This issue of CHP/PCOR's quarterly newsletter covers news and developments from the summer 2004 quarter. It features articles about:

PURPOSE

Smoking is the leading controllable risk factor for heart disease. Only about 69% of U.S. indoor workers are currently covered by a smoke-free workplace policy. This analysis projects the cardiovascular health and economic effects of making all U.S. workplaces smoke free after 1 year and at steady state.

METHODS

We estimated the number of U.S. indoor workers not covered by smoke-free workplace policies, and the effects of making all workplaces smoke free on smoking behavior and on the relative risks of acute myocardial infarctions and strokes. One-year and steady-state results were calculated using an exponential decline model. A Monte Carlo simulation was performed for a sensitivity analysis.

RESULTS

The first-year effect of making all workplaces smoke free would produce about 1.3 million new quitters and prevent over 950 million cigarette packs from being smoked annually, worth about $2.3 billion in pretax sales to the tobacco industry. In 1 year, making all workplaces smoke free would prevent about 1500 myocardial infarctions and 350 strokes, and result in nearly $49 million in savings in direct medical costs. At steady state, 6250 myocardial infarctions and 1270 strokes would be prevented, and $224 million would be saved in direct medical costs annually. Reductions in passive smoking would account for 60% of effects among acute myocardial infarctions.

CONCLUSION

Making all U.S. workplaces smoke free would result in considerable health and economic benefits within 1 year. Reductions in passive smoking would account for a majority of these savings. Similar effects would occur with enactment of state or local smoke-free policies.

BACKGROUND: Given the threat of bioterrorism and the increasing availability of electronic data for surveillance, surveillance systems for the early detection of illnesses and syndromes potentially related to bioterrorism have proliferated.

PURPOSE: To critically evaluate the potential utility of existing surveillance systems for illnesses and syndromes related to bioterrorism.

DATA SOURCES: Databases of peer-reviewed articles (for example, MEDLINE for articles published from January 1985 to April 2002) and Web sites of relevant government and nongovernment agencies.

STUDY SELECTION: Reports that described or evaluated systems for collecting, analyzing, or presenting surveillance data for bioterrorism-related illnesses or syndromes.

DATA EXTRACTION: From each included article, the authors abstracted information about the type of surveillance data collected; method of collection, analysis, and presentation of surveillance data; and outcomes of evaluations of the system.

DATA SYNTHESIS: 17 510 article citations and 8088 government and nongovernmental Web sites were reviewed. From these, the authors included 115 systems that collect various surveillance reports, including 9 syndromic surveillance systems, 20 systems collecting bioterrorism detector data, 13 systems collecting influenza-related data, and 23 systems collecting laboratory and antimicrobial resistance data. Only the systems collecting syndromic surveillance data and detection system data were designed, at least in part, for bioterrorism preparedness applications. Syndromic surveillance systems have been deployed for both event-based and continuous bioterrorism surveillance. Few surveillance systems have been comprehensively evaluated. Only 3 systems have had both sensitivity and specificity evaluated.

LIMITATIONS: Data from some existing surveillance systems (particularly those developed by the military) may not be publicly available.

CONCLUSIONS: Few surveillance systems have been specifically designed for collecting and analyzing data for the early detection of a bioterrorist event. Because current evaluations of surveillance systems for detecting bioterrorism and emerging infections are insufficient to characterize the timeliness or sensitivity and specificity, clinical and public health decision making based on these systems may be compromised.

In spite of advances made in our understanding of the biology of the hepatitis C virus (HCV), the epidemiology and natural history of HCV infection, and the treatment of chronic hepatitis C, the development and worldwide implementation of a comprehensive prevention and control strategy remains necessary. A World Health Organization informal consultation with the Viral Hepatitis Prevention Board was convened and met in Geneva, Switzerland, 13-14 May 2002, to review epidemiological and public health aspects of HCV infection, and the various prevention and control strategies that are currently in place. Based on the presentations and discussions, a number of specific recommendations were made, which should be considered in conjunction with previously published recommendations.

