There are 30 civil wars underway around the globe, where civilians are dealing with death and destruction as well as public health emergencies exacerbated by the deadly march of conflict.

Yemen is battling an unprecedented cholera outbreak which has killed more than 2,150 people this year, with another 700,000 suspected cases of the water-borne disease. The government and a rival faction have been fighting for control of the country, taking 10,000 lives since 2015.

Some 17 children in Syria have been paralyzed from a confirmed polio outbreak in northeastern districts, with 48 cases reported in a country that had not had a case of polio since 1999. The cases are concentrated in areas controlled by opponents of President Bashar al-Assad.

And in the Democratic Republic of Congo — where the civil war officially ended years ago, but thousands of people still suffer from recurrent uprisings and scant infrastructure — a yellow fever outbreak was met last year with a lack of vaccines. The WHO was forced to give inoculations containing a fifth of the normal dose, providing protection for only one year.

And yet today, of the nearly 200 countries on this planet, only six nations — three rich ones and three poor ones — have taken steps to evaluate their ability to withstand a global pandemic.

“The bottom line is that despite the profound global threat of pandemics, there remains no global health mechanism to force parties to act in accordance with global health interests,” write FSI’s Paul Wise and Michele Barry in the Fall 2017 issue of Daedalus.

“There also persists inherent disincentives for countries to report an infectious outbreak early in its course,” the authors write. “The economic impact of such a report can be profound, particularly for countries heavily dependent upon tourism or international trade.”

China, for example, hesitated to report the SARS outbreak in 2002 for fear of instability during political transition and embarrassment over early mishandling of the outbreak. Reporting cases of the 2013 Ebola outbreak in West Africa were slow and the virus killed some 11,300 people in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia before the epidemic was declared over in January 2016.

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“Tragic delays in raising the alarm about the Ebola outbreak in West Africa were laid at the doorstep of the affected national authorities and the regional WHO committees, which were highly concerned about the economic and social implications of reporting an outbreak,” Wise and Barry write in the journal published by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

The Daedalus issue, “Civil War & Global Disorder: Threats and Opportunity,” explores the

factors and influences of contemporary civil wars. The 12 essays look at the connection of intrastate strife and transnational terrorism, the limited ambitions of intervening powers, and the many direct and indirect consequences associated with weak states and civil wars.

“Wise and Barry, both medical doctors with extensive field experience in violence-prone developing countries, analyze the relationship between epidemics and intrastate warfare,” write FSI’s Karl Eikenberry and Stephen D. Krasner in their introduction to the issue that includes eight essays by Stanford University faculty.

“Their discussion is premised on the recognition that infectious pandemics can threaten the international order, and that state collapse and civil wars may elevate the risk that pandemics will break out,” they wrote.

Eikenberry and Krasner are hosting a panel discussion about the new volume of Daedalus with FSI senior scholars, including Wise and Barry, on Oct. 23. Members of the Stanford community and the public are invited and can RSVP here. Podcasts with the authors will also be available at FSI’s World Class site over the next few weeks.

Prevention, Detection and Response

Barry and Wise believe there is significant technical capacity to ensure that local infectious outbreaks are not transformed into global pandemics. But those outbreaks require some level of organized and effective governance — and political will.

Prevention, detection, and response are the keys to controlling the risk of a pandemic. Yet it’s almost impossible for these to coincide in areas of conflict.

Prevention includes solid immunization programs and efforts to reduce the risk of animal-to-human spillover associated with exposure to rodents, monkeys and bats.

Then, early detection of an infectious outbreak with pandemic potential is crucial, through a methodical surveillance structure to collect and test samples drawn from domestic and wild animals, a capacity sorely lacking in areas of conflict and weak governance.

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“Civil wars commonly disrupt traditional means of communication,” they write. “The Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa exposed glaring weaknesses in the global strategy to control pandemic outbreaks in areas with minimal public health capacity.”

New strategies that utilize satellite or other technology to link remote or insecure areas to surveillance are urgently needed, they said.

Then there is the response in countries where civil war not only makes it difficult, but politically treacherous.

In Syria, there had not been a case of polio reported since 1999. In 2013, health workers began to see children with the kind of paralysis that is associated with a highly contagious polio outbreak.

