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Overview (From http://mitpress.mit.edu/books/arguments-count):
In a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks of new technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? In Arguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective. Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technology studies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedented threat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two different professional communities—physicists and computer scientists—constructed arguments about the risks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that our understanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires—the codified knowledge and mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a new repertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view.

In the 1950s, scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speed of ICBMs. But the nation’s elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers so used physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, after establishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risks associated with complex software—most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continue to confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into how different kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technological risks.

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In this piece for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Pavel Podvig dispels the myth that Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, also known as "Star Wars," helped bring the Soviet Union to an end. According to Podvig, these enduring myths about the program create an illusion that missile defense the answer to making the world more secure. 

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Stanford U.S.-Russia Forum Capstone Conference

April 18 - 20, 2012, Stanford University

                                                                                CONFERENCE AGENDA

 Day 1 Wednesday, April 18th, 2012

 12:00 - 1:00pm Lunch

 1:30 - 2:30pm Panel: Business

 Speakers: Birger Steen, Parallels CEO; Bobby Chao, DFJ DragonFund Managing

 Director; David Yang, ABBYY Founder and Chairman of the Board

 Moderator: Alexandra Johnson, DFJ

 Topic: International Entrepreneurs and VCs in Conversation

 4:30 - 6pm Keynote

 Speaker: Francis Fukuyama

 Topic: Regime Change in Middle East and Post-Soviet Space

 6:00 - 7:00pm Dinner 

Day 2 Thursday, April 19th, 2012 

 9:15 - 10:30am Delegate Presentations -- Civil Society

 Groups: U.S.-Russia Perceptions, Corruption

 11:00am - 12:30pm Panel: Civil Society

 Speakers: Professor Kathryn Stoner-Weiss of Stanford, Professor Steve Fish of

 Berkeley

 Moderator: Dr. Patricia Young of Stanford

 Topic: The Post-Election Political Landscape in Moscow

 12:30 - 2:30pm: Joint BBQ with the Russian Student Association

 Performance: Fleet Street

 2:30 - 3:30pm Speaker: Gender

 Speaker: Professor Katherine Jolluck, Stanford

 Topic: Women in the Post-Soviet Sphere

 5:15 - 7:15pm Delegate Presentations -- Economy

 Groups: Investment Banking, Public-Private Partnerships, Resource Curse

 Day 3 Friday, April 20th, 2012
 

 9:30 - 11:00am Panel: Nuclear Defense

 Speakers: Professor David Holloway of Stanford, Ambassador Jack Matlock of

 Columbia, Professor Theodore Postol of MIT

 Moderator: Dr. Benoît Pelopidas of Stanford

 Topic: NATO, US and Russia & Cooperative Missile Defense

 11:30am - 1:30 pm Delegate Presentations -- Security

 Groups: Afghanistan, Missile Defense, Space

 1:45 - 2:45pm Lunch

 3:00 - 4:30pm Speaker: Foreign Policy

 Speakers: Professor Abbas Milani of Stanford

 Topic: Russia, U.S. and Iran Sanctions

 4:45 - 6:00pm Delegate Presentations -- Institutions

 Groups: Education, Immigration

 6:30-8:30pm Closing Dinner

 Keynote: Professor Stephen Walt of Harvard

 Additional Information:

 Meals only for SURF delegates, officers and paid attendees.

 All presentations and panels will be held at the Black Community Services

Center, Room 418

Santa Teresa Street, Stanford, CA.

The closing dinner will be held at the Stanford Faculty Club, 439 Lagunita Drive

Stanford, CA.

The Closing Dinner is available by invitation only 

Black Community Service Center
418 Santa Teresa Street
Stanford, California

Birger Steen CEO Parallels Speaker
Bobby Chao Managing Director, DFJ DragonFund Speaker
David Yang ABBYY Founder and Chairman of the Board Speaker
Alexandra Johnson DFJ Moderator

Encina Hall, C148
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305

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Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Director of the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy
Research Affiliate at The Europe Center
Professor by Courtesy, Department of Political Science
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Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), and a faculty member of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). He is also Director of Stanford's Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy, and a professor (by courtesy) of Political Science.

