This report summarizes analytical work completed on the Trident SLBM nuclear weapons safety issue. First, we evaluated the increase in low levels of risk of death from cancer from potential plutonium dispersal accidents at the Trident base at Kings Bay, Georgia. Specifically, we estimated the number of latent cancer fatalities resulting from a hypothetical worst-case accident involving a 10-kilogram release of weapons-grade plutonium aerosol at Kings Bay with the wind direction toward downtown Jacksonville, located 55 kilometers away. The estimated number of long-term cancer deaths ranges from 5 to 3300 and depends on a number of factors and assumptions including deposition velocity, wind speed and direction, the nature of the plume, and mixing layer height.
Second, we applied a simple, "back ofthe envelope" risk-analytic approach to the Trident safety problem to try to shed some light on the key question: How much should be spent on safety modifications for Trident? Depending on a variety of assumptions and value judgments, our analysis suggests that if one believes that the probability of a serious accident over the 30-year Trident program lifetime is of order 0.01 to 0.10, then an expenditure of $1-5 billion to increase safety is not unwarranted given reasonable estimates of the consequences of such an accident.
The end of the Cold War creates both new challenges and new opportunities for improving nuclear weapons safety. Several post Cold War developments are likely to have negative effects on the safety of existing nuclear weapons arsenals. These potentially dangerous trends include an apparent decline of morale in the laboratories and military organizations responsible for weapons safety, the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons to new states, the likely discontinuation of nuclear testing for safety related purposes, and the introduction of new nuclear weapons operations, including large-scale warhead dismantlement and the relocation and long-term storage of large numbers of nuclear weapons.
In an effort to explore such challenges and opportunities, a NATO Advanced Research Workshop was held in Oxford, England from August 25th through 27th, 1994. The workshop produced seven specific proposals for consideration to increase nuclear weapons safety and security. The proposals represent a summary of the points discussed at the workshop and are not intended to imply complete consensus of all participants.
A solution to the nuclear dilemma has eluded mankind since the creation of nuclear weapons. A visionary attempt by the United States to eliminate the threat at the beginning of the nuclear age (the "Baruch Plan" for the international control of atomic energy) fell victim to the Cold War. However, in this new geopolitical era, the UN Security Council finally has the opportunity to function as its founders intended, and it may now be appropriate to reconsider the idea of a security regime that would bring all nuclear weapons under international control.
The internationalization of nuclear security would have to be implemented over a number of years through a systematic step-by-step process. This paper suggests the following three-phase approach: in Phase I, a new international security regime would be established; in Phase II, a UN-owned international nuclear deterrent force (INDF) would be created; and finally, in Phase III, all national nuclear arsenals would be eliminated in favor of the INDF.
Although may problems face international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries in the years ahead, none is more important than gaining a lengthy extension of the non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Action on extension will be taken by majority vote of the over 160 parties at a conference called to consider this question in 1995. This paper will consider why a lengthy extension of the NPT is important; what options for, and obstacles to, extension exist and what the NPT's strongest supporters can offer the NPT members who are skeptical about a long extension in order to win their votes.
The prevention of nuclear proliferation is intimately related to stringent restraints on the supply of fissionable material available for weapons. We review the practices of the United States in providing security and control of bomb-grade material and the problems that have been encountered. We then consider the challenges to security and control of nuclear weapons material posed by the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the Former Soviet Union (FSU).
The Trident sysem consists of the Ohio-class ballistic-missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), the C-4 and D-5 submarine-launched-ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the reentry vehicles (RVs) and thermonucler warheads comprising the Mk4/W76 and Mk5/W88 systems. Trident is America's premiere strategic nuclear weapon because of its ability to evade detection and its capacity to rapidly destroy a wide range of important targets.
This study examines several technical questions bearing on Trident safety, and it enumerates important issues and options. The secrecy surrounding nuclear weapons restricts this effort, and, as a result, our study cannot be definitive. Moreover, no one can provide a reliable quantitative analysis of the probability of a serious accident. Nevertheless, in any situation that involves a small, yet finite, chance of a catastrophic event, the hazard must be weighed against the costs of reducing risk.
"The 35-year goal of achieving a comprehensive test ban can best be attained, without compromising the integrity of the regime, by not defining precisely what constitutes a nuclear explosion."