The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) is pleased to invite applications for four types of fellowship in contemporary Asia studies for the 2022-23 academic year.

The Center offers postdoctoral fellowships that promote multidisciplinary research on contemporary Japan, contemporary Asia broadly defined, health or healthcare policy in the Asia-Pacific region, and a fellowship for experts on Southeast Asia. Learn more about each fellowship and its eligibility and specific application requirements:

Postdoctoral Fellowship on Contemporary Japan

Hosted by the Japan Program at APARC, the fellowship supports research on contemporary Japan in a broad range of disciplines including political science, economics, sociology, law, policy studies, and international relations. Appointments are for one year beginning in fall quarter 2022. The application deadline is January 3, 2022.
 

There are many reasons to fear an impending Chinese attack on Taiwan: Intensified Chinese aerial activity. High-profile Pentagon warnings. Rapid Chinese military modernization. President Xi Jinping’s escalating rhetoric. But despite what recent feverish discussion in foreign policy and military circles is suggesting, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan isn’t one of them.

Some critics of President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan argue the move will embolden Beijing because it telegraphs weakness — an unwillingness to stick it out and win wars that China will factor in when deciding whether to attack Taiwan, which it considers to be part of its territory.

The reality is, though, that the U.S. departure from Afghanistan will more likely give pause to Chinese war planners — not push them to use force against Taiwan.

The Chinese Communist Party’s stated goal is “national rejuvenation”: Regaining China’s standing as a great power. Chinese leaders and thinkers have studied the rise and fall of great powers past. They have long understood that containment by the United States could keep China from becoming a great power itself.

Luckily for Beijing, the Afghan war — along with Iraq and other American misadventures in the Middle East — distracted Washington for two decades. While China was building roads and ports from Beijing to Trieste, Italy, fueling its economy and expanding its geopolitical influence, the United States was pouring money into its war on terrorism. While Beijing was building thousands of acres of military bases in the South China Sea and enhancing its precision-strike capabilities, the U.S. military was fighting an insurgency and dismantling improvised explosive devices.

In many ways, it was just dumb luck that Mr. Xi and his predecessors, thanks in part to the war in Afghanistan, could build national power, undermine international norms, co-opt international organizations and extend their territorial control all without the United States thwarting their plans in any meaningful way.

But the end of the war in Afghanistan could bring these good times — which the Communist Party calls the “period of important strategic opportunities” — to an abrupt end. Sure, over the past 10 years American presidents tried to get back into the Asia game even as the war continued. Barack Obama asserted we would pivot to Asia back in 2011. Donald Trump’s national security team made great power competition with China its top priority.

But neither went much beyond paying lip service. The withdrawal shows Mr. Biden is truly refocusing his national security priorities — he even listed the need to “focus on shoring up America’s core strengths to meet the strategic competition with China” as one of the reasons for the drawdown.

Such a refocusing comes not a moment too soon. Chinese expansion and militarization in the South China Sea, deadly skirmishes with India, its crackdown in Hong Kong and repression in Xinjiang all point to an increasingly confident and aggressive China. In particular, Chinese military activity around Taiwan has spiked — 2020 witnessed a record number of incursions into Taiwan’s airspace. The sophistication and scale of military exercises has increased as well. These escalations come alongside recent warnings from Mr. Xi that any foreign forces daring to bully China “will have their heads bashed bloody” and efforts toward “Taiwan independence” will be met with “resolute action.”

The U.S. policy toward Taiwan is “strategic ambiguity” — there is no explicit promise to defend it from Chinese attack. In this tense environment, U.S. policymakers and experts are feverishly considering ways to make U.S. commitment to Taiwan more credible and enhance overall military deterrence against China. A recent $750 million arms sale proposal to Taiwan is part of these efforts, as is talk of inviting Taiwan to a democracy summit, which undoubtedly would provoke Beijing’s ire.

Some have argued that America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan undermines efforts to signal U.S. support for Taiwan. On the surface, it may seem as if the U.S. withdrawal would be a good thing for China’s prospects at what it calls “armed reunification.” Indeed, this is the message the nationalist Chinese newspaper The Global Times is peddling: The United States will cast Taiwan aside just as it has done with Vietnam, and now Afghanistan.

