On March 22, a military coup abruptly ended two decades of uninterrupted democracy in Mali, the well-reputed West African country and key counter-terrorism partner of the United States. The coup leader Army Captain Amadou Sanogo and his mutinous troops suspended the 1992 democratic constitution, took over the presidential palace, the state television and several institutions, arrested members of the government, and promised a more efficient fight against Tuareg rebels. Interruption of the Malian democracy by a belligerent military faction is a serious threat to stability, peace, and human rights given the domestic context.
Since the coup, the conflict with the Tuareg rebels has continued to worsen. The two main Tuareg groups — the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and Islamist Ansar Dine — have gained ground and seized new territories in the north of the country, pushing for sharia law. If a domestic solution is not found quickly, African regional organizations and the international community should act in concert with Malian democratic defenders - either diplomatically or coercively - to restore democracy and peace, and stop rebel progression before it is too lateAfrican regional organizations and the international community should act in concert with Malian democratic defenders — either diplomatically or coercively — to restore democracy and peace, and stop rebel progression before it is too late.
The Coup in Mali: Who is Behind it and Why?
Plotters deposed the widely respected and democratically elected President Amadou Toumani Touré, a little over a month before the scheduled presidential election on April 29. Coup leader Captain Sanogo justified the unconstitutional seizure of power under the guise of national security, accusing President Touré of inefficiently fighting the decades-old Tuareg rebellion, and not providing enough resources to the army.
However, given the electoral timing, reasons advanced by Captain Sanogo to justify the coup are illogical. President Touré was not a candidate in the 2012 presidential election, and had just over a month left in his second and last term in office. As a visionary leader, he respected the unique Malian societal and political culture, improved governance, and put the country on a path to sustainable economic growth. Therefore, it is not surprising that Freedom House has continued over the past two decades to classify Mali as a democratic regime — whether electoral or liberal — despite several challenges such as; weak public institutions and central government, poverty, aid dependency, the Tuareg separatist rebellion, and labor or social unrests. The coup leader’s argument is further weakened because the democratic Malian government was offering public space to potentially unsatisfied military personnel to negotiate within the constitutional framework, along with the option to openly discuss issues of concern with presidential candidates.
The Coup is Reinvigorating Fear of a Repressive Military Regime
The coup is reinvigorating fear of the resurgence of repressive rule that reigned for decades after successive military coups. Such repressive rule must be prevented. In 1968, Lieutenant Moussa Traoré ousted the civilian government, eight years after Mali gained its independence from France. Because he was resistant to democratic changes, Traoré was ousted in 1991 by Amadou Toumani Touré in the face of widespread civil unrest and demands for greater political rights and democratic reforms.
In 1991, the Transitional Committee for the Salvation of the People (CTSP) was formed by various groups representing civil society and under the supervision of Amadou Toumani Touré. The Committee organized successful political liberalization, which included; a national conference, a constitutional referendum, a founding election won by President Alpha Oumar Konaré (1992-2002), and consequently a democratic transition in 1992. Many hope that twenty years of democratic developments are not eradicated by this coup. Captain Sanogo still has the window of opportunity to respect the Malian values and people, and end his rule, as requested by the people.
The Devastating Consequences of the Coup in Mali and Africa
The coup has significant implications on the political developments in Mali, West Africa and the African continent. It weakens the already fragile democratic institutions, and calls into question the solidity of the unique political culture, visionary leadership, and the subordination of the military to the executive that were considered by many as the foundation of Malian democracy.The coup weakens the already fragile democratic institutions, and calls into question the solidity of the unique political culture, visionary leadership, and the subordination of the military to the executive that were considered by many as the foundation of Malian democracy. In addition, it worsened the situation in the north of the country, with rebel militias controlling more towns than before the coup. The coup has consequently increased the risk of disproportionate use of force, potentially leading to more violent and deadly conflicts threatening minority groups in Mali, with negative consequences for the entire West African region.
