Nuclear policy
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Young-ju Choi joins the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center as a visiting scholar during the 2016-2017 academic year.  Her research interests are focused on North Korea and Northeast Aisa regional dynamics and the prospective changes of Korea-US relationship post US presidential election this year. She is also currently researching how the Korean mass media is shaping views on Korea’s presidential scandal. Young-ju is an anchor and a journalist at YTN, the first 24-hour news agency in South Korea. In her trademark casual and confident style, Young-ju has anchored all the contemporary major breaking news that have unfolded across the globe. Young-ju also covered a number of stories ranging from domestic politics, international affairs, including the Korean Peninsula issues and Northeast Asia political dynamics.  Young-ju graduated with honors from Seoul National University where she obtained a bachelor's degree in Geography. She enjoys traveling all over the globe and enjoys swimming, scuba diving and golf.
Visiting Scholar
616 Serra StreetEncina Hall E301Stanford, CA94305-6055
(650) 723-6530
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Taeho Kim joins Shorenstein APARC as a Visiting Scholar during 2016-2017 academic year.

Kim's research interest is in South Korea's national security issues and preparation for reunification of the Korean Peninsula. He was a National Assembly Member from 2011 to 2016 and governor of South Gyeongsang Province from 2004 to 2010 in Korea. He holds a BA and an MA in agricultural education, and a PhD in education from Seoul National University

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North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test in the wake of the G20 summit earlier this month. The United States immediately condemned North Korea’s behavior in a statement delivered by the White House, and a few days later, flew a set of bombers near the U.S. military base in Osan, South Korea.

Writing for Toyo KeizaiDaniel Sneider, associate director for research at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, said a consistent strategic and military reasoning drives the North Korean regime’s decision to test nuclear missiles. His analysis piece can be viewed in English and Japanese.

Sneider also spoke with Slate about how the next U.S. administration could respond, suggesting that a deployment of additional nuclear-capable aircraft at U.S. bases in Asia would send a strong signal to Pyongyang. The Slate article is available at this link.

South Korea has been seeking stronger international sanctions against North Korea since the test. As the country’s biggest trading partner, China is considered an important actor in the ability to influence North Korea. In the Korea Times, Sneider said a way to motivate China to augment their role in sanctions against North Korea is to remind Beijing that a continuation of North Korea's nuclear program would only lead to greater scale and capability of American military presence in the region. The Korea Times article is available at this link.

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A television shows breaking news about North Korea's long-range rocket launch in February 2016, Seoul, South Korea.
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Abstract: Deterrence is one of the most central concepts in international relations scholarship. Countries can dissuade changes to the status quo, according to the logic of deterrence, by threatening an opponent with pain (deterrence by punishment) or by reducing the probability that an opponent will achieve its aims (deterrence by denial). In the realm of international security, most deterrence theorists assume that states need military capabilities to deter by punishment or denial. Deterrence works, based on this line of thinking, because states can use military power to destroy cities, bomb critical military targets, or blunt land invasions. It is also possible, however, to punish an adversary without invoking destruction militarily. Yet deterrence through non-military means remains poorly understood in international relations. This project develops a theory to identify the conditions under which countries can deter opponents without using threats of military force. I explore the implications of this theory in one particular context: the development of dual-use nuclear technology. Having the capability to build nuclear weapons — a condition known as “nuclear latency” — may provide countries with deterrence benefits that we normally associate with having a nuclear arsenal. When states achieve nuclear latency, they (implicitly) threaten to develop nuclear weapons at some point in the future. The threat here is to pursue a policy that others would find undesirable, not to physically destroy things of value on another state’s territory, as in traditional deterrence theory. Does this kind of threat discourage others from meddling in a country’s affairs? This study presents the results of an analysis designed to identify the effects of nuclear latency (and nuclear arsenals) on the onset of international conflict from 1945 to 2000, drawing on a new dataset of sensitive dual-use nuclear plants in 32 countries.

About the Speaker: Matthew Fuhrmann is an associate professor of political science and Ray A. Rothrock `77 Fellow at Texas A&M University. He was named an Andrew Carnegie Fellow in 2016 by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. He is the author of Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity (Cornell University Press, 2012) and the coauthor of Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge University Press, 2016). His work has been published or is forthcoming in peer-reviewed journals such as American Journal of Political ScienceBritish Journal of Political ScienceInternational OrganizationInternational SecurityInternational Studies QuarterlyJournal of Conflict ResolutionJournal of Peace Research, and Journal of Politics. He has also written opinion pieces for The Atlantic (online), The Christian Science MonitorSlate, and USA Today. He is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. You can follow him on Twitter @mcfuhrmann.

Encina Hall, 2nd floor

Visiting Associate Professor CISAC
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With nuclear policy an increasingly serious issue in the world today, a Stanford scholar suggests in a newly published paper that the U.S. presidential candidates explain their viewpoints on these topics to the American people.

The journal article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists includes six questions on nuclear terrorism, proliferation, weapons policy and energy developed by Siegfried Hecker, a nuclear scientist and senior fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Hecker served as a director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory before coming to Stanford. He is a world-renowned expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction and nuclear security. Hecker suggests that journalists and the public ask the candidates for the U.S. presidency the following questions:

• "Do you believe that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats facing the United States, and, if so, what will you do to invigorate international cooperation to prevent it?

• How will you attempt to roll back North Korea’s increasingly threatening and destabilizing nuclear weapon program?