However, the American departure from Afghanistan creates security concerns in China’s own backyard that could distract it from its competition with the United States. Beijing’s strategy to protect its global interests is a combination of relying on host nation security forces and private security contractors and free-riding off other countries’ military presence. Analysts have concluded that China is less likely than the United States to rely on its military to protect its interests abroad. Beijing appears committed to avoiding making the same mistakes as Washington — namely, an overreliance on military intervention overseas to advance foreign policy objectives.

Now there will be no reliable security presence in Afghanistan and undoubtedly broader instability in a region with significant economic and commercial interests for China. Chinese leaders are also worried that conflict in Afghanistan could spill across the border into neighboring Xinjiang, where Beijing’s repressive tactics have already been the cause of much international opprobrium.

The reality is, the United States stayed much longer in Afghanistan than most expected. This upsets China’s calculus about what the United States would do in a Taiwan crisis, since conventional wisdom in Beijing had been that the painful legacy of Somalia would deter Washington from ever coming to Taipei’s aid.

But U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have called these assumptions into question. Taiwan, with its proportionately large economy and semiconductor industry, is strategically important to the United States. U.S. power and influence in East Asia are reliant on its allies and military bases in the region and America’s broader role as the security partner of choice. If Taiwan were to fall to Chinese aggression, many countries, U.S. allies included, would see it as a sign of the arrival of a Chinese world order. By comparison, Afghanistan is less strategically important, and yet the United States stayed there for 20 years.

This does not bode well for any designs Beijing might have for Taiwan.

It’s true that China would benefit from a home-field advantage given Taiwan’s proximity, and that Beijing’s arsenal is far greater than Taiwan’s. China, too, would likely enjoy more domestic public support for any conflict than the U.S. would for yet another intervention.

But if China has any hope of winning a war across the Strait, its military would have to move fast, before the United States has time to respond. Chinese planners know that the longer the war, the greater the U.S. advantage. Unlike Chinese production and manufacturing centers, which can all be targeted by the United States, the American homeland is relatively safe from Chinese conventional attack. China is far more reliant on outside sources for oil and natural gas, and thus vulnerable to U.S. attempts to cut off its supply.

And the Chinese economy would suffer more: Since the war would be happening in Asia, trade would be bound to be disrupted there. The United States would need to stick it out for only a short time — not 20 years — for these factors to come into play.

A call on Thursday between Mr. Biden and Mr. Xi hinted at the stakes — the two “discussed the responsibility of both countries to ensure competition does not veer into conflict,” according to the White House.

Chinese leaders already expected a tense relationship with the Biden administration. Now they are faced with the fact that the United States might have the will and resources to push back against Chinese aggression, even if it means war.

So, while there may be other reasons to oppose the end of the war in Afghanistan, the impact on China’s Taiwan calculus is not — and should not be — one of them.

Under the leadership of Carey Moncaster (MA ’94) and Liyi Ye (MA ’16), Stanford e-China recently concluded its Spring 2021 session. Launched in Winter 2020, Stanford e-China, Technologies Changing the World: Design Thinking into Action, is offered twice annually and introduces high school students in China to cutting-edge technologies that are defining the future and providing exciting areas for academic study, professional opportunities, and entrepreneurial innovation. Focusing on the fields of green tech, finance tech, health tech, and artificial intelligence, students engage in live discussion sessions and real-time conversations with Stanford University scholars, Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, as well as American high school students. Moncaster partners with Stanford e-China Advisor Liyi Ye and Ye’s team at Third Classroom in Shanghai.

A key challenge in developing Stanford e-China has been finding and refining a framework that encourages students to analyze the challenges facing each of the technologies highlighted in the course and then brainstorm innovative solutions. To showcase the dynamic research and teachings at Stanford University, Moncaster honed in on Design Thinking, a creative-thinking and problem-solving framework widely utilized throughout campus and Silicon Valley. Moncaster explained, “Design Thinking is a very hands-on, interactive, team-based experience that is dependent on critical feedback from other people. Translating the Design Thinking concepts online, with students, scholars, and practitioners virtually scattered across the world, presents an exciting opportunity to create curriculum that effectively introduces the relevant skills and mindset.”

