The decades-long political winter in the Arab world seemed to be thawing early this year as mass protests toppled Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in January and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in February. It appeared as though one rotten Arab dictatorship after another might fall during the so-called Arab Spring. Analogies were quickly conjured to 1989, when another frozen political space, Eastern Europe, saw one dictatorship after another collapse. A similar wave of democratic transitions in the Arab world was finally possible to imagine, particularly given the extent to which previous transformations had been regional in scope: Portugal, Spain, and Greece all democratized in the mid-1970s; much of Latin America did shortly thereafter; Korea and Taiwan quickly followed the Philippines’ political opening in 1986; and then a wave of change in sub-Saharan Africa began in 1990. All of those were part of the transformative “third wave” of global democratization. In March, many scholars and activists reasonably imagined that a “fourth wave” had begun. 

Two months later, however, a late spring freeze has seemingly hit some areas of the region. And it could be a protracted one. Certainly, each previous regional wave of democratic change had to contend with authoritarian hard-liners, opposition divisions, and divergent national trends. But most of the Arab political openings are closing faster and more harshly than happened in other regions -- save for the former Soviet Union, where most new democratic regimes quickly drifted back toward autocracy.

If Tunisia still provides grounds for cautious optimism, the Egyptian situation is already deeply worrying. Its senior officer corps, which currently controls the government, does not want to facilitate a genuine democratic transition. It will try to prevent it by generating conditions on the ground that discredit democracy and make Egyptians (and U.S. policymakers) beg for a strong hand again. The ruling officers have turned a blind eye to mounting religious and sectarian strife (and an alarming explosion in crime). The military has spent enormous effort arresting thousands of peaceful protesters in Tahrir Square and trying them in military tribunals over the last two months. (In April, one such detainee, a blogger named Maikel Nabil, was sentenced to three years in prison for “insulting the military establishment.”) Yet it claims that it cannot rein in rising insecurity. Many Egyptians see this as part of the military’s grand design to undermine democracy before it takes hold.

The parliamentary elections slated for September are unlikely to help: New political forces have no chance of being able to build competitive party and campaign structures in time. The Muslim Brotherhood, which initially said it would only contest a third of the parliamentary seats, has now announced its intention to contest half of all seats, forming a new political party (Freedom and Justice) for the purpose. If the electoral system retains its highly majoritarian nature, it might well win a thumping majority of the seats it contests (perhaps 40 percent in all), with most of the rest going to local power brokers and former stalwarts of the Mubarak-era ruling party, the National Democratic Party.

Both theory and political experience teach that regimes with spent legitimacy do not last, and the legitimacy of the Libyan, Syrian, and Yemeni dictators is utterly depleted.

Elsewhere in the region, Bahrain’s minority Sunni monarchy opted to crush peaceful protests and arrest and torture many of those with whom it might have negotiated some future power-sharing deal. With active Iranian support and a bizarre degree of American and Israeli acceptance, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad unleashed a slow-motion massacre that could go on for weeks or even months. In Yemen, the government is paralyzed, food prices are rising, and the country is drifting. Having seen the fate of Mubarak, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh is playing for time, but his legitimacy is irretrievably drained, and he lacks the ability to mobilize repressive force on the scale of Assad’s.

Of course, not every country in the region has been affected by the apparent freeze and some could still avoid it. Jordan and Morocco are not yet in crisis but could be soon. Both countries face the same conditions that brought down seemingly secure autocracies in Tunisia and Egypt -- mounting frustration with corruption, joblessness, social injustice, and closed political systems. Not yet facing mass protests, Jordan’s King Abdullah is in a position to lead a measured process of democratic reform from above to revise electoral laws, rein in corruption, and grant considerably more freedom. Yet there is little sign that he has the vision or political self-confidence to modernize his country in this way.

Morocco’s King Mohammed VI is still domestically revered and internationally cited as a reformer, but he is even weaker and more feckless than Abdullah. He has been unwilling to rein in the deeply venal interests that surround the monarchy, or ease the country’s extraordinary concentration of wealth and business ownership. Instead, his security forces, narrow circle of royal friends, and oligopolistic business cronies fend off demands for accountability and reform, further isolate the king, and aggravate the political storm that is gathering beneath a comparatively calm surface.

For now, both monarchies are treading familiar water: launching committees to study political reform but never moving toward real political change. This game cannot last forever. As a former Jordanian official recently commented to me privately: “Everyone is expecting serious changes to the way the king rules the country, and if these changes don’t happen, the system will be in trouble. The king can’t keep talking about reform without implementing it.”

Scholars of the Arab world had been arguing for years that the region’s various repressive regimes (not least Saudi Arabia’s Al Saud dynasty, which keeps several thousand princes on the take) would either pursue democratic reform, or rot internally until they were overthrown. Ultimately, the options remain the same for the regimes that have avoided revolution this year. Those who have reasserted authoritarianism will find only temporary reprieve. Both theory and political experience teach that regimes with spent legitimacy do not last, and the legitimacy of the Libyan, Syrian, and Yemeni dictators is utterly depleted. They will surely be overthrown if not now, then in coming years. The Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies, however, could still survive if they spend what remains of their political legitimacy on democratic reform. In other words, even if the Arab spring comes in fits and starts, it will eventually bring fundamental political change. But whether democracy is the end result depends in part on how events unfold and how regimes and international actors engage the opposition forces.