“However, the government and regional WHO office have been intensely criticized for their slow and uneven response,” the authors note, particularly the government’s resistance to mobilizing immunization efforts in areas sympathetic to opposition forces.

Pressure from international health organizations and neighbors in the region ultimately led to the reinstatement of vaccination campaigns throughout Syria.   

“The Syrian polio outbreak is an important reminder that health interventions, though technical in nature, can be transformed into political currency when certain conditions are met,” they write. “At the most basic level, the destruction or withholding of essential health capabilities can be used to coerce adversaries into political compliance, if not complete submission.”

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Strengthening Global Oversight

The only comprehensive global framework for pandemic detection and control, the authors write, is the International Health Regulations treaty, which was signed in 2005 by 196 member-nations of the World Health Organization to work together for global health security.

The IHR imposed a deadline of 2012 for all states to have in place the necessary capacities to detect, report and respond to local infectious outbreaks. But only a few parties have reported meeting these requirements, and one-third has not even begun the process. There have also been efforts to enhance state reporting of health systems capacities through voluntary assessments of countries working through the Global Health Security Agenda consortium.

But both frameworks, Barry said in an interview, need financial and political support.

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“I see a stronger IHR with more than words — but actual money behind it in order for it to become stronger,” said Barry, noting the Global Health Security Agenda ends in 2018 and she has been asked to sit on a NAAS task force to form its next iteration. “I’m hoping we can move the needle to put money into bio-surveillance and health security, especially in conflict areas.”

Why should Americans care?

“Pathogens know no borders,” Barry said. “And with climate change, we have tremendous movement of vectors; with globalization and billions of people routinely in flight, we have tremendous health threats traveling first class and coach.”

Twenty Countries at High Risk

Meanwhile, some 20 countries are at high risk for pandemic emergence. The two Stanford professors are urgently calling for “new approaches that better integrate the technical and political challenges inherent in preventing pandemics in areas of civil war.”

Wise and Barry note that human factors, such as the expansion of populations into previously forested areas, domesticated animal production practices, food shortages, and alterations in water usage and flows, have been the primary drivers of altered ecological relationships.

So globalization with climate change brews the perfect storm.

“There is substantial evidence that climate change is reshaping ecological interactions and vector prevalence adjacent to human populations,” they said. “Enhanced trade and air transportation have increased the risk that an outbreak will spread widely. While infectious outbreaks can be due to all forms of infectious agents, including bacteria, parasites, and fungi — viruses are of the greatest pandemic concern.”

Science suggests the greatest danger of pandemic lies in tropical and subtropical regions where human and animals are most likely to interact. Most of the estimated 400 emerging infectious diseases that have been identified since 1940 have been zoonoses, or infections that have been transmitted from animals to humans. The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), for example, is believed to have emerged from a simian host in Central Africa.

Recent analyses have suggested that the “hotspots” for emerging infectious diseases overlap substantially with areas plagued by civil conflict and political instability. 

The U.S. Agency for International Development and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have been working on the Emerging Pandemic Threats Program to improve local pandemic detection and response capacities by directing resources and training to countries thought to be at high risk for pandemic. However, it is not clear that this and related programs are addressing the political dynamics at the local level that will determine the essential cooperation of local communities with any imposed global health security response.

“The unpredictability of a serious infectious outbreak, the speed with which it can disseminate, and the fears of domestic political audience can together create a powerful destabilizing force,” Wise and Barry write in their conclusion. “Current discussions regarding global health governance reform have largely been preoccupied by the performance and intricate bureaucratic interaction of global health agencies. However, what may prove far more critical may be the ability of global health governance structures to recognize and engage the complex, political realities on the ground in areas plagued by civil war.”

Rural areas of China have made remarkable progress in reducing adult mortality within the past 15 years yet broadened health insurance was not a casual factor in that decline, according to a new study by an international research team that includes Asia Health Policy Program Director Karen Eggleston.

The New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), a government-subsidized insurance program that began in 2002-03, expanded to cover all of rural China within a decade. Examining NCMS and cause-specific mortality data for a sample of 72 counties between 2004 and 2012, the researchers found that there were no significant effects of health insurance expansion on increased life expectancy.

The study, published in the September issue of Health Affairs, showed results consistent with previous studies that also did not find a correlation between insurance and survival, although much research confirms NCMS increased access to healthcare, including preventive services, and shielded families from high health expenditures.

