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My reply to the frequently asked question if Kim Jong Un will ever give up North Korea’s nuclear weapons is, “I don’t know, and most likely he doesn’t know either. But it is time to find out.” However, insisting that Kim Jong Un give a full declaration of his nuclear program up front will not work. It will breed more suspicion instead of building the trust necessary for the North to denuclearize, a process that will extend beyond the 2020 US presidential election.

However, the time it will take to get to the endpoint should not obscure the progress that has already been made. Since this spring, Kim Jong Un has taken significant steps to reduce the nuclear threat North Korea poses. He has declared an end to nuclear testing and closed the nuclear test tunnels by setting off explosive charges inside the test tunnel complex. He also declared an end to testing intermediate- and long-range missiles including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). I consider these as two of the most important steps toward reducing the threat North Korea poses and as significant steps on the path to denuclearization.

Whereas the North still poses a nuclear threat to Japan and South Korea as well as US military forces and citizens in the region, the threat to the United States has been markedly reduced. In my opinion, North Korea needs more nuclear and ICBM tests to be able to reach the United States with a nuclear-tipped missile. Freezing the sophistication of the program is a necessary precursor to rolling it back in a step-by-step process.

At the September 2018 inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang, Kim also told President Moon that he would commit to dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear complex if the US takes commensurate measures—unspecified, at least in public. The Yongbyon complex is the heart of North Korea’s nuclear program. Shutting it down and dismantling it would be a very big deal because it would stop plutonium and tritium production (for hydrogen bombs) and significantly disrupt highly enriched uranium production.

Yet, Kim’s actions have been widely dismissed as insignificant or insincere by both the left and the right of the American political spectrum. In many of these quarters, the sincerity of Kim’s denuclearization promise is judged by whether or not he is willing to provide a full and complete declaration and to agree on adequate verification measures. But Kim’s willingness to provide a full declaration at this early stage tells us little about his willingness to denuclearize. Moreover, I maintain that insisting on this approach is a dead end, certainly as long as Washington continues to apply “maximum pressure” instead of moving to implement the steps on normalizing relations that President Trump agreed to in the June Singapore statement.

A full declaration is a dead end because it is tantamount to surrender, and Kim has not surrendered, nor will he. A complete account of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities would, in Kim’s view, likely be far too risky in that it would essentially provide a targeting list for US military planners and seal the inevitable end of the nuclear program and possibly his regime.

Furthermore, a declaration must be accompanied by a robust verification protocol. That, in turn, must allow inspections and a full accounting of all past activities such as production and procurement records as well as export activities. And, once all these activities are complete, an inspection protocol must provide assurances that activities that could support a weapons program are not being reconstituted. This would be a contentious and drawn-out affair.

It is inconceivable that the North would declare all of its nuclear weapons, their location, and allow inspections of the weapons or of their disassembly up front. But in addition to the weapons themselves, a nuclear weapon program consists of three interlocking elements: 1) the nuclear bomb fuel, which depending on the type of bomb includes plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU), and forms of heavy hydrogen—deuterium and tritium; 2) weaponization—that is, designing, building and testing weapons, and; 3) delivery systems, which in the case of North Korea appear to be missiles, although airplane or ship delivery cannot be ruled out. Each of these elements involves dozens of sites, hundreds of buildings, and several thousand people.

Let me give an example of what is involved just for verification of plutonium inventories and means of production. Plutonium is produced in reactors by the fission of uranium fuel. We estimate that most of the North’s plutonium has been produced in its 5 MWe (electric) gas-graphite reactor at the Yongbyon complex. A complete declaration must provide for the entire operations history (along with its design and operational characteristics) going back to its initial operation in 1986 to correctly estimate how much plutonium was produced.

In addition, North Korea has operated the Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 research reactor at the Yongbyon site since 1967. Although little plutonium has likely been produced there, this would have to be verified by providing the complete operating history along with performance characteristics since its initial operation. North Korea has also constructed an experimental light water reactor (ELWR) that is likely not yet operational. Its status would have to be checked to see if it was configured to favor weapon-grade plutonium production. Finally, North Korea began to build but never completed 50 MWe and 200 MWe gas-graphite reactors, whose construction operations were stopped by the Agreed Framework in 1994. Their status would have to be verified.

The 5 MWe reactor fuel consists of natural uranium metal alloy fuel elements. Tracking the entire history of fuel fabrication would be an important verification step for plutonium production. It starts with uranium ore mining, milling and conversion to uranium oxide. This is followed by a few additional steps to produce the uranium metal that is formed into fuel elements for the reactor to produce plutonium. Some of these same steps would also be used, but then complemented by turning the uranium into a compound that serves as the precursor gas (uranium hexafluoride) for centrifuge enrichment to produce low enriched uranium for light water reactors or highly enriched uranium for bombs.

A complete and accurate accounting of fuel produced would also likely show a discrepancy that indicates that more fuel was produced at Yongbyon than was consumed. The difference could be accounted for by the fuel that North Korea produced for the gas-graphite reactor it built in Syria, a project that was terminated by Israel’s air raid on the Al Kibar site in September 2007. North Korea is unlikely to acknowledge the illicit construction of the Syrian reactor as part of its own plutonium declaration.

Once produced in the reactor, plutonium has to be extracted from the used or spent fuel after a sufficient period of time that allows the spent fuel to cool thermally and radioactively. The extraction or separations process is accomplished in a reprocessing facility using mechanical and chemical methods. The North’s reprocessing facility became operational in the early 1990s. All of its operations records would have to be examined and verified. In addition, it is likely that some small amount of plutonium that may have been produced in the IRT-2000 reactor was separated in the hot cell facilities in that complex. Its records would have to be examined and verified.

After plutonium is separated, it must be purified, alloyed, cast and machined into final bomb components. Each of these steps generates residue and waste streams that must be monitored and assessed for their plutonium content. Based on my visits to Yongbyon and discussions with the North’s technical staff, I believe that the steps beginning with delivery of yellowcake to Yongbyon (from the uranium mining and milling sites), plus all steps for fuel fabrication, reactor production of plutonium, spent fuel cooling, reprocessing, plutonium purification and alloying into metal ingots are conducted at Yongbyon.

During my visits to Yongbyon, I was told that the plutonium ingots are then taken off site (of an undeclared location) in which the plutonium is cast into bomb components—which would then be followed by machining and assembling into pits, the plutonium cores of the weapons. In 2010, I was also told that all plutonium residues and wastes from reprocessing and plutonium metal preparation were still stored at Yongbyon (under questionable safety conditions). Very little had been done to prepare the spent fuel waste for final disposition. This is likely still the case and, hence, most of the reprocessing facility must remain operational after the rest of Yongbyon is shut down in order to prepare the hazardous waste for safe, long-term disposition. This will also complicate the plutonium inventory verification.

