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About the Speaker: Karl Eikenberry is the William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and a faculty member of the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University.  He is also an affiliated faculty member with the Center for Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law, and researcher with The Europe Center. 

Prior to his arrival at Stanford, he served as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from May 2009 until July 2011, where he led the civilian surge directed by President Obama to reverse insurgent momentum and set the conditions for transition to full Afghan sovereignty.

Before his appointment as Chief of Mission in Kabul, Ambassador Eikenberry had a thirty-five year career in the United States Army, retiring in April 2009 with the rank of Lieutenant General.  His military operational posts included assignments in the continental U.S., Hawaii, Korea, Italy, and Afghanistan as the Commander of the American-led Coalition forces from 2005-2007. 

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Karl Eikenberry William J. Perry Fellow in International Security Speaker CISAC
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Shorenstein APARC postdoctoral fellowships offer a unique opportunity for recent graduates to reside at Stanford for a year to further their research and engage with scholars. The Center annually offers multiple Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellowships in Contemporary Asia, and one Postdoctoral Fellowship in Asia Health Policy.

Fellows develop their dissertations for publication, present their research, and participate in Center activities related to and beyond their specialty. Most importantly, they establish valuable connections with professionals that continue long after they leave Stanford.

Postdoctoral fellows go on to pursue teaching positions and advisory roles at top universities and research organizations around the world. They often continue to contribute to Shorenstein APARC publications, and participate in conferences and related activities into the future.

Shorenstein APARC is delighted to welcome its latest group of exceptional postdoctoral fellows this autumn:

Shorenstein Postdoctoral Fellows

Jianzhi (Jason) Zhao is completing his PhD in international development and economic policy at the University of Maryland. His current research interests are focused on development economics and empirical and international corporate finance, particularly China. His dissertation focuses on how China’s financial system interacts with state-owned enterprises, and policy perspectives of China’s banking sector and macroeconomic stability. At Stanford, Zhao will continue his dissertation work and extend his research analyzing how a firm’s connection to government affects performance and investment behavior. Zhao holds BAs in finance and business administration from Jiangzi University of Science and Technology, and an MA in economics from Fudan University.

Paul Schuler is a political scientist whose current research focuses on liberalization under authoritarian rule and political change in Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam. His dissertation focuses on how the Vietnam Communist Party has liberalized the legislature in order to gain information, co-opt opposition and stabilize power sharing. At Stanford, Schuler will develop his dissertation work into a book manuscript and pursue other projects related to governance under authoritarian rule. Schuler will receive his PhD in political science from the University of California, San Diego – Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies in 2014. He holds a BA in journalism and government & politics from the University of Maryland, and an MA in Pacific international affairs from UC – San Diego. 

Developing Asia Health Policy Postdoctoral Fellow 

Pham Ngoc Minh is a health researcher and administrator. His main interests are public health, disease prevention and the rural-urban divide in developing countries. At Stanford, Pham will be studying epidemiological trends and policy perspectives of diabetes in Vietnam, particularly those among adults in mountainous areas of that country. Pham has more than six years of experience working as a medical lecturer at the Thai Nguyen University of Medicine and Pharmacy in Vietnam, and spent two and a half years conducting postdoctoral research in Japan. He received a Bachelor of Medicine from the Thai Nguyen University of Medicine and Pharmacy, a BA in English from Hanoi University, an MPH from the University of Melbourne, and a PhD in medical science from Kyushu University.

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Professor Paine will explore China’s outlook on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea within the larger settings of Chinese geography and history, including the lessons Chinese leaders continue to draw from Russia’s experience, and how these contexts shape China’s views of its East Asian neighbors. Earlier paradigms of foreign policy offered by Confucianism before 1911 and by Communism thereafter have undergone serious critiques. Which elements in these partly tarnished legacies will China’s leaders decide to affirm, alter, reject, or ignore as they fashion a foreign policy for the 21st century? The outcome will signally affect not only China, but most particularly its neighbors in Southeast and Northeast Asia.