Dr. Fukuyama has written widely on issues in development and international politics. His 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, has appeared in over twenty foreign editions. His book In the Realm of the Last Man: A Memoir will be published in fall 2026.

Francis Fukuyama received his B.A. from Cornell University in classics, and his Ph.D. from Harvard in Political Science. He was a member of the Political Science Department of the RAND Corporation, and of the Policy Planning Staff of the US Department of State. From 1996-2000 he was Omer L. and Nancy Hirst Professor of Public Policy at the School of Public Policy at George Mason University, and from 2001-2010 he was Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He served as a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics from 2001-2004. He is editor-in-chief of American Purpose, an online journal.

Dr. Fukuyama holds honorary doctorates from Connecticut College, Doane College, Doshisha University (Japan), Kansai University (Japan), Aarhus University (Denmark), the Pardee Rand Graduate School, and Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland). He is a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Rand Corporation, the Board of Trustees of Freedom House, and the Board of the Volcker Alliance. He is a fellow of the National Academy for Public Administration, a member of the American Political Science Association, and of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is married to Laura Holmgren and has three children.

(October 2025)

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Kathryn Stoner is the Mosbacher Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), and a Senior Fellow at CDDRL and the Center on International Security and Cooperation at FSI. From 2017 to 2021, she served as FSI's Deputy Director. She is Professor of Political Science (by courtesy) at Stanford and she teaches in the Department of Political Science, and in the Program on International Relations, as well as in the Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy Program. She is also a Senior Fellow (by courtesy) at the Hoover Institution.

Prior to coming to Stanford in 2004, she was on the faculty at Princeton University for nine years, jointly appointed to the Department of Politics and the Princeton School for International and Public Affairs (formerly the Woodrow Wilson School). At Princeton she received the Ralph O. Glendinning Preceptorship awarded to outstanding junior faculty. She also served as a Visiting Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, and an Assistant Professor of Political Science at McGill University. She has held fellowships at Harvard University as well as the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC. 

In addition to many articles and book chapters on contemporary Russia, she is the author or co-editor of six books: "Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective," written and edited with Michael A. McFaul (Johns Hopkins 2013);  "Autocracy and Democracy in the Post-Communist World," co-edited with Valerie Bunce and Michael A. McFaul (Cambridge, 2010);  "Resisting the State: Reform and Retrenchment in Post-Soviet Russia" (Cambridge, 2006); "After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Lessons of Transitions" (Cambridge, 2004), coedited with Michael McFaul; and "Local Heroes: The Political Economy of Russian Regional" Governance (Princeton, 1997); and "Russia Resurrected: Its Power and Purpose in a New Global Order" (Oxford University Press, 2021).

She received a BA (1988) and MA (1989) in Political Science from the University of Toronto, and a PhD in Government from Harvard University (1995). In 2016 she was awarded an honorary doctorate from Iliad State University, Tbilisi, Republic of Georgia.

Download full-resolution headshot; photo credit: Rod Searcey.

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David Holloway is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, a professor of political science, and an FSI senior fellow. He was co-director of CISAC from 1991 to 1997, and director of FSI from 1998 to 2003. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994) was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. It has been translated into seven languages, most recently into Chinese. The Chinese translation is due to be published later in 2018. Holloway also wrote The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (1983) and co-authored The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment (1984). He has contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals.

Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986 -- first as a professor of political science and later (in 1996) as a professor of history as well -- Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). Before coming to Stanford, he taught at the University of Lancaster (1967-1970) and the University of Edinburgh (1970-1986). Born in Dublin, Ireland, he received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his PhD in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University.

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Jack Matlock Ambassador Speaker Columbia
Theodore Postol Professor Speaker MIT
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Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305

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Research Fellow, Hoover Institution
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Abbas Milani is the Hamid and Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University and a visiting professor in the department of political science. In addition, Dr. Milani is a research fellow and co-director of the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution.

