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Japan's experience with China's rise thus far suggests an increasingly tumultuous Northeast Asia. For a decade or more, the Sino-Japanese relationship has been punctuated with a series of political crises, and while the two governments in Beijing and Tokyo have sought to define a new forward looking agenda for their nations, it is the management of these crises that have shaped Japanese attitudes towards a rising China. Sheila Smith will present her analysis of Japan's domestic response to China's rise, and how it has affected the constellations of interests that shape Japan's policy response. She argues that these various moments of contention in Japan's relations with China, from Koizumi's Yasukuni Shrine visits, to resource development in the East China Sea, to the Gyoza "war," and the Senkaku "shock," could have provided the opportunity for building cooperative more effective conflict resolution mechanisms in the Sino-Japanese relationship. Yet within Japan, these various issues of contention have hardened Japanese attitudes rather than produced support for greater diplomatic compromise. As Chinese influence grows, Japan's postwar institutions and policy preferences are being sorely tested not only in the diplomatic realm, but from deeply within Japan's own society. Postwar beliefs about Japan's past, its security and its ability to cope with an increasingly volatile Northeast Asia are all being challenged.

Sheila A. Smith, an expert on Japanese politics and foreign policy, is senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Smith directed the Council on Foreign Relation’s New Regional Security Architecture for Asia Program and currently leads a project on China and India as Emerging Powers: Challenge or Opportunity for the United States and Japan? She joined CFR from the East-West Center in 2007, where she directed a multinational research team in a cross-national study of the domestic politics of the U.S. military presence in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Smith was on the faculty of the Department of International Relations at Boston University (1994–2000), and on the staff of the Social Science Research Council (1992–1993). She has been a visiting researcher at two leading Japanese foreign and security policy think tanks, the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Research Institute for Peace and Security, and at the University of Tokyo and the University of the Ryukyus. Smith earned her PhD and MA degrees from the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. She regularly contributes to CFR’s Asia Unbound blog.

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Sheila Smith Senior Fellow for Japan Studies Speaker Council on Foreign Relations
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About the topic: When democracy returned to Pakistan, Americans and Pakistanis had high expectations of an improved partnership. Those expectations have not been met: The events of 2011 were hard on both sides, and pushed the relationship to a series of dangerous crises. What can we expect in 2012 and beyond, not only in bilateral ties, but in the plans both countries have for regional stability in South Asia?

About the Speaker: Cameron Munter was sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan on October 6, 2010. Prior to his nomination, Ambassador Munter completed his tour of duty at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. He served there first as Political-Military Minister-Counselor in 2009, then as Deputy Chief of Mission for the first half of 2010. He served as Ambassador in Belgrade from 2007 to 2009.

In 2006, he led the first Provincial Reconstruction Team in Mosul, Iraq. He was Deputy Chief of Mission in Prague from 2005 to 2007 and in Warsaw from 2002 to 2005. Before these assignments, in Washington, he was Director for Central Europe at the National Security Council (1999-2001), Executive Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State (1998-1999), Director of the Northern European Initiative (1998), and Chief of Staff in the NATO Enlargement Ratification Office (1997-1998). His other domestic assignments include: Country Director for Czechoslovakia at the Department of State (1989-1991), and Dean Rusk Fellow at Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (1991).

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Cameron Munter U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Speaker
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Aziz Huq earned his BA summa cum laude in International Studies and French from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1996 and his law degree from Columbia Law School in 2001, where he was awarded the John Ordronaux Prize. He clerked for Judge Robert D. Sack of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2001–02) and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the Supreme Court of the United States (2003–04). After clerking he worked as Associate Counsel and then Director of the Liberty and National Security Project of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law. He has also been a Senior Consultant Analyst for the International Crisis Group.

His research and teaching interests include constitutional law, national security and counterterrorism, federal jurisdiction, legislation, human rights, and comparative constitutional law.


Abstract

What forum should be employed to adjudicate the status of persons suspected of involvement in terrorism? Recent clashes between Congress and the President as to whether the status of terrorism suspects should be determined via Article III criminal process or military commissions have revived debate on this venue question. The problem is typically framed as a simple matter of law on the assumption that existing statutory and doctrinal rules already furnish dispositive guidance for sorting suspects between civilian and military venues. This article takes issue with that assumption. It argues that the choice of forum question can more profitably be understood as a problem of institutional design rather than a choice of law puzzle. A key institutional design decision that to date has been ignored is whether or when to create jurisdictional redundancy: When, that is, should overlapping jurisdictions vest the government with a choice of forums or an option to retry a suspect acquitted in an initial process? Such redundancy is currently pervasive. But conventional wisdom suggests that it both risks abuse and is needlessly costly. This Article demonstrates that jurisdictional redundancy has complex direct and indirect effects on the accuracy and cost of terrorism-related adjudication. It presents a comprehensive framework for analyzing jurisdictional redundancy by exploring how the latter influences error rates, system maintenance costs, externalities, information production, and incentives. Applying that framework, I suggest the current status quo of pervasive redundancy has surprising merit in contrast to two leading reform proposals.