The coup also gives reasons — not necessarily valid — to citizens and pessimistic observers to despair about the prospect of democracy in West Africa. The spirit of democracy has recently been challenged in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. If most plotters manage to stay in power, Africa may face a resurgence of military coup plots, reviving the violent nightmare of the two last decades of the twentieth century.
Malian and International Reactions to the Coup
Malian domestic leadership and the international community have all taken serious steps towards returning the country to civilian rule and restoring the democratic system. Malian political and civil society leaders have clearly shown deep opposition to the rupture of the constitutional order, and they have requested return to the rule of law. They are peacefully demonstrating to avoid violence and to preserve national unity. On March 28, the ousted President Touré called for a consensual solution and told French Radio station RFI "what is important is democracy, institutions, and Mali." In the same vein, the international community has strongly condemned the coup, applied some diplomatic sanctions, and requested a return to an elected civilian government.
The U.N. Secretary General has called for immediate restoration of constitutional rule, and the U.N. Security Council echoed a similar sentiment by calling for "the restoration of constitutional order and the holding of elections as previously scheduled." The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) reiterated its policy of “zero tolerance” for unconstitutional seizures of power, organized high-level meetings with heads of state to persuade the junta to step-down, readied its stand-by forces, and placed an economic embargo on Mali.
The African Union immediately suspended the membership of Mali until constitutional rule is restored, and the U.S. paused military aid to Mali and urged rebels to end fighting. France has suspended its official cooperation with Mali, but maintained humanitarian aid and is pushing the U.N. Security Council to explore avenues to support ECOWAS in their efforts to restore order. Canada, the African Development Bank, the European Union, and the World Bank have all suspended their aid. These diplomatic actions, especially from ECOWAS, have pressured the junta to announce (formally but not yet effectively) the restoration of the 1992 constitution on April 1, a few days after unconstitutionally promulgating a new one. Further actions should be made in a timely manner to pressure the junta to step-down, to ensure that power is transferred back to civilian rule and constitutional order restored.
Restoring democracy and peace in Mali — diplomatically or coercively — is imperative. It will send a strong warning to those who try to undermine democratic efforts that unconstitutional appropriation of power and threats to peace and security will not be tolerated. Citizens will also be shown that they are supported in their battle for democracy and peace.
Systemic corruption undermines state capacity, imperils socio-economic development, and diminishes democracy. In his Nairobi speech as a U.S. senator in August 2006, Barack Obama described the struggle to reduce corruption as "the fight of our time". An international conference in Lagos, Nigeria, in September 2011 was devoted to Richard Joseph's influential 1987 book, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic.Transforming prebendalist systems must be at the center of strategies to strengthen democracy and achieve poverty-reducing economic growth in Africa and other regions.
Speaker Bio:
Richard Joseph is John Evans Professor of International History and Politics at Northwestern University and Non resident Senior Fellow in Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution. As a Fellow of The Carter Center, he participated in democracy and peace initiatives in Ghana, Zambia, Ethiopia, Liberiaand Sudan. He has written extensively on issues of democracy, governance and political economy. His books include Radical Nationalism in Cameroun (1977), Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria (1987) and edited books, Gaullist Africa: Cameroon under Ahmadu Ahidjo (1978), State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa (1999), and (with Alexandra Gillies), Smart Aid for African Development (2009). He served as Principal Investigator of the Research Alliance to Combat HIV/AIDS (REACH), a collaborative program in Nigeria, 2006–2011. His current writing and policy projects concern growth, democracy and security. To address these issues, he is designing a collaborative project, AfricaPlus (http://africaplus.wordpress.com/), whose first focus country is Nigeria.
Here is the link to Richard Joseph remarks and the PowerPoint for the talk.
CISAC Conference Room
Despite the fact that sub-Saharan Africa in 2012 contains much of the world’s unutilized and underutilized arable land, a significant and growing share of Africa’s farm households live in densely populated areas. Based on two alternative spatial databases capable of estimating populations at the level of one square kilometer and distinguishing between arable and non-arable land, we find that in at least five of the 10 countries analyzed, 25 percent of the rural population resides in areas exceeding 500 persons per square kilometer, estimated by secondary sources as an indicative maximum carrying capacity for areas of rain-fed agriculture in the region. The apparent paradox of a large proportion of Africa’s rural population living in densely populated conditions amidst a situation of massive unutilized land is resolved when the unit of observation is changed from land units to people.
