My Journey at the Nuclear Brink is a continuation of William J. Perry's efforts to keep the world safe from a nuclear catastrophe. Decades of experience and special access to top-secret knowledge of strategic nuclear options have given Perry a unique, and chilling, vantage point from which to conclude that nuclear weapons endanger our security rather than securing it. At this presentation to launch the Chinese translation of his book, Perry will talk about the future of nuclear competition in the face of US and Russia’s nuclear capability boost claims, North Korea’s nuclear development and the recent deployment of US and South Korea THAAD system against North Korea’s missile. 

An interview with authors of the “The Tropical Oil Crop Revolution” predicts the future of soy and palm oil booms by examining the past and present.

Used in everything from food to fuel, soybean and palm oil have seen production rates skyrocket in the past 20 years. Controversy surrounds the planting of oil crops – cultivated primarily in Southeast Asia and South America – as they are often grown on deforested lands and rely on large farmers and agribusiness rather than smallholders. “The Tropical Oil Crop Revolution: Food, Feed, Fuel, and Forests,” a new book co-authored by Stanford University researchers, examines the economic, social and environmental impacts of the oil crop revolution, and explores how to develop a more sustainable future.

Derek Byerlee, visiting fellow at Stanford’s Center on Food Security and the Environment (FSE), FSE Fellow Walter P. Falcon, and FSE Director Rosamond L. Naylor recently discussed some of their book’s key ideas.

Q: What are the key similarities and differences between the rise of oil crops and the 1965-85 green revolution?

A: From 1990 to 2010, world production of soybean grew by 220 percent and production of palm oil by 300 percent. Like the green revolution for cereal crops, this recent revolution involves two crops – oil palm and soybeans – that dramatically expanded shares in their respective crop subsector – oil crops.

The oil crop revolution differs from its predecessor, the green revolution of rice and wheat, in its mode of expansion. The green revolution embraced tens of millions of producers across many countries, especially where irrigation was available. The oil crop revolution was highly concentrated in a few countries and almost entirely in rainfed areas. Unlike the green revolution, which was spurred on by rapid yield gains, the force behind the oil crop revolution was expansion of crop area. 

Q: What are some ways to improve oil palm sustainability?

A: A lot of faith has been put on certification and private standards and commitments. However, without effective land and forest governance, it will be very difficult for the private sector to operate. The state at both national and local levels will need greatly improved and more transparent systems starting from land and forest tenure laws, information systems, civil service capacity and judicial and redress systems. 

Q: How will the future of oil crops differ from the past?

A: By 2050, we predict demand for oil crops to drop by as much as two-thirds. Demand for biofuel feedstocks cannot maintain the rapid pace of the past decade. Vegetable oils used for food will also grow more slowly. In Asia, population growth will slow and the effects of rising incomes will diminish as consumers in middle-income countries reach high levels of vegetable oil consumption.

The biggest wild card in terms of supply is land availability. Africa has the most land available, however access to clear property rights are often difficult due to “customary rights” to the land. Soybean, a new crop in much of Africa, will increase along with oil palm. We believe the area covered by oil crops does not have to expand greatly; rather, intensification of existing crop land and a modest expansion in area can meet demand. Steady progress is possible through genetic gains in yield. Sufficient degraded land is available for area expansion, provided land governance and incentive systems are developed to steer the expansion onto degraded lands.

Q: How has development of the biodiesel industry affected tropical vegetable oils in the past 25 years, and how will it shape the sector going forward?

A: Before the turn of the 21^st century, few analysts predicted that biodiesel would play a major role in boosting global vegetable oil demand and prices. As it turns out, the expansion of biodiesel markets has been responsible for roughly half of the increase in vegetable oil consumption since 2013. Global biodiesel production more than doubled between 2007 and 2013. By some estimates, it could grow another 50 percent by 2025.

National energy policies continue to play a dominant role in the profitability of the biodiesel industry. The growing response of biofuel policies to low agricultural commodity prices is an important factor that is bound to keep biodiesel in the transportation fuel mix. This is true at least in countries that have strong interests oil crops, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Colombia in the case of oil palm, and the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina in the case of soybeans. Without policies mandating the use of biodiesel in fuel mixes, or incentivizing its use, the industry might fade away.

Q: What do you believe is the biggest takeaway from your research?

A: We are cautiously optimistic that the future expansion of the oil crop sector can be managed more sustainably. The predicted slowing of demand and land requirements will reduce pressure on native ecosystems. Several signs point to convergence among global consumers, private business, civil society, and local governments in finding ways to minimize the trade-offs between economic benefits and social and environmental costs.