A complete declaration must also include how much plutonium was used during underground testing. In addition to the six known tests at Punggye-ri, North Korea also claims to have conducted “subcritical” experiments (stopping just short of a nuclear detonation), which I consider to be unlikely. If it did, however, North Korea would have to declare the amount of plutonium used and its current state, particularly since such experiments could leave plutonium in a usable form unlike the case for nuclear detonations. To verify the nuclear test history of plutonium, as well as for highly enriched uranium, it would be necessary to provide information or allow drill-back inspections into the test tunnels at Punggye-ri to ascertain the type and amount of nuclear material used in the test.

To complicate matters even further, if one or more of the North’s test devices failed to produce a nuclear explosion, then plutonium (or HEU) could still be resident in the tunnels. Both the United States and Russia experienced such test failures. This is also possibly the case for North Korea because there is still some uncertainty as to whether or not a nuclear test was conducted in May 2010 when a faint seismic signal was observed from the test area. For the most part, the jury is still out on that event, but the North would now have to allow inspections and verification.

It should be apparent that the declaration plus commensurate verification of the amount of plutonium North Korea possesses, which I believe is only between 20 and 40 kilograms, will be an enormous job. I cannot see it being accomplished in the current adversarial environment and certainly not within the timeframe that has been specified by the US government.

A similar sequence of declarations, inspections, and verification measures would have to be developed for the other bomb fuels, namely HEU and the hydrogen isotopes, deuterium and tritium. Verification of HEU inventories and means of production will be particularly contentious because very little is known about the centrifuge facility at the Yongbyon site. As far as we know, my Stanford colleagues and I are the only foreigners to have seen that facility, and then only in a hurried walk-through in 2010. In addition, there exists at least one other covert centrifuge site.

The situation is even more problematic for the second element of the North’s nuclear program, that of weaponization, which includes bomb design, production, and testing because we know nothing about these activities or where they are performed. Although we have some information regarding the nuclear test site at which six nuclear tests were conducted, we do not know if there are other tunnel complexes that have been prepared for testing.

The third element includes all of the North’s missiles and its production, storage and launch sites and complexes. These will also represent a major challenge for complete and correct declarations, inspections and verification.

Once all of the elements have been declared and the dismantling begins, then the focus will have to change to verifying the dismantlement and assessing the potential reversibility of these actions—a challenge that is not only difficult, but one that must be ongoing.

Verification was one of the sticking points during the 2007-2008 diplomatic initiative pursued late in the George W. Bush administration. In 2008, the North turned over copies of 18,000 pages of operating records of the reactor and reprocessing facilities in Yongbyon. The veracity of that disclosure has never been established because diplomatic efforts fell apart when the United States insisted on more declarations up front and North Korea accused Washington of having moved the goal posts. That declaration constituted only a small part of what I outlined above as being necessary for a full accounting of plutonium, not to mention the other components of North Korea’s nuclear program. That was 10 years ago, and much has happened since to make future declarations and verification much more problematic.

At this time, the level of trust between Pyongyang and Washington required for North Korea to agree to a full, verifiable declaration up front does not exist. Hence, my colleagues Robert Carlin and Elliot Serbin and I have suggested a different approach. Negotiations should begin with an agreed end state: North Korea without nuclear weapons or a nuclear weapon program. Civilian nuclear and space programs would remain open for negotiation and possible cooperation. But all facilities and activities that have direct nuclear weapons applicability must eventually be eliminated.

Rather than insisting on a full declaration up front, the two sides should first agree to have the North take significant steps that reduce the nuclear threat it poses in return for commensurate movements toward normalization—the details of which would have to be worked out during negotiations. A good next step for the North would be the destruction of the 5 MWe plutonium production reactor, which would be part of the package that Kim proposed to Moon at the Pyongyang Summit. If these actions are matched by US steps toward normalization as pledged in the Singapore statement, they will serve to build the trust required for the North to initiate a phased declaration process that initially covers operations in Yongbyon and eventually includes the entire nuclear program discussed above.

Unfortunately, the strategic opening created by the Singapore and North-South summits has not been followed by such tactical steps to get the negotiation process off the ground. The North and the South are ready to create a commonly acceptable path forward, but we have the worst of environments in Washington. The Trump team claims progress is being made but insists on maintaining maximum pressure. The North’s Foreign Ministry has pointed outthat the “improvement of relations and sanctions are incompatible.” Also, most US North Korea watchers are either wedded to old think that you can’t negotiate with Pyongyang or they are determined to prove President Trump’s claims on North Korea wrong.

With nuclear tensions on the Korean Peninsula dramatically reduced, it is time to find out if Kim’s drive to improve the economy will eventually lead to denuclearization. He may determine that his nuclear arsenal poses a significant hindrance to economic development that outweighs the putative benefits it confers. Washington and Seoul should work together to encourage rather than inhibit this potential shift.

 

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This study focused on an important but often overlooked aspect of safety in medicine: physician safety. In China, patients may violently protest against doctors via disruptive behaviors when facing unsatisfying results, jeopardizing physicians’ security, affecting their diagnostic reasoning, and ultimately harming patient safety. We investigated the relationship between disruptive behaviors, government intervention, and protest results. Statistical analyses reveal that the ‘paying for peace’ mechanism can create distorted incentives for patients and encourage more riots. Efforts should be made to improve service quality and channel medical disputes into the legal framework.

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Lingrui Liu is an Associate Research Scientist at the Yale School of Public Health, Department of Health Policy and Management. Prior to joining the YSPH faculty in fall of 2018, she obtained an ScD from Harvard University (2018). Her research interests include health care organizations, quality improvement, patient safety, organizational design and culture, and implementation of evidence-based practices.

Lingrui Liu Associate Research Scientist, the Yale School of Public Health
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Suhani Jalota was only 20 years old when she established a foundation to help impoverished women in the slums of her native city, Mumbai. She was 23 when Forbes named her one of Asia’s 30-Under-30 Social Entrepreneurs as her foundation was taking off.

Now, at the ripe old age of 24, she is embarking on her pursuit of a PhD in health policy on the econ track at Stanford Medicine’s Department of Health Research and Policy.

As a social entrepreneur, she is hoping to create self-sustaining health organizations managed entirely by the people in the low-income communities they serve.

Last year, Jalota, who is also in the first cohort of Knight-Hennessy Scholars, received the Queen’s Young Leader award from Queen Elizabeth II and attended the royal wedding of Prince Harry and American actress Meghan Markle, who is now Duchess of Sussex.

