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Under The Eagle's Wing: A National Security Strategy of the United States for 2009

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Former Senator Gary Hart has served as chairman of the Council for a Livable World since 2006. Since retiring from the United States Senate, he has been extensively involved in international law and business, as a strategic advisor to major U.S. corporations, and as a teacher, author and lecturer. He is currently Wirth Chair Professor at the University of Colorado and Distinguished Fellow at the New America Foundation.

Hart was co-chair of the U.S. Commission on National Security for the 21st Century. The Commission performed the most comprehensive review of national security since 1947, predicted the terrorist attacks on America, and proposed a sweeping overhaul of U.S. national security structures and policies for the post-Cold War new century and the age of terrorism. He was also co-chair of the Council task force that produced the report: "America Unprepared-America Still at Risk", in October, 2002.

Hart has been Visiting Fellow, Chatham Lecturer, and McCallum Memorial Lecturer at Oxford University, Global Fund Lecturer at Yale University, and Regents Lecturer at the University of California. He has earned a doctor of philosophy degree from Oxford University and graduate law and divinity degrees from Yale University. He was visiting lecturer at the Yale Law School.

Hart represented the State of Colorado in the United States Senate from 1975 to 1987. In 1984 and 1988, he was a candidate for his party's nomination for President.

Senator Hart has written numerous books including Under the Eagle's Wing: A National Security Strategy of the United States for 2009 (Fulcrum Books, January 2008), The Courage of Our Convictions: A Manifesto for Democrats (Henry Holt/Time Books 2006), and The Shield and The Cloak: The Security of the Commons (Oxford University Press, 2006).

Under the Eagles Wing Gary Hart
About Under the Eagle’s Wing: A National Security Strategy of the United States for 2009:

Aimed at the new administration of 2009, Under the Eagle's Wing provides a sound national security strategy for the new century. Speaking from experience, former U.S. senator Gary Hart served on the United States Commission on National Security for the 21st century, which predicted the events of 9/11. Hart argues that threats such as terrorism, disease, and climate change are global challenges that should be addressed as such. He addresses a difficult question: How does a republic make itself secure in a revolutionary age without yielding to the temptations of empire? A thoughtful treatise, Under the Eagle's Wing makes a compelling plea for our leaders to embrace a new world order, one in which the U.S. and other nations draw strength from a united approach.

CISAC Conference Room

Former Senator Gary Hart Chairman, Council for a Livable World; Wirth Chair Professor, University of Colorado; and Distinguished Fellow, New America Foundation Speaker

Michael A. McFaul

Encina Hall
616 Jane Stanford Way
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

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Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies, Department of Political Science
Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution
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Michael McFaul is the Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies in Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and the Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, all at Stanford University. He joined the Stanford faculty in 1995 and served as FSI Director from 2015 to 2025. He is also an international affairs analyst for MSNOW.

McFaul served for five years in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council at the White House (2009-2012), and then as U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation (2012-2014).

McFaul has authored ten books and edited several others, including, most recently, Autocrats vs. Democrats: China, Russia, America, and the New Global Disorder, as well as From Cold War to Hot Peace: An American Ambassador in Putin’s Russia, (a New York Times bestseller) Advancing Democracy Abroad: Why We Should, How We Can; and Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin.

He is a recipient of numerous awards, including an honorary PhD from Montana State University; the Order for Merits to Lithuania from President Gitanas Nausea of Lithuania; Order of Merit of Third Degree from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine, and the Dean’s Award for Distinguished Teaching at Stanford University. In 2015, he was the Distinguished Mingde Faculty Fellow at the Stanford Center at Peking University.

McFaul was born and raised in Montana. He received his B.A. in International Relations and Slavic Languages and his M.A. in Soviet and East European Studies from Stanford University in 1986. As a Rhodes Scholar, he completed his D. Phil. in International Relations at Oxford University in 1991. 