Derek Byerlee, is an Adjunct Professor in the Global Human Development Program at Georgetown University and Editor-in-Chief of the Global Food Security journal. Walter P. Falcon is the Farnsworth Professor of International Agricultural Policy (Emeritus) at Stanford, senior fellow with the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the Stanford Woods Institute for the Environment. Rosamond L. Naylor is the William Wrigley Professor in Earth Science and Professor of Economics (by courtesy) and Gloria and Richard Kushel Director, at the Center on Food Security and the Environment Stanford.

Jaemin Jung, a writer for the South Korean publication known as “SisaIn,” recently interviewed CISAC's Siegfried Hecker on the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons:

Jung: In your recent op-ed piece in The New York Times, you said talking to North Korea is the best option for the Trump administration. Do you still believe so even when the current North Korean regime repeatedly declared to the world that it would never give up its nuclear program as a nuclear power state?

Hecker: Well, I still believe that talking directly, someone from the Trump administration to North Korea, is essential today. However, what I mean by talking is talk to the regime to make sure that we do not have a nuclear catastrophe. The main reason for talking is to eliminate a potential nuclear confrontation. The issue of whether or not North Korea should have nuclear weapons or will ever give up nuclear weapons has to be a much longer-term issue. The immediate issue, I believe, is that we have a nuclear crisis on our hands now, and we must talk in order to make sure that such a confrontation does not happen. So, that’s the reason for talking.

Jung: In other words, direct talk is essential to avoid any misunderstanding or miscalculation on the part of North Korea?

Hecker: Precisely. The reason for direct talking is to make sure there be no such misunderstanding, potential accidents, or potential escalations to the nuclear arena. Making sure that does not happen, that is the reason for talking now.

Jung: Does it mean that after you build trust from such talking, you then move on to real agenda such as denuclearization?

Hecker: Yes. So, what I recommend is not only talking but also listening. I think it’s important for the new administration to listen to what the Kim Jong Un regime has to say.  By listening we could learn enough to understand how to forge better negotiations, or the long term issue of getting rid of nuclear weapons.

Jung: Regarding the now suspended nuclear talks, many people blame the North for breaking its nuclear agreements with the U.S. or cheating repeatedly. In other words, whether we can trust North Korea is a big issue here. What is your take?

Hecker: Well, we don’t have a relationship that provides the underpinning or foundation for trust: trust by America about North Korea or trust by North Korea about the United States.  When it comes to negotiations, an agreement could be signed pretty quickly but trust can take years and years to develop. So, as you look back, North Korea has indeed violated many of the agreements that they signed. In some cases, we can say that it was to develop a hedge in case the United States dropped out of the agreement. For example, in the Agreed Framework signed in 1994, the United States did not follow its end as quickly and as fully as it promised to do. North Koreans developed a hedge. They cheated by developing an enriched uranium program. Over the years, the Agreed Framework may have been able to build trust by building two modern light water reactors there. But the Bush administration did not trust North Korea and killed the agreement. Now, 15 years later, there is still no trust. It would have to be developed. I think this would take at least a decade.

Jung: In that respect, trust is something not only North Korea but the United States should care about, right?

Hecker: That should be one of the main objectives of whatever next round of negotiations are.

Jung: In your article, you suggested direct talks between the US and North Korea instead of a multilateral talks like the 6-party talks.  In the past, the US tried many times talking directly with the North in Geneva or other places, but failed. Why now?

Hecker: The Geneva talks in 1994 were successful. They led to the Agreed Framework. The main reason that I proposed direct talks between the U.S. and North Korea now is, as I mentioned in the beginning, to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. We have to better understand what North Korea’s nuclear intentions are. What do they expect to get from their nuclear weapons, what are their nuclear policies, what do they have in place to avoid nuclear accidents, what do they have in place to make certain their nuclear weapons are safe and secure? Those kinds of discussions cannot be held in a multilateral forum. The only country that has the opportunity to have those kind of talks with North Korea is the United States. So, talk to avoid a nuclear catastrophe should be bilateral. Eventually negotiations have to include South Korea, they have to include China, and the 6-Party Talks members Japan and Russia should be involved. So, negotiations will have to be multilateral affair. However, to get to the point of meaningful negotiations, to avoid nuclear catastrophe, there should be bilateral talks. The sooner, the better.

Jung: Can you specify what you mean by ‘nuclear catastrophe’?