• Will you continue to support the (Iranian nuclear) deal and, if so, how will you work with Iran, quell dissent among our allies in the region, and answer criticism here at home?

• Do you plan to continue building a strategic partnership with India, and, if so, how will you reassure Pakistan that the U.S. insistence on nuclear restraint in South Asia includes not just Pakistan, but India as well?

• Will you continue to push for a reduced role for nuclear weapons in U.S. defense policy? If so, will you promote further nuclear arms reductions and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? And if Russia and China stay their current course, how will you deal with US nuclear modernization, and how will you reassure America’s allies?

• What are your plans for the domestic nuclear power industry and for the role the United States will play in this sector internationally?"

In his article, Hecker describes the context surrounding many of these questions. For example, he noted that the alarming acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal in the last six years indicates that the current U.S. policy approach to that country needs to be revisited.

Also, Hecker points out the complexity of the current nuclear arms situation worldwide. Both Russia and China have expanded their nuclear systems and are pursuing a more aggressive foreign policy. On the other hand, every president of the post-Cold War era has reduced U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons for its national security.

 

 

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A Chinese-made Hongqi-2 missile on display at the Military Museum in Beijing in 2011. China then announced a double-digit increase in its secretive military budget.
FREDERIC J. BROWN/AFP/Getty Images
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Siegfried S. Hecker
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Stanford nuclear scientist and CISAC senior fellow Siegfried S. Hecker explains in this article in 38 North why North Korea's recent nuclear test is "deeply alarming" and what Washington's possible policy options are going forward. An excerpted passage is below:

 

On September 9, 2016, seismic stations around the world picked up the unmistakable signals of another North Korean underground nuclear test in the vicinity of Punggye-ri. The technical details about the test will be sorted out over the next few weeks, but the political message is already loud and clear: North Korea will continue to expand its dangerous nuclear arsenal so long as Washington stays on its current path.

 

Preliminary indications are that the test registered at 5.2 to 5.3 on the Richter scale, which translates to an explosion yield of approximately 15 to 20 kilotons, possibly twice the magnitude of the largest previous test. It appears to have been conducted in the same network of tunnels as the last three tests, just buried deeper into the mountain. This was the fifth known North Korean nuclear explosion; the second this year, and the third since Kim Jong Un took over the country’s leadership in December 2011. Continue reading

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People watch a news report on North Korea's first hydrogen bomb test at a railroad station in Seoul on January 6, 2016.
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Abstract: All nations that have selected a strategy for the long-term management of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel have opted for disposal in a deep-mined, geologic repository.  Choosing a site for such a facility has been problematic.  Of the two dozen efforts that have been undertaken in the United States and abroad over the last half decade, only six remain on track, and only three have reached what appears to be a stable outcome.  Typically, a country organizes its waste management program to compare at least two sites before making a final choice.  All those sites must be shown to be technically suitable based on predetermined criteria.  For countries like the United States, which can site a repository in a variety of host geologic formations, these criteria are generic in nature.  Basing a siting decision on generic criteria especially requires the exercise of discretion.  This circumstance produces tough dilemmas that may be quite difficult to overcome credibly.

About the Speaker: Dr. Metlay is a member of the Senior Professional Staff of the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board (NWTRB).  He received his Bachelor of Science degrees from Caltech in molecular biology and medieval history and his Masters and Doctoral degrees in public policy from the University of California, Berkeley.  He taught political science at Indiana University and MIT.  Dr. Metlay has authored numerous publications dealing with technology policy, regulation, organization behavior, and radioactive waste.  He has worked in the Carter White House and with the Secretary of Energy on radioactive waste issues.  Dr. Metlay has testified before Congress and several state legislative committees.

The dilemma of multiple choices: Comparing the technical suitability of sites for a deep-mined, geologic repository for high-activity radioactive waste
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Encina Hall, 2nd floor

Daniel Metlay Senior staff member U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board
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Scott D. Sagan
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Jeffrey Lewis and Scott Sagan discuss President Obama’s consideration of adopting a policy of No-First-Use of nuclear weapons, stating that “While we think that such a pledge would ultimately strengthen U.S. security, we believe it should be adopted only after detailed military planning and after close consultation with key allies, tasks that will fall to the next administration.”
 
The authors argue that the U.S. should instead apply a "nuclear necessity principle" derived from just war doctrine.  Sagan and Lewis propose that the Obama Administration declare that “the United States will not use nuclear weapons against any target that could be reliably destroyed by conventional means.”
 
To read the op-ed, published in The Washington Post, click here.
 
To view a video by The Wall Street Journal, featuring Scott Sagan, about the pros and cons of a U.S. nuclear No-First-Use policy, click here.
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President Obama Participates In The Nuclear Security Summit
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In 2014 Ambassador Stephen W. Bosworth was a Payne Distinguished Lecturer at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) in the Freeman Spogli Institute (FSI) of International Studies at Stanford University. Bosworth, who passed away in January 2016, was a three-time U.S. ambassador, served in numerous academic and government posts, and had an extensive career in the United States Foreign Service.
 
To commemorate his career in public service as well as his contributions to the center and to FSI, Shorenstein APARC has published his three lectures in this book. The content ranges from Bosworth's diplomatic career and his thoughts on the promotion of democracy, to the North Korean nuclear issue, to the overall state of the U.S. alliances in Asia.
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Stephen W. Bosworth
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978-1-931368-44-5
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