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Preparation is key to avoiding 'worst-case outcome,' Chertoff says

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At an April 11 symposium in Washington, D.C., Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff said while the best-laid plans are likely to change if a pandemic or bioterrorism attack hits the United States, having no plans in place is a sure guarantee for disaster. CISAC members Lynn Eden, Martha Crenshaw, and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar participated in "Germ Warfare, Contagious Disease and the Constitution," a daylong event co-hosted by Stanford Law School. CISAC affiliate Laura K. Donohue conceived and developed the project, which aimed to bring together senior policy-makers and legal experts to discuss how issues of constitutional law inform responses to natural pandemics or bioterrorism attacks.

Secretary Michael Chertoff of the Department of Homeland Security delivered the keynote address April 11 at the panel titled “Germ Warfare, Contagious Disease and the Constitution” in Washington, D.C.

Although the best-laid plans are likely to change if a pandemic or bioterrorism attack hits the United States, having no plans in place is a sure guarantee for disaster, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff told policy-makers, government officials, constitutional law experts and law students at a symposium April 11 in Washington, D.C.

"Preparation won't eliminate the problems and the stress, and it is often said that no battle plan has ever survived first contact with the enemy," Chertoff told the roughly 200 people attending the event, "Germ Warfare, Contagious Disease and the Constitution," hosted by Stanford Law School and the Constitution Project, a nonprofit organization.

"But I can tell you this," Chertoff continued. "If you don't have a plan, you are definitely going to have the worst-case outcome. A plan at least gives you a running start."

During the symposium, experts discussed the need to reform the complex web of federal and state laws to enable agencies to respond effectively to deadly natural or manmade epidemics—from pandemic flu to smallpox and aerosolized anthrax—while protecting individual rights.

Earlier that day, about 60 people from the current and two previous presidential administrations, public health officials, Stanford academics and law students participated in a closed-door, fictitious scenario that explored the federal government's response to an unfolding deadly epidemic as it crossed state lines. Lynn Eden, associate director for research at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, moderated the session, which was developed in cooperation with experts from the Department of Homeland Security.

"I think it's the first time detailed issues of constitutional law have been brought to bear in a natural pandemic or bioterrorism exercise," Eden said afterward. "It's very hard to plan for a catastrophe. This approach brought another facet to bear on disaster planning."

Margaret Hamburg, a former assistant secretary in the Department of Health and Human Services, opened the symposium, which was broadcast live on C-SPAN from the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Kathleen Sullivan, director of the Stanford Constitutional Law Center, moderated a panel featuring Stanford law Professors Pamela Karlan and Robert Weisberg; Christopher Chyba, director of the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton and a former CISAC co-director; Jeff Runge, assistant secretary in the Department of Homeland Security; Michael Greenberger, director of the Center for Health and Human Security at the University of Maryland; and Martin Cetron, director of the Division of Global Migration and Quarantine at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

Sullivan opened the panel by reflecting on how recent health crises have informed ongoing legal and policy debates: "West Nile virus. Anthrax mailings. Avian flu—responses to these infectious disease issues and concern about bioterrorism are running about our minds as we think about the response to 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, and the complex web of local, state and federal authority to deal with such emergencies. What does the Constitution have to say about our ability to deal with infectious disease, whether it's naturally occurring or composed as a weapon of violence?"

In the 21st century, Cetron explained, health officials still rely on a "14th-century toolbox of isolation and quarantine" to control an outbreak. That is "part of our modern reality," he said. "The biggest area is not lack of specific authority, but the fact that jurisdictions are highly complex when it comes to international ports of entry [and] interstate movement. There are often overlapping jurisdictions and overlapping authorities. If there's a gap in some of this, the risk is that neither the state nor the feds would want to step up to that responsibility."

Greenberger said state officials are often ignorant about what they can do in an emergency. "The powers given to governors are extraordinary," he said. Three statutes exist in Maryland to authorize declarations of emergency and allow the governor to enforce isolation and quarantine of infected people, order citizens to take treatment against their will, force doctors to serve in dangerous situations and seize hospitals. "What's extraordinary is that most governors don't even know they have this power," Greenberger said. "The extent of legal illiteracy in this area is shocking."