Commenting on the study, Eggleston said population health policies remain central to China’s efforts to increase life expectancy and to bridge the gap between rural and urban areas.

Eggleston also noted that multiple factors beyond the availability of health care determine how long people live, and anticipates the research team will continue to explore the impacts of NCMS by extending the study to look at infants and youth.

Read the study (may require subscription) and view a related article on the Stanford Scope blog.

Design learning and journey maps are all the rage here at Stanford University and in Silicon Valley. So why not apply it to health systems to reduce diagnostic errors?

That’s what Stanford Health Policy’s Kathryn M. McDonald is trying to do: Map the journey of worrisome scenarios that keep clinicians up at night, and then plant design seeds that might just help those clinicians get back to sleep.

One of those real-world scenarios involves a preventable diagnostic error made as a high-risk condition unfolds across multiple visits to the doctor. Missed cancer diagnoses, for example, are the leading cause for paid medical malpractice claims in the ambulatory setting, with one in 20 patients experiencing potentially preventable diagnostic errors each year.

“For example, a patient who has a positive fecal blood test, but no follow-up colonoscopy within a reasonable period may experience a missed opportunity to detect and successfully treat colon cancer,” McDonald said.

McDonald and her team worked with San Francisco public health clinics that cater to low-income patients to investigate this key problem — missed diagnosis and prevention activities during outpatient care — then came up with design seeds to plant possible solutions.

She and her co-authors published their research in the journal Implementation Science. The project was conducted at the Ambulatory Safety Center for Innovation (ASCENT), a patient safety learning laboratory led by Dr. Urmimala Sarkar at University of California San Francisco, and funded by the federal Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.

The team used a research design approach called “journey mapping,” a tool that tells the story of a customer’s experience through his own viewpoint. They constructed maps for each pathway used by doctors to monitor patients with sinister findings, starting with the initial diagnostic assessment during an initial clinic visit and continuing through ongoing follow-up visits.

“Whenever participants in the study verbalized elements of the pathway that were particularly vulnerable to error or poor monitoring, we marked the activity with a bullseye target, also referred to by clinicians as a ‘pain point,’” the authors wrote. “To our knowledge, this technique has seldom been applied to the ambulatory setting, and has not been targeted to clinic workflow efficiency or patient safety intervention development.”

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“A design seed gives the specs for what a solution needs to do,” said McDonald, who is the executive director of Stanford Health Policy’s Center for Health Policy and Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research. “Once you know the vulnerabilities through journey mapping, you create all the design seeds that are tied to the problem, then the implementation stage becomes much more straightforward and more likely to assure that all the key goals are met.”

To test out this theory, McDonald’s team spent the last two years working with doctors, residents, nurse practitioners and registered nurses with the San Francisco Health Network. The publicly funded integrated health network operates under the auspices of the San Francisco Department of Public Health and includes 14 primary care clinics, as well as urgent and specialty care at Zuckerberg San Francisco General hospital.

“The health system serves many of the most medically and socially vulnerable patients in San Francisco,” the authors wrote in their research paper. “Like many safety-net systems and ambulatory practices, the health system does not have a comprehensive electronic health record system and struggles with information transfer as well as fragmentation of health information across over 50 electronic platforms.”

The health system had more than half a million outpatient visits last year by people who could not afford care. Patients at the network’s main clinics and hospital are diverse: 35 percent are Latino, 21 percent are white, another 21 percent are Asians, and 17 percent are African-American.

Only 1 percent of the network population has commercial insurance; 10 percent were uninsured; 57 percent were on Medi-Cal — California’s Medicaid program — 21 percent were on Medicare and the remaining 11 percent were covered by other, mostly public sources.

This type of ambulatory health care is complex, requiring constant tracking and reconciliation of individual patient activities, patient data, and the unique evolution of each clinical case.

"Human factors and industrial design methodologies have tremendous potential to help unravel these complexities and provide fundamental insights that can drive the development of novel solutions," said co-author George Su of the University of California San Francisco School of Medicine.

McDonald said that journey mapping helped frontline clinic members see their workflow for a specific task, which in this case was monitoring this diverse population for follow-up visits after a potentially sinister finding. The system challenge is population management of an ill-defined problem.