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Aziz Huq Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School Speaker
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Jacob Shapiro Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University; Co-director, Empirical Studies of Conflict Project Speaker
David Blum Predoctoral Fellow, CISAC Commentator
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David Palkki Deputy Director, National Defense University, Conflict Records Research Center; Co-editor, The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of A Tyrant’s Regime, 1978-2001 Speaker
Martha Crenshaw Professor of Political Science (by courtesy); Senior Fellow, CISAC and FSI Commentator
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Abstract

As the diplomatic standoff in North Korea enters its fourth year, the crisis atmosphere on the Korean peninsula sparked by Pyongyang's military actions in 2010 has eased. Pyongyang has agreed to return to the diplomatic table, its hand strengthened by advancing its nuclear program in the interim. Washington and Seoul remain reluctant to engage, having been burned by Pyongyang's clandestine uranium enrichment program unveiled in 2010. The authors argue that re-engagement, with the immediate objective to stop a third nuclear test and prevent further missile tests, is imperative to contain the nuclear threat for now; preventing the nuclear program's expansion and preparing the way for the ultimate denuclearization of the peninsula—critical goals—must be left to a second step.

 

Note: There is a supplement to this piece with detailed overhead imagery, additional analysis of Pyongyang's march toward a more threatening nuclear weapons capability, and brief commentary on how the accession of Kim Jong-un to leadership may influence North Korea's nuclear trajectory. Click here to access "North Korea from 30,000 Feet"

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
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Siegfried S. Hecker
Robert Carlin
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The sixth session of the Korea-U.S. West Coast Strategic Forum was held in the Bechtel Conference Center at Stanford University on June 8, 2011. Established in 2006 by Stanford University and now convening semi-annually alternating between Stanford and Seoul, the Forum brings together distinguished South Korean (Republic of Korea, or ROK) and American scholars, experts, and former military and civilian officials to discuss North Korea, the U.S.-ROK alliance, and regional dynamics in Northeast Asia. Stanford University’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center is co-organizer of the Forum with the Sejong Institute of Korea. Operating as a closed workshop under the Chatham House Rule of individual confidentiality, the Forum allows participants to engage in candid, in-depth discussion of current issues of vital national interest to both countries.

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Shorenstein APARC
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Beyond NK CROPPED

Why should Americans worry about South Korean security? The answer is clear: North Korea, and beyond. Most international attention to the North Korea problem has focused on U.S. policy, but South Korea's longterm role may in fact be more important. South Korea's security is vital to peace and stability, not only in Northeast Asia but also the wider world.

Written by eminent scholars, practitioners, and policymakers with extensive on-the-ground experience, Beyond North Korea assesses the varied contexts—regional and global, traditional and nontraditional—that underpin South Korea's varied security challenges. What are South Korea's military requirements? How do relations with its neighbors enhance or undermine its position? What economic, environmental, and demographic factors come into play? This book reveals that South Korea's national security rests as much on sound domestic policy choices as on successful interstate relations. 

Desk, examination, or review copies can be requested through Stanford University Press.


Beyond North Korea is the first in a new series of policy-related studies on contemporary South Korea sponsored by the Koret Foundation of San Francisco.

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Future Challenges to South Korea's Security

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Byung Kwan Kim
Gi-Wook Shin
David Straub
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Shorenstein APARC
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The legacy of the late North Korean leader Kim Il Sung's decision in the early 1990s to pursue a strategic partnership with the United States has run its course. In its place, the focus of Pyongyang's policies has decisively shifted to Beijing. However wary the North Koreans may be of their neighbor, the fact is that from Pyongyang's viewpoint, the Chinese have delivered and the United States did not.

Any shards remaining from the North's previous, decades-long effort to normalize ties with the U.S. were swept away by current leader Kim Jong Il's trip in May to China, his third in barely a year. Based on our discussions with Chinese officials, we believe that during that visit, Pyongyang and Beijing came to an understanding that, in preparation for planned, major domestic political events in 2012, both sides require sustained political stability, a convergence of interests that provides the opportunity for expanding bilateral relations beyond anything enjoyed in the past. The North is building toward a "prosperous and powerful" nation in celebration of the Kim Il Sung centenary in April; the Chinese are looking toward their 18th Party Congress scheduled for late next year. In both cases, it was apparently decided, stability on the Korean peninsula would serve economic programs and the succession of a new generation of leaders.