Despite such challenges, Chertoff praised the participants for tackling the issue. "I think for the first time we've begun to think very seriously and in a disciplined fashion about how to plan for dealing with a major natural pandemic or a major biological attack," he said. "I wish I could tell you these things are unthinkable. But the one thing I've learned in the last seven years is there's pretty much nothing that's unthinkable."

Stanford in Washington

Laura K. Donohue, a CISAC affiliate and a 2007 Stanford Law School graduate who is the inaugural fellow at the Stanford Constitutional Law Center, conceived the daylong event to bring together policy-makers and constitutional experts to discuss response to natural pandemics and bioterrorism. "It was a chance to bring together the policy world, both operational and strategic, and give them the opportunity to talk to legal experts," she said. "This helped policy-makers think through the issues and think outside the box, and it did so in a non-threatening manner."

Donohue said she was prompted to create the symposium after directing a CISAC-supported terrorism-response exercise in 2003 that involved more than 25 agencies at the national, state and local levels. "In these exercises involving first responders, legal issues always got pushed off the table," Donohue said. "I was struck by this. In an emergency, the law goes out the window. Then, when I got to law school, I saw the broader legal and constitutional context for this discussion."

With support from the directors at CISAC and Stanford Law School, and funding from donor Peter Bing and the Stanford Constitutional Law Center, Donohue brought the two groups together in a high-profile setting.

"This was Stanford in Washington," she said. "It was an opportunity for Stanford to be visible at the U.S. Senate with participation from leading people on these issues. There is no doubt we got an audience we wouldn't otherwise have attracted."

This article first appeared in Stanford Report, 4/16/2008.

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Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World

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Arms races among invertebrates, intelligence gathering by the immune system and alarm calls by marmots are but a few of nature’s security strategies that have been tested and modified over billions of years. This provocative book applies lessons from nature to our own toughest security problems—from global terrorism to the rise of infectious disease to natural disasters. Written by a truly multidis­ciplinary group including paleobiologists, anthropologists, psychologists, ecologists, and national security experts, it considers how models and ideas from evolutionary biology can improve national security strategies ranging from risk assessment, security analysis, and public policy to long-term strategic goals.

Terence Taylor is the President and Director of the International Council for the Life Sciences and a former CISAC Science Fellow. He previously served with the United Nations as a Commissioner and Chief Inspector for Iraq on weapons of mass destruction and was a career officer in the British army. He also serves on the U.S. National Academy of Sciences Forum on Microbial Threats and is an adviser to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Mr. Taylor was also a member of the National Research Council Steering Committee on Genomic Databases for Bioterrorism Threat Agents and served as Chairman of the Permanent Monitoring Panel on Risk Analysis of the World Federation of Scientists.

Raphael Sagarin received his Ph.D. in marine ecology in 2001 from the University of California, Santa Barbara. Dr. Sagarin has served as a Geological Society of America congressional science advisor in the office of U.S. Representative Hilda L. Solis. Dr. Sagarin has used his insights as a biologist and policy advisor in his recent work on using biological insights to guide security planning and policy. Based on a short treatment of this topic in Foreign Policy, he organized a working group at the National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis to explore a wide range of evolutionary insights into security analysis. Comprised of paleobiologists, psychologists, ecologists, anthropologists and security experts, the working group produced the forthcoming University of California Press volume: Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World, edited by Dr. Sagarin and Terence Taylor.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

Terence Taylor Director Speaker International Council for the Life Sciences
Raphael Sagarin Associate Director for Ocean and Coastal Policy, Nicholas Institute for Environmental Policy Solutions, Duke University Speaker
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A Ticking Time Bomb: The Global Tobacco Pandemic - Current and Future Scenarios

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John Seffrin, Ph. D., will be speaking on the issues of tobacco, with his experience as CEO of America Cancer Society, and as the immediate past president of the International Union Against Cancer in Geneva, Switzerland.