“Lots of ambulatory care work is done one patient interaction at a time, but robust monitoring requires a view from a higher plane,” she said in an interview. “Journey mapping makes the aerial view more tangible and realistic for clinic team input.”

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McDonald’s team selected high-risk cancer situations: incidentally discovered pulmonary nodules; monitoring for breast, colorectal and prostate cancers; and ear, nose and throat cancers. These high-risk cancers require recurring and timely follow-up care to assure intervention whenever the disease takes hold.

The team interviewed clinicians from each of five specialty clinics responsible for these high-risk patients in pulmonary medicine, breast cancer, gastroenterology, urology, and otolaryngology. They asked the frontline clinicians: “What keeps you up and night? And what are your clinical hunches about who might fall through the cracks?”

While the providers talked about the types of patients who become lost to follow-up visits, the researchers found, none of the clinics had a standardized and efficient method of quantifying how many patients were lost to follow-up care and, perhaps more importantly, why.

“Many other health networks share similar struggles with incomplete documentation and measuring the real-time scope of patient safety problems,” wrote McDonald and co-authors Sarkar, Su and Sarah Lisker of the University of California San Francisco School of Medicine; and Emily S. Patterson of Ohio State University College of Medicine.

“When a patient has a warning signal for a serious condition that has yet to materialize but may in the future, the ability of a clinical team to watch the patient closely over time hinges on incredible vigilance on the part of individual clinicians — hardly an ideal solution,” McDonald said.

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This is the crux of the problem, she said, and where so-called “design seeds” are planted.

“The design seeds lay the groundwork in a very specific fashion. Journey mapping and process tracing figure out the problem, in our case, vulnerabilities, and then the design seeds are the first-stage of the solution,” McDonald said. “It’s very user-focused, learning directly from those who are on the frontlines of the work, and making sure that the problem is specified in a way that allows for the developments of solutions that can scale more flexibly during implementation.”

The team identified 45 vulnerabilities within San Francisco’s publicly funded health clinics.

“Repeatedly, we heard that clinicians worry about properly tracking these patients, and are troubled by the significant personnel time required in carrying out patient-level monitoring activities without tools and organization approaches for population-level monitoring,” they wrote.

But even then, the team did not jump straight to solutions. That’s the next step.

The team will launch a pilot project to test possible solutions that will grow from the design seeds, such as whether new digital technology, workflow arrangements, and structured data collection could help find those patients lost in the cracks of an overloaded system.

“Such focused and potentially scalable work is particularly needed for patients who may be lost to follow-up in systems that are stretched for dollars and time,” the authors concluded. “Providers will often create informal workarounds in response to the lack of comprehensive and coordinated record-keeping systems, which can result in errors as well as redundant efforts.”

The ASCENT team is already implementing a monitoring solution informed by the journey mapping activities, in subspecialty care clinics at Zuckerberg San Francisco General, by testing technical and workflow models.

“We determined the need for a registry for high-risk patients in the otolaryngology clinic to help us monitor the entire process,” said Sarkar, a primary care physician and head of the ASCENT lab at UCSF. “This means the final diagnosis, workup and treatment planning, the actual treatment itself and then surveillance and follow-up.”

After going in for a routine procedure, a man ends up with a punctured lung and a medical emergency. A woman's surgery goes well until her stomach is stitched up with a sponge inside. Most of us feel safe going to the doctor, but the road to high-quality care was not straightforward. In this FSI World Class Podcast, Stanford Health Policy's Kathryn McDonald tells us how the safe, high-quality care we expect got where it is today and what we can do to maintain it. Kathryn McDonald is the Executive Director of the Center for Health Policy/Primary Care and Outcomes Research at Stanford University.

And in this Q&A posted on Medium, McDonald responds to the age-old question: How can we improve the quality of health care?

"One of the lead agencies that’s responsible for generating evidence and moving it into practice is the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). They’re under Health and Human Services. They have a major program called AHRQ’s Evidence Now aimed at improving heart health in America. Lots of people are on aspirin to prevent heart attacks, but there are also lots of people who could benefit from it who aren’t on it. They’re working with the health-care delivery system to figure out how to get patients who need to be on aspirin to use it. These are driven by reforms to make the delivery system accountable for patients’ health. If you can change behavior — either of patients or of physicians — you can save more lives."

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