Short of the wars that have periodically broken out in the region, the United States has never faced a more urgent set of opportunities and challenges there: real prospects for democratic development exist alongside the very real risks of Islamist ascension, political chaos, and humanitarian disaster. Countries across the Arab world differ widely in their political structures and social conditions, and the United States cannot pursue a one-size-fits-all strategy. But there are a few basic principles that it should apply everywhere. As it has generally and in a number of specific cases, the Obama administration must explicitly and consistently denounce all violent repression of peaceful protest. And it should enhance the credibility of those words by tying them to consequences. For example, in Libya, the United States identified and froze the overseas assets of top officials who were responsible for brutality. Additionally, it imposed travel bans on them and their family members, and asked Europe to do the same. In the past few days, the Obama administration has also moved to freeze the personal assets of Assad and other top Syrian officials. In extreme cases -- Libya is one, and Syria has now become another -- the United States can press the United Nations Security Council to refer individuals to the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.

When Arab governments turn arms against peaceful protesters, the United States and Europe should stop supplying them with weapons. Western countries have been selling (or giving) regimes, such as Saleh’s in Yemen, the tools of repression, including tear gas, ammunition, sniper rifles, close-assault weapons, and rockets and tanks. Although Saleh may have been a valuable asset in the fight against terrorism at one time, he has become a liability. By ending such trade, the United States would firmly send the message to the leaders of Bahrain (another recipient) and Yemen that if they are going to violently assault and arbitrarily arrest peaceful demonstrators for democracy, they are at least not going to continue doing so with U.S. guns.

For now, there is an urgent need for mediation to break the impasse between rulers and their oppositions and to find ways to ease the region’s remaining dictators out of power. Recognizing the need for an active UN role during the Arab uprising, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has begun to dispatch experienced and talented UN staff to engage in dialogue with different groups in Yemen and elsewhere. These diplomats can help develop possible political accommodations with the protesters. The United States should encourage the UN to try to mediate these conflicts, reconcile deeply divided forces within political oppositions, and help governments pave the way for credible elections. Because it is more neutral, the UN is the international actor best suited to mediate as well as convene experts on institutional design and help supply technical support for drafting constitutions.

American diplomats will have their own role to play: They can channel financial and programmatic support and provide another venue for different actors to meet and discuss differences. They should also speak out for human rights, civil society, and the democratic process. Such expressions of moral and practical support have made a significant difference in transitional situations in other countries, such as Chile, the Philippines, Poland, and South Africa. The Arab world has its own distinct sensitivities, but the ongoing uprisings present an unusual opportunity for U.S. ambassadors to join with representatives of other democracies to lean on Arab autocrats and aid Arab democrats.

The United States should help Arab democrats get the training and financial assistance they need to survive while urging them to cooperate with one another. This does not just mean more grants to civil society organizations. There is, of course, a need for such funding, but too much U.S. money thrown at these groups will discredit them as “American pawns” or promote corruption. Aid should be pooled among multiple donors, provide core (rather than project-related) funding for organizations with a proven track record of advancing democratic change, and must be carefully monitored to ensure that it is being used effectively.Western countries have been selling (or giving) regimes, such as Saleh’s in Yemen, the tools of repression, including tear gas, ammunition, sniper rifles, close-assault weapons, and rockets and tanks.

Finally, given its enormous demographic weight and political influence in the Arab world, as Egypt goes, so will go the region. Engaging Egypt will prove vital to any larger strategy of fostering democratic change in the Arab world. Beyond aid and vigilant monitoring of the political process, the United States must deliver a clear message to the Egyptian military that it will not support a deliberate sabotage of the democratic process, and that a reversion to authoritarianism would have serious consequences for the U.S.-Egyptian bilateral relationship, including for future flows of U.S. military aid. The United States cannot allow the Egyptian military to play the cynical double game that the Pakistani military has, or Egypt may become another Pakistan in two senses: an overbearing military may hide behind the façade of democracy to run the country, and the military may consort with our friends one day and our enemies -- radical Islamists within Egypt and Hamas outside it -- the next, to show it cannot be taken for granted.

This period of change in the Arab world will not be short or neatly circumscribed. Not a continuous thaw or freeze, the coming years will see cycles -- ups and downs in a protracted struggle to define the future political shape of the Arab world. The stakes for the United States are enormous. And the need for steady principles, clear understanding, and long-term strategic thinking has never been more pressing.

After his death, will Osama Bin Laden become a myth?

For the West perhaps, but not for Arabs. Bin Laden’s influence has been in decline since 2004, when people realized that most of his victims were Muslims.

You have never stopped making the case for the democratization of the Arab world. It got to the point, in 1995, that Hassan II banned you from the palace for several months. How do you explain the wave of protests that we see today, from the Gulf to the Atlantic, sparing no country?

Aside from the conjunctural factors, there are some underlying reasons. To begin with, there is the character of the regimes that exists. Some are completely closed, while others have a façade of openness. All of a sudden, the structures of mediation — parties, unions, associations, etc. — that were supposed to represent civil society were completely discredited. At the end of the day, we were left with the dominant elites, alienated and cut off from the rest of the country, relying on the security apparatus. Also, in reality, the economic opening imposed by globalization and promoted by international financial institutions only profited the elites. In the absence of any serious policy of redistribution, GDP growth was accompanied up by an increase in poverty and social insecurity that made life more precarious even for the middle classes. Finally, we cannot ignore the demographic evolution of these countries. The transition from the extended family to the nuclear family, and the entrance of women into active public life on a greater scale considerably changed the social landscape. At the same time, widespread access to new means of communication broke the spell of the state’s monopoly on information, and brought more and more people into contact with the wider world. Even before the rise of new media technologies, the arrival of Al-Jazeera in the living rooms of the region had created a revolution!

