this, even if at a moderate pace.

DPJ policymakers advocate pursuit of an East Asian community as only one of a nest of regional structures, including a regional security system that might grow out of the Six Party talks on North Korea. They also embrace the idea of a Japan-U.S.-China strategic dialogue, based on their own perception that without the combined muscle of the United States and Japan, they cannot bring China to the table on a range of issues from energy to intellectual property.

The last element of the DPJ’s policy vision is to take another major step in clearing away the legacy of the wartime past. Hatoyama personally reaffirmed his government’s adherence to the statement on war responsibility issued by then Prime Minister Murayama in 1995, at the time of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war.

Hatoyama, Ozawa and others in the DPJ leadership are determined to confront the history issue in a way that eases tensions with China and South Korea and also closes doors backward. They will not only refuse to go to the Yasukuni Shrine but also want to remove the Class A war criminals whose “souls” are enshrined there by decision of the shrine authorities, to the consternation of the Emperor, among others. The DPJ led the hue and cry over the unapologetic revisionism of former Japanese air force chief of staff, General Toshio Tamogami, who wrote an essay justifying Japan’s colonialism and wartime aggression, including the attack on Pearl Harbor. Foreign Minister Okada has backed the creation of a joint history textbook by China, Japan and South Korea, based on the model followed by France and Germany. These are stances the LDP has been historically incapable of taking.

The DPJ draws some inspiration from the anti-imperial form of Asianism—“Small Nipponism”—championed by the late Tanzan Ishibashi, who served briefly as premier in the mid-1950s and who was allied to Hatoyama’s beloved grandfather, and former premier, Ichiro Hatoyama.

In the coming months, the Hatoyama government will have numerous opportunities to develop its new policies, particularly in the run-up to Japan’s hosting of the APEC summit next year. Undoubtedly, it will be difficult to implement in practice, but this new Asianism marks a clear turning point in Japan’s postwar foreign policy.