Sarah Paine is a professor of strategy and policy at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI. She is the author of two prize-winning books: The Wars for Asia, 1911-1949 (Cambridge, 2012) and Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (M. E. Sharpe,1996). Among her other publications are The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 (2003); Modern China, 1644 to the Present (co-auth., 2010); Nation Building, State Building, and Economic Development (ed., 2010); and four co-edited naval books respectively on blockades, coalitions, expeditionary warfare, and commerce-raiding. She has degrees in in history (Columbia, PhD), Russian (Middlebury, MA), and Latin American studies (Harvard, BA).

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Sarah C. M. Paine 2013-14 Campbell and Bittson National Fellow Speaker Hoover Institution, Stanford University
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The period from the arrest of the “gang of four” in October 1976 to the final step in the removal of Hua Guofeng in mid-1981 saw CCP rural policy go through a number of phases. The initial emphasis on a moderate version of the Dazhai model gave way to “traditional policies” (luoshi zhengce) by mid-1978; these policies were supplemented in 1979 by “responsibility systems,” the most radical of which, household contracting (baochan daohu), became a sharply divisive issue in 1980, but still not the main aspect of agricultural policy. The tide was moving strongly toward household contracting by mid-1981, but had not yet achieved unambiguous endorsement as the Party policy.

A number of inadequate approaches have dominated the literature, notably 1) a power/policy struggle between Hua Guofeng's neo-Maoists and Deng Xiaoping's reform coalition; 2) the power of the peasants; and 3) the leading role of provincial reformers. The first has no validity, the second and third must be viewed through more complex lenses. The talk will explicate the key factors and present an alternative explanation of the success of rural reform.

Frederick C. Teiwes is Emeritus Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney. He received his B.A. from Amherst College and his Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. He is the author of various books on Chinese elite politics including Politics and Purges in China (1979, 1993), Leadership, Legitimacy, and Conflict in China (1984), and Politics at Mao's Court (1990). Some of his most important work has been jointly authored with Warren Sun including The Politics of Agricultural Cooperativization: Mao, Deng Zihui, and the "High Tide" of 1955 (1993), The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger during the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1971 (1996), China’s Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians and Provincial Leaders in the Emergence of the Great Leap Forward, 1955-1959 (1999), and The End of the Maoist Era: Chinese Politics during the Twilight of the Cultural Revolution, 1972-1976 (2007).

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Frederick Teiwes Emeritus Professor of Chinese Politics Speaker University of Sydney
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Zack Bonzell came to Stanford with a strong interest in human biology and political science. Last summer, the undergraduate had the chance to fuse his interests while doing field research with faculty at the university’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). 

During a two-week internship, he travelled to Guatemala with FSI senior fellows Paul Wise, Beatriz Magaloni, Alberto Díaz-Cayeros and Scott Rozelle to learn about the country’s rural health care system by shadowing doctors and interviewing mothers in an impoverished area about the issues leading to the area’s high rates of child malnutrition.

“That experience was an ideal way to blend my interests and gave me a better idea of how to craft my course of study at Stanford,” said Bonzell, who is now a junior. “One of the things that really struck me was when Paul Wise said the health outcomes we were seeing are the result of extreme material deprivation. These people are sick because they are poor. That gave me more of an interest in political economy.”

Students conduct interviews about nutrition with REAP in China. Photo Credit: Matt Boswell

FSI is now expanding its educational opportunities for students, like Bonzell, who want to do research on global issues in Asia, Latin America, Europe and Africa.

The Stanford Global Student Fellows program (SGSF) is being funded in large part through a $1.25 million anonymous gift that will help grow existing programs and create new offerings for graduates and undergraduates.

“This program deepens FSI’s commitment to its mission of educating the next generation of leaders in international affairs,” said FSI Director Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar. “It also offers outstanding opportunities for Stanford students to work closely with the leading thinkers on global policy issues.”

