The atomic bombs had been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki just before 18-year-old William J. Perry landed in Japan during the War of Occupation as a mapping specialist. He saw the devastation left behind by American firebombers on Tokyo and Okinawa.

The young man quickly understood the staggering magnitude of difference in the destruction caused by traditional firepower and these new atomic bombs. He would go on to devote his life to understanding, procuring and then trying to dismantle those weapons.

But that was seven decades back. And many young Americans today believe the threat of nuclear weapons waned alongside the Cold War and Cuban Missile Crisis.

So as faculty at Stanford and the Center for International Security and Cooperation evolve with the digital age by taking their lessons online, one of the university’s oldest professors is also adapting to online teaching in an effort to reach the youngest audience, urging them to take on the no-nukes mantle that he’s held for many years.

“The issue is so important to me that I tried all sorts of approaches from books and courses and lectures and conferences to try to get my contemporaries and the generations behind me engaged – all with limited success,” says the 86-year-old Perry, a CISAC faculty member and the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus) at the center’s parent organization, the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

“First – which is a sine qua non – they must become seriously concerned that there is a nuclear danger, which most of these kids don’t understand at all,” said Perry. “Secondly, we want to convince them that there is something they can actually do about it.”

To reach those students, he believes he must go digital. So Perry – who co-teaches with CISAC’s Siegfried Hecker the popular Stanford course, “Technology and National Security” – began to map out a classroom course that would be videotaped and serve as a pilot for an online class that would be free and open to the public.

That course, “Living at the Nuclear Brink: Yesterday & Today” included lectures by some of the best people working in the field of nuclear nonproliferation today. Among those who will be highlighted in the online course are Perry and Hecker; Joe Martz of the Los Alamos National Laboratory; Stanford nuclear historian David Holloway; Stanford political scientist Scott Sagan; and Ploughshares Fund president, Joseph Cirincione.

The Perry Project will produce short-segment videos highlighting key information and stories from the course, packaging them in an online course available in multiple platforms and possibly offered by the university.

Perry used his personal journey as a young soldier during WWII, a mathematician and later a developer of weapons for the U.S. nuclear arsenal as undersecretary of defense for the Carter administration – and then trying to dismantle those weapons as secretary of defense for President Bill Clinton.

“I’m not doing this simply because I want to put a notch on my belt, to say that I’ve done a MOOC,” Perry said. “I’m doing it because I really want to get across to hundreds of thousands of young people.”

Last summer, he launched the Perry Project by inviting a dozen high school and college students to campus for a nuclear weapons boot camp so that they could take back to campus the message that nuclear annihilation is still a real, contemporary possibility.

He asked them: How do I get through to your generation?

“They said, `We don’t get our information by books or even by television, we get it through social media and YouTube, the various social media platforms. And you want to make the message relevant and relatively compact,’” he recalls.

Perry listened. “Living at the Nuclear Brink: Yesterday and Today” is in production now and a short-segment pilot video should be made available in the fall.

Cybersecurity fellow Jonathan Mayer to teach online class on surveillance.

CISAC is turning to other forms on online learning, as well.

Cybersecurity fellow Jonathan Mayer is teaching an online course in surveillance law.

And lectures from CISAC's signature course, “International Security in a Changing World” (PS114S) will soon go up on YouTube as lecture modules entitled, “Security Matters.”

“Online learning offers a way to expand CISAC's reach to new audiences, geographies, and generations,” says CISAC Co-Director Amy Zegart, who has co-taught the popular course for the past few years with CISAC’s Martha Crenshaw.

“At the same time, the PS114 online modules will give us a living lecture library so that future Stanford students can compare faculty lectures on similar topics across time – learning, for example, how Martha Crenshaw assessed the terrorist threat in 2010 vs. 2015,” Zegart said.

Guest lecturers whose presentations will be included for the YouTube package include:

• Jack Snyder of Columbia University: Democratization and Violence
• Francis Fukuyama of Stanford: The Changing Nature of Power
• Zegart: Understanding Policy Decisions: The Cuban Missile Crisis
• Scott Sagan of CISAC: The Nuclear Revolution; and Why Do States Build/Forego Nuclear Weapons?
• Abbas Milani, director of Iran Studies at Stanford: Historical Perspective on Iran
• Former FBI Director Robert Mueller: the FBI’s Transformation Post 9/11
• U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry (Ret.) and former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan: The War in Afghanistan and the Future of Central Asia
• Jane Holl Lute, former deputy secretary of Homeland Security: Emerging Threats in Cybersecurity
• Perry: Security Issues in Russia, Yesterday and Today
• Brad Roberts: former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy: Ensuring a (Nuclear) Deterrence Strategy that is Effective for 21^st Century Challenges
• CISAC Co-Director David Relman: Doomsday Viruses

And lectures at CISAC’s Cybersecurity Boot Camp for senior congressional aids will also be videotaped and packaged for YouTube and online consumption later this year.