Hecker: What I’m concerned about is that in the past 10 years North Korea has developed, as best we know because nobody knows for sure, a really threatening nuclear arsenal, perhaps having enough nuclear material of 20-25 nuclear weapons. They continue to try and make those weapons more sophisticated and to be able to mount them on missiles. So, with that level of nuclear firepower, the reason that I worry about nuclear catastrophe is that one could have an accident, there is concern about security and safety of their nuclear weapons, there could be miscalculation on the part of the regime, there could be confrontation and escalation of military activities that could lead to nuclear use. Any use of nuclear devices of any sort on the Korean peninsula is what I call nuclear catastrophe. Today the most important part is to avoid the use or detonation of nuclear device on the Korean peninsula. That has to be the first objective of the Trump administration.

Jung: If the direct talks with the North go well, you said Trump should send a presidential envoy to Pyongyang.  Don’t you think Trump must get North Korea’s commitment to denuclearization before sending such an envoy?

Hecker: That approach misunderstands what my concerns are. My most immediate concerns are to avoid the use of nuclear weapons. The issue of denuclearization comes down the road. In other words, it’s a longer-term issue. The concerns I have about the use of nuclear weapons are so great that they require talks now without preconditions. Any future negotiations, of course, must be aimed at eventual denuclearization of North Korea. However, in my opinion, that’s much of a long-term issue. It will not happen over the next few years. I am not talking about negotiations now. I’m talking about talking, talking to avoid a nuclear catastrophe.

Jung: Do you prefer the U.S. talking with North Korea about it in formal or informal setting?

Hecker: I am saying at this point a presidential envoy should bring up the topic in a quiet, informal setting, but it has to have the imprimatur of the Trump administration.

Jung: In op-ed, you said the nuclear clock keeps ticking, and every six to seven weeks, the North may be able to add another nuclear weapon to its arsenal. Is the nuclear bomb based on plutonium only, or does it include uranium-based bomb, too?

Hecker: My estimate is not based on plutonium alone. It’s based on both plutonium and highly enriched uranium.  North Korea cannot produce more than one bomb’s worth of plutonium per year. With highly enriched uranium we have great uncertainties. We simply do not know enough about highly enriched uranium program. My best estimates are perhaps as many as six nuclear weapons out of highly enriched uranium per year.  So, it’s possible that North Korea could make 6-8 nuclear weapons per year. But let me stress the fact again that’s my best estimate, and we don’t know for certain. It’s important to realize that the nuclear crisis is here now. We don’t need to wait until North K. can reach mainland U.S. with a nuclear-tipped missile.

Jung: So, how many nuclear weapons do you think North Korea has now?

Hecker: Again, all we can do is estimate, and my own estimate is North Korea may have enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium for perhaps 20-25 nuclear weapons as of the end of 2016.

Jung: Some experts believe freeze on North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, not denuclearization, is the best realistic option at this point to break the long stalled nuclear talks.  What do you think?

Hecker: I’ve been promoting for the last eight years or so that we proceed in the following manner: First, halt the program, then roll it back, and then eventually eliminate it. To me, freeze is the same as halt. So, the most important part is to stop the problem from getting worse. However, there are many aspects to what we call halt or freeze. I stated it in the following manner - I call it “Three Nos.” We would like North Korea to make no more bombs (that means, no more plutonium or highly enriched uranium), no better bombs (no more nuclear tests or long-range missile test), and no export of bombs or nuclear material. So, that would be the essence of a freeze or halt.)

Jung: I see many North Korea experts agree with your proposal as a realistic option to break the current bottleneck in the nuclear talks. Did you get any reaction from the U.S. government?

Hecker: Well, I wish the American government had supported that eight years ago, because then we’d be in a much better position today. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons we didn’t get there, and now we have to deal with the way things are. Now, the Trump administration comes in, and its challenge is to avoid a nuclear detonation on the Korean peninsula. That’s the challenge, and because of that, it’s a completely different challenge than the Obama administration or the Bush administration faced, and the Trump administration must address that challenge differently.

Jung: So, what is your advice to the Trump administration?

Hecker: At this point, talk to the North Koreans to prevent any sort of potential nuclear catastrophe, and then try to listen to the North Koreans. And make sure they understand our strong commitment to our allies, South Korea and Japan, and that we care about human rights in North Korea, and we are committed to the eventual denuclearization of North Korea. Finally, it will be to North Korea’s advantage to get back to serious negotiations to eventually denuclearize the Korean peninsula. That’s my advice.