The program, which is part of FSI’s efforts to expand student opportunities, will build on the institute’s undergraduate mentorship programs that allow students to work on faculty research projects each quarter. Those positions will now be available during the summer. Some of the positions will be connected to projects in FSI’s new International Policy Implementation Lab, an initiative that gives students a close-up view of how academics and policy influencers can address some of the world’s thorniest issues.

PoliSci 114S students work together in a UN conflict simulation. Photo Credit: Rod Searcey

Building on FSI’s experience placing students in research opportunities, the program will create and expand summer field research internships. The two- to six-week internships this summer will give undergraduates the opportunity to work with FSI senior fellows in China, Guatemala, India and Mexico who study global health, conflict resolution, governance and poverty reduction.  In coming years, the program will likely include additional fieldwork projects in Rwanda, Tanzania and Brazil. The SGSF program covers all travel expenses for students and provides students with an opportunity to work closely with a faculty member and a team of other students on an ongoing research project addressing real-world problems in a specific region. 

“What makes FSI such an incredible institution is that it attracts faculty who have very pragmatic interests,” Bonzell said. “It seeks to wed academic work with a more direct impact, and there’s a lot of potential for more students to think along similar lines.”

The Stanford Global Student Fellows will also allow FSI to work closely with its partners, including the Program in International Relations, the Haas Center for Public Service, and Stanford in Government to provide opportunities for graduate and undergraduate students. 

Mexican Ambassador Eduardo Medina Mora and Jorge Olarte, '13, speaking with students at the US-Mex FoCUS event. Photo Credit: Rod Searcey

One of the program’s new initiatives geared toward undergraduates is the Global Policy Summer Fellowships. The fellowships help secure placement and a $6,000 stipend for students interested in interning at international policy and international affairs organizations. This summer, The Europe Center at FSI is placing students at the Center for European Policy Studies and Bruegel, two Brussels-based think tanks. Future positions will be created with six offerings abroad and two based in the United States.including the Program in International Relations, the Haas Center for Public Service, and Stanford in Government to provide opportunities for graduate and undergraduate students. 

The Stanford Global Student Fellows program will also commit $400,000 to create a Mentored Global Research Fellowship that will provide research opportunities for students to conduct their own overseas research under the close mentorship of a faculty member. The program will award stipends of $6,000 for summer undergraduate projects and $9,000 for summer graduate projects, and $1,500 for smaller projects executed during the school year.

Thomas Hendee '13 chatting with children in rural Guatemala. Photo Credit: Maria Contreras

The faculty advisory committee overseeing the development and implementation of these new programs includes Scott Rozelle, the Helen F. Farnsworth Senior Fellow and the co-director of FSI’s Rural Education Action Program; Stephen Stedman, a senior fellow at FSI and the deputy director of CDDRL; and Lisa Blaydes, assistant professor of political science.

The application deadline for all summer programs is Feb. 28, 2015. The deadline to apply for academic quarterly programs is the end of the first week of each quarter, beginning in the fall of 2014. 

For more information, students should contact Elena Cryst at ecryst@stanford.edu and watch for postings on FSI’s student program Facebook page. Students can also sign up for the program’s distribution and announcement list.

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WSJDigitalNetwork: While visiting SCPKU, U.S. First Lady Michelle Obama used the Highly Immersive Classroom to connect students there with students at Stanford University. Garth Saloner, Dean of Stanford's Graduate School of Business, talks about how Stanford uses technology to spread education. Read more.

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From territorial disputes in the East China Sea to heated propaganda wars across the region, peace in northeast Asia seems increasingly tenuous. At the heart of rising tensions are unresolved historical issues related to World War II, which drive a wedge between the United States’ two main allies in the region, Japan and South Korea, and fuel a revived rivalry between Japan and China. As the main victor in World War II, the United States has some responsibility for these disputes. It constructed the postwar regional order and has been largely content since then to view the matter as settled, even though issues of territory, compensation, and historical justice were left unresolved. During the Cold War, when the region’s main players were cut off from each other, the United States’ approach worked well. But as the region democratizes and grows increasingly integrated, long-buried issues are coming to the surface. As U.S. President Barack Obama heads to Japan and South Korea this month, it is time for the United States to tackle wartime history in Asia head on.

