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Michael A. McFaul
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This week, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov unveiled a new foreign policy doctrine for Russia. As a written document, the doctrine underscores all the right themes. Two themes stand out. First, Russian policymakers plan to follow a rational and realistic foreign policy that will serve Russian economic and political interests. Such a strategy includes active engagement with the West. Second, Russian leaders see an intimate relationship between domestic and foreign policy. The document stresses the need to use foreign policy to help solve Russia's domestic problems, including first and foremost Russia's economic woes.

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Michael A. McFaul
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Michael A. McFaul - To make his case, [Bush] has a powerful historical experience to draw upon: the end of the Cold War. Regime change in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union fundamentally enhanced American national security. If Iraq possessed Russia's nuclear arsenal today, the United States would be in grave danger. Two decades ago we feared this same arsenal in the hands of the Kremlin. Today we do not. The reason we do not is that the regime in Russia has become more democratic and market-oriented and therefore also more Western- oriented.
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The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was one of the first multilateral bodies where its members states, including the US, Russia, all other post-Soviet and European countries, agreed that democracy, rule of law, and human rights were an indivisible part of security. In the mid-1990s the star of the OSCE was on the rise: the organization deployed large multi-disciplinary field missions throughout the former Yugoslavia; it was involved in the protection of rights of ethnic minorities in the Baltics; it was designated to lead conflict-resolution efforts in the post-Soviet space. In addition, the OSCE was conducting election observation and democracy-promotion efforts in the region. With time, however, the consensus of the 1990s has eroded and the effectiveness of the organization is increasingly put into question by some of its member states. What can be learned from the OSCE's experiences? Can multilateral organizations effectively promote democracy in absence of consensus among its member states? The presenter will give a practitioner's perspective on these questions.

About the speaker
Dr. Vladimir Shkolnikov
has served as the Head of Democratization Department in the Warsaw-based Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (ODIHR/OSCE) since spring 2004. He is responsible for direction and management of ODIHR's democracy-promotion technical assistance programs in areas of rule of law, parliamentary support, political party development, gender equality, and migration policy development in the former Soviet states and in Southeastern Europe. Prior to assuming his post he held positions of migration adviser and election adviser at the ODIHR. He has traveled extensively, including to most of the conflict areas in the post-Soviet space. Prior to joining the ODIHR he was resident research consultant at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA. He received his Ph.D. in public policy analysis from the Pardee RAND Graduate School of Policy Studies.

CISAC Conference Room

Vladimir Shkolnikov Head of Democratization Department Speaker Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, OSCE
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Authors
Michael A. McFaul
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When presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin meet in Moscow next month, issues such as

START II, NATO expansion, trade with Iran and Iraq, and Russia's new draconian law on

religion are likely to dominate the agenda. To historians of US-Soviet relations, this agenda

should sound familiar as arms control, European security, regional conflicts, and human rights were the main components of most summit agendas between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This old agenda suggests that the promise of a new post-communist strategic partnership between the United States and Russia has not been realized. Especially as Russia continues to struggle in reforming its economy, many in the US have now concluded that engagement with this "basket case" is not worth the trouble--better to walk away from the failing project of internal reform and prepare instead to contain future external aggression.

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Michael A. McFaul
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The improvement in Russian-American relations is one of the few positive factors in the muddled picture of international relations today. Russian President Vladimir Putin's support for the American struggle against international terrorism has elevated communications between two former enemies to a new level. The upcoming November summit will be yet another sign of this. Politicians on either sides of the ocean are even calling the US and Russia "allies." Noting the decisiveness with which President Putin supports the US and Washington's extremely positive reaction to this, many Russian politicians and public figures have began speaking openly of Russia's entry into Western organizations and unions. Membership in the World Trade Organization is discussed in Moscow as an obvious reward Russia should receive for supporting American military actions; entry into the European Union is brought up as a relatively near goal, and so forth. The hopes are great, but do they reflect reality? Inflated expectations and skewed assessments of the speed and character of Russia's integration into the West are dangerous.

