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The Arab Peace Initiative: a primer and future prospects

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In the wake of September 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia proposed to Israel "full withdrawal from all the occupied territories" for "full normalization of relations." However, by the time the Arab summit met in Beirut in March 2002, the initiative had been modified and its terms hardened. CDDRL visiting professor, Joshua Teitelbaum, shares his analysis of the initiative and how Israel should respond.
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CISAC's Hecker talks North Korea

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Management Science and Engineering Professor Siegfried S. Hecker, an expert on nuclear weapons, recently returned from a visit to North Korea, where he frequently checks on the country's denuclearization process. Hecker has researched extensively in fields of plutonium science-he served as director of Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986 through 1997, and remains an emeritus director to the Laboratory. Through a series of Track Two, non-governmental, non-official visits to North Korea, Hecker has worked closely with the previous and current administration's North Korean negotiations team. The Daily spoke with Hecker about his experiences in the country, and his insight into nuclear issues in North Korea and elsewhere.

The Stanford Daily (SD): This is your sixth visit to North Korea. You made one each year from 2004 to 2009. How is this trip different from the previous ones? Any change in North Korean society, diplomacy?

Siegfried Hecker (SH): We visited North Korea from Tuesday, Feb. 24 to Saturday, Feb. 28, and first of all it was quite a relief from Beijing in that the air was quite clear and that the weather was beautiful. In Beijing, it went day to day from being smoggy to being almost impossibly smoggy. So the first thing that we found when we got off at Pyongyang, was the relief of having reasonably clean air.

Even though it was in February and still quite cold, the greatest impression left is that Pyongyang and the people just looked more prosperous this time than I have seen them look in the past. There were more cars on the road; there were more tractors, especially when we got off into the countryside. The people were better dressed.

Particularly, one of the things I look for is color. Years ago, North Korea, like the Soviet Union, was all drab, gray and black. Now you see lots of colors; lots of down jackets, for example, on little children and women with bright colors from yellow to green to red. There was more construction in Pyongyang. We've seen many cranes working on the ground.

All the way around, while some people believed that North Korea and its economy is sinking, we've actually seen it rising and looking better than we've seen in the past. I would say this is the starkest observation of how it struck differently as the previous times.

[Diplomatically,] we've seen a change of attitude since October 2006, when they conducted a nuclear test. Even though, by technical standards, that nuclear test was of limited success, politically for them it was very successful. So the principal attitude change is one of greater confidence on their part. They now tell us, you must deal with us as a nuclear weapon state. We have demonstrated that we have nuclear weapons. We've tested a nuclear weapon, and so we expect to be treated as a state that has nuclear weapons. That confidence will most likely harden their negotiating position. Then, of course, they're also still trying to get a sense of what the new administration will do. They are entering the negotiations with a new administration from what they considered to be a position of strength.

SD: How is North Korea's disablement process of its nuclear facilities going?

SH: In July 2007, they stopped operations and began disabling the nuclear facilities. When I was there almost exactly one year ago, they showed me the nuclear facilities, allowed me to take photographs of the nuclear facilities to demonstrate that they are disabling those facilities that produce the bomb fuel-the plutonium. Disabling the facilities means making it more difficult to restart. They have finished most of the disablement actions, but still need to complete the unloading of the fuel from the nuclear reactor.

They made the decision last year to slow down the unloading because the other parties did not meet their obligations of providing heavy fuel oil or equivalent energy aid. At this point, Japan and South Korea have not finished their obligations, so the slow-down continues.

If the other parties complete their obligations, then I believe North Korea is prepared to complete the disablement. However, the next important step is to dismantle the facilities-that is, take them apart. The terms of that dismantlement have not yet been negotiated. Subsequently, they will need to give up their nuclear weapons. That seems a long way off now based on their comments.

SD: In one of your reports, you discussed the idea of a scientific fingerprint that could deter North Korea from exporting its plutonium. This is very interesting. Can the method have wider use?