American officials were confronted by the uncomfortable realities of wartime issues last year, when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, without warning, made an official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, which honors Japan’s war dead, including some who had been convicted and executed as Class-A war criminals. The Japanese leader certainly understood that his decision would irk China and South Korea, which see such visits as signals of Tokyo’s embrace of an unapologetic view of Japan’s wartime aggression. What was even more troubling was that the visit came only a few weeks after U.S. Vice President Joe Biden apparently received assurances from Abe that Tokyo would avoid any such provocations. Biden subsequently encouraged South Korean President Park Geun-hye to sit down with the Japanese leader, although Park questioned whether he could be trusted to hold his historical revisionism in check -- a concern that was clearly justified.

Japan and South Korea have made repeated efforts over the past two decades to resolve their wartime history issues, but progress has always proved short-lived. South Korean officials now openly plead for the United States to step in. That would be anathema to Japan, which fears being isolated. Obama managed to convene a brief meeting of the Japanese and South Korean leaders recently at the nuclear safety summit in Europe, but the agenda focused solely on North Korea. For its part, the United States simply urges restraint and dialogue, consistently refusing to intervene directly into disputes over the wartime past. American diplomats understandably argue that the subject is a minefield and that any U.S. involvement will be viewed with suspicion in China, Japan, and South Korea alike.

Even so, China’s bid for regional domination makes it nearly impossible for the United States to continue to stay out of the fray; Beijing has already started to position itself as sympathetic to South Korean fears about Japan and has embarked on a global propaganda campaign against Japanese “militarism,” pointing with undisguised glee at any evidence of Japanese nostalgia for its wartime past.  By taking a leading role in dealing with the wartime past, the United States could make it difficult for Beijing to use it for political gain.

[...]

The first few paragraphs of this article have been reproduced with permission of Foreign Affairs. The complete version may be accessed on Foreign Affairs online.

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The greatest dangers to nuclear facilities are sabotage and theft from insiders, according to political scientist Scott Sagan. Analysis of past incidents can help boost safeguards at these sites.

A diesel generator at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in Southern California was possibly sabotaged, likely by an insider, in 2012.

Insider threats are the most serious challenge confronting nuclear facilities in today's world, a Stanford political scientist says.

In every case of theft of nuclear materials where the circumstances of the theft are known, the perpetrators were either insiders or had help from insiders, according to Scott Sagan and his co-author, Matthew Bunn of Harvard University, in a research paper published this month by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

"Given that the other cases involve bulk material stolen covertly without anyone being aware the material was missing, there is every reason to believe that they were perpetrated by insiders as well," they wrote.

And theft is not the only danger facing facility operators; sabotage is a risk as well, said Sagan, who is a CISAC senior fellow and professor of political science.

While there have been sabotage attempts in the United States and elsewhere against nuclear facilities conducted by insiders, the truth may be hard to decipher in an industry shrouded in security, he said.

"We usually lack good and unclassified information about the details of such nuclear incidents," Sagan said.

The most recent known example occurred in 2012, an apparent insider sabotage of a diesel generator at the San Onofre nuclear facility in California. Arguably the most spectacular incident happened at South Africa's Koeberg nuclear power plant (then under construction) in South Africa in 1982 when someone detonated explosives directly on a nuclear reactor.

Lessons Learned

In their paper, the authors offered some advice and insights based on lessons learned from past insider incidents:

  • Don't assume that serious insider threats are NIMO (not in my organization).
  • Don't assume that background checks will solve the insider problem.
  • Don't assume that red flags will be read properly.
  • Don't assume that insider conspiracies are impossible.
  • Don't assume that organizational culture and employee disgruntlement don't matter.
  • Don't forget that insiders may know about security measures and how to work around them.
  • Don't assume that security rules are followed.
  • Don't assume that only consciously malicious insider actions matter.
  • Don't focus only on prevention and miss opportunities for mitigation.
 

