Stephen D. Krasner, the Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, and senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) and the Hoover Institution, has been named deputy director of FSI, announced FSI Director Coit D. Blacker, the Olivier Nomellini Professor in International Studies. Larry Diamond, a senior fellow at FSI and the Hoover Institution, and professor, by courtesy, of political science and sociology, has been named director of FSI's Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law (CDDRL).

Krasner succeeds political science Professor Michael McFaul, former deputy director of FSI and CDDRL director, who has joined the Obama administration as special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs and senior director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council.  Diamond will direct CDDRL while McFaul is on leave.

"We are delighted that Steve Krasner and Larry Diamond are assuming these leadership roles at this dynamic time in FSI's growth and development," said Blacker. "Steve and Larry's exemplary scholarship, research, and teaching, and their passionate commitment to the expansion of democracy and good governance, are a wellspring of inspiration to Stanford faculty and students, and to current and aspiring leaders the world over."

Krasner served as deputy director of FSI and CDDRL director from January 2003 to January of 2005. He then served as director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State from February 2005 through April of 2007. In that role, Krasner was the driving force behind foreign assistance reform designed to more effectively target American foreign aid. He was also involved in activities related to the promotion of good governance and democratic institutions around the world.

Among extensive publications, Krasner is the author of Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and American Foreign Policy (1978), Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism (1985), and Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999). Publications he has edited include Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities (2001). He taught at Harvard and UCLA before coming to Stanford in 1981.

Krasner received a BA in history from Cornell University, an MA in international affairs from Columbia University, and a PhD in political science from Harvard. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Diamond is the founding coeditor of the Journal of Democracy, the co-director of the International Forum for Democratic Studies of the National Endowment for Democracy, and has been coordinating CDDRL's democracy program. His newest book, The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World (Times Books, 2008), explores the sources of democratic progress and stress and the prospects for future democratic expansion.

Diamond's other published works include Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq (Times Books, 2005), Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (1999), Promoting Democracy in the 1990s (1995), and Class, Ethnicity, and Democracy in Nigeria (1998).

In May 2007, Diamond was named "Teacher of the Year" by the Associated Students of Stanford University for teaching "that transcends political and ideological barriers." At Stanford Commencement ceremonies in June 2007, he was honored with the Dinkelspiel Award for Distinctive Contributions to Undergraduate Education and cited, inter alia, for "the example he sets as a scholar and public intellectual, sharing his passion for democratization, peaceful transitions, and the idea that each of us can contribute to making the world a better place."

Diamond received a BA, MA and PhD from Stanford, all in sociology.

Krasner and Diamond are part of the distinguished Stanford faculty group who lead the Draper Hills Summer Fellows on Democracy and Development Program each summer, which brings to Stanford some 30 rising leaders from major transitioning countries such as Russia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Kenya to examine and foster linkages among democracy, sustainable economic development, and good governance.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s apparent stroke in mid-August raises the possibility of near-term political succession in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea). This has prompted U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) planners—concerned with command and control of North Korea’s fissile material under conditions of regime disarray, internecine conflict, or collapse—to examine afresh the alliance’s assumptions, contingency plans, and political strategies.

The Korean Peninsula occupies a central place in the Chinese national security calculus. Chinese policy above all aims to avert military conflict on the Peninsula and regime collapse in the North. Conflict and collapse scenarios could embroil China in unwanted military action, imperil its long-term economic development program, jeopardize its crucial ties with the United States and South Korea, open the floodgates to North Korean refugees, and alter the Northeast Asian strategic landscape to China’s disadvantage.

For these and other reasons, China has emphasized the need for a peaceful, negotiated resolution of the problem posed by North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. It has encouraged North Korea to emulate, to the extent feasible, China’s own post-1978 economic reforms. At the same time, China has deepened political and commercial ties with South Korea, and sustained the North Korean regime through generous economic and military assistance.

China’s core interests—plus its special ties with North Korea’s military, party, security, and economic elite—have persuaded many outside observers that Beijing possesses not only unique insights into the Pyongyang regime’s internal dynamics but also potential leverage. Further, many assume that China, having both the need and ability to influence North Korea’s political succession, will do precisely that—shape, or if necessary impose, a North Korean succession that accords with China’s policy interests.
China has consistently denied having superior knowledge and usable leverage, and has adamantly rebuffed speculation regarding its national ambitions and potential actions.

Such disclaimers notwithstanding, some in the ROK and the United States postulate that national and alliance interests might best be served by “coordinating” with China on North Korean regime change/collapse scenarios. A few even argue that the alliance should “subcontract” this issue to China, thereby tacitly acquiescing in its intervention to ensure a peaceful, stable transition.

Despite the high stakes, crucial U.S.-ROK contingency planning seemingly has been approached in an environment that is rich in conjecture and hope, and poor in hard intelligence and agreed assessments.
Yet it is possible—indeed imperative—to do better than this. With respect to one small part of the complex whole—China’s interests, potential leverage, and likely actions—a starting point for rigorous
analysis might include the following issues and questions:

Knowledge : Does China in fact enjoy superior knowledge of internal DPRK decision-making? What are the sources of and limits upon such knowledge? How have the North Koreans approachedspecial bilateral ties with the Chinese in the realms of party-to-party affairs and military cooperation?
Are there reasons to believe that China contributed to North Korea’s nuclear program? If not, are there reasons to believe that North Korea shared any knowledge whatsoever of its activities with China? Has China sought to cultivate North Korean officials and, if so, when, and how successfully?  How has North Korea reacted to any such Chinese activities?

Leverage: How much leverage does China enjoy over North Korean political, military, and economic decisions? What are the sources of such leverage? What are the constraints? How should one assess North Korea’s likely response to Chinese pressure? What options does North Korea enjoy in deflecting such pressure?

A Proactive Approach by China to North Korean Political Succession : What posture is China likely to adopt toward political succession in North Korea? What are its policy options? What assets does it hold? How does the issue of North Korean succession—including the possibility of regime chaos or collapse—fit into China’s broad strategic posture? What external considerations (especially those involving the ROK, the United States, Japan, and Russia) must China take into account?

ROK and U.S. Policy Considerations Regarding China’s Potential Involvement in a North Korean • Political Succession: What essential posture should the ROK and the United States adopt? On the one hand, should they enlist China’s cooperation in “managing” political succession in North Korea, or endeavor to minimize that involvement, instead addressing North Korean succession scenarios as primarily a task for the U.S.-ROK alliance? On the other hand, should they accept (and even tacitly encourage) China’s superior ability to effect a stable succession that preserves peace and stability? Should they broaden the scope of the current six-party talks to include formal discussion among “the five” (excepting North Korea)? Or should some other approach be adopted?

On one level, U.S. and ROK planners must urgently address these issues in order to have confidence that the two allies can deal smoothly with any North Korean political succession scenario. On a deeper level, a rigorous bilateral analysis of this type can serve to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance itself by fully illuminating a broader set of underlying national attitudes, interests, and priorities.