“We are excited to enter into this phase of experimentation to see what works, what doesn't, and how we can further CISAC's teaching mission both here at Stanford and around the world,” Zegart said.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, an "open borders" United States absorbed millions of European immigrants in one of the largest mass migrations ever. New research by Stanford economist Ran Abramitzky challenges the perception that immigrants lagged behind native-born Americans in job pay and career growth.
 

BY CLIFTON B. PARKER

European immigrants to America during the country's largest migration wave in the late 19th and early 20th centuries had earnings comparable to native-born Americans, contrary to the popular perception, according to new Stanford research.

"Our paper challenges conventional wisdom and prior research about immigrant assimilation during this period," said Ran Abramitzky, an associate professor of economics at Stanford, faculty affiliate of The Europe Center and author of the research paper in the Journal of Political Economy.

New research challenges conventional wisdom about immigrant assimilation during the bygone era of open borders and mass migration. Photo Credit: Lewis Hine/Library of Congress

New research challenges conventional wisdom about immigrant assimilation during the bygone era of open borders and mass migration.

Abramitzky and his colleagues found the average immigrant in that period did not face a substantial "earnings penalty" – lower pay than native-born workers – upon their arrival.

"The initial earnings penalty is overstated," said Abramitzky.

He said the conventional view is that the average European immigrants held substantially lower-paying jobs than native-born Americans upon first arrival and caught up with natives' earnings after spending some time in the United States. But that perception does not hold up to the facts, he said.

Abramitzky's co-authors include Leah Platt Boustan from the University of California, Los Angeles, and Katherine Eriksson from California Polytechnic State University.

The researchers examined records on 21,000 natives and immigrants from 16 European countries in U.S. Census Bureau data from 1900 to 1910 to 1920.

"Even when U.S. borders were open, the average immigrant who ended up settling in the United States over the long term held occupations that commanded pay similar to that of U.S. natives upon first arrival," Abramitzky said.

In that bygone era of "open borders," Abramitzky said, native-born Americans were concerned that immigrants were not assimilating properly into society – yet, on the whole, this concern appears to be unfounded. "Such concerns are echoed in today's debate over immigration policy," he added.

At the same time, Abramitzky said that immigrants from poorer countries started out with lower paid occupations relative to natives and did not manage to close this gap over time.

"This pattern casts doubt on the conventional view that, in the past, immigrants who arrived with few skills were able to invest in themselves and succeed in the U.S. economy within a single generation," Abramitzky and his colleagues wrote.

Age of migration

America took in more than 30 million immigrants during the Age of Mass Migration (1850-1913), a period when the country had open borders. By 1910, 22 percent of the U.S. labor force – and 38 percent of workers in non-southern cities – was foreign-born (compared with 17 percent today).

As the research showed, immigrants then were more likely than natives to settle in states with a high-paying mix of occupations. Location choice was an important strategy they used to achieve occupational parity with native-born Americans.

"This Age of Mass Migration not only is of interest in itself, as one of the largest migration waves in modern history, but also is informative about the process of immigrant assimilation in a world without migration restrictions," Abramitzky said.

Over time, many of the immigrants came from the poorer regions of southern and eastern Europe.

Abramitzky pointed out that native-born Americans in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were concerned about poverty in immigrant neighborhoods and low levels of education among children, many of whom left school early to work in industry.

Consequently, American political progressives championed a series of reforms, including U.S. child labor laws and compulsory schooling requirements.

Still, some natives believed that new arrivals would never fit into American society. And so, in 1924, Congress set a strict quota of 150,000 immigrant arrivals per year, with more slots allocated to immigrants from northern and western European countries than those from southern and eastern Europe.

But those early-20th-century fears of unassimilated immigrants were baseless, according to Abramitzky.

"Our results indicate that these concerns were unfounded: The average long-term immigrants in this era arrived with skills similar to those of natives and experienced identical rates of occupational upgrading over their life cycle," he wrote.

How does this lesson apply to today's immigration policy discussion? Should the numbers of immigrants and their countries of origin be limited and those with higher skills be given more entry slots?

Abramitzky said stereotyping immigrants has affected the political nature of the contemporary debate.

"These successful outcomes suggest that migration restrictions are not always necessary to ensure strong migrants' performance in the labor market," he said.

In this week's Politico, David Remnick has written a lengthy piece about former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul's rocky tenure in Moscow, as Vladir Putin came back into power as president and U.S.-Russia relations began to deteriorate.

Michael A. McFaul, a FSI senior fellow and CISAC affiliated faculty member, writes in this Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law that while the U.S. and Europe maintain pressure on Putin through sanctions, the West also needs to get serious about strengthening Ukraine.

"So far, Ukrainians have done more to thwart Mr. Putin than any action by outside powers," says McFaul. "The West can likewise do more to help the Kiev government win hearts and minds in eastern Ukraine."

And in a Politico magazine piece by McFaul earlier this week, he argues that Putin today sees a path to glory that does not involve democratic governance and ignores international norms.

"Putin dreams of comparisons with Peter the Great or the Catherine the Great," writes McFaul, who was ambassador in Moscow from January 2012 until this February, when he returned to Stanford as a political science professor at FSI's New Yorker.