The Myna Mahila Foundation— which provides affordable sanitary products and promotes employment and empowerment among women in Mumbai’s slums — was the only non-UK charity chosen to receive donations in lieu of gifts for the royal couple.

Stanford Health Policy caught up with Jalota to ask her a few questions about what inspires her and how she became so passionate about sanitary health and empowering women in India.

Who inspired you to become social-entrepreneur at such a young age?

I come from a government family and, growing up, our conversations at home were always about the development of India and the status of women. My father is an Indian civil servant who has worked on water sanitation for the city; my mom works with underprivileged girl children, and my brother creates water filters for the same slum community. My grandparents were in the police. It’s just what we do. It’s our family calling. 

As for entrepreneurship, it was Duke University, the Baldwin Scholars Program and the Melissa and Doug Entrepreneurship Fellowship that actually made me believe that all the dreams I had to change the pitiful state of things on the ground in Mumbai could actually be achievable. There I learned to translate the problems I saw to actionable items that the institution was willing to back and support endlessly.

Then in 2011, I met Dr. Jockin Arputham, who spent 40 years working in the slums of Mumbai as the founder of Slum Dwellers International. He became my inspiration, my idol and my mentor. He singlehandedly improved the lives of millions of women.

Dr. Arputham passed away in October. I am here to complete this mission.

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What inspired you to establish the Myna Mahila Foundation? 

When I started spending more time with women in the slum communities they told me horrific stories about living on the railway tracks, children dying in front of them, and not being able to walk the public toilets without being sexually harassed. Some were taking pills to constipate themselves just so they did not have to go to the public toilet. Others would tell me how they had been married off at 12 and were still living with drunk husbands who beat them every day. 

Women were ignoring their own health and it really struck me as how this would lead to such wasted potential for the women, and for India.

The slum community leaders and I began brainstorming — we became very chatty. That’s where the name comes from. Myna from the chatty South Asian bird and Mahila, which means women in Hindi. And we found that their menstrual cycles were physically and mentally exhausting. We found that sanitation and hygiene were clear signals of dignity for women, so we jumped on that.

You see, 320 million women in India do not have access to sanitary pads. And menstruation in India is a taboo health topic; there is a stigma to shopping for sanitary pads. Most women use rags on their periods and these often become dirty, leading to urinary and vaginal infections.

When you are trapped under an aluminum roof where your horizon is the lining of the slum settlement, and you only see limitations ahead of you, it is difficult to see another way of life. After more than six years of working on sanitation and health research with these women, I realized the problems lay deeply entrenched in a woman’s lack of agency, or ability to make decisions. You are brought up to think that what the generations ahead of you have been doing is the only way of life. Hiding your periods, not cooking food or sleeping with the family during your periods, not going to the temple or playing sports — you believe this is the only way to live.

So we came up with a scheme to sell sanitary pads door-to-door to women who would normally not leave their homes or go to a pharmacy to buy them from male clerks. And we get to know these women; they are opening up and exploring things outside the confines of their husbands’ world. I learned that if women were confident to talk about their periods and menstrual hygiene, it could break the silence surrounding domestic violence or sanitation.

Tell us about the women who work for you and the women you serve. 

We employ women from the slum communities we serve, including the accountants, production and sales managers, and the education trainers. We work mostly with Muslim women as that is a representation of the demographics of the communities we are in.

We currently meet about 10,000 women at their doorsteps every month in the 12 slums across Mumbai. It’s not about giving out free pads — a woman gets her period 450 times in her lifetime, so what we’re trying to do is make sure that she understands that it’s a normal health cycle that should not stop her from getting her education and jobs. We have more than 500 girls in our sponsor a girl program, with 100 more girls joining every month. We hold individual counseling and mentorship for these girls along with menstrual hygiene workshops at health camps. We employ 20 women and have partnerships with self-help groups across the city who work with us part-time.

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You strongly believe that self-sustaining health organizations should be managed by women in those communities. Why is this so important?

In the words of my mentor Dr. Arputham, it’s not our purpose to tell the women in the slums what to do; you must think about it from their perspective of what they need and help them create their own change. This has been my mission ever since.

We have millions of NGOs in India so you realize that if things are not really improving at a national level, then there’s something that we’re not doing right. We need the civic mindset to marry the efficiency of the business world. This makes people less dependent and more autonomous to be in control of their own situations. And that comes with a sense of pride.

Why focus on health and sanitation?

We are still struggling with the basics in India: basic health, which includes food, housing, potable water and improved sanitation. Numerous research studies have demonstrated that improvements in sanitation have led to dramatic improvements in health, such as life expectancy outcome measures. Unless we have basic health standards achieved, we will remain behind. To add to the problem, health-care is often deprioritized in India. While it accounts for nearly 18 percent of the GDP here in the United States, for example, it only accounts for 1 percent in India. Can you imagine that? With more than 1 billion people. The role of the public sector in India is to get people on the same level playing field with the basics: education, health care so you’re well enough to go to school or work, find food, shelter and water.

India is a true democracy — so if people start to recognize the importance of health and demand better health care, they can get it. 

What are your goals for the PhD?

To learn more research techniques to use for conducting experiments on the ground for a variety of topics, including women’s demand for health care, effects of positions of power in seeking health care, and the connection between environment and health. On the supply side, I am becoming increasingly interested in understanding pay-for-performance incentive structures in health institutions and for front-line health workers.

I will also be spending my December breaks and summers in India working at the foundation. After my second year, I hope to continue data collection for my dissertation topic: the effect of environmental changes on health outcomes, such as child stunting levels in the slums. As part of my undergrad thesis, I collected anthropometric data on 880 children to look at the effect of slum redevelopment (when the government forcibly relocates people from slums to government subsidized housing) on child stunting. I learned that when a child has one additional year in the buildings — instead of out in the slums with no toilets and clean water and proper ventilation — they were less likely to be stunted. The effect was even more pronounced (and significant) for children moving from slums without toilets than for children moving from slums with toilets.

Another area of research for me moving forward is how this plays out if a pregnant mother gives birth in the slums or the building. Is that affecting the child’s birth weight? Is water quality, sanitation, population density — have other health outcomes actually improved?

You could have gone anywhere for your PhD. Why Stanford?

The Knight Hennessy Scholars Program — that was a very compelling pull. Further, I think that being at Stanford gives you this additional advantage of having access to really positive technology like Virtual Reality — giving people exposure to a different world. We want people to demand better health care, so if they can experience what it feels like to walk into a hospital and a clean waiting room with a bench and a trash can, it can change their concept of what they deserve. I’m really excited to learn more about how new technologies can be applied in the slums to prompt people to stand up and demand better for themselves.