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Michael A. McFaul
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Between a continuation of engagement and a return to containment is a third path: realistic engagement. [Bush] needs to communicate to [Putin] that he believes in the possibility of Russia's integration into Europe and the Western community of states. But he also needs to clearly articulate the real terms of integration, terms that will require Russia to undergo serious political and economic changes. To help Russia integrate into the West, the American strategy must still be engagement, but with more realistic expectations about when, and with real standards for how this integration might occur.

President Bush thus must express his faith in Russia's ability to rejoin Europe as a democratic state with a market economy. Many within Russia do not believe the United States and the new administration in particular want to see Russia as part of the West. Bush should even be so bold as to present NATO membership for Russia as a real goal for the long term. Europe will only be whole and free, a goal Bush's father once articulated, if Russia is a member.

Most Russians still hope their country can become a full-fledged member of Europe. They do not want to become an autocratic ally of China seeking to confront the West. But a decade of disappointed expectations about democracy and markets, coupled with seemingly hostile acts from the West, has fueled doubts about Russia's place in the world. President Bush cannot eliminate this self-doubt overnight, but he can make clear American intentions toward Russia. By articulating a positive but realistic vision for Europe -- whole, free and including Russia -- he can help to reverse Russia's dangerous anti-Western drift.

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Michael A. McFaul
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Michael A. McFaul - Ten years ago, President Boris Yeltsin and his newly minted government launched a set of revolutionary changes comparable in scale and scope with the French Revolution and the Bolshevik Revolution. Like these earlier social revolutions, Yeltsin and his band of revolutionaries sought to transform the fundamental organization of the polity and economy within Russia. Their aim was to destroy the Soviet command economy and replace it with a market economy. They also aspired to crush Soviet dictatorship and replace it with a democratic polity. Unlike their counterparts in France in 1789 or Russia in 1917, Russia's anti-communist revolutionaries added an additional task -- the dissolution of the Soviet empire. In some respects, then, the agenda of change introduced a decade ago in Russia was even more far reaching than that which the Jacobins or Bolsheviks sought to achieve.
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%people1% - When the bronze statue of Saddam Hussein crashed to the ground more than a week ago, the image joined a long series of unforgettable mental pictures marking the end of tyrannical rule. In much of the former colonial world, the retiring of a European flag followed by the hoisting of a new flag of independence captured the moment. And more recently, the chiseling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the crane uprooting secret-police founder Felix Dzerzhinsky's statue in Moscow in 1991.
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%people1% - The celebration in Prague should have been more raucous. The most successful alliance in world history has extended to corners of Europe unimaginable just a few years ago. The military capacity gained for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from expansion is minimal but the political returns will be fantastic. More than any other institution, NATO has helped make Europe democratic, peaceful and whole. What is particularly striking about the new members -- Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia -- is how many of them emerged from Communist rule with no democratic traditions. The pull of NATO, the desire to join this Western club, created real incentives for democratic consolidation.
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Michael A. McFaul - First, the collapse of the old regime left a vacuum of state power. The anarchy, looting and interruption of state services that we see in Iraq are predictable consequences of regime change. Second, after the fall of the dictator, expectations about "life after the dictator" exploded. People who have been oppressed for decades want to benefit from the new order immediately. The urgent and angry questions last week from Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi National Congress leader now back in Iraq, about why the Americans have not provided more relief faster is typical. The first leaders after the departure of the king in France, the czar in Russia or the communists in Eastern Europe knew Chalabi's situation well. Paradoxically, society's expectations inflate at precisely the same moment when the state is least prepared to meet them. Third, the coalition that opposed the dictatorship dissolved. While the dictator was still in power, this united front embraced one ideology of opposition -- "anti-king," "anti-czar," "anti-shah" or "anti- communist." In doing so, these coalitions consisted of economic, political, ethnic and religious forces with radically different visions for their country after regime change. Unity ended after the dictator fell. In Russia, Bolsheviks and liberals in 1917 and nationalists and democrats in 1991 went their separate ways. In Iran in 1979, Islamic leftists, liberals and militant clerics celebrated their shared goal of removing the shah. Just a few years after the collapse of the old order, many of the coalition partners who brought down the shah were out of power or in jail. Soon after the Soviet puppet regime in Afghanistan fell, the anti-Soviet coalition forces were killing each other.
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