SH: One of the concerns with North Korea would be the possibility of them selling or exporting plutonium or nuclear technologies. We know enough about the North Korean plutonium that we have what you call a scientific fingerprint. The makeup of plutonium is determined by the type of reactor and by how long it was in the reactor. We know that about the North Korean plutonium so we can identify North Korea's plutonium. This should be a deterrent for North Korea ever exporting its plutonium because we would know it came from North Korea.

We, of course, don't know whether or not North Korea would ever want to sell its plutonium, but just in case, the fingerprint represents a deterrent. This fingerprinting of plutonium is not as useful for plutonium from the rest of the world, because there are so many different types of reactors and we know less about their fuels and operating schedules.

SD: Do you think the example of North Korea contributes much to a solution of nuclear problems in other regions-for example, Iran?

SH: Right now, the second nuclear hot spot is Iran, and the difference between North Korea and Iran is that North Korea has declared its nuclear program now to be a weapon's program and has demonstrated that at least it can detonate a nuclear device, even though it wasn't fully successful. Iran, I believe, is developing an option for nuclear weapons but under the umbrella of doing it strictly for civilian purposes. They say, "We're not a nuclear weapon state and we have no intention of developing nuclear weapons," but they are continuing to put most of the capabilities in place should they decide to build weapons.

The dividing line between military and civilian is a very fine line, so North Korea and Iran are two very different problems. However, those countries certainly watch each other and look at the diplomatic responses during each other's negotiations.

SD: Are you advising anyone in the new administration?

SH: We work very closely with the U.S. government on this, although our visits are strictly track two visits, which means non-governmental, non-official visits. I don't go as an official, but rather as a Stanford University employee. In the past, we worked very closely with the previous North Korean negotiations team led by Ambassador Christopher Hill. We have now begun to work with the new team that is just being put in place.

SD: During your visits, you met with North Korean officials in education, public health, and explored possibilities of cooperation in these areas. How do you envision these future exchanges?

SH: We met with officials from the ministry of education and one of the economic universities to discuss potential cooperation in educational and technology exchange. In the past, we have also met with officials from the health ministry. So, in addition to working the nuclear issues, we're very interested in trying to engage the North Korean community in a broader set of activities than simply nuclear, and technology is one of those. They're very interested in material science, biotechnology, information technology, and so we explored the possibility of exchange visits and particularly having some Stanford professors go to North Korea and lecture on those topics.

SD: What classes do you currently teach at Stanford? How do you like being a professor at Stanford?

SH: I have a terrific time-that's one of the reasons why I'm at Stanford. The two classes that I teach are both Management Science and Engineering classes. They both focus on the intersection of technology and policy. One is a very large class, MSE 193/293, that Professor William Perry, former Secretary of Defense, and I teach together. We cover everything from history of technology and warfare to modern times and what the current challenges are in the security arena. Both Prof. Perry and I try to teach that in the spirit of our own experiences in these areas. It's a very, very large class-over 200 students.

Then I teach a course by myself in spring that's exactly the opposite. It's a sophomore seminar, MSE93Q, and I have approximately 16 students. The title is "Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Terrorism," and in essence, it's everything nuclear. So I cover in that 10 weeks the whole nuclear problem. I try to get students to understand the basics of nuclear technology and how that interfaces with the policy issue of nuclear weapons, energy, proliferation and terrorism. We cover topics such as: If you develop nuclear energy, why do you have to be concerned about nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation? What is the connection between nuclear energy and nuclear weapons? That's what we cover in 10 weeks' time, and I've enjoyed the interaction with students immensely.

SD: What do you aim to teach students in the classroom and outside?

SH: Particularly, I want students to understand the intersections of technology and policy. The nuclear field is a very good one to do that because you must understand the basics of nuclear technology to make good policy. And we also now have 60 years of very rich history of the interplay of those two in so many different countries and so many different ways. For example, in both of my classes the students have to write policy papers that show they have at least a basic understanding of the technology, even though they may be social science, political science, international relations majors, but I want them to understand the difference between plutonium and uranium, between fission and fusion, between weapons and energy. That's what I like to be able to contribute to the University.

