The International Control of Atomic Energy, 1945-46: Why Did It Fail? Are There Lessons to be Learned for Today?
David Holloway (speaker) is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, a professor of political science, and an FSI senior fellow. He was co-director of CISAC from 1991 to 1997, and director of FSI from 1998 to 2003. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994) was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986 -- first as a professor of political science and later (in 1996) as a professor of history as well -- Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). Before coming to Stanford, he taught at the University of Lancaster (1967-1970) and the University of Edinburgh (1970-1986). Born in Dublin, Ireland, he received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his PhD in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University.
Michael May (discussant) is Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He is the former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, having served seven years in that capacity through January 2000. May is a director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he worked from 1952 to 1988. He served as director of the Laboratory from 1965 to 1971. May was a technical adviser to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty negotiating team; a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and at various times has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the General Advisory Committee to the AEC, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the RAND Corporation Board of Trustees, and the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences. May received the Distinguished Public Service and Distinguished Civilian Service Medals from the Department of Defense, and the Ernest Orlando Lawrence Award from the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as other awards. His current research interests are in the area of nuclear and terrorism, energy, security and environment, and the relation of nuclear weapons and foreign policy.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
David Holloway
CISAC
Stanford University
Encina Hall, E214
Stanford, CA 94305-6165
David Holloway is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, a professor of political science, and an FSI senior fellow. He was co-director of CISAC from 1991 to 1997, and director of FSI from 1998 to 2003. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994) was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. It has been translated into seven languages, most recently into Chinese. The Chinese translation is due to be published later in 2018. Holloway also wrote The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (1983) and co-authored The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment (1984). He has contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals.
Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986 -- first as a professor of political science and later (in 1996) as a professor of history as well -- Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). Before coming to Stanford, he taught at the University of Lancaster (1967-1970) and the University of Edinburgh (1970-1986). Born in Dublin, Ireland, he received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his PhD in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University.
Assessing Social Support for Suicide Bombing
Giacomo Chiozza (speaker) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Travers Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He holds a PhD from Duke University and a BA from the Università degli Studi di Milano. Before joining the Berkeley Political Science department, he was a post-doctoral fellow in national security at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. His research interests include the study of foreign perceptions of the United States in the American World Order and the quantitative analysis of conflict processes. He is the author of "A Crisis like No Other? Anti-Americanism at the Time of the Iraq War" (European Journal of International Relations, forthcoming); "Disaggregating Anti-Americanism: An Analysis of Individual Attitudes Towards the United States" (In Keohane and Katzenstein, Anti-Americanisms in World Politics, 2007), as well as of articles on leaders and conflict processes that were published in the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and the Journal of Peace Research.
Aila Matanock (discussant) is a doctoral student in political science at Stanford. She received an undergraduate degree magna cum laude in Social Studies from Harvard University, while working with the Belfer Center’s Managing the Atom Project and with the Los Alamos National Laboratory. After graduation, she took a job at the RAND Corporation as a research assistant where she analyzed projects on terrorism and nuclear weapons. Her current research is on social support for terrorism, the effect of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict, and the reasons for varying levels of shared sovereignty in international agreements.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Poland in an Integrated Europe: Perspectives for sustainable development, greater innovation and strategic partnership in the globalized economy
Economic security, sustainable development, clean energy and energy security, better regulations, greater innovativeness and the growing share of Polish economy in the international market; these are the main priorities of the Polish government and Ministry of Economy. How is Poland going to handle the 21st Century challenges? How will Poland find its niche in the globalized economy? These are the questions that will be discussed by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, Mr. Waldemar Pawlak.
Born in 1959, Mr. Waldemar Pawlak graduated from the Warsaw University of Technology with an engineering degree in automotive and construction machinery. He has served as a member of the Polish Parliament since 1989; as President of the board of the Warsaw Commodities Exchange from 2001 to 2005; as Prime Minister of Poland in 1992 and again in 1993 to 1995; and as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy of Poland since November 2007.
This seminar is jointly sponsored by the Forum on Contemporary Europe, the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, the U.S.-Polish Trade Council, and the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Los Angeles.
Oksenberg Conference Room
Everything You Wanted to Know about Writing for <i>International Security</i>
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Is America Sill a Free Country?
Mr. Melia was Associate Director of the Free Trade Union Institute of the AFL-CIO (1986 to 1988). Prior to that he served for six years as Legislative Assistant for foreign and defense policy to U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY). Thomas Melia received his M.A. in Africa Studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.
CISAC Conference Room
Safeguarding Uranium Enrichment Facilities
Nuclear energy production today and in the near future will still be dominated by light-water reactors and therefore there will be a continued need for uranium enrichment. There is currently a focused attention on gas centrifuge enrichment. Gas centrifuge technology is much cheaper and efficient, but also poses a greater security concern, than the former gas diffusion technology.
In order to address the increased security concerns, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is planning and implementing strengthened safeguards procedures involving an increased reliance on continuous and remote monitoring technologies, and environmental sampling. The IAEA is also promoting multilateral enrichment centers as an additional avenue to enhance international security. Much of the current enrichment industry today already involves international partnerships such as between the US and European companies, or the tripartite agreement between Russia, China and the IAEA.
In order for safeguards and multilateral approaches to be viable and effective, they need to be accepted by industry, operators, states and the regulatory agencies. This talk will address how strengthened safeguards could be implemented while accommodating potentially conflicting interests such as: the protection of proprietary information, transparency in monitoring, applicability in multilateral arrangements, cost-effectiveness, and the ultimate goal of ensuring that enrichment activities remain peaceful.