And what was the trigger?

The sense of insult. The sense that one’s dignity was being insulted. This notion of dignity is essential to understanding what is happening right now. Until now, the prevailing concepts, especially that of national honor, were elements of a collective attitude. Dignity is a demand of the individual. I will add that the WikiLeaks revelations played a role in laying bare the disdain in which the governments held their citizens.

This revolt led to a set of demands that were democratic, and virtually never religious, even if Islamist movements tried to hop aboard the train.  Why?

Because this is a movement of the citizen! Its young organizers are challenging at once the authoritarianism of the regimes and the ideological discourse of the Islamists. They want neither despotism nor theocracy. They belong to a globalized, post-ideological generation, which privileges the autonomy of the subject and the individual. They refuse the identity gambit, Islamist or not, and aspire to universal values. We are in the full enthusiasm of the 1848 “springtime of the peoples,” with the romantic twist of May ’68. It remains to be seen if these young protesters will be able to transform their efforts into something that has a more concrete political content. Right now, we are entering into the kind of trench warfare between the besieged regimes and the democratic movements.

How do you understand the evolution of the situation in Tunisia and Egypt?  Are you optimistic?

The two situations are not identical. I’m optimistic regarding the transition to democracy in Tunisia, and more circumspect regarding Egypt. In Egypt, the army was always the spine of the regime. Under the pressure of the street, it broke from the head of state, but it remains very much in business, and will, in my opinion, hold onto its role as kingmaker for a long time. The temptation to reconstitute a party that would restore an order from the bits and pieces of the old regime – bringing together Islamists, businessmen, former dissidents, etc.— to the detriment of the reformers, is very real.

Do you think the regime in Syria will fall in turn?

Yes, if the revolt persists, and widens so much that the regime would be obliged to call on the army, which might hesitate to fire on the people. Right now, it’s the Republican Guard, controlled by the Alaouite minority, with the support of paramilitary groups, which is carrying out the repression. But it’s not clear that they would be able to stand against a general uprising. This is the problem that all the closed regimes face, once they’re confronted with an insurrection.

In the monarchies, the demonstrators don’t demand that the sovereign “leave,” but that the system be reformed. Could it be that Kings are more legitimate and republican dictators? The monarchy is at once an institution of arbitration and the symbol of national identity. For the most part, the populations of these countries accept this concept. But, eventually, this could cease to be the case, if these monarchies do not respond to their peoples’ aspiration for change. Right now, they — especially the divine-right monarchies — are struggling to find a response to this urgency.

To that point: In Morocco, where Mohammed VI named a commission to consider the reform of institutions, the religious powers of the king are today widely debated. The youth who organized the February 20th movement and the following demonstrations are calling into question the article of the constitution that emphasizes the sacred character of the person of the king. They are also questioning his role as commander of the faithful. How far must this reform go?

“Sacrality” is not compatible with democracy. One can understand that the person of the king should be inviolable, because he is the representative of the nation. One can preserve the role of “commander of the faithful,” if it is understood as having a moral dimension --somewhat like the Queen of England is the head of the Church of England and Defender of the Faith. But it’s necessary to give up the idea of the sacred character of the person of the king. If one keeps that notion, which was copied from French absolutism, in the midst of an institutional arrangement that is otherwise democratic, everything will be skewed. In the end, that won’t work.

Can the commission named by Mohamed VI go so far as to propose the suppression of the sacrality of the person who of the king?

I think that the Moroccan monarchy has understood the depth of the challenge, even if it has barely responded to it.  The commission is advisory. It’s the king who will decide.

In Morocco today, the ultraleft is part of the February 20 Movement, demanding the election of a constituent assembly…

That’s unrealistic. That would mean the end of the regime. Historically, constituent assemblies consummated the end of a regime.

Fundamentally, must it move towards a Spanish-style monarchy, as some demand? Or should we rather have a constitution in which the king would more or less have the powers of the French president, with a two-headed executive, as one sometimes hears in Morocco?

In France, the Head of State and the Prime Minister are both determined by popular sovereignty. In Morocco, there are two sources of legitimacy – that of ballots, and that of tradition. One can’t transpose the logic of the philosophy of cohabitation with that of a protected space. We have to turn the page, and do it without ambiguity. Morocco should draw on the experiences of the European monarchies, while preserving its own traditions and culture.

Do you think the reform will go that far?

Either the reform will stop short, because it doesn’t go far enough, and the contestation will continue. Or the king will choose to take the process to its conclusion. But in that case he risks to be brought to account, particularly for the choices of his entourage. Because the regime has waited too long, and time is pressing, there is a risk that everything will have to be done all at once. It’s an enormous challenge, without precedent. To reform the constitution is not only to define the equilibrium of power and give a moral dimension to the “commander of the faithful,” it is also to make sure that all the activities of state are inscribed in a legal and rational framework.

Is the challenge the same for the other Arab monarchies?

