While concern had grown over the past several weeks about a breakdown in U.S.-Russian arms control, it appears the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and nuclear arms control more broadly may have a new lease on life, albeit with lots of questions.

Washington’s negotiation with Moscow on New START hit a roadblock on October 16.  President Putin said Russia would agree to a one-year extension, which U.S. negotiators had proposed instead of five years, but without the conditions sought by the American side.  National Security Advisor O’Brien summarily rejected the Russian position because it ignored the U.S. demand for a freeze on all nuclear warhead numbers.

Things changed yesterday.  The Russians announced that they would agree to a one-year extension of New START and said they are “ready to assume a political obligation together with the United States to freeze the sides’ existing arsenals of nuclear warheads during this period.”  The Russian statement added that this presumed no additional U.S. conditions.  The Department of State spokesperson quickly and positively reacted, saying U.S. negotiators are “prepared to meet immediately to finalize a verifiable agreement.”

New START constrains U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces to their lowest levels since the 1960s.  However, when it comes to nuclear warheads as opposed to delivery systems, the treaty limits only “deployed” strategic warheads—that is, warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).  The treaty does not cover reserve strategic warheads or any non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons.

If Russian acceptance of a one-year freeze means that the Trump administration has succeeded in persuading Moscow to negotiate a treaty limiting all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, that is a commendable breakthrough.  Indeed, a treaty covering all the two sides’ nuclear arms has long seemed the logical next step after New START (President Obama proposed such a negotiation in 2010).

Questions remain, however.  The Russian statement indicates that Moscow is ready to undertake, as a political obligation, a one-year freeze on nuclear warhead numbers.  It remains unclear whether Russian officials, beyond that freeze, are prepared to negotiate a legally-binding and verifiable treaty constraining all nuclear warheads that would be in effect for a number of years (New START is in force for 10 years, with the possibility of its extension for an additional five years).

In the past, Russian officials have made a variety of demands for negotiating such a treaty.  They made withdrawal of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons from Europe (about 150 nuclear gravity bombs) a precondition.  They also insisted that the United States had to address Russian concerns about long-range, precision-guided conventional strike systems and missile defense.

When it comes to negotiation of a treaty, not just a freeze, will Russian officials maintain these demands?  If they do, a complex negotiation will become even more difficult.  The Trump administration has been adamant, for example, that it will not agree to constraints on missile defense.

Verification presents another stiff challenge.  New START provides procedures for counting strategic warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs.  However, when a warhead is taken off of an ICBM or SLBM and placed in storage, for all intents and purposes, it disappears as far as New START is concerned.

The State Department spokesperson’s statement about finalizing a “verifiable agreement” left uncertain whether it referred to the treaty to be negotiated or the freeze.  U.S. arms control negotiator Billingslea later said the freeze would require measures for effective verification.  Yesterday’s statement from Moscow, however, was silent on verification.

Provisions to allow effective verification of all nuclear warhead numbers will prove far more intrusive than anything the U.S. and Russian militaries have accepted to date.  The Trump administration has expressed interest in a portal system, which would provide for monitoring of things that leave or enter a production facility.  However, accounting for the total number of warheads on each side presumably would require monitoring systems at, and perhaps access into, storage sites for nuclear weapons.  These are among the most sensitive facilities that either side has.  Negotiating that kind of verification will prove an arduous process and take a time—and may require the development of new technologies for monitoring purposes.

Finally, Mr. Billingslea said that, while the freeze would apply to the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, the treaty to be negotiated would be trilateral and include China.  Beijing consistently has rejected taking part in a trilateral arms treaty.

So, it appears that U.S. and Russian negotiators still have issues to resolve.

Irrespective of the freeze, New START is worth saving and extending to 2026 (the treaty’s terms provide that there could be multiple extensions).  Extension to 2026 would mean five more years of limits on Russian strategic nuclear forces.  It would mean five more years of information about those forces provided by the treaty’s verification measures, including data exchanges, notifications and on-site inspections.  And extending the treaty would require no change in U.S. strategic modernization plans, as those plans were designed to fit within the treaty’s limits.

One last observation:  New START requires that, if a side wishes to withdraw from the treaty, it must give the other three months’ notice before doing so.  It is now October 21, which means that, if negotiations with the Russians do not go well and the Trump administration were to give notice, the United States could not actually withdraw from the treaty until after January 20, 2021—when Donald Trump will be starting his second term or Joe Biden will have become the 46^th U.S. president.  Mr. Biden is on record as supporting New START’s extension for five years, with no conditions.

* * * * *

US President Donald Trump missed a "golden" chance to end North Korea's nuclear program by walking out of his Hanoi summit with Kim Jong-un empty-handed when the North Korean leader had, in effect, offered to give up a key nuclear facility, a US nuclear scientist claimed.

Read the rest at  The Korea Herald

President Trump’s impulsive decision recently to remove 12,000 American troops from Germany — without a serious interagency review or consultation with close allies — is just the latest example of how undisciplined and ill-advised his actions toward NATO and Europe have become in the past 3 1/2 years. As the NATO deputy secretary general from 2016 to 2019, I always marveled at the bipartisan support the alliance enjoys. Since NATO was founded in 1949, every U.S. president and every Congress have worked to deepen transatlantic cooperation. This unwavering support has kept the peace for more than 70 years.