The anthrax attacks of 2001, the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and weapons of mass destruction tabletop exercises have made it clear that no single community can prepare fully, nor respond completely, to a large-scale bioterrorism event. Policymakers recognize the need to forge relationships and coordinate preparedness planning efforts at the local, state, national, and international levels.1 However, there is little consensus about the optimal level of localization or regionalization for each of the resources and services that must be operationalized during a bioterrorism response.

We sought to evaluate the evidence regarding the effectiveness of existing regional systems that facilitate a response to bioterrorism. We sought evidence regarding the tasks that would need to be performed during a bioterrorism response (such as triage, provision of emergency medical care, transportation, and surveillance) and regionalized organizations that would likely contribute personnel, material, and information required to perform these bioterrorism response tasks.

The key questions addressed in this report are:

*What are the key tasks of local responders - such as local public health officials, clinicians, and emergency medical personnel - during a bioterrorism event?

*What resources do local responders require to perform the tasks identified in Key Question 1?

*Which existing regional systems for delivery of goods and services could be relevant to supplying the resources identified in Key Question 2?

*Can regionalization of bioterrorism preparedness planning facilitate supplying needed resources to local responders during a bioterrorism event?

*How do geographic variations in the affected population (e.g., urban as opposed to rural), special populations, and the interplay of private and public sector players affect regionalized systems?

OBJECTIVES: The authors sought to develop a conceptual framework for evaluating whether existing information technologies and decision support systems (IT/DSSs) would assist the key decisions faced by clinicians and public health officials preparing for and responding to bioterrorism.

METHODS: They reviewed reports of natural and bioterrorism related infectious outbreaks, bioterrorism preparedness exercises, and advice from experts to identify the key decisions, tasks, and information needs of clinicians and public health officials during a bioterrorism response. The authors used task decomposition to identify the subtasks and data requirements of IT/DSSs designed to facilitate a bioterrorism response. They used the results of the task decomposition to develop evaluation criteria for IT/DSSs for bioterrorism preparedness. They then applied these evaluation criteria to 341 reports of 217 existing IT/DSSs that could be used to support a bioterrorism response. Main Results: In response to bioterrorism, clinicians must make decisions in 4 critical domains (diagnosis, management, prevention, and reporting to public health), and public health officials must make decisions in 4 other domains (interpretation of bioterrorism surveillance data, outbreak investigation, outbreak control, and communication). The time horizons and utility functions for these decisions differ. From the task decomposition, the authors identified critical subtasks for each of the 8 decisions. For example, interpretation of diagnostic tests is an important subtask of diagnostic decision making that requires an understanding of the tests' sensitivity and specificity. Therefore, an evaluation criterion applied to reports of diagnostic IT/DSSs for bioterrorism asked whether the reports described the systems' sensitivity and specificity. Of the 217 existing IT/DSSs that could be used to respond to bioterrorism, 79 studies evaluated 58 systems for at least 1 performance metric.

CONCLUSIONS: The authors identified 8 key decisions that clinicians and public health officials must make in response to bioterrorism. When applying the evaluation system to 217 currently available IT/DSSs that could potentially support the decisions of clinicians and public health officials, the authors found that the literature provides little information about the accuracy of these systems.

This compendium of articles provides a clear view of the factors affecting the health of Americans and the role of public health, medical care, and the community in ensuring the nation's health. The Seventh Edition continues the emphasis of earlier editions on the health of the population, the determinants of health, women's health, long term care, and the precarious set of circumstances faced by the nation's public health and health care systems as we begin the 21st century.

New issues, particularly related to bioterrorism and community health are addressed in this edition. This volume also includes coverage of tobacco, immunizations, HIV/AIDS, environmental health, dietary guidelines, physical activity, and food safety. In addition, a major new feature is an article on community problem solving, emphasizing a multidisciplinary approach to collaborative practice and research to improve community health.

This abstract was presented at the Annual Meeting for the American Public Health Association on November 17, 2003.