Prior to coming to Stanford, Milani was a professor of history and political science and chair of the department at Notre Dame de Namur University and a research fellow at the Institute of International Studies at the University of California at Berkeley. Milani was an assistant professor in the faculty of law and political science at Tehran University and a member of the board of directors of Tehran University's Center for International Studies from 1979 to 1987. He was a research fellow at the Iranian Center for Social Research from 1977 to 1978 and an assistant professor at the National University of Iran from 1975 to 1977.

Dr. Milani is the author of Eminent Persians: Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941-1979, (Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, NY, 2 volumes, November, 2008); King of Shadows: Essays on Iran's Encounter with Modernity, Persian text published in the U.S. (Ketab Corp., Spring 2005); Lost Wisdom: Rethinking Persian Modernity in Iran, (Mage 2004); The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution (Mage, 2000); Modernity and Its Foes in Iran (Gardon Press, 1998); Tales of Two Cities: A Persian Memoir (Mage 1996); On Democracy and Socialism, a collection of articles coauthored with Faramarz Tabrizi (Pars Press, 1987); and Malraux and the Tragic Vision (Agah Press, 1982). Milani has also translated numerous books and articles into Persian and English.

Milani received his BA in political science and economics from the University of California at Berkeley in 1970 and his PhD in political science from the University of Hawaii in 1974.

Hamid and Christina Moghadam Director of Iranian Studies
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After stirring international media attention and drawing criticism from its neighbors and the United States, North Korea’s controversial launch of a rocket under the guise of installing an “Earth observation” satellite in orbit took place on Apr. 13.

David Straub, associate director of Stanford’s Korean Studies Program, assesses the likely responses of the United States and other concerned countries, and provides historical context for the actions of North Korea’s leadership.

How is the launch going to impact North Korea’s relations with the United States and other countries?

We have already “been there, done that.” This will be the third North Korean test of a long-range rocket in six years. Shortly after the launches in 2006 and 2009, the North Koreans tested their first nuclear devices. The concern is that they will again use the expected international condemnation of their launch as a pretext for conducting another nuclear test.

But sometimes experience changes perspective. The United States and other countries will want to try to respond to the rocket test in a way that complicates any North Korean effort to justify a new nuclear test.

The international community really cannot remain silent, because United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1874, which was passed in 2009, forbids North Korea from conducting precisely this kind of launch. I anticipate the UNSC will meet to discuss the situation but will not be able to issue a formal resolution. It will probably wind up issuing only a UNSC presidential statement criticizing the launch. China is the main obstacle. It does not approve of North Korea’s activities, but it is more concerned that putting great pressure on North Korea will result in instability. 

The United States, South Korea, and Japan will continue to consult and coordinate closely with one another. They may take additional measures to collect intelligence about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. They may also look to bolster their cooperation on missile defense, and take further steps to restrict North Korea’s access to nuclear- and missile-related materials and technology. They may apply additional economic sanctions to show their disapproval of North Korea’s actions.

Do you think the launch is going make it more difficult for North Korea to conduct trade and obtain aid and development assistance?

North Korea’s behavior now is part and parcel of its behavior over the past several decades. For the North Korean regime, the wellbeing of its people is clearly a secondary priority compared to its own survival.

At least since the end of the cold war, North Korea has faced a dilemma: Open up or fail, or open up and fail. In other words, it needs to open up to receive outside investment and technology if it is ever to have a successful economy. If it does not do that, the regime is unsustainable over the long run. But North Korea’s leaders fear that opening to the outside world would bring down their regime because it will expose the country’s weaknesses to its people. In order to get out of this dilemma, they have reached for weapons of mass destruction—particularly nuclear devices and the missiles they hope eventually can carry them. That is why there is no indication the North Korean leadership is prepared to completely give up those programs, at least on any terms that the United States, Japan, or South Korea could accept.

This is a long-term challenge for the United States and its allies. We have to see the situation for what it is, and deal with it accordingly. That means we must never “accept” North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. As long as North Korea maintains these programs, we must make it clear that we will not establish diplomatic relations or ease sanctions. But that also does not mean that we should not continue to hold out to North Korea the possibility of a negotiated settlement, should it really be prepared to completely give up these programs.  