A review of nationally representative farm surveys shows a tendency of (1) declining mean farm size over time within densely populated smallholder farming areas; (2) great disparities in landholding size within smallholder farming areas, leading to highly concentrated and skewed patterns of farm production and marketed surplus; (3) half or more of rural farm households are either buyers of grain or go hungry because they are too poor to afford to buy food; most households in this category control less than one hectare of land; and (4) a high proportion of farmers in densely populated areas perceive that it is not possible for them to acquire more land through customary land allocation procedures, even in areas where a significant portion of land appears to be unutilized.
Ironically, there has been little recognition of the potential challenges associated with increasingly densely populated and land-constrained areas of rural Africa, despite the fact that a sizeable and increasing share of its rural population live in such areas. Inadequate access to land and inability to exploit available unutilized land are issues that almost never feature in national development plans or poverty reduction strategies. In fact, since the rise of world food prices after the mid-2000s, many African governments have made concerted efforts to transfer land out of customary tenure systems (where the majority of rural people reside) to the state or to private individuals who, it is argued, can more effectively exploit the productive potential of the land to meet national food security objectives. Such efforts have nurtured the growth of a relatively well-capitalized class of “emergent” African farmers. The growing focus on how best to exploit unutilized land in Africa has arguably diverted attention from the more central and enduring challenge of implementing agricultural development strategies that effectively address the continent’s massive rural poverty and food insecurity problems, which require recognizing the growing land constraints faced by much of its still agrarian-based population. The final section of the paper considers research and policy options for addressing these problems.
This paper examines the academic performance of migrant students in migrant schools in China and explores determinants of their performance. The paper compares academic performance, student backgrounds and measures of school quality between Beijing migrant schools and rural public schools in Shaanxi province. Furthermore, we employ multivariate regression to examine how individual characteristics and school quality affect migrant student performance and the achievement gap between students in migrant schools and those in rural public schools. We find that although students in Beijing migrant schools outperform students in Shaanxi’s rural public schools when they initially arrive in Beijing, they gradually lose ground to rural students due to the poorer school resources teachers in migrant schools. Additional analysis comparing migrant students in migrant schools to migrant students in Beijing public schools demonstrates that given access to better educational resources, migrant school students may be able to significantly improve their performance.
Contention and Trust in Cities and States explores cities and nation-states throughout history and around the world, bringing together the research of top scholars. It takes as a jumping-off point the work of the late Charles Tilly, but proceeds varied topics ranging from how today’s drug cartels undermine nation-states to how cities, nation-states, and empires treated religious minorities in the middle of the last millennium. Threaded throughout are themes of city-state relations, trust networks and commitment, democracy and inequality, and the importance of historical legacies in shaping state structures, practices, and capacities.
The past year unfolded with Japan’s unprecedented triple disaster and closed with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s historic trip to Myanmar. Moving into 2012, Europe’s economy creaks along uncertainly and China gears up for a major leadership change. In an interview with the Ukranian magazine Glavred, political science professor Phillip Lipscy discusses landmark Asian economic and political events of 2011, and what they could mean in the coming year.
What was the most significant event in terms of Asia’s economy in 2011?
The March 11 Great Tohoku earthquake and tsunami: Besides the tragic loss of life and property, the disaster disrupted global supply chains and plunged the Japanese economy into a recession. The nuclear meltdown in Fukushima also led many countries to question the future of nuclear energy—this will have long-lasting consequences for global energy markets and efforts to deal with climate change.
What was the most significant political event?
Signs of political opening in Burma/Myanmar could have profound consequences not only for that country but for the rest of Asia as well. Hillary Clinton became the first U.S. Secretary of State to visit the country in 50 years. Aung San Suu Kyi has been released from detention and the National League for Democracy has re-registered as a political party. If this leads to democratization, it will be remembered as an important turning point.