The information for the research paper emanated from an American Academy of Arts and Sciences project on nuclear site threats, Sagan said.

"It was unusual in that it brought together specialists on insider threats and risks in many different areas – including intelligence agencies, biosecurity, the U.S. military – to encourage interdisciplinary learning across organizations," he said.

Sagan explained that the experts sought to answer the following questions: "What can we learn about potential risks regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear power facilities by studying insider threat experiences in other organizations? What kinds of successes and failures did security specialists find in efforts to prevent insider threats from emerging in other organizations?"

'Not perfect'

He noted that only a few serious insider cases in the U.S. nuclear industry have arisen, thanks to rigorous "personal reliability" programs conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. military for people with access to sensitive nuclear materials.

But there is room for improvement, Sagan said.

"These programs are effective," he said, "but they are not perfect. And relative success can breed overconfidence, even complacency, which can be a major cause of security breaches in the future."

For example, the nuclear industry needs to do more research about how terrorist organizations recruit individuals to join or at least help their cause. It also needs to do a better job on distributing "creative ideas and best practices" against insider threats to nuclear partners worldwide.

Sagan said the U.S. government is not complacent about the danger of insider threats to nuclear security, but the problem is complex and the dangers hard to measure.

"Sometimes governments assume, incorrectly, that they do not face serious risks," he said.

One worrisome example is Japan, he said.

"Despite the creation of a stronger and more independent nuclear regulator to improve safety after the Fukushima accident in Japan, little has been done to improve nuclear security there," said Sagan.

He added, "There is no personal reliability program requiring background checks for workers in sensitive positions in Japanese nuclear reactor facilities or the plutonium reprocessing facility in Japan."

Sagan explained that some Japanese government and nuclear industry officials believe that Japanese are loyal and trustworthy by nature, and that domestic terrorism in their country is "unthinkable" – thus, such programs are not necessary.

"This strikes me as wishful thinking," Sagan said, "especially in light of the experience of the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist group, which launched the 1995 sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway."

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Relations between China and Japan continue to fray and have no immediate chance of improving, according to one of the nation’s leading East Asian scholars.

“I think we all know that Sino-Japanese relations are about as bad as they have ever been,” said Harvard professor Ezra Vogel, who spoke to a filled room at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center in the Freeman Spogli Institute on Thursday.

“I tend to be optimistic,” he said. “But I honestly don’t see any short-term solutions, I think we’re in for a period now where the issues are going to be very tough and the relations are going to be very tough.

“For any long-term solution, there is going to have to be some resolution of the history issue,” he added, referring to the disputes over the wartime past in Northeast Asia.

Vogel delivered the final lecture in a seminar series focused on the Sino-Japanese rivalry. The series brought various experts to Shorenstein APARC this spring to consider the historical contention between China and Japan, and its impact on that contemporary relationship. Professors Peter Duus of Stanford and Jessica Chen Weiss of Yale University were among the scholars who presented earlier this year, along with the Brookings Institution’s Richard Bush.

Professor Vogel is a renowned scholar of both China and Japan, the author of many books that have become classics in the study of both countries. A sociologist by training, he is the Henry Ford II Professor of Social Sciences, Emeritus, at Harvard University. Vogel described himself as a historian in practice, joking that he had become a historian “simply by living a long time.”

A shifting terrain of relations

In his April 3 lecture, Vogel traced the history of relations between Japan and China, particularly in the post-war era, and discussed how they have been impacted by disputes over history.

In the current atmosphere, under the influence of the media and political leaders highly responsive to public opinion, the image of Sino-Japanese relations is dominated by a sense of deep friction. But, Vogel said relations between the two great Asian powers were not always bad. 

After the early decades of the Cold War, when there were no formal ties between Japan and the People’s Republic of China, there was a relative blossoming in the relationship. Following the normalization of relations in 1972, and as Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping took over the reins of power, Sino-Japanese relations entered a period of closer ties and political thaw.

“The relationship was really moving in a very positive way,” Vogel said. Japanese aid and foreign investment was key to the opening up of China to the world economy and there was a flow of exchanges among youth and of popular culture between the two neighbors.