For final projects, Stanford e-China students delve into an area of personal interest in one of the technology fields, applying aspects of the Design Thinking framework to develop a prototype pitch and action plan. Some of the sample projects have focused on improving the accessibility of digital healthcare for China’s rural residents, improving the mental health of Chinese students, utilizing solar energy at rural schools to provide electricity to students at night, and lowering carbon emissions at traditional power plants. Once it has been deemed safe to travel to the United States again, the top three students from each session will be invited to annual ceremonies at Stanford University. During the ceremonies, students will present their pitches and sharpen their Design Thinking skills with Stanford community members present.

Based on feedback from students, a highlight of Stanford e-China has been the chance to collaborate with American high school students studying about China and U.S.–China relations in SPICE’s China Scholars Program (CSP). With the support of CSP instructor Dr. Tanya Lee, the Chinese and American students work together in small groups on WeChat and Canvas to apply Design Thinking to an environmental challenge in their respective communities. In the process, they figure out how to bridge different time zones, tech resources, learning styles, and cultural perspectives.

Moncaster reflected, “Since Tanya, Liyi, and I are trying to cultivate future leaders in U.S.–China relations, we are hoping to increase the interaction between the students in Stanford e-China and the China Scholars Program. It has been fascinating to hear them discuss not only cutting-edge technologies but also how they can serve as change agents and address topics such as social inequality.” She continued, “Thanks to our inspiring guest speakers and the robust dialogue between my students and the CSP students, I am confident that many of my students have been inspired to become social entrepreneurs of the future. I also hope that some of my students will consider applying to Stanford as undergraduates or graduate students.”

In terms of next steps, Moncaster and Ye hope to shift some of their attention to training schoolteachers in China—including the regular schoolteachers of their Stanford e-China students—via professional development seminars. SPICE Instructor Dr. Mariko Yoshihara Yang and Dr. Rie Kijima already offered one such seminar, which focused on Design Thinking. SPICE hopes to offer additional seminars to teachers in China on Design Thinking as well as other pedagogically focused strategies such as Project-Based Learning.

SPICE is seeking support to broaden its work with Stanford e-China, the China Scholars Program, and teacher professional development in China.

The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University is pleased to announce that political scientist Charles Crabtree has been appointed as a visiting assistant professor with the Japan Program.

Crabtree is an assistant professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. During the 2021-22 academic year, while on leave from Dartmouth, Crabtree will research fairness in politics, with applications to areas including the study of repression, human rights, policing, and immigration. He will also collaborate with Kiyoteru Tsutsui, director of the Japan Program and senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, on several forthcoming publications and seminars that generate fresh perspectives on Japanese political, economic, and societal issues.

"Charles is an excellent academic partner, and I am delighted to have him with us at Stanford this year,” said Tsutsui. “His research into the normatively important issue of discrimination makes unique contributions to public evaluations of institutional legitimacy across regimes, especially in the context of Japanese politics, where it is insufficiently studied.”

Crabtree’s research focuses on the politics, sociology, and economics of discrimination across countries in Asia, particularly in Japan, where out-group discrimination continues to mar the lived experiences of many. He examines the consequences of discrimination and evaluates various means of reducing it in politics, the workplace, and everyday life. His book on this subject, Studying Discrimination: An Experimental Approach, is under contract with Cambridge University Press.

Methodologically, Crabtree is interested in research design, experiments, and applying computational tools to better understand the social world. He has published his research in journals such as the American Journal of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, and Political Analysis. As someone who deeply believes in the value of public scholarship, he regularly writes on issues related to Japan for The Hill and about American and Japanese politics for outlets such as Foreign Policy, the Japan Times, the South China Morning Post, The Atlantic, and the Washington Post.

Crabtree holds a doctorate in Political Science from the University of Michigan and master’s degrees from Pennsylvania State University and Northwestern University.