The problem is practically the same in Jordan, with the added fragility that derives from the institution’s lack of historical depth. In the Gulf, a process will take longer because civil society is not as well developed. Oil rents also allow problems to be postponed. That being said, in Bahrain, the monarchy, by choosing one side rather than another, is playing a dangerous game. And in Kuwait, they have already known ten years of repetitive crises.

How do you evaluate the West’s attitude toward the “Arab Spring”?

Westerners are blinded by the Islamist bogeyman. But France, in particular, which should rejoice to see young Arabs coming into the street in the name of its own values, seems to me turned in on itself and completely confounded. The United States is more pragmatic. It is acting in accordance with its strategic interests, case by case.

Is it true that you were one of the consultants who, in 2009, participated in crafting Barack Obama’s speech in Cairo?

Among others, I was consulted. Unlike other American presidents, Obama knows and understands the region. But when he made that speech he was not as well aware as his predecessors had been of the constraints of the American system – particularly the strength, in the United States, of the pro-Israel lobby.

How does one become the advocate of the democratic opening of the Arab monarchies when one is the nephew of Hassan II?

From studying abroad, undoubtedly an opening to the world. And an interest, acquired very early, in social problems…

But you remain a monarchist?

Yes. I remain convinced that a change in the framework of a reformed monarchy represents the least costly solution for Morocco. I would be lying if I were to claim that biology had nothing to do with this conviction.

The stands that you’ve taken have caused you several difficulties with your Uncle Hassan II. Then with your cousin Mohammed VI…

With Mohammed VI above all, insofar as his entourage brings more influence to bear than did that of Hassan II, I have been hassled, and made the object of campaigns against me…

How are your relations with him today?

During the last ten years, I was in the royal palace once. I have only seen the king two or three times, in the context of family reunions. The memories of the shared childhood and youth remain. The sense also of belonging to the same family. This is a constitutive element of my identity.

The Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) hosted a conference on the democratic transition in Egypt on Friday as part of its Program on Arab Reform and Democracy.

A series of four panels explored a number of issues surrounding the transition to democracy following the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak. Prominent scholars from Stanford and other institutions participated in the conference.

Twelve Egypt scholars from American, Egyptian and European universities and think tanks convened in four panels throughout the day to discuss the revolution, the transition process, the changing political landscape and Egypt's future. The conference was co-sponsored by the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies.

Panelists included Hoover Institution senior fellow Larry Diamond, history professor Joel Beinin, political science assistant professor Lisa Blaydes, CDDRL visiting scholar Ben Rowswell and CDDRL Program Manager Lina Khatib. They were joined by academics from Kent State University, Harvard University, Georgetown University, the University of Texas, Notre Dame University, the University of Exeter, the American University in Cairo and the Brookings Doha Center.

Each panel featured an introduction by the chair, followed by two or three 30-minute talks by panelists and a 30-minute Q&A session.

Emad Shahin, an associate professor of religion, conflict and peacebuilding at Notre Dame, opened the first panel with a talk that emphasized the role of the youth in charging the 18 days of protest that toppled former President Hosni Mubarak.

"In 18 days, this movement dismantled three pillars of Mubarak's regime-the security apparatus, NDP [National Democratic Party] and...the military," he said.

Samer Shehata, an assistant professor of Arab politics at Georgetown University, discussed the response of the regime to the protests and the reasons for its failure.

The second panel looked to the future, focusing on the Egyptian presidential elections scheduled for later this year. Speeches addressed the process of negotiations between the regime and opposition groups, the agenda for constitutional and institutional reform and political repression.

Panelist Jason Brownlee, an associate professor in the Department of Government at University of Texas at Austin, drew a parallel between the current situation in Egypt and the one in Russia in 1991. He described the liberal movement as "electorally weak" and said it experienced difficulty in maintaining momentum.

The third panel addressed political parties in the post-revolution landscape, including the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood party. Panelist Hesham Sallam, a doctoral candidate at Georgetown University, spoke on how the timeline for the parliamentary elections, currently set for this September, disadvantages newly formed parties and favors parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

"The speed of transition in Egypt  gives advantage to existing political parties by not allowing time for newcomers to organize," he said.

"The Brotherhood knows how to play politics where liberals have absolutely no idea," added Shadi Hamid, the director of research at the Brookings Doha Center.

Diamond described parallels with the situation in Iraq in 2004 and 2005.

"The liberals weren't good at organizing, had no mass constituency and got electorally crushed...but they had a constructive influence on the constitution making process," he said.

"We should look at this as an iterative process of several elections to come," he added.

The final panel focused on looking forward. Rowswell presented a new "Open Source Democracy Promotion" project, designed to provide Egyptian activists with an option for crowd sourcing constitutional negotiations.

"The best approach is for informed and engaged citizens to support the Egyptian activists...inspired by the opportunity Egyptians have given themselves but also inspired by what Egyptians have given the world regarding democratic state building and ushering in a new age of democracy based on mutual collaboration and participation," Rowswell said.

Hamid delivered the final talk of the conference, presenting his forecast for the parliamentary elections. He singled out newly formed parties backed by wealthy individuals as key players in the upcoming vote.

"The established political parties will do quite well, but also individuals with name recognition in their districts and those with resources will do well," he said.

Hamid cautioned against overly idealistic projections, given the disorganization of the liberal parties in Egypt.

"We have to be realistic," he said. "We wanted to think for a long time that once there was democracy, Egyptians would become fluffy American-style liberals, and we don't know if that is true."

