American adversaries such as Russia and China are using cyber-enabled deception operations to spread divisive messages. In 2016, Houston’s Islamic Da’wah Center became the site of two dueling protests, both of which began in online communities formed by a Kremlin-backed organization. Discovering and calling out specific disinformation campaigns can be difficult, but by increasing awareness that our adversaries are actively trying to inflame divisions in our society, we can begin to counter these insidious efforts.

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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine looks like a horrific Cold War throwback. Once again, a strongman rules in Moscow, Russian tanks are rolling across borders, and a democratic nation is fighting for its survival, street by street, day by day, armed with little more than Molotov cocktails and a fierce belief in freedom. For all the talk of emerging technologies and new threats, the violence in Ukraine feels raw and low-tech, and the world suddenly looks old again.

And yet, amid all these echoes of the past, Russia’s invasion has ushered in one development that is altogether new and could dramatically change geopolitics in the future: the real-time public disclosure of highly classified intelligence.

Read the rest at The Atlantic

As a scholar working in the field of nuclear disasters, I watched in horror as Russia tried to capture the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant—likely for strategic military purposes, or to control the country’s supply of energy. I became especially worried when shelling set part of the complex on fire and began to wonder if another nuclear catastrophe was out to happen. Many of these fears were echoed by Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, who claimed in a viral tweet that a potential disaster at the plant would be ten times larger than Chernobyl, which remains the biggest nuclear catastrophe to this day.

Read the rest at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 

As the evening ended, there was a moment when one of the Ukrainian students came to me to tell me that he was so sorry for #WhatsHappeningInMyanmar. I told him, “Thank you. I am sorry too. I can only imagine what you are going through.” In response he asked, “But you feel it, yeah?”

For a moment, we stood there, teared up, in silence. It was simply powerful. I felt understood. I felt the support. And this was all while I was trying my best to not make this about Myanmar and to give them space for their own grief and trauma. It was not empty words of sympathy. It was a shared moment.

This is why across-movement international solidarity is important. When you are in it together, when vocabulary falls short to describe the immense trauma you are going through, when you are far from home watching your home burn, it’s the tears, it’s the silence, it’s the tremor in your voice, it’s a hug — that reminds you are not alone.

Living By the Ideals of Democracy

In political science classes at Stanford, we talk a lot about the ideals of democracy and legitimacy, about sovereignty and independence. Ukrainians don’t just talk about these ideas— they live by them.

A week ago, Russia invaded my home, bringing war to a peaceful democracy. Since then, my days and nights have been full of fear. However, my experience as a Ukrainian living abroad doesn't compare to what my friends and family are going through back home. Even under the constant threat of enemy fire, they still manage to help — collecting humanitarian aid,organizing transportation, coordinating national and local volunteering networks.

This way of living did not begin this month. For centuries, my nation has fought heroically for our independence and distinct cultural identity: our people defended Ukrainian symbols in the face of repressions, broke free of the Soviet Union, and shook off dictators time and time again to re-establish our democracy. For the first time, the world sees our fight. You see us face devastation the post-WWII world vowed would never happen again. As Russians bomb cities —destroying kindergartens, hospitals, orphanages, and schools — you witness our resilience. You watch our people take to the streets and stand against the occupying forces trying to enter our cities, singing the national anthem and telling Russians to leave our land.
 

This time, our fight is global, and, Ukrainians abroad are united in the fight. In under a week, the Ukrainian community at Stanford has launched a Joint Statement on Russia's War Against Ukraine, obtaining more than 800 signatures so far. We created the StandWithUkraine website with resources in 15 languages on organizations accepting donations, volunteering opportunities, reliable information sources, and templates for political advocacy.

The broader Stanford community has inspired me with their support as well. I appreciated Prof. McFaul's event that brought Ukrainians and MIP students together, especially because it demonstrated the FSI's community's unique ability to help. I hope that this potential can result in concrete actions, including further advocacy, donations, and volunteering. As scholars who have devoted their lives to the study of democracy, your time to act is now: join the fight to save Ukraine and Europe.

Uniting Abroad and at Home

As students of international policy, it is easy to distance ourselves from conflicts around the world. We are taught to examine them analytically through an international relations lens, hypothesizing what might be motivating a leader like Putin, Xi, or Biden to act in a certain way. But having the chance to hear from Ukrainian students and leaders across the Stanford community bridged what we study in the classroom and read in the news with what is actually happening to families and friends on the ground.
 

Listening to their stories and learning how we can assist, as policy students and citizens, was a reminder that we are not powerless — public opinion and advocacy can push policymakers to stand up for democracy and against violations of sovereignty and human rights.

Unfortunately, there have been too many instances of unnecessary fighting and occupying of foreign land, including by my own country the United States. The international community has shown that it can unite and respond when a foreign state violates international laws and norms – and we must not forget this should future invasions occur anywhere around the world.

Doing All We Can

The tragedy that is unfolding in Ukraine hits especially close to home for me both physically and emotionally – even more so after hearing all the touching stories of our Ukrainian friends at professor McFaul’s house.

I am from Estonia, another country unlucky enough to have an aggressive Russia as a neighbor. Should Putin meet any success in Ukraine, my homeland very well may be picked as the next target. Ironically enough, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has only made NATO stronger, and as a member of the alliance, we should feel safe. But I also cannot overlook the irony and am even ashamed that the cost of NATO unity seems to be the complete destruction of Ukraine, who is essentially doing the fighting for all of us. Thousands of Ukrainian lives have ended, and millions will be emotionally damaged forever.