What I like about the students is how truly interested and dedicated they are and how experienced so many of them are in the international arena. In addition, what's also fascinating is that we have students from all over the world. Whether it is a physics major from Palestine, or somebody who grew up in Iran, Pakistan, India or in China, Vietnam, Africa, they bring a totally different outlook on the world to the table, which then of course helps the rest of the students to understand that this world is much more than just about the United States of America, and Stanford is a great place to do it.

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Understanding Stability and Dissent in the Kingdom: The Double-edged Role of Islamic Networks in Saudi Politics

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Stephane Lacroix is a postdoctoral scholar in the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies, and a lecturer in the department of political science at Stanford University. He is also a former researcher and lecturer at Sciences Po in Paris, where he supervised the Kuwait Program of Gulf Studies. Lacroix holds an MA in Middle East Studies and Arabic Language from the Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales (INALCO) in Paris, as well as an MA and PhD in Political Science from Sciences Po. He has published articles on Saudi Arabia and Islamism in some of the major academic journals on the Middle East, including the Revue des Mondes Musulmans et de la Mediterranee, the Middle East Journal and the International Journal of Middle East Studies, as well as in several edited volumes. He is also a former consultant on Saudi Arabia for the International Crisis Group (ICG). His forthcoming book "Awakening Islam : a History of Islamism in Saudi Arabia", based on extensive fieldwork in the Saudi Kingdom, will be published by Harvard University Press in the winter 2010.

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Stephane Lacroix Post Doctoral Scholar, Political Science Speaker Stanford University
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Defeating Islamist Radicalism: Building a Global Counter-extremism Network

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C. Holland Taylor is an expert on Islam and the process of Islamization in Southeast Asia, having lived, studied and worked in the Muslim world, from Iran to Indonesia, over a period of more than four decades.  

Mr. Taylor established LibForAll Foundation (www.libforall.org) in 2003, together with former Indonesian president Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid, whom the Wall Street Journal has called "the single most influential religious leader in the Muslim world" and "easily the most important ally the West has in the ideological struggle against Islamic radicalism." Under their leadership, LibForAll has grown into the leading NGO developing and operationalizing successful counter-extremism strategies worldwide.

Their inspiration lay in the heroic example of President Wahid's own 16th century Javanese ancestors, whose deft use of soft and hard power defeated Muslim extremists, and guaranteed freedom of religion for all Javanese, two centuries before the Bill of Rights led to the separation of church and state in the U.S.

Based on lessons derived from this struggle, LibForAll is forging a Global Rahmatan lil ‘Alamin ("Blessing for All Creation") Counter-Extremism Network of top Muslim opinion leaders in the fields of religion, education, pop culture, government, business and the media, who are joining to proclaim, with one voice, that radical Islam has no theological validity, and thereby mobilize the "great silent majority" of moderate, peace-loving Muslims to reject the extremists' ideology of hatred and violence. 

This strategy has resulted in a number of world-class achievements, causing Wall Street Journal foreign columnist Bret Stephens to proclaim: "LibForAll is a model of what a competent public diplomacy effort in the Muslim world should look like."

In his presentation, Mr. Taylor will explain key elements of LibForAll's ground-breaking strategy and present examples of world class achievements, including: a "musical jihad" against religious hatred and terrorism; development of the first part of a unique 26-episode counter-extremism television/video series (Ocean of Revelation); and convening an historic religious summit where top Muslim leaders condemned the evils of Holocaust denial - generating worldwide publicity that effectively countered the December 2006 Holocaust denial conference in Tehran.

Mr. Taylor's work with LibForAll follows a career as a successful entrepreneur and global telecom executive, during which he served as CEO of USA Global Link, and was credited by numerous leading publications as one of the essential catalysts in the deregulation of the global telecommunications industry.

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Learning not to love the bomb

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Philip Taubman
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The Obama administration seems ready to resuscitate relations with Russia, including by renewing nuclear-arms-reduction talks. Even before the inaugural parade wound down, the White House Web site offered up a list of ambitious nuclear policy goals, with everything from making bomb-making materials more secure to the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons.