"From the perspective of international actors doing democracy promotion, I think there's a distinction between encouraging Egyptians to make one choice over another," Rowswell said. "I think it should be ensuring that there is a choice to make."

Policy brief: Climate trend and global crop production since 1980

Global warming is likely already taking a toll on world wheat and corn production, according to a new study led by Stanford University researchers. But the United States, Canada and northern Mexico have largely escaped the trend.

"It appears as if farmers in North America got a pass on the first round of global warming," said David Lobell, an assistant professor of environmental Earth system science and center fellow at the Program on Food Security and the Environment at Stanford University. "That was surprising, given how fast we see weather has been changing in agricultural areas around the world as a whole."

Lobell and his colleagues examined temperature and precipitation records since 1980 for major crop-growing countries in the places and times of year when crops are grown. They then used crop models to estimate what worldwide crop yields would have been had temperature and precipitation had typical fluctuations around 1980 levels.

The researchers found that global wheat production was 5.5 percent lower than it would have been had the climate remained stable, and global corn production was lower by almost 4 percent. Global rice and soybean production were not significantly affected.

The United States, which is the world's largest producer of soybeans and corn, accounting for roughly 40 percent of global production, experienced a very slight cooling trend and no significant production impacts.

Outside of North America, most major producing countries were found to have experienced some decline in wheat and corn (or maize) yields related to the rise in global temperature. "Yields in most countries are still going up, but not as fast as we estimate they would be without climate trends," Lobell said.

Lobell is the lead author of the paper, Climate Trends and Global Crop Production Since 1980, published May 5 online in Science Express.

Russia, India and France suffered the greatest drops in wheat production relative to what might have been with no global warming. The largest comparative losses in corn production were seen in China and Brazil.

Total worldwide relative losses of the two crops equal the annual production of corn in Mexico and wheat in France. Together, the four crops in the study constitute approximately 75 percent of the calories that humans worldwide consume, directly or indirectly through livestock, according to research cited in the study.

"Given the relatively small temperature trends in the U.S. Corn Belt, it shouldn't be surprising if complacency or even skepticism about global warming has set in, but this study suggests that would be misguided," Lobell said.

Since 1950, the average global temperature has increased at a rate of roughly 0.13 degrees Celsius per decade. But over the next two to three decades average global temperature is expected to rise approximately 50 percent faster than that, according to the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. With that rate of temperature change, it is unlikely that the crop-growing regions of the United States will continue to escape the rising temperatures, Lobell said.

"The climate science is still unclear about why summers in the Corn Belt haven't been warming. But most explanations suggest that warming in the future is just as likely there as elsewhere in the world," Lobell said.

"In other words, farmers in the Corn Belt seem to have been lucky so far."

This is the first study to come up with a global estimate for the past 30 years of what has been happening, Lobell said.

To develop their estimates, the researchers used publicly available global data sets from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and from the University of Delaware, University of Wisconsin, and McGill University.

The researchers also estimated the economic effects of the changes in crop yield using models of commodity markets.

"We found that since 1980, the effects of climate change on crop yields have caused an increase of approximately 20 percent in global market prices," said Wolfram Schlenker, an economist at Columbia University and a coauthor of the paper in Science.

He said if the beneficial effects of higher carbon dioxide levels on crop growth are factored into the calculation, the increase drops down to 5 percent.

"Five percent sounds small until you realize that at current prices world production of these four crops are together worth nearly $1 trillion per year," Schlenker said. "So a price increase of 5 percent implies roughly $50 billion per year more spent on food."

Rising commodity prices have so far benefited American farmers, Lobell and Schlenker said, because they haven't suffered the relative declines in crop yield that the rest of the world has been experiencing.

"It will be interesting to see what happens over the next decade in North America," Lobell said. "But to me the key message is not necessarily the specifics of each country. I think the real take-home message is that climate change is not just about the future, but that it is affecting agriculture now. Accordingly, efforts to adapt agriculture such as by developing more heat- and drought-tolerant crops will have big payoffs, even today. "

Justin Costa-Roberts, an undergraduate student at Stanford, is also a coauthor of the Science paper. David Lobell is a researcher in Stanford's Program on Food Security and the Environment, a joint program of Stanford's Woods Institute for the Environment and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Schlenker is an assistant professor at the School of International and Public Affairs and at the Department of Economics at Columbia.

The work was supported by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

Martha Crenshaw has been researching terrorist organizations since the late 1960s. In the wake of the U.S. military’s successful mission against Osama bin Laden, she comments on what happens to Al Qaeda now, and the challenges that remain.

CISAC: What does the death of Osama bin Laden mean for the world?

Crenshaw: The killing of bin Laden brings closure to a pursuit that began well before the 9/11 attacks. The successful raid demonstrated American tenacity as well as a somewhat surprising ability to keep a secret over the past several months as American intelligence agencies zeroed in on bin Laden's fortified compound in Abbottabad. Although most of the world thought he was hiding in the mountainous and inaccessible border regions of Pakistan, sheltered by local tribes, he was actually centrally located in a city not too far from Islamabad. It is often said that terrorism cannot be deterred because terrorists have no return address, but it turned out that bin Laden did. After years of patient intelligence work the U.S. finally found it. 

CISAC: What happens to Al Qaeda now?