Medical School Office Building (MSOB)
Room x303
251 Campus Drive
Stanford, CA 94305

John Seffrin CEO of America Cancer Society Speaker
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Health Impact Assessment of Global Climate Change: Expanding upon Comparative Risk Assessment Approaches for Policy Making

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Climate change is projected to have adverse impacts on public health. Cobenefits may be possible from more upstream mitigation of greenhouse gases causing climate change. To help measure such cobenefits alongside averted disease-specific risks, a health impact assessment (HIA) framework can more comprehensively serve as a decision support tool. HIA also considers health equity, clearly part of the climate change problem. New choices for energy must be made carefully considering such effects as additional pressure on the world's forests through large-scale expansion of soybean and oil palm plantations, leading to forest clearing, biodiversity loss and disease emergence, expulsion of subsistence farmers, and potential increases in food prices and emissions of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere. Investigators must consider the full range of policy options, supported by more comprehensive, flexible, and transparent assessment methods.

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Is Mother Nature the Best Bioterrorist?

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As we find ourselves at the start of the "biological century" with a wealth of potential benefits to public health, agriculture, and global economies, it is almost deliberately naive to think that the extraordinary growth in the life sciences might not be exploited for nefarious purposes. A report published in 2006 by an ad hoc committee of the National Academies of Science recognized that the breadth of biological threats is much broader than commonly appreciated and will continue to expand for the foreseeable future. The nature of these threats, and a set of potential approaches with which to mitigate these threats, will be reviewed.

David Relman, MD, is professor of medicine, and of microbiology and immunology at Stanford University. He is also chief, infectious diseases section, at the VA Palo Alto Health Care System in Palo Alto, California. His research is directed towards the characterization of the human indigenous microbial communities, with emphasis on understanding variation in diversity, succession, the effects of disturbance, and the role of these communities in health and disease.  This work brings together approaches from ecology, population biology, environmental microbiology, genomics and clinical medicine.  In addition, his research explores the classification structure of humans and non-human primates with systemic infectious diseases, based on patterns of genome-wide gene transcript abundance in blood and other tissues. The goals of this work are to recognize classes of pathogen and predict clinical outcome at early time points in the disease process, as well as to gain further insights into virulence. Past scientific achievements include the description of a novel approach for identifying previously-unknown pathogens, the identification of a number of new human microbial pathogens, including the agent of Whipple's disease, and some of the most extensive analyses to date of the human indigenous microbial ecosystem. See http://relman.stanford.edu

Among his other activities, Dr. Relman currently serves as Chair of the Board of Scientific Counselors of the National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research (NIH), Chair of the Institute of Medicine's Forum on Microbial Threats (U.S. National Academies of Science), member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, and advises several U.S. Government departments and agencies on matters related to pathogen diversity, the future life sciences landscape, and the nature of present and future biological threats.  He co-chaired a three-year study at the National Academy of Sciences that produced a report entitled, "Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences" (2006). He is a member of the American Academy of Microbiology. Dr. Relman received the Squibb Award of the IDSA in 2001, and was the recipient of both the NIH Director's Pioneer Award, and the Distinguished Clinical Scientist Award from the Doris Duke Charitable Foundation, in 2006.

Reuben W. Hills Conference Room

David Relman Professor of Medicine and of Microbiology and Immunology Speaker Stanford University
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Population Aging, Child Health and Control of Infectious Diseases

The Asia Health Policy Program works with other researchers at Stanford and several countries of the Asia-Pacific to analyze prominent issues in population aging, child health, and control of infectious disease. Examples include comparative study of long-term care insurance and informal caregiving; collaborative study of health and healthcare access for children with special health needs; and a research project focusing on controlling tuberculosis and multi-drug resistant tuberculosis in Northeast Asia.