What are some of the key things to keep in mind about North Korea’s recent actions and about the country in general?

To understand what North Korea is doing, we have to get back to basics. The fundamental situation stems from the 1945 division of the Korean Peninsula into two separate states. North Korea’s Stalinist-style system developed into a totalitarian dictatorship with a personality cult, and it has been spectacularly unsuccessful, especially compared to its rival state South Korea.

The leaders in North Korea are reasonably well-informed and intelligent people. They saw what happened to the Soviet Union and its satellite states in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and decided it would not happen to them. For them, the lesson was: Do not open up or even receive aid, unless it is completely controlled to minimize outside influences. Most of the North Korean elite believes their regime is the legitimate Korean regime. They also understand that regime collapse could well mean absorption of the North by the South, and the possibility that they could go on trial for crimes against their own people. I anticipate that most of the elite will try very hard to hold the regime together in the coming years, even if it means continuing to pursue nuclear and missile programs and threatening and even attacking South Korea again.

But sooner or later major change is inevitable in such a rigid system. This requires the concerned countries to have a clear-headed analysis of the situation, take a long-term perspective, and consistently implement a principled policy. It is very challenging to do this with so many countries involved. But it can be done. Over the long term, the strengths of democracies far outweigh their weaknesses in dealing with countries like North Korea.  

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How do experts evaluate complex techno-political futures? This essay addresses the question by showing how scientists and engineers confronted U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s call to render “nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.” Popularly known as the “Star Wars” missile defense program, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative launched a world-wide debate that continues to echo today. I argue that experts used disciplined projections – predictions based on generally accepted, mathematical rules of scientific disciplines – to produce certainty and authority about the future of SDI. Importantly, different disciplines highlighted distinctive aspects of SDI, and generated different kinds of political authority. Physicists analyzed idealized systems and mobilized a form of disciplinary objectivity. By contrast, computer experts analyzed complex, faulty systems, and made their arguments persuasive by appealing to common sense. These differences reveal the influence of technological enthusiasm in U.S. political culture.

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Michael A. McFaul, a Stanford political science professor and senior fellow at the university’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, was confirmed by the Senate to be the next ambassador to Russia. 

McFaul, President Barack Obama’s top advisor on Russia and a Bing Senior Fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, will succeed John Beyrle.

"Mike will bring to his new posting in Moscow the same intensity, clarity of vision and imagination that he demonstrated as President Obama's point person on Russia at the White House," said Coit D. Blacker, FSI’s director and the Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies. 

The Dec. 17 voice vote confirming McFaul came on the last day the Senate was in session before its winter break. Sen. Mark Kirk, R-Ill., had held up McFaul's approval over issues with U.S. policies toward Russia.

During confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October, McFaul discussed the overall status of U.S.-Russian relations, missile defense, arms reduction agreements and trade relations.

Since the beginning of the Obama administration, McFaul has been the special assistant to the president for national security affairs and senior director for Russia and Eurasia at the National Security Council.

He served as senior adviser on Russia and Eurasia to Obama during the presidential campaign and continued to advise on foreign policy issues during the transition.

The Obama administration has achieved new momentum in relations with Russia with McFaul's involvement.

The two countries have signed the New Start arms control treaty, which calls for significant cuts in nuclear arsenals; finalized a civilian nuclear cooperation pact; forged agreement on tougher sanctions on Iran; and expanded the supply route to Afghanistan through the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The two powers now turn to the efforts to forge cooperation on missile defense in Europe and to gain Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization, as well as the challenges posed by Iran and Libya.

"This is a complex and sensitive time in the ever-evolving relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation," Blacker said. "Having an ambassador in place who gets the relationship has never been more important. For this reason above all others, Mike is the perfect choice. We are all deeply proud of Mike and all that he has accomplished."

McFaul, who has served as FSI’s deputy director and director of the institute’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, received a bachelor’s degree in international relations and Slavic languages and an master’s in Slavic and East European studies from Stanford in 1986. He was awarded a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford, where he completed his PhD in international relations in 1991.