I took two women who work at Myna Mahila with me to the royal wedding. These are women who come from the slums — and what impressed them most was the cleanliness. They couldn’t believe how people could keep everything so clean. If more women see this through VR, they will start to think that this world should become theirs too. We have access to thousands of women and if we can teach menstrual hygiene education through this technology — well, as an entrepreneur, I get very excited about this. This is just one of the many technologies I want to learn more about and see if they can be applied in the slums.

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What did you make of Meghan Markle’s visit to the foundation in January 2017?

When she came to visit she told us she would support us in any way that she could. She kept her word. For us being chosen as one of seven charities for the royal wedding, I thought to myself, oh my God, she really thinks that we’re on to something that could actually change the world for many women. I feel like I have a huge responsibility to live up to their expectations. Now we have to keep our word to them and help women meet their true potential.

 

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Eloise Duvillier

Eloise Duvillier is the Program Manager of the Program on Democracy and the Internet at the Cyber Policy Center. She previously was a HR Program Manager and acting HR Business Partner at Bytedance Inc, a rapidly-growing Chinese technology startup. At Bytedance, she supported the globalization of the company by driving US acquisition integrations in Los Angeles and building new R&D teams in Seattle and Silicon Valley. Prior to Bytedance, she led talent acquisition for Baidu USA LLC’s artificial intelligence division. She began her career in the nonprofit industry where she worked in foster care, HIV education and emergency response during humanitarian crises, as well as helping war-torn communities rebuild. She graduated from University of California, Berkeley with a bachelor’s degree in Development Studies, focusing on political economics in unindustrialized societies.

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Many analystspractitioners, and scholars are skeptical of the efficacy of drone strikes for counterterrorism, suggesting that they provide short-term gains at best and are counterproductive at worst. However, despite how widespread these views are, reliable evidence on the consequences of drone strikes remains limited. My research on drone warfare and U.S. counterterrorism—some of which was recently published in International Security—addresses this issue by examining the U.S. drone war in Pakistan from 2004 to 2014. Contrary to the skeptics, I find that drone strikes in Pakistan were effective in degrading the targeted armed groups. And, troublingly, they succeeded in doing so even though they harmed civilians.

 

Three Key Findings

I have conducted research in Pakistan and the United States over the last few years, gathering new qualitative data on the politics of the war and its effects on the two main targets, al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban. I have also evaluated detailed quantitative data on drone strikes and violence by al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban. This research offers three important findings.

First, the U.S. drone war was damaging for the organizational trajectories of al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban. I found that after the United States surged its surveillance and targeting capabilities in 2008, both groups suffered increasing setbacks; they lost bases, their operational capabilities were reduced, their ranks were checked by growing numbers of desertions, and the organizations fractured politically. These effects appear to have persisted until 2014. In a related paper, my University of Michigan colleague Dylan Moore and I show that during the drone program in the Waziristan region, violence by the two groups fell substantially.

Second, the U.S. drone war disrupted al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban not just by killing their leaders and specialized rank-and-file members, but also by heightening the perceived risk of being targeted. Across a variety of empirical materials, including some collected through fieldwork, I found that both groups were direly constrained by the fear—a constant sense of anticipation—of drone strikes, which crippled routine movement and communication. In addition, leaders and rank-and-file jihadis regularly viewed each other with the suspicion of being spies for the drone program, which contributed to their organizational fragmentation.

Third, the notion of increased recruitment for al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban due to civilian harm in drone strikes is questionable. In the local battlefield, I did not find evidence of any tangible increase in recruitment. Interviews with some surviving mid-level members of al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban negated the impression that the groups benefited from a stream of angry recruits. Instead, a recurring theme was that they experienced desertions and manpower shortages because of the stress of operating under drones. To the extent that new recruits were available, both groups struggled to integrate them in their organizations because of the fear that they might be spies for the drone program.

 

Beyond Pakistan?

The U.S. drone war in Pakistan is a crucial case of U.S. counterterrorism policy, but it is one of many other campaigns. The U.S. government is waging such campaigns in Yemen and Somalia, and considering an expansion in the Sahara. In my work, I identify two factors which are important for the dynamics evident in Pakistan to hold generally.

First, the United States must have extensive knowledge of the civilian population where the armed group is based. The counterterrorism force needs such knowledge to generate intelligence leads on their targets, who are often hiding within the civilian population. This comes from detailed population data sharing by local partners, large-scale communication interception, and pattern-of-life analysis of target regions from sophisticated drones.

Second, the United States must be able to exploit available intelligence leads in a timely manner. As members of targeted armed groups consistently try to escape detection, most intelligence has a limited shelf life. The capability to act quickly depends on the bureaucratic capacity to process intelligence, decentralized decision-making for targeting, and rapid-strike capabilities like armed drones.

In Pakistan, the United States met these criteria with an abundance of technology and high-quality local partner cooperation. Starting in 2008, the United States mobilized a large fleet of drones and surveillance technologies to develop granular knowledge of the civilian population in the targeted regions. Despite deep political rifts on the conflict in Afghanistan, the Central Intelligence Agency obtained extensive covert support from Pakistani intelligence against al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban, which enabled it to regularly locate targets. With ample targeting authority and armed drones operating from nearby bases, U.S. forces were able to exploit available leads.

In Yemen, however, the United States has struggled to develop knowledge of the civilian population and act on available intelligence. My interviews with U.S. officials and a leaked government document suggest that, until 2013, U.S. forces did not sustain aerial surveillance of targeted regions, the Yemeni state’s capacity in support of operations remained poor, and the targeting rules were stringent.

 

Implications for U.S. Counterterrorism Policy

The U.S. government’s preference for drone strikes is motivated by the desire to prevent attacks against the American homeland. My research suggests that the drone program has the potential to inflict enough damage on the targeted armed groups to upset their ability to plot and organize attacks in the United States.

The United States also deploys drone strikes to manage jihadi threats to allied regimes. In such cases, the political value of strikes depends, in part, on the capability of the local partner. An effective drone deployment can go a long way in providing a necessary condition for restoring order. But the local partner must ultimately step up to consolidate state control.

For example, President Obama’s drone policy degraded al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Taliban, securing the American homeland and substantially reducing the threat to the nuclear-armed Pakistani state. The Obama administration’s policy was sufficient because the Pakistani state was relatively capable and could build on the gains made by U.S. counterterrorism strikes. Indeed, Pakistan’s ground operations, although contentiously timed, consolidated those gains.