Crenshaw: There are differing opinions. One is that bin Laden is a unique figure and that there's no other leader of a terrorist organization that has the kind of aura he has. People who joined Al Qaeda swore personal allegiance to him. He had this kind of bearing, and they respected his personal piety. It's hard to replace a leader like that. At the same time, that part of the organization affiliated with bin Laden is still a major actor. A lot of attacks, like the London bombing, are traced back toward them. A lot of the failed and foiled attacks in the U.S. were traced back there, too, suggesting he played an operational role as well as an inspirational role.

On the other side, even if Al Qaeda disappeared, other affiliates like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula are still extremely dangerous and capable. They can trade on his reputation and inspire others to join. They might make demands for revenge. There are also those who could replace bin Laden, not so much as an inspirational leader but in terms of operations. The central organization's more visible second in command, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, is free although he will be under intense pressure. There is also a second-tier leadership whose abilities and appeal are largely unknown. Local affiliates such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have often overshadowed AQ central, and in fact AQAP is currently considered to be the most serious threat to US security. 

CISAC: It sounds like there is likely to be jockeying for power.

Crenshaw: There certainly will be. Will Zawahiri necessarily step into the No. 1 role now? Or will he be challenged? It's possible. You can kind of see how little we know and how hard it is for the U.S. to piece it together by how long it has taken to find bin Laden. The U.S. has been looking for him since 1998.

CISAC: Does that make things more or less dangerous?

Crenshaw: There's a theory that the more fragmentation you have, the higher the level of violence. The way you get more resources and support is to be more audacious than your rivals. You could have violence from one faction against another. There's also the idea that you attack your enemy to show how dangerous you really are. Nobody wants to be seen as weak, so they feel that they have to do what the other side is doing. 

More: An interview with Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, a European think tank based in Madrid. 

Mitul Bhat

Shadi Bushra

Colin Casey

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Nicholas Dugdale

Roxana Gharegozlou
Roxana Gharegozlou

Daniel Mattes

Daniel Mattes

Jack Mosbacher
Jack Mosbacher

Jenna Nicholas
Jenna Nicholas

Daniel Ong
Daniel Ong

Annamaria Prati
Annamaria Prati

Otis Reid

The Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) at Stanford University is pleased to announce the 2012 class of Senior Honors Students. This marked the first year that CDDRL is officially an interdisciplinary honors program, allowing the Center to reach beyond the traditional international relations discipline and recruit students from computer science, economics, political science, history, and beyond.

The 2012 class is composed of 12 remarkable juniors with a global footprint and social conscious, who are interested in undertaking significant research in areas examining civil society in Sudan, Uganda's emerging oil economy, technology's impact on democracy, and transnational justice, among others. This diverse cohort was selected from among a competitive pool of applicants for the opportunity to join the CDDRL scholarly community for the 2011-12 academic year.

Honors students will spend four quarters participating in research seminars to refine their proposed thesis topic, while working in consultation with a CDDRL faculty advisor to supervise their project. In September, the group will travel to Washington DC for honors college where they will visit leading government and development organizations to witness policymaking in practice and consult with key decision-makers.

Please join CDDRL in congratulating the 2012 Senior Honors students and welcoming them to the Center.

Below are profiles of our 12 honors students highlighting their academic interests, what brought them to apply to CDDRL, and some fun facts.  

Mitul Bhat

Mitul Bhat

Major: Economics, International Relations

Hometown: New Delhi

Perspective thesis topic: Relationship between income inequality and corruption in Latin America

What interests you about the field of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law? I was lucky enough to grow up in several different countries, which I think gave me a very real awareness of how different economic development is across and even within countries. I want to better understand why the discrepancies exist and what can be done to help the people who suffer most from global inequity. I recognize that this is a multifaceted issue, with obstacles and potential solutions in government, civil society, the business sector, and elsewhere, and this is why I am interested in the combined field of Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law.

Why you are excited about joining the CDDRL community? I am drawn to the interdisciplinary nature of the Center -- an issue like development, in which I am particularly interested, cannot be solved through Political Science or Economics methods alone and so I can learn about the topic in a more well-balanced way. The chance to interact with professors and fellow students who are engaged in interesting work across all aspects of the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law, appeals to me as well.

Future aspiration post-Stanford: Work in the field of development economics

Fun fact about yourself: I have never broken a bone.

Shadi Bushra

Shadi Bushra

Major: International Relations/ Human Biology

Hometown: Khartoum, Sudan; Savage, MN

Perspective thesis topic: How can youth movements in Sudan promote democracy and government accountability?

What interests you about the field of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law? The process of democratization is one of the most studied and least uniform among any of political science's many subfields. It has been proven to be correlated with greater welfare, higher standards of living, peace and more responsive government. Yet despite these documented effects, a large portion of the world is living under faux-democratic or authoritarian governments.

More personally, my own family left Sudan in the early years of the Bashir regime because my father was a political activist, although we return for summers. Having seen the first-hand effects of such repression on individuals and communities I am very interested in how democracy can be spread to those places where it is least likely. I think my country of Sudan is a good place to start.

Why you are excited about joining the CDDRL community? CDDRL boasts some of the greatest scholars in the field of democracy. It will be an honor and a pleasure to tap the Center's resources and minds to further my own understanding and research in the field.

Future aspiration post-Stanford: Perhaps working in journalism in Africa or the Middle East. Other options include working with an NGO or the UN in the aforementioned regions.

Fun fact about yourself: I love watching and practicing boxing, Brazilian jiu-jitsu and mixed martial arts. I'm also a budding photography enthusiast.