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In the fourth and final year of the Obama administration's first term, North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Critics call U.S. policy a "failure." Why did the Obama administration adopt the approach it did? Does the policy have any prospect of eventual success? Is the administration likely to change its approach this year, especially with new leadership in North Korea, or next year, if re-elected? Korean Studies Program associate director David Straub, a former State Department Korea country director, will analyze the people, processes, and parameters of Obama administration policy toward North Korea.

David Straub was named associate director of the Korean Studies Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center on July 1, 2008. Prior to that he was a 2007–08 Pantech Fellow at the Center. An educator and commentator on current Northeast Asian affairs, Straub retired in 2006 from the U.S. Department of State as a senior foreign service officer after a 30-year career focused on Northeast Asian affairs. 

This event is made possible by the generous support from the Koret Foundation.

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David Straub was named associate director of the Korea Program at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (Shorenstein APARC) on July 1, 2008. Prior to that he was a 2007–08 Pantech Fellow at the Center. Straub is the author of the book, Anti-Americanism in Democratizing South Korea, published in 2015.

An educator and commentator on current Northeast Asian affairs, Straub retired in 2006 from his role as a U.S. Department of State senior foreign service officer after a 30-year career focused on Northeast Asian affairs. He worked over 12 years on Korean affairs, first arriving in Seoul in 1979.

Straub served as head of the political section at the U.S. embassy in Seoul from 1999 to 2002 during popular protests against the United States, and he played a key working-level role in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program as the State Department's Korea country desk director from 2002 to 2004. He also served eight years at the U.S. embassy in Japan. His final assignment was as the State Department's Japan country desk director from 2004 to 2006, when he was co-leader of the U.S. delegation to talks with Japan on the realignment of the U.S.-Japan alliance and of U.S. military bases in Japan.

After leaving the Department of State, Straub taught U.S.-Korean relations at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in the fall of 2006 and at the Graduate School of International Studies of Seoul National University in spring 2007. He has published a number of papers on U.S.-Korean relations. His foreign languages are Korean, Japanese, and German.

David Straub Associate Director of Korean Studies Program (KSP) Speaker the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
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Abstract:

US-Russia ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation can improve strategic stability between both countries, but this cooperation would pose a potential threat to China’s strategic security, especially if it is a closed and deep cooperation. The United States and Russia should make their bilateral cooperation an open regime, and let China and other countries join, so that improvement of US-Russia strategic stability is not based on the sacrifice of strategic stability with China and other countries. China and the United States may also cooperate on BMD in areas of early warning and mutual launch notification. The security costs of these cooperative measures are very low, and the benefits would improve stability, confidence, and mutual trust. Finally, BMD cooperation between the United States
and its East Asian allies (Japan and Taiwan) is threatening Sino-US strategic stability. The United States could improve Chinese confidence by increasing transparency about and limiting the performance of BMD systems.

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Reducing carbon-dioxide emissions is primarily a political problem, rather than a technological one. This fact was well illustrated by the fate of the 2009 climate bill that barely passed the U.S. House of Representatives and never came up for a vote in the Senate. The House bill was already quite weak, containing many exceptions for agriculture and other industries, subsidies for nuclear power and increasingly long deadlines for action. In the Senate, both Republicans and Democrats from coal-dependent states sealed its fate. Getting past these senators is the key to achieving a major reduction in our emissions.

Technological challenges to reducing emissions exist, too. Most pressing is the need to develop the know-how to capture carbon dioxide on a large scale and store it underground. Such technology could reduce by 90 percent the emissions from coal- fired power stations. Some 500 of these facilities in the U.S. produce 36 percent of our CO2 emissions.

But these plants aren’t evenly spaced around the country. And therein may lie the key to addressing the political and technological challenges at the same time. If the federal government would invest in carbon capture and storage, it could go a long way toward persuading politicians in every state to sign on to emission reductions.

I’ll get to the specifics of the technology shortly. But first, consider how the costs of emission reduction fall hardest on certain parts of the country: A carbon tax levied on all major sources of released CO2, the approach favored by most of the environmental community, would make energy from coal-fired power plants cost more. To make a significant difference, such a tax would have to amount to $60 a ton.