In contrast, in today’s Afghanistan, the U.S. government cannot rely on instruments of counterterrorism alone. U.S. officials realize that just degrading the Afghan Taliban and the Islamic State is unlikely to stabilize the country. The Afghan government remains so weak that it will struggle to consolidate territorial control even after substantial degradation of its armed foes.

Finally, a key limitation of counterterrorism strikes is that they cannot alleviate the ideological appeal of jihadi actors like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Strikes cannot substitute for efforts at countering online jihadi propaganda and de-radicalization. Thus, they should not be seen as a silver bullet that can defeat armed groups operating from safe havens and weak states.

 

Civilian Protection and Drone Strikes

Civilian harm in U.S. counterterrorism remains a vital challenge. While moral objections to civilian casualties are a powerful reason to reconsider drone operations, my research suggests that strategic concerns, like a surge in local violence or increased recruitment of targeted organizations, are not. In Pakistan, for example, drone strikes harmed civilians while also undermining al-Qaeda and Pakistan Taliban. Similarly, the U.S.-led counter-ISIL campaign in Iraq and Syria was very difficult for the civilian population, and yet also inflicted losses on the Islamic State.

If civilian casualties do not affect the strategic outcomes of counterterrorism campaigns, then the U.S. government must be convinced to protect civilians for purely moral reasons. How responsive might the U.S. government be to such appeals? It is unclear. The Obama administration was not transparent about the use of drone strikes. Under President Trump, the lack of transparency has worsened. Concerned policymakers and human rights activists must continue to push the U.S. government to be more transparent and to protect civilians caught up in counterterrorism campaigns.

 

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A group of 8 Stanford graduate and undergraduate students entered the gates of SCPKU on September 21st. They are participating in the inaugural fall quarter of China Studies in Beijing, an overseas, pilot program being offered by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies in partnership with Peking University. Jay Gonzalez, a Stanford junior, already described his experience as “life-changing” – “exactly what I dreamed of and more.”

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(From left to right): Lucas Hornsby (sophomore), Jenny Zhao (SCPKU’s Beijing program coordinator), Isaac Kipust (junior), Cathy Dao (sophomore), Minhchau Dinh (second year, Master’s in International Policy), Jenn Hu (sophomore), and Jay Gonzalez (junior) walking towards SCPKU for China Studies in Beijing orientation

Leading faculty from different Stanford departments and two Peking University faculty are offering intensive courses on contemporary Chinese society, politics, international relations and economic development. And each of the students brought their energy, curiosity and long-standing interest in China to the fall program. With an array of exposure to China – from one whose Chinese begins and ends with “ni hao (hello)” to another who calls China his adoptive home -- their interests vary from a passionate interest in the Belt Road Initiative; China-Africa relations; geopolitics; technology and Chinese entrepreneurs; Chinese domestic politics; and, literally, “anything China.” Many recognize China’s central role in the world and the critical importance of acquiring a nuanced understanding of this global power.

picture0 (Clockwise, from left to right): Isaac Kipust, Jay Gonzalez, Prof. Andrew Walder, Lucas Hornsby, Prof. Thomas Fingar, Josh Cheng (Executive Director, SCPKU), Jenny Zhao, Prof. Jean Oi, Jenn Hu, Cathy Dao, and Minchau Dinh

(Clockwise, from left to right): Isaac Kipust, Jay Gonzalez, Prof. Andrew Walder, Lucas Hornsby, Prof. Thomas Fingar, Josh Cheng (Executive Director, SCPKU), Jenny Zhao, Prof. Jean Oi, Jenn Hu, Cathy Dao, and Minchau Dinh

Each of the Stanford faculty teaching in the overseas program has dedicated his or her professional life to engaging with and understanding China. These students have unparalleled access to foremost China experts like Prof. Thomas Fingar, Shorenstein APARC Fellow and former chairman of the National Intelligence Council who has devoted himself to U.S.-China relations since the “ping-pong diplomacy” days in the early 1970’s. Prof. Jean Oi, the founding Lee Shau Kee Director of SCPKU and the William Haas Professor in Chinese Politics in the department of political science; and Prof. Andrew Walder, Denise O’Leary & Kent Thiry Professor in the Department of Sociology, were among the first group of U.S. scholars to conduct fieldwork in China after Deng Xiaoping’s Open Door policy was announced in 1978. Prof. Scott Rozell, Senior Fellow at FSI and Co-director of the Rural Education Action Program is the recipient of numerous awards and recognitions, including in 2008 of the Friendship Award, the highest award given to a non-Chinese by China’s Premier.

picture2 (Clockwise, from left to right): Prof. Thomas Fingar, Isaac Kipust, Prof. Scott Rozelle, Prof. Andrew Walder, Jennifer Choo (Associate Director, Stanford China Program), Lucas Hornsby, Drew Hasson (second year, Master’s in International Policy), Jenn Hu, and Prof. Jean Oi on the Yalu River looking over at North Korea.

(Clockwise, from left to right): Prof. Thomas Fingar, Isaac Kipust, Prof. Scott Rozelle, Prof. Andrew Walder, Jennifer Choo (Associate Director, Stanford China Program), Lucas Hornsby, Drew Hasson (second year, Master’s in International Policy), Jenn Hu, and Prof. Jean Oi on the Yalu River looking over at North Korea

The program is simultaneously exposing students to China’s contemporary politics, society and economy in the classrooms and pairing them with lived experiences -- through real-life conversations with PKU professors and PKU classmates; ordinary citizens of Beijing; and through visits to diverse parts of China. To date, the group has traveled to historic Chengde (承德); a mining equipment factory in Jinzhou city (锦州); the China-North Korean border in Dandong (丹东); and the strategic port city of Dalian (大连). Each of these areas embed layers of history and reveal artifacts from different eras: the Manchus who ruled the Han Chinese during the Qing Dynasty (Chengde); the SOE restructuring in the 1990’s that devastated China’s Northeastern “rust belt” (Jinzhou); massive human casualty suffered by the Chinese during the Korean War (Dandong); and the Sino-Russo-Japanese tug-of-war that marked Dalian’s fate throughout the 19th and 20th century. Through these experiences, students are gaining insights into how the world might look to their counterparts in China and elsewhere.

Below are pictures and reflections from students’ own experiences at Jinshanling (金山岭) Great Wall, Chengde as well as in China’s Northeast (东北) region.

Jinshangling (金山岭) Great Wall

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Jenn Hu and Minchau Dinh (holding up the Stanford banner) at the Great Wall

Chengde City (承德市)

The city of Chengde in Hebei Province, located 155 miles northeast of Beijing, was an imperial summer resort during the Qing Dynasty. Emperor Kang Xi (1662-1723) discovered this rare scenic spot during a hunting trip and turned it into a “Mountain Resort.”

