In this paper, Marinov draws on the experience of the European Union (EU) to ask under what conditions economic integration furthers democratization. Scholars agree that incentives at the European level have helped democratic transitions in Southern and Eastern Europe. However, there is no agreement on (i) the exact causal mechanisms involved, (ii) the relative size of the effects, (iii) whether this success can be replicated outside or Europe. He addresses these issues by offering a theory of how integration furthers democratization. He argues economic integration can help citizens resolve the coordination dilemmas they face in holding their rulers accountable. Integration works in two ways: (a) through diffusion of civic culture, it enables citizens to second-guess each other's likely actions in the event of government abuse, (b) through credible conditionality, integration removes the ability of the ruler to lean on some support coalitions while abusing others. An empirical test of the theory strongly confirms that economic integration leads to democracy when its culture-spreading aspect is strongly backed by conditionality. An important aspects of the theory is that it generalizes. The theory and evidence suggest that there are substantial unexploited opportunities for encouraging democracy in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

This paper presents an instituion - the COmmunity Responsibility System (CRS) - which constitutes a missing link in our understanding of market development. It highlights the importance of contract enforcement institutions combining reputational and legal mechanisms in the rise of modern markets. Throughout pre-modern Europe, the CRS provided the contract enforcement required for intercommunity impersonal exchange characterized by separation between the quid and the quo over time and space. It induced communities to care about their collective reputation and motivated their partial courts to provide partial justice. Collective responsibility, which supports micro-lending in developing countries, was a central component of the European developmental process. The CRS contributed to teh endogenous institutional dynamic that led to the development of an intra-state centralized legal system based on personal legal responsibility that is currently the norm. This development supports the view that long-distance trade impacts economic growth through its influence on intra-state institutional development.

Why is there so much alleged electoral fraud in new democracies? Most scholarship focuses on the proximate cause of electoral competition. This article proposes a different answer by constructing and analyzing an original dataset drawn from the German parliament’s own voluminous record of election disputes for every parliamentary election in the life of Imperial Germany (1871-1912) after its adoption of universal male suffrage in 1871. The article analyzes the election of over 5,000 parliamentary seats to identify where and why elections were disputed as a result of “election misconduct.” The empirical analysis demonstrates that electoral fraud’s incidence is significantly related to a society’s level of inequality in landholding, a major source of wealth, power, and prestige in this period. After weighing the importance of two different causal mechanisms, the article concludes that socio-economic inequality, by making new democratic institutions endogenous to preexisting social power, can be a major and underappreciated barrier to democratization even after the adoption of formally democratic rules.

The republican tradition continues to frame French debates on empire, as it has done since the Revolution. French republicanism and Anglophone liberalism have shared numerous features in relation to empire: both are egalitarian traditions of moral universalism, and both uphold an ideal of political emancipation that has tended to entail assimilation to a European political model. This paper explores the course of French debates over empire from the period of Napoleon through the July Monarchy — the broader context for the thought of the iconic liberal republicans Constant and Tocqueville — with particular attention to the ways in which liberal and republican registers were deployed in both support and critique of empire, and to how the articulation of liberal and republican agendas in France was affected by the Algeria conquest. It also discusses the first Algerian contribution to French public deliberation about the conquest, Hamdan Khodja’s 1833 text Le Miroir, a work that self-consciously inhabited both a liberal cosmopolitan and a Muslim perspective and that was nearly alone in French debates in making a principled argument for Algerian.

On May 10-11, 2010 the Program on Good Governance and Political Reform in the Arab World at CDDRL held its international inaugural conference. In line with the Arab Reform Program's vision, the conference featured internationally renowned scholars, activists, and practitioners from the Arab world, Europe and the United States. Over the two days, conference participants engaged in multidisciplinary debates addressing hard politics as well as soft politics, and analyzing political reform from different angles, with panels on the economy, state systems, the media, civil society, political opposition, youth politics, and the role of international actors. Problems facing political reform in the Arab world today were discussed and scrutinized, as were possible paths forward. The conference debates unearthed the need for a deep understanding of the problems facing political reform in the region that is driven by an analysis of long-term and often ignored issues that are at the core of political developments. The debates also highlighted that problems and prospects for reform are different in each Arab country because each country has its own unique set of issues and because within each country different ethnic groups, classes, and locales have different takes on and stakes in political developments. The conference closed with a speech by Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim.

The Program on Arab Reform and Democracy at CDDRL is pleased to announce a one-day conference to be held on Friday April 29, 2011, entitled, "Democratic Transition in Egypt." This event, co-sponsored by the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies at Stanford University, will focus on Egypt's current revolutionary period, to examine this pivotal moment in Egypt's political history and prospects for future reform. The conference brings to Stanford leading Egypt academics from American, European, and Egyptian universities and think tanks.  Panels will examine the background to the revolution, discuss the role of oppositions parties and civil society, and forecast Egypt's political future.

Early in the Supreme Court oral arguments in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Justice Kennedy alerted the plaintiffs' lawyer that, for him, "the case turns on this:... 'No other nation in the world permits its court to exercise universal civil jurisdiction over alleged extraterritorial human rights abuses to which the nation has no connection." That statement, quoting an amicus brief filed for one of the defendants, is true when taken literally, but is misleading inasmuch as it fails to take into account that analogous suits are allowed in teh civil-law world of Continental Europe if one knows how to go beyond the literal, as transposing from one legal system into another requies. Universal jurisdiction for jus cogens violations has found a fooring in the criminal law of civilian States for reasons tied to deep systemic attributes not shared by the United States legal order.