That's welcome news, but for such goals to be realized, the White House will need to be prepared to reimagine and reshape the nuclear era and, against strong opposition, break free from cold war thinking and better address the threats America faces today.

George W. Bush actually started down this road. He reached an agreement with the Kremlin in 2002 to cut the number of operational strategic warheads on each side to between 1,700 and 2,200 by the year 2012, a two-thirds reduction. Washington is likely to reach that goal ahead of schedule. President Bush's efforts were propelled by the Nuclear Posture Review - a periodic reassessment of nuclear forces and policies - in December 2001. While still grounded in the belief that nuclear weapons are the silver bullets of American defense, the review let a little daylight into the nuclear bunker by acknowledging that nuclear-weapons policy had to be readjusted to deal with rapidly changing threats. Soon, however, the president's initiatives were overshadowed by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, his administration's absorption with the threat of terrorism and the gradual breakdown in relations with Russia.

President Bush's agreement with Moscow, which was built upon weapons reductions made by Presidents Bill Clinton and George H. W. Bush, is President Obama's starting point. But rather than settle for the next level - 1,000 active weapons seems to be the likely goal - the White House should reconsider the entire superstructure of nuclear-weapons strategy. This won't be easy. The mandarins of the nuclear establishment remain enthralled by elaborate deterrence theories premised on the notion that the ultimate defense against a variety of military threats is a bristling nuclear arsenal.

It's true that America's nuclear weapons still offer the hope of deterring attacks from countries like North Korea and, if it soon goes nuclear, Iran. But it is hard to imagine how they would dissuade a band of elusive, stateless terrorists from making a nuclear bomb and detonating it in New York, Washington or Los Angeles.

One provocative road map for moving away from nuclear deterrence comes from a quartet of cold war leaders - Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former secretaries of state; William Perry, a former secretary of defense; and Sam Nunn, a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Two years ago, they bridged their ideological differences to call, improbably, for the abolition of nuclear weapons, and they proposed a series of interim steps to reduce nuclear dangers, stop the spread of bomb-making materials and lay the groundwork for a nuclear-free world.

Even the quartet recognizes that "getting to zero" will be exceedingly difficult. But the issue today isn't whether the elimination of nuclear weapons is feasible. That's a distant goal.

An achievable immediate goal should be to cut the United States' and Russia's nuclear stockpiles down to the bare minimum of operational warheads needed to backstop conventional forces. As long as these two countries have far and away the most nuclear weapons, Washington looks hypocritical when it lectures other nations about the size of their arsenals or their efforts to develop nuclear weapons.

There's reasonable disagreement among experts about the minimum number of nuclear weapons the United States and Russia should maintain. The more emphasis you put on nuclear deterrence, the more potent you think the arsenal should be. And the more you want to engage the world in arms reduction and prevent proliferation, the more you consider radical cuts. To bring the number down below 1,000 would require determined presidential leadership.

The president's determination will be measured by how effectively he makes the case for Senate ratification of the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Leading scientists say that technological advances over the past decade have erased doubts about whether an international monitoring system can detect and locate underground tests outlawed by the treaty. The scientists also say that the United States has the technical expertise and tools to maintain the effectiveness of its nuclear weapons without underground testing, as has been successfully demonstrated since the United States stopped testing in 1992.

Ratification of the test-ban treaty would help build momentum for a 2010 review of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the increasingly frail 1968 accord aimed at limiting the spread of nuclear weapons and eventually eliminating them. American leadership is essential to reinvigorating the treaty and buttressing nonproliferation efforts. The best way to avoid nuclear terrorism is to prevent terrorists from acquiring the highly enriched uranium needed to make the simplest nuclear bomb.

Listening to the discussion at a recent nuclear-weapons conference in Washington, I felt as though I had slipped back in time to the cold war and its arcane, often surreal debates about waging nuclear war and the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. It's heartening to see President Obama and his national-security team promising to elevate nuclear-weapons policy and free it from the shibboleths of cold war nuclear theology. Now they must put their words into action.