As one student noted, these field trips “supplement academic discussions with . . . diverse representations of China – from historical kingdom to innovation contender (Cathy Dao, Stanford sophomore).”

picture4 Prof. Jean Oi and Isaac Kipust engaged in discussion at the imperial summer resort of Chengde

Prof. Jean Oi and Isaac Kipust engaged in discussion at the imperial summer resort of Chengde

China’s Northeast region (东北)

Jinzhou City (州市), Liaoning Province

Jinzhou Mining Machinery (Group) Co., Ltd

picture5 Faculty and students enter the factory at Jinzhou Mining Machinery (Group) Co., Ltd. with the company’s senior managers

Faculty and students enter the factory at Jinzhou Mining Machinery (Group) Co., Ltd. with the company’s senior managers

Stanford students and faculty toured a mining equipment factory in Jinzhou city in Northeast China. Massive worker lay-offs and closures of state-owned enterprises devastated this “rust belt” region throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s. The company’s senior management sat with students and faculty and described its current reincarnation as a private shareholding company. They also opened up about their difficulties in attracting talent; local tax rates and land use fees; and their inability to enforce contracts and redress payment defaults.

As Jenn Hu (Stanford sophomore) remarked, “One thing I found particularly fascinating [was that]. . . it was not unusual for [the company’s] clients to bail on contractual obligations . . . . [T]he company allowed their client to pay them back in the form of raw materials, essentially engaging in barter trade . . . The fact that an increasing number of clients are unable to pay back, a trend party leaders have dubbed the ‘new normal,’ is also indicative of China’s slowing growth.”

picture6 Jay Gonzalez and Jenny Zhao pose in front of a giant painting of “model workers” at Jinzhou Mining Machinery (Group) Co., Ltd.

Jay Gonzalez and Jenny Zhao pose in front of a giant painting of “model workers” at Jinzhou Mining Machinery (Group) Co., Ltd

Dandong City (丹东市)

War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea Railroad Museum (铁路抗美援朝博物馆)

picture7 Group photo in front of the old railroad tracks in Dandong, Liaoning province, that helped transport Chinese troops into North Korea during the Korean War

Group photo in front of the old railroad tracks in Dandong, Liaoning province, that helped transport Chinese troops into North Korea during the Korean War

picture8 Jenn Hu reading the captions at the “War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” Railroad Museum

Jenn Hu reading the captions at the “War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” Railroad Museum

Dandong’s small “railroad museum” displayed images, quotes and photos from the Korean War – better known as “War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” in China. Nearly 3 million People’s Liberation Army troops overwhelmed the U.S. troops and allies in 1950; and China tragically lost anywhere from 149,000 to 400,000 soldiers in the war.

Students heard the Chinese perspective on the war, which focused on U.S. aggression and China’s rightful defense. The museum’s guided tour, in fact, ended with an anti-American sing-along that praised China’s bravery and denounced U.S. imperialism. As one student commented on her blog, “[f]rom the ends of the room, [the museum’s visitors’] voices rose in unison, and swelled into a chorus of song -- 抗美援朝鲜,打败美帝野心狼! (‘Resist America, help Korea, defeat the American imperialists with their wolf-like ambitions!’) (Cathy Dao, Stanford sophomore),” giving substance to the reality that history is, indeed, political.

picture9 Prof. Scott Rozelle, Senior Fellow at FSI and faculty member for China Studies in Beijing, engaged in a heated debate with the local guide from Dandong who argued that North Korea’s decision to start the Korean War was to defend its motherland against U.S. military aggression.

Prof. Scott Rozelle, Senior Fellow at FSI and faculty member for China Studies in Beijing, engaged in a heated debate with the local guide from Dandong who argued that North Korea’s decision to start the Korean War was to defend its motherland against U.S. military aggression

picture10 Sino-North Korean Friendship Bridge that links Shinuiju, North Korea, to Dandong, China.

Sino-North Korean Friendship Bridge that links Shinuiju, North Korea, to Dandong, China

Dalian (大连)

Lastly, students traveled to Dalian, the “pearl of the East” founded by the Russians in 1898 and built in the style of European cities at the turn-of-the-century. The site of intense battles during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the city now boasts a Sino-Soviet Friendship Monument built in 1996.

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Group photo in front of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Monument in Dalian city

Whether it be “[t]he sheer size of a small city like Jinzhou”(pop: 3.1 million) or the “‘little’ city” of Dalian (pop: 6.2 million), these cities drove home for students the sheer scale of a country like China – its significance, complexity, and import.

Students have written blog pieces posted on FSI’s Medium site in which one student also described a fascinating solo backpacking trip to Tibetan communities in western Sichuan and, another, the quotidian challenges of everyday life in Beijing. Regardless of their subject matter, however, their words echo the program’s success in enabling students to perceive the world through vastly differing lenses – lenses that often show a place and people that are deeply warm and welcoming and, at other times, reflect a world that proves decentering and unclear. Yet, the complementary experiences in the classroom and outside the curriculum are enabling students to develop an imagination that can encompass the “other” and nurture a humility that can feed a lifetime of questions. As Cathy Dao commented upon visiting the “War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” Railroad Museum, “I realized that such hostility is a function of history. How each country portrays conflicts [such as the Korean War] strongly influences the perceptions that its people have. [But] [s]hould we learn how one another views history, we can see the humanity in what would otherwise be an abstract and incompatible ‘other.’”

picture12 (Counter clockwise): Julie Gu (second year, Masters in International Policy), Pan Xue (Beijing program assistant), Jenny Zhao, and Lucas Hornsby taking a group selfie in Dalian city

(Counter clockwise): Julie Gu (second year, Masters in International Policy), Pan Xue (Beijing program assistant), Jenny Zhao, and Lucas Hornsby taking a group selfie in Dalian city

For information regarding similar opportunities, please visit FSI Student Programs or email Patrick Laboon, FSI’s Academic Program Manager, at plaboon@stanford.edu for all updates regarding the many international student opportunities offered through FSI.

 

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(Clockwise, from left to right): Prof. Thomas Fingar, Isaac Kipust, Prof. Scott Rozelle, Prof. Andrew Walder, Jennifer Choo (Associate Director, Stanford China Program), Lucas Hornsby, Drew Hasson (second year, Master’s in International Policy), Jenn Hu, and Prof. Jean Oi on the Yalu River looking over at North Korea.
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The two-day forum, part of a project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, led by the Freeman Spogli Institute’s Karl Eikenberry and Stephen Krasner, gathered experts to examine trends in civil wars and solutions moving forward.   