Midwest Carbon Footprint

As a result, gasoline prices would rise 26 percent, and natural gas for household usage by 25 percent, nationwide. Rich and urbanized states could probably tolerate this. The West Coast, with its hydroelectric power, and the Northeast, which relies to a large extent on natural gas, could most easily absorb the associated increase in energy costs.

But the price of energy in the rural, Midwestern states would more than quadruple because of their large carbon footprint. Midwesterners get most of their electricity from coal; they drive relatively long distances to get to work, shopping and entertainment; and rural homes and buildings use more energy for heating and cooling.

One carbon-tax proposal now being considered is a “cap and dividend” plan that would send the tax revenue back to all U.S. citizens equally. But that would also favor the rich states that are less dependent on driving and coal.

It would be more helpful for the coal-dependent states if the federal government would use revenue from a carbon tax to help develop the technology for carbon capture and storage.

And that brings us to the technological challenges: No plant of any size with the capacity for CCS yet exists, but it has been demonstrated to work at small scales. Three different processes for capturing the CO2 are being tested, and scaling them up for 500-megawatt or 1,000-megawatt facilities should be possible.

For two years, the Mountaineer plant in New Haven, West Virginia, has been capturing and storing a tiny amount of its CO2 -- 2 percent of it -- but plans to build a full-scale carbon-capture plant here have been abandoned. Because Congress has dropped any idea of imposing a tax on carbon emissions, the investment doesn’t make sense.

A large plant in Edwardsport, Indiana, was being constructed with the expensive gasification process that makes it easy to add carbon-capture facilities, but it, too, has been shelved.

China may finish its large demonstration carbon-capture plant before the U.S. gets any model up to scale. Others are planned in Europe, and a small one is operating in Germany. This plant has been unable to get permission for underground storage, so it is selling some of its CO2 to soft-drink companies and venting the rest.

Subterranean Storage

Storing captured CO2 is eminently possible, too. For 15 years, the Sleipner facility in Norway has been storing 3 percent of that country’s CO2 underneath the ocean floor, with no appreciable leakage. Algeria has a similar facility, the In Salah plant, operating in the desert.

One storage strategy under consideration in the U.S. is to inject captured CO2 into huge basalt formations off both the east and west coasts. Inside the basalt, the carbon gas would gradually turn into bicarbonate of soda.

There are other ways to dispose of carbon dioxide. It has been used for enhanced oil recovery for many decades without any danger, and has been effectively stored in depleted oil reservoirs. (The gas is dangerous only in high concentration.)

It remains uncertain how much of the captured CO2 might leak during storage. Even if this were as much as 10 percent, however, it would mean that 90 percent of it would stay underground.

As CCS technology develops, it will have to be made more efficient so that it uses less energy. As it is, the capture phase is expected to require that a power plant burn 20 percent to 25 percent more coal than it otherwise would.

The technological challenges may explain why energy companies haven’t lobbied for subsidies to develop CCS. The electric-energy sector isn’t known for innovation and risk- taking. Just look at the U.S.’s outdated power grid.

But the federal government could pay for the subsidies through a tax on carbon. Such a levy would have other advantages, too: It would raise the cost of energy to reflect the damage that burning coal and oil now do to the environment, and spur the development of renewable sources.

If states with large carbon footprints can’t accept such a tax, the CCS subsidies could be paid from the general fund. The cost to build coal-fired power plants with CCS technology is estimated to be about $5 billion to $6 billion -- about the price of a single nuclear power plant. The total price for the U.S.’s 500 large plants would be $250 billion. That’s as much as the planned modernization and expansion of our missile defense system over 10 years.

But it would slash our carbon emissions by at least 20 percent. There is no other politically possible way to cut CO2 as much, and as quickly -- in a decade or two. And devastating climate change is far more likely than a missile attack.

U.S. investment in CCS technology could also induce China and Europe to follow suit. And this would allow the world time for renewable-energy technologies to mature -- to the point where we could do away with coal burning altogether.

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