Colin Casey

Colin Casey

Major: Political Science

Hometown: Annapolis, Maryland

Perspective thesis topic: Political Economy of Conflict and Transition in Sudan

What interests you about the field of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law?Throughout my time at Stanford I have been moved by both the remarkable successes and dramatic failures of economic development and political transformation across the globe. My work both inside and outside the classroom has forced me to confront the fact that today newspapers are filled with stories of both healthy political discourse and nation-sweeping political upheaval, of civil stability and civil war, of fabulous wealth and stunning poverty. The field of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law has captivated my interest, therefore, not only because it is intellectually challenging but also because the questions that define it are critical to the well-being of people all over the world. Having the chance to explore these questions with the CDDRL program is an honor and a privilege.

Why you are excited about joining the CDDRL community? The opportunity to write an honors thesis with at CDDRL is an opportunity to explore, to engage, and to grapple. It is an opportunity to build upon the work I have done and to deepen my understanding of the work I will do. It is an opportunity to apply my love for critical thinking and problem solving, to journey further into the fascinating complexities of the developing world, and to face off with the awesome challenges of political and economic transformation. And because it provides me the privilege of utilizing extensive resources, working hands-on with leaders of the academic world, and sharing thoughts and theories on issues of global importance with other smart and passionate students, it is an opportunity that thrills me.

Future aspiration post-Stanford: After I graduate, I hope to work in the international development field. There are a number of organizations that are finding new and creative ways to stimulate emerging markets through investment and micro-finance, but the industry as a whole still suffers from structural inefficiencies, and there is great progress to be made both in terms of identifying viable and profitable enterprises and unleashing the enormous potential of the developing world.

Fun fact about yourself: Last summer, I rode my bike across the country from New Jersey to  California to raise money for the Valentino Achak Deng Foundation, a San Francisco based organization that is building a school in Southern Sudan. 

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Nicholas Dugdale

Nick Dugdale

Major: Political Science and Classics

Hometown: Corte Madera, CA

Perspective thesis topic: Tax Evasion in Greece (more specifically: what social, political, and economic factors promote widespread tax evasion, particularly in the Greek context)

What interests you about the field of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law?

Why you are excited about joining the CDDRL community? CDDRL provides an amazing  opportunity to work closely with the leading scholars in the field, as well as to collaborate with other students who share similar interests. 

Future aspiration post-Stanford: Work in the international development field for the UN or a similar organization 

Fun fact about yourself: I am a competitive sailor and have represented the US at 3 world championships.

Roxana Gharegozlou
Roxana Gharegozlou

Roxana Gharegozlou

Major: International Relations

Hometown: Tehran, Iran/ Vancouver, Canada

Prospective thesis topic: Transitional Justice: Assessing the Impact of Truth Commissions

What interests you about the field of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law? The range of salient issues that the field encompasses and its potential to break new ground in theory, practice, and policy formation. I am particularly interested in the linkages between human rights and governance.

Why you are excited about joining the CDDRL community? I am looking forward to being part of a global network of talented scholars and practitioners whose insights and experiences will be an invaluable resource as I move forward with my research into democracy, development, and the rule of law.

Future aspiration post-Stanford: Fieldwork in human rights

Fun fact about yourself: I am originally from the Qashqa'i tribe of Iran.

Daniel Mattes

Daniel Mattes

Daniel Mattes

Major: International Relations (Minor in Modern Languages - Italian and Arabic)

Hometown: San Francisco, California

Perspective thesis topic: The International Criminal Court and Efforts at Localization of its Mission

What interests you about the field of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law? My interests continue to center on the Middle East and Africa, two regions with the worst human rights records and most tragic histories of conflict, but ones that also offer clear opportunities for reform, growth, and inspirational transformation. The rule of law, most directly pertinent to my thesis topic, is and will continue to be a vital facet in encouraging domestic and global societies to respect the rights of their people. This field is filled with arduous challenges as well as tremendous opportunities that surface each day in the current events facing the world.

Why you are excited about joining the CDDRL community? The program at CDDRL offers a tremendous opportunity in the form of a smaller student group that is motivated for discussion, analysis, and research by the dynamic professors with whom they work, the great resources available to them by the Center, and their own personal desire to not only observe but also impact the world. I want a pragmatic and useful thesis that contributes to the creation of strong human rights protections and hope where there currently is none. CDDRL, its resources, and the faculty offer me such an opportunity.

Future aspiration post-Stanford: I would love to spend some more time in Italy (following my six months in Florence), but even more, I want to travel around the Middle East and Africa, both for personal interest and for career/academic opportunities. After that, I’m open to any opportunity that comes my way – whether that is law or graduate school, a job, or even the Peace Corps.

Fun fact about yourself: I live in a house called the Enchanted Broccoli Forest.

Hava Mirell

Major: History and the Law

Hometown: Los Angeles, CA

Perspective thesis topic: The Impact of International Diplomatic Pressure on Zimbabwe

What interests you about the field of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law?  As a history major focusing on Southern Africa, I'm constantly studying successful and unsuccessful democracies, failed development projects, and the complete absence of the rule of law. After studying these topics for the past three years and spending six months in South Africa, I want to use the CDDRL Honors Program to finally understand from a political science perspective why it is that democracy has or has not succeeded in Southern Africa, why corruption is so prevalent, and how we can improve economic growth in the region. 