Climate Change and Global Health: Quantifying a Growing Ethical Crisis

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Climate change, as an environmental hazard operating at the global scale, poses a unique and "involuntary exposure" to many societies, and therefore represents possibly the largest health inequity of our time. According to statistics from the World Health Organization (WHO), regions or populations already experiencing the most increase in diseases attributable to temperature rise in the past 30 years ironically contain those populations least responsible for causing greenhouse gas warming of the planet. Average global carbon emissions approximate one metric ton per year (tC/yr) per person. In 2004, United States per capita emissions neared 6 tC/yr (with Canada and Australia not far behind), and Japan and Western European countries range from 2 to 5 tC/yr per capita. Yet developing countries' per capita emissions approximate 0.6 tC/yr, and more than 50 countries are below 0.2 tC/yr (or 30-fold less than an average American). This imbalance between populations suffering from an increase in climate-sensitive diseases versus those nations producing greenhouse gases that cause global warming can be quantified using a "natural debt" index, which is the cumulative depleted CO2 emissions per capita. This is a better representation of the responsibility for current warming than a single year's emissions. By this measure, for example, the relative responsibilities of the U.S. in relation to those of India or China is nearly double that using an index of current emissions, although it does not greatly change the relationship between India and China. Rich countries like the U.S. have caused much more of today's warming than poor ones, which have not been emitting at significant levels for many years yet, no matter what current emissions indicate. Along with taking necessary measures to reduce the extent of global warming and the associated impacts, society also needs to pursue equitable solutions that first protect the most vulnerable population groups; be they defined by demographics, income, or location. For example, according to the WHO, 88% of the disease burden attributable to climate change afflicts children under age 5 (obviously an innocent and "nonconsenting" segment of the population), presenting another major axis of inequity. Not only is the health burden from climate change itself greatest among the world's poor, but some of the major mitigation approaches to reduce the degree of warming may produce negative side effects disproportionately among the poor, for example, competition for land from biofuels creating pressure on food prices. Of course, in today's globalized world, eventually all nations will share some risk, but underserved populations will suffer first and most strongly from climate change. Moreover, growing recognition that society faces a nonlinear and potentially irreversible threat has deep ethical implications about humanity's stewardship of the planet that affect both rich and poor.

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Holly Gibbs
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China's Harmonious Society: Two Overviews--Health Systems Reform and the HIV Epidemic

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China's Harmonious Society colloquium series

co-sponsored by the Stanford China Program and the Center for East Asian Studies

Since 2006, the official doctrine of China's Communist Party calls for the creation of a "harmonious society" (HeXieSheHui). This policy, identified with the Hu Jintao leadership, acknowledges the new problems that have emerged as China continues its amazing economic growth. The economy is booming but so are tensions from rising inequality, environmental damage, health problems, diverse ethnicities, and attempts to break the "iron rice bowl." In this series of colloquia, leading authorities will discuss the causes of these tensions, their seriousness, and China's ability to solve these challenges.

Nancy Shulman's talk topic will be posted soon.

Nancy Shulman conducts laboratory and clinical research in the area of HIV therapeutics, with focus on antiretroviral resistance and treatment strategies of experienced patients, the impact of antiretroviral treatment on HIV co-receptor utilization, and HIV in China. she received her MD from Kansas University Medical School and holds a BA in biochemistry from University of Texas, Austin. She is a doctor specializing in internal medicine, pediatrics, and infectious diseases.

"Healthcare Coverage for 1.3 Billion: China's Odyssey"

Karen Eggleston

Media coverage as well as the academic literature give conflicting appraisals of China's reality: Is China's healthcare system on the verge of collapse? Why is healthcare so expensive and difficult to access in contemporary China? Have reforms 'marketizing' healthcare drastically undermined progress in assuring affordable access for all? Or do hospitals and other providers constitute a last bastion of state control and bureaucratized monopoly in the name of equal access? Chinese analysts and policy advisers have engaged in a sometimes acrimonious debate; some champion a government-led, National Health Service-like model, while others passionately argue that market forces should play a greater role. In this talk, Karen Eggleston will present a brief overview of China's health system reforms and current developments.

