The USSR's anti-plague system had four main responsibilities: monitor natural foci of endemic dread diseases such as plague, tularemia, anthrax, and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever; protect the nation from imported exotic diseases (e.g., cholera and smallpox); protect the nation from biological warfare; and perform tasks for the Soviet offensive biological weapons program. Although the anti-plague system appears to have had successes in public health, its work undoubtedly was compromised by excessive secrecy, which led to anti-plague scientists having to overcome substantial barriers before being able to communicate with colleagues in other Soviet public health agencies, publish the results of their work, and undertake travel to non-socialist countries. This system disintegrated after December 1991, but was resurrected as elements of the newly independent states' health systems.

Reporting on the findings of a recently concluded project carried out by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), I will discuss: (1) the threats that the anti-plague systems' human resources, pathogen culture collections, and equipment pose to international security; (2) the promises these systems hold, should they regain their former level of scientific/technical capability, for enhancing international public health; and (3) current activities by U.S. government agencies to lessen the security and safety threats of these systems and, simultaneously, increase their public health capabilities. As appropriate, I will illustrate the presentation with photos taken by CNS personnel in the course of having visited more than 40 anti-plague institutes and stations.

Dr. Raymond Zilinskas worked as a clinical microbiologist for 16 years, after graduating from California State University at Northridge with a BA in Biology, and from University of Stockholm with a Filosofie Kandidat in Organic Chemistry. He then commenced graduate studies at the University of Southern California. His dissertation addressed policy issues generated by recombinant DNA research, including the applicability of genetic engineering techniques for military and terrorist purposes. After earning a PhD, Dr. Zilinskas worked at the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1981-1982), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (1982-1986), and University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute (UMBI) (1987-1998). In addition, he was an Adjunct Associate Professor at the Department of International Health, School of Hygiene and Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, until 1999.

In 1993, Dr. Zilinskas was appointed William Foster Fellow at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), where he worked on biological and toxin warfare issues. In 1994, ACDA seconded Dr. Zilinskas to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), where he worked as a biological analyst for seven months. He participated in two biological warfare-related inspections in Iraq (June and October 1994) encompassing 61 biological research and production facilities. He set up a database containing data about key dual-use biological equipment in Iraq and developed a protocol for UNSCOM's on-going monitoring and verification program in the biological field.

After the fellowship, Dr. Zilinskas returned to the UMBI and Johns Hopkins University. In addition, he continued to serve as a long-term consultant to ACDA (now part of the U.S. Department of State), for which he carried out studies on Cuban allegations of U.S. biological attacks against its people, animals, and plants and investigations carried out by the United Nations of chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and the Arabian Gulf region. Dr. Zilinskas also is a consultant to the U.S. Department of Defense.

In September 1998, Dr. Zilinskas was appointed Senior Scientist at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies. On September 1, 2002, he was promoted to the Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the CNS. His research focuses on achieving effective biological arms control, assessing the proliferation potential of the former Soviet Union's biological warfare program, and meeting the threat of bioterrorism. Dr. Zilinskas' book Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense, a definitive account on how modern biotechnology has qualitatively changed developments related to biological weapons and defense, was published in 1999. In 2005, the important reference work Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense, which is co-edited by Richard Pilch and Dr. Zilinskas, was published by Wiley. He currently is writing a book on the former Soviet Union's biological warfare program, including its history, organization, accomplishments, and proliferation potential, which will be published in 2006.

Congressman Weldon represents the Seventh Congressional District of Pennsylvania. He is in his tenth term and is the most senior Republican in the Pennsylvania delegation. He is a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee and a leading House supporter of a national missile defense program. The Congressman has worked to strengthen the dialogue between the US and North Korea for the past three years. He has worked closely with Ambassador Han of North Korea as well as former Secretary Powell and Ambassador Pritchard to urge both sides to continue their participation in the six-party talks.