Why you are excited about joining the CDDRL community? I'm excited to join the CDDRL community because of the incredible resources, especially the brilliant faculty, that the Center offers. Nowhere else on campus can you ask a question about governance in Zimbabwe and receive a response from one of the leading experts on this topic. Just the opportunity to talk to the CDDRL faculty, let alone actually work with them and have them as advisors, is unbelievable. I'm beyond excited for the upcoming year.  

Future aspiration post-Stanford: International human rights lawyer

Fun fact about yourself: I've never seen The LIttle Mermaid.

Jack Mosbacher
Jack Mosbacher

Jack Mosbacher

Major: Political Science

Hometown: Woodside, CA

Perspective thesis topic: The Implications of Uganda's Emerging Oil Economy

What interests you about the field of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law? I am most interested in the emphasis on policy-making and the constantly evolving scholarship in this very contemporary area of academia.

Why you are excited about joining the CDDRL community? I am so excited to have the opportunity to work one-on-one with the wonderful researchers in the CDDRL community and to be a part of the international effort to promote improved governance and substantive rule of law in some of the world's darkest places.

Future aspiration post-Stanford: Chaplain in US Army.

Fun fact about yourself: I play on the baseball team at Stanford - but I also love musical theater and opera.

Jenna Nicholas
Jenna Nicholas

Jenna Nicholas           

Major: International Relations

Hometown: London

Perspective thesis topic: What is the genesis, evolution and apparent trajectory of Chinese philanthropy, non-profits and social enterprise in China?

What interests you about the field of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law? I think that often democracy, development and the rule of law are considered as independent entities but they are deeply interconnected with one another. As we promote any one of them, it is essential that we consider the causal effects on the other two.

Why you are excited about joining the CDDRL community? I am really excited about engaging with people who are all working on different areas of study and are willing and interested to share their research with each other. As we embark on trying to understand the complexities of democracy, development and the rule of law, it is fascinating to reflect upon cross-disciplinary approaches to issues, innovation of thoughts and ideas whilst at the same time appreciating consensus and respecting divergence of views.

Future aspiration post-Stanford: I am very interested in the integration of business with societal issues which leads to fields such as philanthro-capitalism, social entrepreneurship, micro-finance and venture philanthropy. I am particularly interested in models of organization which facilitate cooperative research and develop metrics of success in the developmental field. I intend to find a role for myself somewhere at the forefront of creative development which will have an impact on the world.

Fun fact about yourself: When I was 12 years old, I spoke on behalf of the Baha’i faith on the importance of protecting the environment for Commonwealth Day at Westminster Abbey. Before the event I was talking to Desmond Tutu and he gave me a high five for being cheeky! Recently I met him again at the Skoll World Forum and reminded him of our last encounter. This time he gave me two high fives and a hug!  

Daniel Ong
Daniel Ong

Daniel Ong

Major: Computer Science

Hometown: Facebook

Physical Hometown: Singapore

Perspective thesis topic: How technology (mobile phones, email, twitter/fb) is changing the way social consciousness is formed- and how that affects democratic processes.

What interests you about the field of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law? I may be majoring in a very different field, but the issues and questions that DDRL constantly visits are ones which come up constantly in my mind. If there was more time, I would have double majored in Political Science and CS- but right now, I'm focused on learning all I can and seeing how I can use technology to make things better.

Why you are excited about joining the CDDRL community? The conversations, and the chance to bounce ideas and thoughts off people who have so much domain knowledge in these areas. Just the chance to learn from them, and refine my ideas is invaluable in itself.

Future aspiration post-Stanford: Entrepreneur-in-Government, or startup

Fun fact about yourself: I am a machine which turns coffee into code (and hopefully, a thesis paper)

Annamaria Prati
Annamaria Prati

Annamaria Prati

Major: International Relations

Hometown: Mountain View, California

Perspective thesis topic: United Nations Electoral Assistance

What interests you about the field of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law? This field works to answer some of the most pertinent questions of our time and can have widespread implications for the greater world.

Why you are excited about joining the CDDRL community? It is a great community of scholars that is working on incredibly interesting projects. CDDRL has shown me that research does not mean looking down from an ivory tower, and I am looking forward to learning more.

Future aspiration post-Stanford: Going to grad school

Fun fact about yourself: I play the harp

Otis Reid

Otis Reid

Major: Public Policy and Economics

Hometown: Chapel Hill, NC

Perspective thesis topic:  Regulatory Development and Stock Market Effectiveness in Ghana

What interests you about the field of Democracy, Development, and Rule of Law?  Development is, in my opinion, the central challenge of our time. I'm very excited about having the chance to help contribute to our knowledge of this field and ultimately to help accelerate the development process, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Given the interconnections between development, governance, and accountability, being at a center that looks at all three is particularly interesting.

Why you are excited about joining the CDDRL community? Honestly, it was the T-shirt that really got me ("Democracy Never Looked So Good"). No, more seriously, I'm very excited to have a chance to build more relationships across the different disciplines of democracy, development, and governance and to see how research can help to drive policy.

Future aspiration post-Stanford: After Stanford, I want to enter the policy-making community around development. I'm interested in the intersection of development and security, so I'd ultimately love to have a position on the National Security Council helping to coordinate development policy. (Professor Jeremy Weinstein's current position on the NSC is a model for the type of position that I'd like to hold.)

Fun fact about yourself: I spent my seventh grade year living in Paris, France - the second most time I've spent outside the country is last summer, which I spent in Accra, Ghana.