Karen Eggleston focuses her research on comparative healthcare systems during economic development and transition from central planning to market-based economies. Her interests include the impact of payment incentives on healthcare insurer and provider behavior; chronic disease management; and incentives surrounding health behaviors such as the spread of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, overuse of antibiotics, and smoking. She earned her PhD in public policy from Harvard University and has MA degrees in economics and Asian studies from the University of Hawaii.

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Karen Eggleston

Shorenstein APARC
Stanford University
Encina Hall E301
Stanford, CA 94305-6055

(650) 723-9072 (650) 723-6530
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Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies
Center Fellow at the Center for Health Policy and the Center for Primary Care and Outcomes Research
Faculty Research Fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research
Faculty Affiliate at the Stanford Center on China's Economy and Institutions
karen-0320_cropprd.jpg PhD

Karen Eggleston is a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford University and Director of the Stanford Asia Health Policy Program at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at FSI. She is also a Fellow with the Center for Innovation in Global Health at Stanford University School of Medicine, and a Faculty Research Fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Her research focuses on government and market roles in the health sector and Asia health policy, especially in China, India, Japan, and Korea; healthcare productivity; and the economics of the demographic transition.

Eggleston earned her PhD in public policy from Harvard University and has MA degrees in economics and Asian studies from the University of Hawaii and a BA in Asian studies summa cum laude (valedictorian) from Dartmouth College. Eggleston studied in China for two years and was a Fulbright scholar in Korea. She served on the Strategic Technical Advisory Committee for the Asia Pacific Observatory on Health Systems and Policies and has been a consultant to the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the WHO regarding health system reforms in the PRC.

Economics of Health and Aging in Asia

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Director of the Asia Health Policy Program, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Stanford Health Policy Associate
Faculty Fellow at the Stanford Center at Peking University, June and August of 2016
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Nancy Shulman Assistant Professor of Medicine (Infectious Diseases) Speaker School of Medicine, Stanford University
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WHO official joins CISAC as consulting professor

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David L. Heymann, assistant director-general for communicable diseases and the director general's representative for polio eradication at the World Health Organization (WHO), has joined CISAC as a consulting professor.

Heymann has dedicated much of his career as a medical doctor to investigating and fighting the spread of infectious diseases and mobilizing global efforts to prevent pandemics.

"Dr. Heymann's expertise on threats to health security is a welcome addition to CISAC," Siegfried Hecker, CISAC co-director, said. "He is deeply knowledgeable about the most severe disease-related threats as well as how best to build cooperative international efforts to reduce these threats."

Prior to assuming his current position at WHO, Heymann served as executive director of WHO's Communicable Diseases Cluster, which includes programs on infectious and tropical diseases. In that position, he oversaw the response to Severe Accute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003.

Before joining WHO, Heymann worked for 13 years as a medical epidemiologist in sub-Saharan Africa, on assignment with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control. While there, he participated in investigating both the first outbreak of Ebola, in Yambuku (then Zaire) in 1976, and the second outbreak, in Tandala, in 1977. He directed the international response to the Ebola outbreak in Kikwit in 1995. Heymann also spent two years as a medical officer in the WHO smallpox eradication program in India prior to 1976.

Heymann spent two weeks in residence at Stanford last spring, co-hosted by CISAC and FSI, during which he delivered a a talk in FSI's Payne Lecture series. In the lecture, titled "Infectious Diseases across Borders: Public Health Security in the 21st Century," he discussed the collective responsibility to defend public health. He surveyed WHO's efforts to fight emerging and re-emerging infectious disease on every continent.

Among those efforts is a global network of scientists who monitor and collect viruses, sending samples to four WHO collaborating centers for analysis and tracking. This network detected the novel virus H5N1, known as avian flu, in 1997, a disease WHO continues to track closely.

Currently, Heymann said, the H5N1 virus is in the third of six phases in WHO's pandemic alert system, meaning that there have been cases of human infection but "no, or very infrequent, human-to-human spread."

Heymann emphasized, "It is important to prevent the disease at the source." At the same time, WHO is working to "provide universal access to vaccines," which, while not eliminating the disease, "will prevent sickness," he said.

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