What new policy and economic trends appeared in 2011? Which of them will continue into the coming year?
There seems to be a subtle shift in views towards China's economy. Chinese government officials are deeply concerned about the "middle income trap." China has reached a level of development where many countries saw their economic growth slow down sharply. Rising incomes are eroding China's advantage in low-cost manufacturing. There is much talk of multinational companies relocating their operations to even cheaper countries, such as Vietnam. This is an important transition for China, and it will remain an important issue in coming years.
In terms of people, who do you feel was the most notable, and who was
the most disappointing this past year?
The people of Japan, who responded with remarkable perseverance, order, and discipline to such a tragic natural disaster.
The most disappointing were the political leaders of Japan, who could not set aside
their differences and come together for the sake of their country.
Will China continue to spread its influence in 2012, and might any countries oppose this process?
China is now the second largest economy in the world and an important military power. It is inevitable that China will rise in international stature and influence. However, Chinese leaders also face some important challenges—rising inequality, an overheated housing market, and bad loans in its financial system. The focus of international attention should be on integrating China into the world order as a peaceful, responsible stakeholder—not on confrontation.
What impact could the economic crisis in Europe have on the economics and international policy of the Asia-Pacific region?
If the financial crisis in Europe is mismanaged, nobody will escape the consequences. Europe is a crucial export market for Asian countries, and European financial institutions are major lenders to emerging economies in the region. Equally as important, repeated financial crises and political mismanagement in the United States, Japan, and Europe could begin to undermine perceptions of democratic government and capitalism.
What will be most important event in Asia next year?
China's leadership transition, particularly given the many immediate challenges the country faces.
Encina Hall
616 Serra Street
Stanford, CA 94305-6055
Gabriela Calderon holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University. Her research interests include policies that affect gender differences in developing countries, policy evaluation, violence in Latin America and the effect of institutions and governance on the provision of public goods and health/education outcomes. She did her master's degree in economic theory and bachelor's degree in economics at the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México. Currently, in the Program on Poverty and Governance, her research analyzes the way institutions and democracy affect the provision of public goods, and the impact they have on health outcomes like infant mortality trends. She is also studying the effects of government interventions that combat drug-trafficking organizations over violence in Mexico.
Her research has focused on the topics of development, public finance, and the evaluation of public policy programs in Mexico. For example, during the summers of 2009/2010, she conducted a field experiment in Zacatecas, Mexico with Giacomo de Giorgi, an assistant professor from Stanford University, and Jesse Cuhna, a former Stanford student. The main task was to evaluate the impact of financial literacy classes on underprivileged women entrepreneurs in the region. To successfully complete an evaluation in an untreated region, they proposed collaborating with the Mexican NGO CREA on a joint project. They contacted local interviewers, trained them, and identified all women entrepreneurs in the 17 communities, in which we conducted the experiment. Preliminary results suggest that the female entrepreneurs who were randomly assigned to treatment earned higher profits, had larger revenues, and served a greater number of clients. They also found that they were more likely to implement formal accounting techniques.
She has also studied programs that are not randomly assigned as an experiment. For example, she has analyzed the effects of a national policy in Mexico of child care services, called Estancias Infantiles para apoyar a Madres Trabajadoras (EI), using administrative, census and household data. Her empirical research strategy identifies the effects of the program on both the men and women who were eligible for the program. She used time, location and eligibility variation, and considered a major threat to identification of the actual effects: for example, a manufacturer who moves into a municipality at approximately the same time as the EI program and who happens to disproportionately demand the skills of women who were eligible to the program happened to have. To ensure that such scenarios do not affect her results, she chose not triple difference strategy, in which all ineligible people are treated as “controls” for the EI-eligible families. Instead, she employs Synthetic Control Methods, using the same methodology as Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2010) to ensure that her control group has the same mix of skills and preferences as the EI-eligible group. She adapted the Synthetic Control Method to analyze repeated cross-sectional household data, which are data that are typically available in developing countries