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Larry Diamond Appointed Director of CDDRL

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Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford and the Hoover Institution was appointed Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law in February 2009, when former Director Michael McFaul went on public service leave to join the National Security Council in the Obama Administration.

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford and the Hoover Institution was appointed Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law in February 2009, when former Director Michael McFaul went on public service leave to join the National Security Council in the Obama Administration.

Diamond is the founding coeditor of the Journal of Democracy, the co-director of the International Forum for Democratic Studies of the National Endowment for Democracy, and has been coordinating CDDRL's democracy program. His newest book, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World (Times Books, 2008), explores the sources of democratic progress and stress and the prospects for future democratic expansion.

Diamond's other published works include Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (Times Books, 2005), Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (1999), Promoting Democracy in the 1990s (1995), and Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria (1998).

In May 2007, Diamond was named "Teacher of the Year" by the Associated Students of Stanford University for teaching "that transcends political and ideological barriers." At Stanford Commencement ceremonies in June 2007, he was honored with the Dinkelspiel Award for Distinctive Contributions to Undergraduate Education and cited, inter alia, for "the example he sets as a scholar and public intellectual, sharing his passion for democratization, peaceful transitions, and the idea that each of us can contribute to making the world a better place."

Diamond received a BA, MA and PhD from Stanford, all in sociology.

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"The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power"

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David E. Sanger covers the White House for The New York Times and is one of the newspaper's senior writers. In a 24-year career at the paper, he has reported from New York, Tokyo and Washington, covering a wide variety of issues surrounding foreign policy, globalization, nuclear proliferation, Asian affairs and, for the past five years, the arc of the Bush presidency. Twice he has been a member of Times reporting teams that won the Pulitzer Prize. Sanger's new book, The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power (Harmony, 2009), is an examination of the challenges that the tumultuous events of the past eight years have created for the new president.

Before covering the White House, Mr. Sanger specialized in the confluence of economic and foreign policy, and wrote extensively on how issues of national wealth and competitiveness have come to redefine the relationships between the United States and its major allies. As a correspondent and then bureau chief in Tokyo for six years, he covered Japan's rise as the world's second largest economic power, and then its humbling recession. He also filed frequently from Southeast Asia, and wrote many of the first stories about North Korea's secret nuclear weapons program in the 1990's. He continues to cover proliferation issues from Washington.

Leaving Asia in 1994, he took up the position of chief Washington economic correspondent, and covered a series of global economic upheavals, from Mexico to the Asian economic crisis. He was named a senior writer in March, 1999, and White House correspondent later that year.

Mr. Sanger joined the Times in the Business Day section, specializing in the computer industry and high-technology trade. In 1986 he played a major role in the team that investigated the causes of the space shuttle Challenger disaster, writing the first stories about what the space agency knew about the potential flaws in the shuttle's design and revealing that engineers had raised objections to launching the shuttle. The team won the 1987 Pulitzer Prize for national reporting. He was a member of another Pulitzer-winner team that wrote about the struggles within the Clinton Administration over controlling exports to China.

In 2004, Mr. Sanger was the co-recipient of the Weintal Prize for diplomatic reporting for his coverage of the Iraq and Korea crises. He also won the Aldo Beckman prize for coverage of the presidency, awarded by the White House Correspondent's Association. The previous year he won another of the association's major prizes, the Merriman Smith Memorial Award, for coverage of the emergence of a new national security strategy for the United States. In 2004 he and four other colleagues also shared the American Society of Newspaper Editor's top award for deadline writing, for team coverage of the Columbia disaster.

Mr. Sanger appears regularly on public affairs and news shows. Twice a week he delivers the Washington Report on WQXR, the radio station of the Times. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Aspen Strategy Group.

Born in 1960 in White Plains, N.Y.,  Mr. Sanger was educated in the public school system there and graduated magna cum laude in government from Harvard College in 1982.

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David E. Sanger Chief Washington Correspondent Speaker The New York Times
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