Elena Rodriguez-Vieitez is a postdoctoral science fellow at CISAC, Stanford. Her research concerns proliferation risks associated with the global expansion of nuclear power. She received her PhD in nuclear engineering at the University of California, Berkeley. Her dissertation focused on nuclear physics experimental work conducted at cyclotron facilities at the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab and Michigan State University, where she analyzed nuclear structure and fragmentation reaction data of neutron-rich unstable nuclei. As a nuclear engineering graduate student, she collaborated on a Department of Energy research project on radioactive waste transmutation in molten-salt reactors, where she modeled actinide transmutation efficiency and evaluated proliferation and environmental risks. As a graduate student, Rodriguez-Vieitez was also a research associate on public policy and nuclear threats at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. Prior to her PhD studies, she was an intern at the National Academy of Sciences' Board on Radioactive Waste Management in Washington, DC.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Sneider: Cautionary lessons for U.S.-Korea relationship
After several days of meetings in Seoul, most importantly with President-elect Lee Myeong-bak and his senior advisors, we came away convinced that our hopes for a “new beginning” were more than justified. As President Lee takes office, it is clear that his administration is deeply committed to restoring the alliance to its previous place as the foundation of Korean foreign and security policy. Equally important, the new government is focused on the need to boost economic growth based on the free flow of trade and investment, and sees the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States as central to that goal.
For those of us who have long argued that a vibrant Korea is vital to America’s interests, these were welcome words. It is no secret that there was a perception in the United States that President Roh Moo-hyun, backed by a significant portion of the Korean people, no longer saw the alliance as a strategic imperative for Korea. Unfortunately, many Americans, particularly in Congress, had begun to share this view of the alliance, fueled by a mistaken belief that Koreans were “anti-American.”
This view of President Roh and of Korea was unfair and even distorted. President Roh deserves credit, particularly in the last two years, for taking important steps to improve alliance relations, not least his promotion of the negotiation of the FTA. He made unpopular decisions, such as the dispatch of troops to Iraq, in order to preserve a cooperative atmosphere. And as we saw demonstrated in the election, public opinion in Korea regarding the United States has shifted dramatically since the emotional days of 2002.
The Lee administration can anticipate a warm greeting in Washington, as is already clear in the preparations for his visit next month. The new President has sounded all the right notes – seeking closer cooperation on North Korea policy, restoring positive ties with Japan, America’s other vital ally in Northeast Asia, and building a broader strategic partnership with the U.S. beyond the Korean peninsula.
Amidst the renewed embrace of the alliance, it is worth however keeping a few cautionary lessons from the past in mind:
1. Not everything will be Smooth Sailing
Despite the welcome official rhetoric, it is no secret that the relationship between the United States and the Republic of Korea has never been entirely smooth. From its earliest days, born out of Korea’s liberation and the trials of the Korean War, the alliance has been marked by both close cooperation and by clashes over key policy goals. While bound together by strategic necessity, the national interests of Korea and the United States have not always been identical.
There is nothing unusual about such differences among allies. Look for example at the tensions that plagued U.S.-European relations over the disastrous decision to invade Iraq. Even with the best of intentions, there will be moments of conflict between Seoul and Washington. What is important is how governments manage those differences to protect the underlying relationship. Both Koreans and Americans need to remember the virtues of quiet diplomacy, trying to avoid negotiating their differences through the media.
2. All politics is local
Alliance relations can no longer be managed solely by diplomats or by friends meeting behind closed doors. Those ties are crucial but both Korea and the United States are democracies in which the issues that are at the core of the relationship – from trade to the alignment of military forces – are matters of public discussion. Domestic politics shapes policy decisions but both Koreans and Americans sometimes forget the pressures operating on the other side.
This is particularly important in an election year. The Korean National Assembly election in April is already having an impact, delaying ratification of the FTA. The U.S. election will mean FTA ratification by the U.S. Congress this year may be impossible. Presidential candidates are taking positions that they may adjust after gaining power. On another level, the new government in Seoul needs to remember that the Bush administration is a lame duck affair and begin to prepare for a new government in Washington.
3. Expect the Unexpected, particularly with North Korea
The limited progress on the nuclear negotiations with North Korea has temporarily brought closer coordination between Korea and the US. But it would be foolish to assume that this trend will necessarily continue. The negotiations are already facing a slowdown as negotiators grapple with much tougher problems. If they break down, both Seoul and Washington, along with their other partners in the 6-party talks, will face some hard questions about how to respond. Any attempt to pressure Pyongyang is likely to bring an escalatory response, not least to test the new government in Seoul.
It is possible that Seoul and Washington will once again be somewhat out of synch. Ironically, the Bush administration – and whatever follows it -- may favor greater concessions than the new administration in Seoul would prefer to make.
These differences are manageable. The key is real policy coordination between the US and Korea – and the inclusion of Japan in a revived trilateral coordination mechanism. If both sides keep that commitment, we will indeed have made a “new beginning” in our alliance.
Daniel Sneider is the Associate Director for Research at Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. A former foreign correspondent, Sneider covered Korea for the Christian Science Monitor.
Why Nuclear Disarmament Matters
CISAC Conference Room
Regional Challenges: A Romanian Perspective
His speech will address the new challenges facing Southeastern Europe and the ways in which Romania will contribute to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Jointly sponsored by the Hoover Institution, the Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, and the Forum on Contemporary Europe at Stanford University.
Lou Henry Hoover Building
Room 100
Stanford University