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This talk is an overview of the changing role of foreign investment in Chinese workplaces. Foreign investment inflows helped transform the Chinese industrial landscape in the 1990s. As ownership has become blurred and increasingly mixed between domestic-foreign and public-private in China, preferential policies and laws for foreign-invested firms have diminished. A more level playing field has raised the stakes for foreign business and led to their increased participation in national debates on labor legislation and legal protections for workers. This talk will focus on this new role for foreign investors and how it is changing Chinese laws and the Chinese workplace.

Professor Gallagher studies Chinese politics, law and society, and comparative politics. She is currently working on two projects. The first, funded by a Fulbright Research Award and the National Science Foundation, examines the development of rule of law in China by examining the dynamics of legal mobilization of Chinese workers. "The Rule of Law in China: If They Build It, Who Will Come?" focuses on the demand-side of rule of law through an exploration of legal aid plaintiffs in Shanghai, a four-city household survey on legal knowledge, attitude, and practice, and in-depth case analysis of labor disputes. The second project examines labor standards and practices in four Chinese regions. One goal is to find if there are diffusion effects in legislation, court behavior, and labor practices across different regions. Another goal is to look for evidence of a "race to the bottom" in labor standards and social welfare not between China and other competing economies, but within China's own domestic economy.

This talk is part of the Stanford China Program Winter 2009 China Seminar Series titled "30 Years of Reform and Opening in China: How Far from the Cage?"

Daniel and Nancy Okimoto Conference Room

Mary E. Gallagher Associate Professor of Political Science Speaker University of Michigan
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A central element of Deng Xiaoping's political reforms initiated during the 1980s was to reform the ways that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) related to other national institutions (the state and military), sectors of society, and the Party itself.  While there have been significant ups and downs over the past thirty years, many elements of Deng's original vision for Party reform have been carried out and continue to be pursued. As a result, today's Chinese Communist Party is a stronger institution that has survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist party-states worldwide. Yet, it faces new challenges, to which it must adapt. Professor Shambaugh's lecture will assess the CCP's adaptations and reforms over the past three decades.

David Shambaugh has been Professor of Political Science & International Affairs in the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University since 1996.  He directed the Elliott School's Sigur Center for Asian Studies from 1996-98, and since that time has been the founding Director of the China Policy Program.  He has also been a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program and Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution since 1998.  In 2008 he was also appointed an Honorary Research Professor at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences.

Before joining the faculty at George Washington, he previously taught at the University of London's School of Oriental & African Studies (1987-1996), served as Editor of The China Quarterly (1991-1996), and directed the Asia Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (1986-87).  He received his B.A. in East Asian Studies from the Elliott School at George Washington, an M.A. in International Affairs from Johns Hopkins SAIS, and Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan.  Professor Shambaugh has published widely-having authored or edited 25 books, approximately 200 articles and book chapters, and 100 opinion-editorials and book reviews.  He is a frequent commentator on Chinese and Asian affairs in the international media, sits on the editorial boards of a number of scholarly journals, and has served as a consultant to various governments, research institutes, and private corporations. 

This talk is part of the Stanford China Program Winter 2009 China Seminar Series titled "30 Years of Reform in China: How Far from the Cage?"

Philippines Conference Room

David Shambaugh Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the China Policy Program Speaker the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University
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Three decades of economic reform in China have created expectations of political change to follow. However, neither the Chinese Communist Party nor China's capitalists are following this script. The CCP has strengthened its support for the private sector and integrated capitalists into the existing political system. China's capitalists have shown little interest in promoting democratization. Many are dependent on the state for their success, and have shared interests, personal ties, and common views on a range of policy issues. Rather than being potential agents of change, China's entrepreneurs are proving to be a key source of support for the party's agenda.

Bruce Dickson received his B.A. in political science and English literature, his M.A. in Chinese Studies, and his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Michigan. He joined the faculty of The George Washington University and the Elliott School in 1993. He teaches on China, comparative politics, and democratization. Professor Dickson is currently examining the political consequences of economic reform in China, and in particular the relationship between private entrepreneurs and the Chinese Communist Party.