Read the rest at  The Columbus Dispatch

Where is nuclear arms control—negotiated restraints on the deadliest weapons of mass destruction—headed? This 50-year tool of US national security policy is currently under attack. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear arms agreement with the Russian Federation, will go out of force in February 2021 unless it is extended for an additional five years as the treaty permits. At this moment, nothing is on the horizon to replace it.

Read the rest at The Washington Quarterly

This essay by Oriana Skylar Mastro originally appeared in Cato Unbound.

In his lead essay, Eric Gomez cites profound technological changes as the main reason why the United States should rethink its nuclear policy. However, there is one drastic change he does not adequately take into account: the rise of China. This response essay, therefore, focuses on the China factor in U.S. nuclear policy.

Chinese Nuclear Modernization

Since the turn of the century, China has been modernizing its nuclear forces in earnest. Currently, Beijing’s nuclear arsenal is estimated to number in the 200s. From 2017 to 2018, warheads increased by ten, and the Pentagon anticipates that the stockpile will double over the next ten years. These modernization efforts, such as moving from silo-based liquid-fueled ICBMs to mobile solid-fueled delivery vehicles, have focused mainly on improving force survivability. China also added a sea leg to its nuclear deterrent in 2016 with the introduction of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (JL-2) on its Jin-class ballistic missile submarine.

Additionally, China is producing ballistic missile systems with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) and maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) technologies that enhance missiles’ effectiveness. To this end, China has launched more ballistic missiles for testing and training in 2019 than the rest of the world combined. Meanwhile, the PLA’s new hypersonic cruise missiles supposedly are capable of piercing existing missile defense systems. Furthermore, structural reforms in China’s military reveal the critical role nuclear weapons play in Chinese strategy. In 2016, the branch in charge of China’s nuclear deterrent, the Second Artillery, was upgraded to a service, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force. Its commander was added to China’s highest military body, the Central Military Commission.

[Sign up for our newsletters to get the latest from APARC's scholars.]

China’s drive to modernize, diversify, and expand its nuclear forces may cause some to argue with Gomez’s essential premise that new thinking is needed. This week, U.S. Strategic Commander Adm. Charles Richard remarked that China’s nuclear weapons buildup is “inconsistent” with their long-held no-first-use policy, emphasizing the need for the United States to pursue nuclear modernization. Indeed, there has been a resurgence in Cold War thinking about nuclear deterrence. For example, Former Senator Jon Kyl and Michael Morell argued for more low-yield nuclear warheads as part of an “escalate to deescalate” strategy. Similarly, Bret Stephens raised concerns that the U.S. arsenal is insufficient to prevent Chinese aggression.

However, I agree with Gomez that we need to rethink U.S. nuclear policy to ensure it can better meet contemporary challenges. Specifically, I argue that to best suit U.S. foreign policy interests, U.S. nuclear policy needs to minimize the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.-China great power competition and pave the way for arms control.

Continue reading Oriana Mastro's response essay in Cato Unbound >>

For months, President Trump has put the brightest possible spin on COVID-19. He insists the virus is under control. He praises his administration’s “incredible” job. He suggests a vaccine will be available by November. Unfortunately, the real world looks very different.

Trump and his administration likewise are spinning an image of progress on nuclear arms control. As with their assertions on COVID-19, the image does not reflect reality.

Readt the rest at The Hill 

Failing to renew the New START arms control treaty with Russia “is not a wise direction of travel,” said Rose Gottemoeller, a former Deputy Secretary General of NATO who ranked as one of President Barack Obama’s top nuclear security experts. 

She knows better than most. Gottemoeller was the chief US negotiator at the Moscow and Geneva talks where details of the treaty were hammered out between 2009 and 2010. Officially ratified a year later, New START limited both the United States and Russia to seven hundred delivery vehicles and just over double that count in total warheads, and was reinforced with a stringent verification process to closely monitor each country’s compliance. 

Read the rest at National Interest

In recent months, tensions have once again flared between Pyongyang and Seoul, calling into question the state of inter-Korean and U.S.-Korea relations. As the future of denuclearization talks with North Korea remains uncertain and the United States looks towards the November 2020 presidential election, APARC gathered experts on Korea and international security to provide analysis of where we stand with the DPRK and what considerations future Korea policies should involve.

[Never miss a chance to participate in an APARC event. Sign up for our newsletters to stay informed about upcoming webinars.]

Gi-Wook Shin, APARC’s director and the director of the Korea Program, moderates the APARC-led discussion hosted by the Freeman Spogli Institute. Robert Carlin, a longtime analyst of North Korea and frequent visitor to the DPRK, joins the panel from the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Leading North Korea and international affairs expert Victor Cha provides insight into the public statements and apparent policy goals of North Korea's leadership, while fellow Georgetown scholar and imminent APARC center fellow Oriana Mastro offers commentary on the ongoing need for military stability in the area. Siegfried Hecker, an internationally recognized expert in plutonium science, global threat reduction, and nuclear security, adds his expertise in nuclear nonproliferation and arms control to the discussion.