In the arrangements — formal and informal — that emerged from Kim Jong Il's discussions with his hosts, Pyongyang agreed not to "make trouble" (as the Chinese described it to us) in the short term, presumably meaning no deliberate military provocations, no third nuclear test and no launch of another ballistic missile. Beyond that, the talks ended in a compromise that neither side found entirely satisfactory. Kim came away with less aid and a smaller Chinese commitment of support than he had sought, though Pyongyang typically asks for more than it can get.

The North did, however, receive increased access to both Chinese capital and technology in spite ofUnited Nations and other foreign sanctions. Kim also obtained, through the establishment of joint economic zones with China along the Yalu River, a locale to test adjustments necessary to economic development, adjustments that would fall short of what Beijing considers genuine economic reform. Chinese President Hu Jintao, we were told, had to settle for Kim's promise to cause less trouble but without a North Korean commitment to serious steps toward denuclearization.

We believe that this pivot toward Beijing is no routine oscillation in North Korean policy. The drive to normalize relations with the U.S. from 1991 to 2009 had been real, sustained and rooted in Kim Il Sung's deep concern about the regime's future in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Perhaps there was no better demonstration of the North's approach in those years than the situation on Oct. 25, 2000 — the 50th anniversary of the entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers into theKorean War. Who was in Pyongyang on that date meeting Kim Jong Il? The Chinese defense minister? No, he was cooling his heels while Kim met with the U.S. secretary of State. That was no accident of scheduling on Pyongyang's part; it would not happen again today.

If the paradigm shift is real, we expect the North in the near to medium term to make far less overt trouble. Less tension on the Korean peninsula? What could be wrong with that? Nothing, as long as it is understood that such tranquillity will also provide a veil for the North's continuing pursuit of nuclear weapons and increasingly sophisticated delivery systems. With the onset of stability and growing Chinese-North Korean cooperation, Pyongyang may well calculate that the outside world's focus on the North Korean nuclear program will become diffuse. Indeed, the North Koreans have long assumed that given enough time, the world would resign itself to their nuclear weapons, as happened with India and Pakistan.

To help things along, it isn't out of the question that Pyongyang might even agree to some U.S. efforts to contain the nuclear program through a series of what Washington calls "pre-steps." The North has repeatedly expressed willingness to consider discussion of its uranium enrichment program and moratoriums on missile and nuclear tests. As unilateral actions, these would have short-term benefits by further stabilizing the situation to provide additional room for discussions. But in the absence of long, serious negotiations between the two sides, they will turn out to be no more meaningful than the ill-considered agreements of the now moribund six-party talks.

All of which brings us back to the deepening North Korean-Chinese ties, and the downgrading in Pyongyang's calculations of relations with the United States. There was considerable momentum behind the North's strategy for engaging the U.S. in past negotiations. That is no longer the case, with consequences we have only started to feel.

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Los Angeles Times
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Robert Carlin
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Recent events in the U.S. have raised concerns about the safety and security of research with hazardous microbial agents, particularly with regard to the insider threat. The anthrax letters of 2001 and several technical surprises in legitimate infectious disease research, led to a series of high-level committee recommendations on safety and security of the ongoing work. When a scientist from a U.S. military high-containment laboratory was implicated in the anthrax letters case, the president and congress called for more regulation. Subsequently, a series of steps to reduce the risk have been proposed: from armed guards, pathogen accountability and medical and psychological exams for scientists to training, ethical frameworks, codes of conduct and standards of quality research. Franz will discuss the implications of these events on both security and productive research in support of public health and the life-sciences enterprise, and the important role of leadership and culture in enhancing both safety and security.


About the speaker: Dave Franz is a Vice President and Chief Biological Scientist at MRIGlobal. He served in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command for 23 of 27 years on active duty and retired as Colonel. He served as Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and as Deputy Commander of the Medical Research and Materiel Command. Prior to joining the Command, he served as Group Veterinarian for the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Dr. Franz was Technical Editor for the Textbook of Military Medicine on Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare released in 1997. He serves on numerous national committees and boards. Dr. Franz holds an adjunct appointment as Professor for the Department of Diagnostic Medicine and Pathobiology at the College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State University. The current focus of his activities relates to the role of international engagement in the life sciences as a component of national security policy.

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Dave Franz Vice President and Chief Biological Scientist Speaker MRIGlobal
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