"But if we judge him by his ability to achieve even his own stated goals, his record is not so great. He has achieved some objectives aimed at restoring Russia to the position of global greatness he believes it deserves, but failed at achieving those most important to him. And the future looks even darker."

Northeast Asia is a global center of economic dynamism, propelled by phenomenal growth in social and cultural interactions among the region's nations. Still, wounds from past wrongs, committed during times of colonialism and war, have not yet fully healed, and the question of history has become a highly contentious diplomatic issue. After one and a half years in office, the leaders of China and South Korea (Korea hereafter) still refuse to hold bilateral summits with their Japanese counterpart, largely due to disputes over the past. Questions about history touch on the most sensitive issues of national identity, making it very difficult for countries to compromise.

How should we understand and approach current historical tensions in Northeast Asia? Pessimists worry that the legacies of the past will persist and that there is not much we can do about it. Optimists believe that these issues will inevitably fade over time as the wartime generation passes away and the countries of the region become increasingly integrated economically and culturally.

Last summer, I had an opportunity to deliver a special lecture series at a Korean university. More than 30 students from China, Japan, Korea, the U.S. and Europe attended the lectures, which focused on problems related to the modern history of Northeast Asia and territorial disputes. I asked students whether they thought Japan had apologized for its past actions of aggression. Korean and Chinese students mostly replied that Japan had either "not apologized at all" or was "not sincere." In contrast, most Japanese students were hardly aware of the misfortunes of the past and the controversies about the government's stance.

The historical amnesia of Japanese students is most worrisome, but the insistence by Chinese and Korean students that the Japanese have not apologized at all is troubling, too. Although the definition of "apology" may vary depending on circumstances, it is undeniable that Japanese leaders, including prime ministers, have directly expressed regret about Japan's actions of aggression to Koreans and Chinese. Of course, legitimate doubts arise in Korea and China as to Japan's sincerity. More than once, a prime minister's apology has been undercut by the denial of wartime responsibility by his education minister, or by a subsequent visit by the prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine to Japan's war dead.

My teaching experience illustrates the danger posed by a crucial gap in perceptions. History does not merely narrate events or developments. In reconstructing the past, it is inevitable that certain parts are omitted or stressed, producing different views. Divided historical memories separate nations, resulting in distinct, often contradictory, perceptions. Those perceptions become deeply embedded in the public consciousness, transmitted to succeeding generations formally by education and informally through the arts, popular culture and mass media.

Time isn't a cure-all

Why have these nations developed distinct, and incomplete, memories of the wartime period?

One common answer is that Japan was an aggressor while China and Korea were victims, but this is too simplistic to explain the complexities of modern history and collective memory in Northeast Asia. Different events acquire disproportionate weight in the formation of each nation's historical consciousness. For China and Korea, Japanese acts of aggression -- such as the Nanjing Massacre or forced labor and sexual slavery -- constitute the most crucial elements. For Japan, events related to U.S. actions, such as the firebombings of Japanese cities or the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, are more important. Korea and China are a less significant element in Japan's memory, while Japan looms large in theirs.

Japan's focus on U.S. actions, over the sufferings of Koreans and Chinese, explains the country's historical amnesia and reluctance to come to terms with its Asian neighbors. Unlike Germany, postwar Japan developed a mythology of victimhood, shaped by the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the massive incendiary and atomic bombings of its cities. Victim consciousness provided fertile soil for the growth of postwar neo-nationalism that justified colonialism and war and denied Japan's responsibility for atrocities.

Balanced historical memory with a better understanding of the perspective of the other side is urgently needed. Japan needs to clearly comprehend the mindset of its neighbors, instead of complaining about its "apology fatigue." China and Korea are also responsible for educating their citizens about Japan's own struggle to come to terms with its past. That kind of mutual understanding rests on resuming efforts at joint historical study with a commitment to open-minded debate. Only then can the nations of Northeast Asia begin to narrow perception gaps and forge a shared view.

This is a task not only for governments but for civil society. We should encourage exchanges among young people from the three countries, including joint visits to historic sites such as the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and Seodaemun Prison History Museum in Seoul. Such gatherings would constitute a regionwide attempt to share and heal the pains of the past. Disregarding or ignoring dark events means not only evading historical accountability but also missing the opportunity to learn from history. Germany's failure to learn from its defeat in World War I led to the rise of Nazism and another world war. The German experience should provide a valuable lesson for all, especially Japan.

We cannot depend on time alone to heal these wounds. When issues of the past posed a stumbling block in improving relations between China and Japan in the 1970s, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said, "Because our generation is not wise enough to resolve all of the pending questions, let's leave the unsettled ones to the next generation." Contrary to his expectations, however, the two countries are stricken today with a worse situation involving history and territorial disputes, and the younger generation tends to be even more swayed by the fever of nationalism.

This is a moment of both danger and opportunity for Northeast Asia. The current impasse in regional relations demands a commitment to confronting the corrosive nationalism fed by the unresolved issues of history. As the wartime generation passes from the scene, they are called upon to leave behind a wiser generation capable of realizing the potential of Northeast Asia to be the center of the 21st century.

This article was originally carried by Nikkei Asian Review on 25 July and reposted with permission.