 

Dr. Dickson is the author of Wealth into Power: The Communist Party's Embrace of China's Private Sector (2008), Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreuneurs, and Prospects for Political Change (2003), Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties (1997), and is co-editor of four other books. His articles have appeared in Asian Survey, China Quarterly, Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Journal of Contemporary China, Journal of Democracy, National Interest, and Political Science Quarterly. He is a frequent commentator on political developments in China and Taiwan and on U.S.-China relations, and has appeared on CNN, NPR, BBC, and VOA.

 

This talk is part of the Stanford China Program Winter 2009 China Seminar Series titled "30 Years of Reform and Opening in China: How Far from the Cage?"

Philippines Conference Room

Bruce Dickson Professor of Political Science and International Affairs Speaker The Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University
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Compared to other Communist parties that were falling apart in the 1980s, the China Communist Party's success since 1978 is extraordinary. Deng did not start opening and reform, but he made it work. How? What kind of person was he? How was he prepared for his job? One important strategy was setting goals but not drawing bluebrints. He tried experiments, learnt from them, and then let new institutions develop organically. His key experiments were in Guangdong and Fujian. What were the politics and the economics of these experiments and what did they learn?

Ezra Vogel is Henry Ford II Research Professor of Social Sciences at Harvard, honorary director of the Program on US-Japan Relations and former director of Harvard's East Asia Research Center. He was also the second chairman of the Council for East Asian Studies, the first director of the Harvard University Asia Center and former director for the Program on US-Japan Relations at the Center for International Affairs. He has been a professor at Harvard since 1967. Vogel holds a bachelor's degree from Ohio Wesleyan, a PhD from Harvard and ten honorary degrees. He received the Japan Foundation Prize in 1996 and lectures frequently in Asia. Professor Vogel is currently writing a biography of Deng Xiaoping.

This talk is part of the Stanford China Program Winter 2009 China Seminar Series titled "30 Years of Reform and Opening in China: How Far from the Cage?"

Philippines Conference Room

Ezra Vogel Henry Ford II Professor of the Social Sciences, Emeritus Speaker Harvard University
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Minxin Pei is a senior associate in the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His research focuses on democratization in developing countries, economic reform and governance in China, and U.S.-China relations. He is the author of From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the Soviet Union (Harvard University Press, 1994) and China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy (Harvard University Press, 2006). Pei’s research has been published in Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, Modern China, China Quarterly, Journal of Democracy and many edited books. Pei is a frequent commentator on BBC World News, Voice of America, and National Public Radio; his op-eds have appeared in the Financial Times, New York Times, Washington Post, Newsweek International, and International Herald Tribune, and other major newspapers. Pei received his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University.

Richard and Rhoda Goldman Conference Room

Minxin Pei Senior Associate Speaker China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
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On December 4, Clint Eastwood's Letters from Iwo Jima was the last of four films to be screened at the Cubberley Auditorium as part of the Shorenstein APARC Divided Lenses: Film and War Memories in Asia film series. The film portrays the Battle of Iwo Jima (February 19-March 26, 1945) as experienced by Lt. Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi and the Japanese soldiers who served under his command.

Following the screening Robert Toplin, professor of history at the University of North Carolina Wilmington, interviewed Eastwood about the making of the film. Eastwood remarked that Letters from Iwo Jima won Japan's Academy Prize for "Outstanding Foreign Language Film," joking that he was the only foreign thing about the film, as the screenwriter and most of the cast and crew were Japanese.

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The Mumbai terror attacks, apparently carried out by Pakistan-based Kashmiri militant groups, highlight one of the most pressing challenges facing the new Obama administration. Though it is officially a key ally in U.S. anti-terrorism efforts, the Pakistani government has been unable or unwilling to control Islamist militancy within its borders. Large swaths of the country are now in the hands of the jihadis, including reconstituted elements of the Taliban. These groups are wreaking havoc both in Pakistan and abroad. Combined with Pakistan's collapsing economy and arsenal of at least several dozen nuclear weapons, this is the recipe for disaster.