Emotionally, witnessing the thousands of casualties on both sides as a result of one man’s idea of a parallel universe and disregard of human life is heartbreaking. I also fear we are on the verge of making the same mistakes we have already made in the past. While the West has already done a lot to help Ukraine, are we doing enough? In a few months, after potentially thousands more innocent people have been massacred, will we be able to look our Ukrainian friends in the eyes and truly say we did all we could? As of now, it seems like the answer is no.
 

We are dealing with consequences, not the cause. While it is controversial to advocate for NATO to get directly militarily involved for the defense of Ukraine, there is a good chance that if we don’t intervene now, we will have to do so at a much higher cost in the future. The risk is huge, given Russia’s nuclear arsenal. In that line of thought, my own Estonia would probably be among the first targets, should a NATO-Russia war break out.

But in moments like this, it is important to have a higher risk tolerance than in times of peace. We are past the diplomatic appeasement period. The Russian Army is not the mighty creature it was portrayed to be and can be defeated. But for that to happen, we must all stand up to it, and support the conditions for the Russian population to stand up and reclaim their country from the dictator. There is no more peace in Europe, and peace elsewhere will also not last if Putin is not stopped now. My heart is broken for Ukraine already. I do not want it to be broken again for Estonia or Latvia, or for Germany and France.

As an international policy student and as a citizen of the free world, I invite all Western decision-makers to ask themselves this: when Ukraine may be in complete rubbles, when a ruthless dictator has gotten his way at the cost of an entire nation and is hungry for more, when the history books are written, will I be able to comfortably say that I did everything I could to prevent it? If the answer is no, then it’s time to get back to work. Long live free Ukraine!

This essay was originally published in Foreign Affairs magazine.

But the United States and its allies could do more to punish Russia. They could bar all transactions with Russia, whether trade or financial. They could seize all Russian assets within their jurisdictions. Washington could announce secondary sanctions on anyone using U.S. dollars for any transaction with Russia. Most important, the United States could use these and other measures to prevent Russia from exporting oil and gas. Letting Russia continue to export oil and gas would be like letting China sell consumer electronics even after it had taken Taiwan by force.

If the United States and its allies have been cautious in their response to Russia, they are likely to be even more restrained when responding to China — and Beijing knows it. China’s ability to retaliate against the West with economic sanctions of its own is much greater than Russia’s. Singapore, which announced trade and banking restrictions against Moscow, trades about $2.5 billion worth of goods with Russia each year — but $57 billion worth of goods with China. China’s leaders likely do not fear U.S.-led economic sanctions in the event of a Taiwan takeover because they probably think that China’s own productive capacity, resources, and friendly partners will allow them to survive on their own, especially since China will soon be the world’s largest economy. They are probably right. China could absorb the types of sanctions being imposed on Russia. And given China’s ability to inflict pain on Western countries, any measures levied against Beijing would likely be softer than those imposed on Moscow.

Taiwan Is Not Ukraine

The Western military response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have an even smaller impact than sanctions on China’s thinking about Taiwan. True, neither the United States nor NATO has deployed troops to fight on Ukraine’s behalf. And U.S. military assistance to Ukraine has been modest: late last month, President Joe Biden instructed the State Department to release up to an additional $350 million worth of weapons from U.S. stocks to Ukraine.

But Russia would have to invade a NATO ally without provoking a U.S. military response for Chinese leaders to seriously question Washington’s commitment to defending Taiwan. Biden has made clear from the beginning of the crisis that his administration will never send troops to Ukraine—a stark contrast with his rhetoric on Taiwan. Just last week, Biden stated unequivocally that the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. As a show of support, he also sent to the island a delegation of former U.S. officials led by Mike Mullen, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In any case, Chinese planners largely assume the United States would intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan. What some of them question is whether the United States could amass enough forces fast enough to blunt a Chinese assault on the island. Ironically, if the United States had launched a military operation in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Chinese leaders would have had further reason to question Washington’s ability to thwart a Chinese assault on Taiwan. The United States does not have the resources to fight the Russians in Europe and prepare adequately for a great-power war in Asia.  

Of course, these facts have not prevented China from trying to manipulate the narrative to undermine Taiwan’s resolve. Chinese state media has been flush with stories about how the United States did not come to Ukraine’s aid and therefore won’t come to Taiwan’s either. Like much of what appears on Chinese state media, however, these stories reflect what Chinese leaders want the world to believe—not what they believe themselves.

Not the Right Time

Chinese leaders are without a doubt considering an attack on Taiwan, but now is not the right time. China’s military is still honing the capabilities it would need to take and hold the island. And Xi is unlikely to take a dangerous gamble on Taiwan before the next Party Congress in late 2022, when he is widely expected to secure a third term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi is also working hard to lessen China’s technological dependence on the West, thus minimizing the impact on any further decoupling after a possible war. For all these reasons, an assault on Taiwan before 2025 is unlikely.

If anything, the crisis in Ukraine creates an additional incentive for China to wait. Beijing does not want the world to equate the two scenarios. From China’s perspective, Ukraine is an independent country engaged in a border dispute with Russia. Taiwan, by contrast, “has always been an inalienable part of China’s territory,” as China’s ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Deng Xijun, put it late last month. In other words, linking the two issues would undermine China’s claim to the island.

China also understands that moving against Taiwan now would solidify fears in the West of an axis of autocrats. The United States may not have the resolve to fight a protracted war to defend Taiwan. But suddenly faced with a need to defend freedom and democracy against an authoritarian alliance, Washington could muster a greater military response and convince its allies to do the same. Partly for this reason, China has desperately tried to maintain some semblance of neutrality during the Ukrainian crisis.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has certainly changed aspects of the international order. It has rallied European countries against Russia, prompted Germany to increase defense spending, and even convinced historically neutral countries such as Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland to take a stance against Moscow. From China’s perspective, however, nothing Russia or its adversaries have done meaningfully alters the calculus on Taiwan.