Russia’s war in Ukraine has been roundly condemned in the West. NATO members have continued to supply Ukraine with weaponry while the EU, US and their allies have ensured that the Russian economy remains under the most extensive and intensive set of sanctions in history. Yet many leaders of countries in the global south have been far more hesitant to condemn Russian actions. Some have merely abstained in United Nations resolutions criticizing Russia, while others have remained neutral. This paper will endeavor to explain why the global south has such a different perspective from the global north on Russia’s war in Ukraine. I argue that this is a result of America’s withdrawal from the global south over the last two decades and Russia’s reemergence in many parts of the Middle East, Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America and Asia.

This paper starts with a comparison between the Russian policies toward the occupied Donbas regions and the Russian administration of the colonized Ukrainian lands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Then, we describe how these policies affected the population of the Donetsk and Luhansk Popular Republics and the position of the indigenous population in the newly established colonial framework. Finally, we describe how the  Russian government uses the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk Popular Republics as sources of ideological resources to maintain the dictatorial regime of Vladimir Putin.

Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia has experienced its largest wave of emigration since 1917. While estimates on the number of Russians who have fled wartime Russia vary widely, most sources estimate the number to be anywhere between 500,000 and 1,000,000. The majority of wartime émigrés have fled to nearby destination countries including but not limited to Georgia, Kazakhstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan, while a smaller number have gone further, relocating to countries in the EU, Southeast Asia and Latin America. Broadly speaking, the émigrés are younger and more prosperous than the average Russian citizen, have higher levels of education, and are driven more so by political push factors than members of previous waves. Many of the recent émigrés were engaged in political activism against the regime before emigrating; some worked as journalists, NGO employees, academics and activists, while others were dissidents of the regime at large.

While these general characteristics offer some clues about the composition of the wartime flight from Russia, many questions remain unanswered about the émigrés, their future prospects and their positionality in relation to Russia and their host communities. For instance, are émigrés staying in their destination countries or do they plan on relocating further? Have wartime émigrés found like-minded communities in their host countries? In what ways and to what extent have wartime émigrés participated in the civic and political life of their host communities? What is the political impact–if any–of émigrés staying in touch with loved ones back in Russia?

Given that wartime emigration from Russia is a recent and ongoing phenomenon, this memo seeks to expand our understanding of the wartime flight by leveraging one-on-one interviews with émigrés to explore the nuanced personal, social, and political dimensions of wartime emigration. By featuring individual stories, this research aims to highlight the complexities of émigré life including barriers to relocation, integration challenges, and potential political repercussions of emigration. While our small pool of interviews cannot provide a representative portrait of all wartime émigrés, we hope that these interviews can shed light on the lives of those who have fled wartime Russia and inspire further research on the wartime exodus.

Our memo is organized as follows. Part I aims to provide a general overview of the wartime exodus from Russia by providing information on the profiles of émigrés and why they decided to emigrate as well as common destinations for emigration. Part II consists of selected quotes and general takeaways from the surveys conducted with wartime émigrés from several different host countries by a colleague from Charles University. We conclude by discussing questions that remain unaddressed regarding émigrés, their future plans and their political impact on their host and home communities.

Our project studies the role that fiction and non-fiction for the young audience play in present-day Russia and, more specifically, in the conceptualization of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In four critical essays, we explore the representations of the military/war-time experience in four editions for children, two of which are created and disseminated with the assistance of the state (Azbuka o Vazhnom, Zhit – Rodine sluzhit), and two others are published by independent publishing houses (Zver 44, Voina vs Detstvo). Our goal is to compare attitudes towards the war and broader, general ethical systems, communicated through these texts, and artistic devices, used to achieve these goals. We demonstrate that there is an ongoing ideological battle between the official political and liberal narratives in the children 's literature in Russia.

This paper explores the suppression of civic commemorative initiatives in post-Soviet Russia, particularly in the context of historical politics and national memory. The study traces the trajectory of policies regarding the commemoration of terror victims in this period, the resistance faced by such initiatives, and some of the main motives behind the state’s efforts to control historical narratives. A significant focus is on the impact of the invasion of Ukraine in accelerating the trends of historical suppression. The findings suggest a deliberate and systematic approach by the state to manipulate public perception of history to consolidate power, promote a unified national identity, and suppress alternative interpretations that could challenge the state’s narrative. This research contributes to our understanding of historical politics in Russia and the broader implications of state-controlled narratives in shaping public memory and identity. It also underscores the challenges faced by civil society in preserving historical truth in an increasingly repressive socio-political environment.

This paper investigates the critical role of private satellite constellations, particularly Starlink, in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict. It delves into how these systems are employed for intelligence gathering, communications, and logistical support, emphasizing their strategic importance in modern warfare. The research contributes to the discourse on the militarization of space assets, providing a nuanced understanding of the intersections between technology, ethics, and warfare.

As the third year of Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s war of aggression is now well underway, military victories and defeats in Ukraine’s counter-offensives have served as a primary lens through which Western audiences have understood Russia’s will to continue prosecuting its illegal war. As the Kremlin’s blatant power grab offended the consciences of millions the world over, a means for the West to compel an end to Putin’s war besides military intervention proved necessary. Within short order, various NATO-aligned states led largely by the United States and European Union unveiled one of the most comprehensive and draconian sanctions packages in history.

Much less visible than the progress of Ukrainian soldiers on the battlefield has been the impact of halted trade on Russia’s fiscal-military state and military-industrial capabilities. Moreover, it remains to be seen if financial disincentives can persuade Putin and his inner circle to change course, or if the Russian Federation’s strongman leader is persuaded by sheer military force alone.

This Stanford-US-Russia Forum (SURF) memorandum seeks to investigate the efficacy of Western-led sanctions regimes against the Russian Federation. We begin our inquiry with an overview of sanctions implemented after the start of the full-scale invasion and how these complemented existing sanctions responding to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. We next consider the impacts of economic sanctions on various interests of Russian industries and citizens in and outside of Russia. This paper next turns to various tactical and strategic shortcomings of historic Western sanctions strategies. Lastly, we seek to provide policy recommendations outside of those already recommended by the McFaul-Yermak sanctions working group.