Observers have suggested that, to ameliorate this situation, the United States should lead a renewed effort to solve Pakistan's dispute with India over the territory of Kashmir. The resolution, according to this reasoning, will significantly reduce the militants' incentives for violence. There is even talk of appointing former President Bill Clinton as special envoy to lead such a project.

Not a good idea

Despite its intuitive appeal, this would be an unfortunate South Asia policy for the United States. American efforts to mediate the Kashmir dispute would be ill advised for three reasons:

First, Islamist militants seek nothing less than complete Pakistani possession of Kashmir. Such a solution is out of the question. To allow Muslim-majority Kashmir to secede from the Indian Union on the basis of religion would badly undermine India's efforts to build a cohesive state out of the multiplicity of ethnic and religious groups within its borders. India has flatly rejected such an approach for more than 60 years and will not agree to it now. Thus, American efforts to devise a solution acceptable to both New Delhi and the militants would, at best, be wasted.
At worst, such a policy could convince the militants that violence has been effective, coercing the United States into bringing India to the bargaining table. This could embolden the jihadis further, resulting in even more terrorism in Pakistan and abroad.
Second, American intervention in the Kashmir dispute would greatly annoy India. After decades of mutual indifference, Washington and New Delhi now view each other as strategic partners, with a host of common economic and security interests. The Indian government has made clear that it considers Kashmir a bilateral issue to be resolved solely with Pakistan. U.S. interference would demonstrate callousness toward Indian concerns on this sensitive issue and could squander much hard-earned good will.

Kashmir improving

Third, proponents of American intervention ignore recent improvements in Kashmir. Left to their own devices, India and Pakistan have launched a peace process and implemented a series of confidence-building measures. As a result, violence has declined, and Indian forces have adopted a less aggressive posture in the region.

Of course, such improvements are tenuous. They could fall victim to events such as the Mumbai attacks, which were undoubtedly intended to undermine the improved security situation and increase regional tensions. Nonetheless, given recent progress, it would be inadvisable to jettison Indo-Pakistani bilateralism in favor of third-party diplomatic intervention.

Observers are correct to note the dangers emanating from Pakistan and the importance of South Asian stability to United States security. South Asia is no longer a strategic backwater; it is a region to which the Obama administration will have to pay close attention, as events in Mumbai have dramatically demonstrated. In crafting its South Asia policy, however, the administration should remember that less can be more, particularly regarding Kashmir.

S. Paul Kapur is associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and a faculty affiliate at Stanford University"s Center for International Security and Cooperation. His views do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government. Sumit Ganguly is professor of political science at Indiana University-Bloomington and an adjunct senior fellow of the Pacific Council on International Policy in Los Angeles. They wrote this article for the Mercury News.

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The small band of terrorists who attacked Mumbai last week killed nearly 200 people, wounded several hundred more and stoked tensions between India and Pakistan. The attacks have brought attention to the countries' long-simmering dispute over Kashmir and the diplomatic balancing act the United States must play between the nuclear-armed neighbors. They also expose major flaws in India's national security and highlight Pakistan's ineffectiveness in dealing with terrorist groups.

Paul Kapur, a faculty affiliate at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation and an associate professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, is an expert on international security in South Asia. He's the author of Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia, and his work has appeared in journals such as International Security, Security Studies, Asian Survey, and Asian Security.

In an interview with Stanford Report, Kapur discussed the group that was likely behind the attacks and how he expects the situation to unfold.

American and Indian officials say there's evidence linking the attacks to members of Lashkar-e-Taiba. Who are these people, and what would be their motivation for hitting Mumbai?

Lashkar-e-Taiba is one of a number of militant groups that have been fighting against Indian control of Kashmir. India doesn't control all of Kashmir but controls part of it, including the Kashmir valley, which is especially prized.