That “special era” remained through year 1992, even as the rest of the world distanced itself from China, both economically and politically, following the Tiananmen Square incident. The visit of the Japanese Emperor to China that year marked the peak of a “golden age” of positive relations between the two countries following the war.

‘Golden age’ fades

After 1992, the constructive relationship between China and Japan began to slip for several reasons.

By the mid-1990s, the Soviet Union no longer existed as a threat – a “broad strategic reason” that had united the countries. Taiwan’s growing independence movement was becoming a flashpoint of contention, with Chinese irritation over the close ties between pro-independence Taiwanese leaders and Japan.

Perhaps most important of all, China, in the wake of the student protests, embarked upon a “patriotic education” campaign designed to shore up the loyalty of youth by stressing broad themes of Chinese national pride. In that campaign, reminders of the wartime struggle against the Japanese invasion of the 1930s occupied a central part of the message, communicated in textbooks, movies and books that remain a staple of Chinese popular culture. The demonization of Japan has colored Chinese perceptions, Vogel said.

In Japan, the sense of anxiety about the rise of China is also reflected in a rise of conservative attacks on China and the promotion of a Japanese version of ‘patriotic education.’ The perception that Japanese leaders are increasingly unrepentant about the wartime past, symbolized by the visits of Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni shrine to Japan’s war dead, feeds these tensions over the past.

Vogel said biased education on that wartime era and misinformation in the media are key factors behind the publics’ formation of historical memory, and subsequently, encourage strong antagonism toward one another.

Guarded optimism

Disputes over history, particularly of the wartime period, must be addressed for any warming of the Japan-China relationship to occur.

“I think until we get some kind of deeper meaning of World War II, we’re not going to have much progress,” he said.

Vogel said the Japanese should try harder to give a fair representation of World War II to youth, who often only receive a few short details on that time period. The Chinese should “slow down” on anti-Japanese propaganda, he recommended.

Vogel said he is optimistic about an improvement in the bilateral relationship, but also emphasized that progress will be hard to achieve under current leadership. Even so, the two countries would be remiss to avoid dealing with issues of historical interpretation, especially as it continues to serve as a roadblock to an easing of tensions in the region.

The audio and transcript from the April 3 seminar, "The Shadow of History and Sino-Japanese Relations," are posted below.

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About the Topic: America’s longest war draws to an end this year with the conclusion of combat operations in Afghanistan.  The still undecided Afghan presidential election potentially marks the first successful democratic transition in that country’s history and the process thus far has been positive.  However, the political, security, and economic problems that Afghanistan’s next leader will face are daunting.  The level of American support for Afghanistan’s future development hinges on the signing of a Bilateral Security Agreement that permits the U.S. to continue pursuing intelligence and military operations against Al Qaeda and international terrorist organizations in Central and South Asia.  Karl Eikenberry, who served both as the U.S. ambassador and the commander of U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, will reflect on the American experience in Afghanistan and discuss the difficult challenges still ahead.    

About the Speaker: Karl Eikenberry is the William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and is a Distinguished Fellow with the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University. He served as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from May 2009 until July 2011 and had a 35-year career in the United States Army, retiring with the rank of lieutenant general. His military assignments included postings with mechanized, light, airborne, and ranger infantry units in the continental United States, Hawaii, Korea, Italy, and Afghanistan as the Commander of the American-led Coalition forces from 2005–2007. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, has earned master’s degrees from Harvard University in East Asian Studies and Stanford University in Political Science, was awarded an Interpreter’s Certificate in Mandarin Chinese from the British Foreign Commonwealth Office, and earned an advanced degree in Chinese History from Nanjing University. He is also the recipient of the George F. Kennan Award for Distinguished Public Service and Harvard University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Centennial Medal. Ambassador Eikenberry serves as a Trustee for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Asia Foundation, and the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, and is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 

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Karl Eikenberry William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at CISAC, Former US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Retired U.S. Army Lt. General Speaker
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