 

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Attendees at a two-day forum, part of a project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

The Council on Foreign Relations presently tracks six countries in a state of civil war, including three (South Sudan, Afghanistan, and Yemen) where the situation is currently worsening. Furthermore, three states (Central African Republic, Myanmar, and Nigeria) are experiencing sectarian violence with the potential to become larger conflicts. With two months still remaining in 2018, the combined fatalities in Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen alone is fast approaching 100,000 for the year.

It was against this backdrop that Shorenstein APARC’s U.S.-Asia Security Initiative (USASI), the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS), and the School for International Studies at Peking University recently co-hosted the security workshop “Civil Wars, Intrastate Violence, and International Responses.” Held in Beijing, on October 22-23, the workshop brought together thirty-five U.S. and international experts to gain a wider perspective on intrastate violence and consider the possibilities for, and limits of, intervention. The workshop is the latest activity of the AAAS project on Civil Wars, Violence, and International Responses, chaired by Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, director of USASI, and by Stephen Krasner, senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and professor of international relations.

“Some of the major discussion topics included the appropriate political and economic development models to apply to fragile states recovering from internal conflict, justifications for intervention, and the likely impact of great power competition on the future treatment of civil wars." - Karl Eikenberry

Workshop participants included academics and professionals with expertise in political science, global health, diplomacy, refugee field work, United Nations, and the military. Countries represented at the table included the United States, Ethiopia, France, and China. Throughout the two-day session, they examined three crucial questions: What is the scope of intrastate conflicts and civil wars, and to what extent is it attributable to domestic or international factors? What types of threats to global security emanate from state civil wars? What policy options are available to regional powers and the international community to deal with such threats?

 

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USASI Director Karl Eikenberry addresses one of the sessions

USASI Director Karl Eikenberry addresses one of the sessions

China’s Emerging Role in Addressing Intrastate Violence

The workshop’s timing and location was prescient. Over the past two decades, China’s global exposure–through trade, investment, and financing–has increased dramatically. Coupled with a growing number of its citizens living abroad, China’s equity in other states has reached the point where it has a direct interest in those experiencing or are at risk of political instability and internal violence. Indeed, through its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, China has the opportunity to help stabilize fragile states by stimulating economic development.

“The workshop revealed, at least for me, that China is backing away from its absolute defense of sovereignty and non-intervention,” said Stephen Krasner. “As Chinese interests have expanded around the world, and as both its investments and the number of its citizens living abroad have increased, the Chinese have become more concerned with political conditions in weakly governed countries.”

With China’s growing policy and academic interests in addressing civil wars and intrastate violence, as well as its higher international profile in places like United Nations peacekeeping operations, the Beijing event provided an excellent opportunity for Chinese experts to exchange views with their international colleagues.

Paul H. Wise, MD, MPH; Senior Fellow at Stanford Health Policy

Paul H. Wise, MD, MPH; Senior Fellow at Stanford Health Policy

Where We are Today, Where We Go Tomorrow

The Beijing workshop was arranged into four sessions, with themes focusing on trends in intrastate violence, the threats it poses to international security, the limits of intervention, and advice to policymakers.

Each panel included presentations of prepared papers, moderator comments, and an open discussion by all participants. A fifth and final session provided an opportunity to summarize the preceding discussions. The workshop then closed out with an open conversation, where participants offered insight and policy recommendations developed over the preceding two days of dialogue.

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Martha Crenshaw seated at round table
“The workshop,” observed Martha Crenshaw (shown above), a Senior Fellow at FSI, “was a unique opportunity to exchange views with Chinese colleagues on the subject of civil conflict in the contemporary world. A valuable learning experience for all of us."

The "Civil Wars, Intrastate Violence, and International Responses” workshop marks the second phase of the AAAS project by the same name that launched in 2015. The first phase of the project culminated in the publication of 28 essays across two volumes of the AAAS quarterly journal Dædalus. The ongoing second phase consists of a series of roundtables and workshops in which project participants engage with academics and with government and international organization officials to build a larger conceptual understanding of the threats posed by the collapse of state authority associated with civil wars, and to contribute to current policymaking. Project activities have included meetings with the United Nations leadership and staff; academic activities in the United States; sessions with the U.S. executive and legislative branches; and a visit to Nigeria.

Throughout the workshop, Chatham House Rule of non-attribution applied to all dialogue. A workshop report will be published by the co-hosts in early 2019.

The U.S.-Asia Security Initiative is part of Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC). Led by former U.S. Ambassador and Lieutenant General (Retired) Karl Eikenberry, USASI seeks to further research, education, and policy relevant dialogues at Stanford University on contemporary Asia-Pacific security issues.

March 1, 2019 update: the workshop report is now available online. Download the report >> 

Group photo of Participants in the “Civil Wars, Intrastate Violence, and International Responses” workshop

Participants in the “Civil Wars, Intrastate Violence, and International Responses” workshop

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Karl Eikeberry at Civil Wars, Intrastate Violence, and International Response Workshop
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At 11am on November 11, 1918, the armistice that effectively ended the First World War was signed. What came to be known as “The Great War” had a profound and lasting impact on the cultural fabric of the nations involved: as Paul Fussell wrote, “its dynamics and iconography proved crucial to the political, rhetorical, and artistic life of the years that followed; while relying on inherited myth, war was generating new myth.” Over the course of the 20th century, the concept of war evolved beyond historically traceable moments and events to include the consideration of war as site and influence shaping every aspect of lived experience. This conference seeks to examine ways in which literature and the arts have taken up and taken apart war and the myths surrounding it -- grappling with it both as subject and context while also considering the ways in which the experience of war molded, mutilated, and morphed artistic forms. Though the word “centennial” often rings of monolithic celebration, it is equally an opportunity to highlight the attempts of writers and artists to contain, contend, or survive war and to question and problematize preconceptions and existing views of war by investigating their inherently bipolar nature.