General Cha achieved the rank of Lieutenant General in the Army of the Republic of Korea. He has had a distinguished career, serving both in the public and the private sector, including as policy advisor to the Ministry of Unification, director general of the Policy Planning Bureau and deputy minster for Policy, and as an assistant professor in international relations. He has a B.A. in political science from Seoul National University, a B.S. in mechanical engineering from the Korea Military Academy, and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Paris. He is the author of several books and articles on Korean security issues, published in both Korean and English.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has long been based on the principle of national sovereignty, including a norm against interference by one member state in another's domestic affairs. But some members would like to set aside the prohibition in cases such as Myanmar, whose military junta continues to repress Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy to the detriment of ASEAN's image in the West. Opposed to this view are the group's newest, poorer, more continental, and politically more closed members: Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and of course Myanmar itself. They want ASEAN to uphold national sovereignty and reaffirm non-interference. The prospect of Myanmar assuming the chair of ASEAN in 2006-2007 makes this controversery even more acute. Is ASEAN splitting up? Will a compromise be reached? And with what implications for the nature and future of ASEAN and its conservative faction?

Carlyle A. Thayer is the 2004-2005 C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington DC. He has written and lectured widely on Southeast Asian affairs. He has held positions at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (in Hawaii) and the Australian Defence College. His degrees are from the Australian National University (PhD), Yale University (MA), and Brown University (BA).

This is the 10th seminar of the 2004-2005 academic year hosted by the Southeast Asia Forum.

Dr. Sarah Mendelson is a senior fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Before joining CSIS in 2001, she taught international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Dr. Mendelson received her B.A. in history from Yale University, and her Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. She also earned a certificate from the Harriman Institute.

At CSIS, she manages several projects that explore the links between security and human rights. Her current research includes collaborative work on public opinion surveys of Russian attitudes on democracy, human rights, Chechnya and the military. She directed a collaborative study evaluating the impact of Western democracy assistance to Eastern Europe and Eurasia. In addition, she has served on the staff of the National Democratic Institute's Moscow office, and was a resident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. She has also been a fellow at CISAC and at Princeton University's Center of International Studies.

Dr. Mendelson serves on the steering committee of Human Rights Watch, the editorial board of International Security, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security.

Tonya Putnam has a J.D. from Harvard Law School and received her Ph.D. from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University in March 2005. She is currently a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC, but will be moving to the Center on Globalization and Governance at Princeton University for a postdoctoral fellowship next academic year. Her dissertation, Courts Without Borders? The Politics and Law of Extraterritorial Regulation, explores the extraterritorial reach of U.S. federal courts and regulatory institutions, and implications for the development of de facto international regulatory frameworks. Other research areas have included human rights in peace implementation missions, comparative legal responses to the threat of cybercrime and cyberterrorism, risk communication in the context of radiological terrorism (dirty bombs), and obstacles to military reform in Russia.

Has the Bush administration used the War on Terror to consolidate power in the executive branch? Is the United States in danger of undermining civil liberties and laying the foundation for an American police state? Arguing against conventional wisdom the authors answer these questions with an emphatic No. Drawing on evidence from the USA Patriot Act, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the Transportation Security Administration, intelligence reform, and the detention of enemy combatants, the authors argue that what is most striking about US homeland security policy in the wake of 9-11 is just how weak the response of the American state has been. This outcome is contrary to both conventional wisdom and theoretical expectation. The authors argue that this puzzle is best explained by focusing on the institutional structure of US domestic politics.

Jay Stowsky is an adjunct professor at the University of California, Berkeley's School of Information Management and Systems (SIMS) and is the executive drector of UC Berkeley's Services Science Program. Previously, he directed UC Berkeley's program on Information Technology and Homeland Security at the Goldman School of Public Policy and served in the Clinton administration as senior economist for science and technology policy on the staff of the White House Council of Economic Advisers. Stowsky has also served as associate dean at UC Berkeley's Haas School of Business and as director of research policy for the University of California system. He has authored several studies of U.S. technology policy, including "Secrets to Share or Shield: New Dilemmas for Military R&D in the Digital Age," in Research Policy (Vol. 33, No. 2, March 2004) and "The Dual-Use Dilemma," in Issues in Science and Technology (Winter 1996). He is co-author, with Wayne Sandholtz, et al., of The Highest Stakes: The Economic Foundations of the Next Security System (Cambridge Oxford University Press, 1992).

Matthew Kroenig is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley and a Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Fellow at the Institute of Global Conflict and Cooperation. Kroenig's dissertation research explains the conditions under which states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapons states. Previously, he was a research associate with the Information Technology and Homeland Security Project and has also served in government as an intelligence analyst.