These types of groups have been active since the late 1980s. There was a spontaneous--and mostly indigenous--uprising against Indian rule in Kashmir as the result of Indian ineptitude and malfeasance. The Pakistanis took advantage of the situation and got involved with the insurgency and started backing militant organizations with arms and training and financial and logistical support. It was an opportunity on the Pakistani side. By supporting the insurgency, they could potentially get the territory from India and bleed Indian resources.

What does that say about Pakistan's responsibility for the attacks?

There does seem to be strong evidence that Lashkar-e-Taiba was involved, and the attackers did come from Pakistan. But that doesn't mean the Pakistani government was directly involved with this operation. My guess is they probably weren't.

Events like this show that the Pakistani government is either unable or unwilling to quash militancy within its territory and to stop terrorists from using Pakistani soil to launch attacks on its neighbors.

Even if the Pakistani government now is not directly pulling the strings of these groups, the groups exist largely because of Pakistani support in the past. So now the genie is out of the bottle. The big danger is that a group like this could trigger an Indo-Pakistani crisis and conflict without the direct involvement of the Pakistani government.

But that doesn't mean the Pakistani government was directly involved with this operation. My guess is they probably weren't.

What does this mean for relations between India and Pakistan? Do you expect India will launch a military response?

It's certainly possible. If you think about the last time there was a major Indo-Pakistani militarized crisis, it was after a failed attack on the Indian parliament-also involving Lashkar-e-Taiba-back in 2001. That attack failed. About five people died, and it was over in the space of a morning. Nonetheless, the Indians were so outraged that they mobilized about 500,000 troops along the international border, and there was a major standoff that lasted almost a year.

That was-in my view-a lot less provocative than Mumbai. This attack killed almost 200 people, wounded hundreds more, lasted almost three days and targeted the financial hub of India. There's going to be a lot of pressure domestically for the government to act in a forceful way.

The unfortunate thing is that things were getting better between the two sides. Since that last crisis in 2001-2002, a peace process had begun and there was really a thaw in Indo-Pakistani relations. Kashmir had actually gotten more stable, and the general sense was that the regional trajectory was a positive one. Ironically, it may be that some of that progress is what motivated the Mumbai attacks. Part of the goal of an operation like this would certainly be to derail improving relations in the region.

Both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons. How will that factor into how the countries deal with each other?

Nuclear weapons will create incentives for the two countries-even in the event of a crisis-to behave somewhat cautiously so the situation doesn't spin out of control. But the problem is that nuclear weapons also greatly reduce the margin for error. In the event of a miscalculation, the cost could be catastrophic.

America is an ally of both these countries and has relied on the Pakistanis to combat the Taliban along the border with Afghanistan. What's at stake for American diplomacy in this situation?

It's very tricky. The U.S. relies on Pakistan as a major ally in the war on terror. We've been pressuring the Pakistanis to pay attention to the northwest frontier and the border with Afghanistan and get that area under control. One thing the United States does not want to see is an Indo-Pakistani conflict, which draws Pakistani forces away from that mission in the northwest and back to the east to combat the Indians. From the standpoint of U.S. goals in Afghanistan, it would take resources away from that struggle, and so the United States very much wants the current situation to be resolved in a way that doesn't involve a major confrontation.

The problem is that it's going to be hard for the U.S. to say to the Indians, "Hey, you shouldn't retaliate against these guys," because this is exactly the argument that the United States makes in justifying its own retaliation against terrorists. If a country is unable or unwilling to keep its territory from being used to launch terror attacks, then U.S. leaders have claimed to have the right to go in and deal with the situation.

There are reports that India received warnings about the possibility of terrorist attacks on Mumbai. What did government officials do with that information, and why wasn't more done to beef up security and counterterrorism measures?

It's not clear that they did anything. They may have ratcheted up security for a short time and then let it return to normal levels. One of the things that's going to come out of this in the weeks and months ahead is an examination of the effectiveness of the Indian security services. Obviously, there's a huge intelligence failure here. But at a tactical level, it took almost three days to get a handful of terrorists out of three or four buildings. It wasn't a shining moment. The Indian security forces bravely did their job. But in terms of their effectiveness, my sense is that there were some pretty serious shortcomings.

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