November 10, 2018 (Day 2)
SCHEDULE:

  • 9 – 11am - 2nd PANEL
    Chair: Jennifer Scappettone (University of Chicago, Associate Professor)
     
  • Aubrey Knox (CUNY, PhD Student)
    "The Regulated Body: The Grand Palais as Military Hospital in World War I"
  • Joanna Fiduccia (Reed College, Assistant Professor)
    "A Destructive Character: Alberto Giacometti’s Crisis of the Monument"
  • Hadrien Laroche (INHA, France, Philosopher and Researcher)
    "Duchamp's waste: Trauma, Violence and Aesthetics"
     
  • 11 - 11.30am – COFFEE BREAK
     
  • 11.30am - 12.45pm – KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Jay Winter (Yale University, Emeritus Professor)
"All the Things We Cannot Hear: Silences of the Great War"

  • 12.45am – 2pm – LUNCH BREAK
     
  • 2 - 4.30pm - 3rd PANEL
    Chair: Peter Stansky (Stanford University, Emeritus Professor)
     
  • Martin Löschnigg (University of Graz, Austria, Professor)
    "‘The extreme fury of war self-multiplies’: First World War Literature and the Aesthetics of Loss"
  • Ron Ben-Tovim (Ben Gurion University, Israel, Post-Doc), Boris Shoshitaishvili (Stanford University, PhD Student)
    "Re-Enchanting the World after War: J. R. R. Tolkien, David Jones, and the Revision of Epic"
  • Anna Abramson (MIT, Post-Doc)
    "Atmospheric Myths of The Great War"
  • Isaac Blacksin (UC Santa Cruz, PhD Student)
    Senseless Encounter, Immutable Sense: The Contradictions of Reporting War

 

  • 4.30 – 4.45pm – COFFEE BREAK
     
  • 4.45 – 6pm – KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Alexander Nemerov (Stanford University, Professor)
"A Soldier Killed in the First World War"

For more info,  please email: massucco@stanford.edu

Sponsored by:  the Division of Literatures, Languages, and Cultures;  Stanford Department of Art and Art History; Theater and Performance Studies; Stanford Humanities Center; The Europe Center; Dept. of French and Italian; Dept. of History; Dept. of German Studies; and the Dean's Office of Humanities and Sciences.

 

Stanford Humanities Center
424 Santa Teresa Street
Stanford, CA 94305

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At 11am on November 11, 1918, the armistice that effectively ended the First World War was signed. What came to be known as “The Great War” had a profound and lasting impact on the cultural fabric of the nations involved: as Paul Fussell wrote, “its dynamics and iconography proved crucial to the political, rhetorical, and artistic life of the years that followed; while relying on inherited myth, war was generating new myth.” Over the course of the 20th century, the concept of war evolved beyond historically traceable moments and events to include the consideration of war as site and influence shaping every aspect of lived experience. This conference seeks to examine ways in which literature and the arts have taken up and taken apart war and the myths surrounding it -- grappling with it both as subject and context while also considering the ways in which the experience of war molded, mutilated, and morphed artistic forms. Though the word “centennial” often rings of monolithic celebration, it is equally an opportunity to highlight the attempts of writers and artists to contain, contend, or survive war and to question and problematize preconceptions and existing views of war by investigating their inherently bipolar nature.

November 9, 2018 (Day 1)
SCHEDULE:

  • 4 – 4.30pm – OPENING REMARKS
  • 4.30 - 7pm - 1st PANEL

Chair: Russell Berman (Stanford University, Professor)

  • Greg Chase (College of the Holy Cross, Lecturer)
  • ‘Death is not an event of life’: How Wittgenstein’s War Experience Re-Shaped His Philosophy
  • Victoria Zurita (Stanford University, PhD Student)
  • Ironic prospects: hope in Jean Giono’s To the Slaughterhouse
  • André Fischer (Auburn University, Assistant Professor)
  • Politics by other means: War photography in the work of Ernst Jünger
  • Nicholas Jenkins (Stanford University, Associate Professor)

 

For more info,  please email: massucco@stanford.edu

Sponsored by:  the Division of Literatures, Languages, and Cultures;  Stanford Department of Art and Art History; Theater and Performance Studies; Stanford Humanities Center; The Europe Center; Dept. of French and Italian; Dept. of History; Dept. of German Studies; and the Dean's Office of Humanities and Sciences.
 

Stanford Humanities Center
424 Santa Teresa Street
Stanford, CA 94305

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A matrix with m rows and n columns looks like a rectangle filled with tiny boxes: m times n boxes, to be exact. But after visiting the Stanford Center at Peking University (SCPKU) for three months, my mental matrix of the world looked more like a weird trapezoid. New acquaintances added rows and their unique perspectives added columns. My brain drew lines from geography to economics to politics, but the lines were on crumpled paper. Ah and don't forget history. So multiply the rectangle by time t and out comes a 3D trapezoid.

How do we mentally travel through odd shapes with any sense and efficiency? China Studies in Beijing classes at the SCPKU sharpened our tools for the endeavor. On day one, Thomas Fingar emphasized that the goal of a foreign policy class is not to remember a list of facts, but to build a personal matrix of relations and to learn tricks for traversing the matrix. Jean Oi demonstrated how people's ideals can constrain the goals of business and political leaders. Scott Rozelle showed how economic developments in China changed real lives. Clarity reduces the dimensions we care about. Sometimes we need to melt and reshape the whole matrix. Other times we just need to prune a few rows and columns. We have the algorithms, technologies, "intelligences." Our tools, both natural and artificial, can be useful for navigating political spheres and leading to action.

But tools are not all we have. Other people's matrices sometimes slam into our own. Warping it, filling it. At Peking University (PKU), I met students with different stories and missions. One student transfers industrial expertise from China to Southeast Asia. Another connects Stanford and PKU students to openly discuss US-China relations. I also collaborated with PKU researchers. The scientists are fast learners and deeply curious. The clinicians are hard working and harder feeling. They all faithfully give their time and spirit. Despite the different bases of our matrices, language in particular, we could cooperate and together build a fuller model of the world.

What was the visiting graduate student's place in all of this? As a psychologist, I study humans and their brains. The brain itself is a messy matrix. Figuratively, a life history of data to curate; literally, cells that code spacetime. Maybe the psychology and geometry of every other brain is not so foreign from each of our own. Our science can keep digging deeper and tilling truer in search of common ground. We can build an empirical basis for humans to flourish together.

Sometimes, after long times, a complex matrix can instead be depicted as a fractal. Like flakes of snow. Each one is unique, starting with the same properties of H2O but morphing through many phases. Maybe with study and reflection we will look back at both China studies and brain studies and, rather than see a messy matrix, find a fractal. Hopefully such a model can also be useful to guide our way forward.

About the author Josiah Leong: Awarded a SCPKU Predoctoral fellowship for research from August to November 2018. He is a doctoral candidate in psychology and his research is about how brain creates emotions and makes decisions. During his visit, he started a neuroimaging study with the Peking psychology department and taught neuroimaging data analyses to addiction researchers at the Peking Sixth Hospital. He also engaged with researchers in anthropology, history, and political science, and he audited courses from the China Studies in Beijing overseas program. These experiences clarified his vision for how psychological science can guide the policies that govern everyday life. He has seen how scientific collaboration builds communities across borders, and he remains optimistic that the practice of science can lead people to question their assumptions and reshape their matrices, so to speak.

 

 

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