SPICE’s Stanford e-Japan Manager and Instructor Waka Takahashi Brown has won the 2019 Elgin Heinz Outstanding Teacher Award for her teaching excellence with Stanford e-Japan, an online course that introduces U.S. society and culture and U.S.–Japan relations to high school students in Japan. Stanford e-Japan is currently supported by the Yanai Tadashi Foundation. Initial funding for Stanford e-Japan was provided by the U.S.-Japan Foundation. Brown will formally accept the award at a ceremony at Stanford University on December 5, 2019.

“Waka walks in the footsteps of Elgin Heinz as a key leader in educating the next generation about the U.S.–Japan relationship,” stated David Janes, Chair of the Board, EngageAsia. Janes has overseen the Elgin Heinz Outstanding Teacher Award since its inception in 2001.

Read the full article.

EngageAsia administers the Elgin Heinz Outstanding Teacher Award, which is funded by the United States-Japan Foundation. The Award recognizes exceptional teachers who further mutual understanding between Americans and Japanese. The 2019 Award focused on the humanities and the 2020 Award is expected to focus on Japanese language. It is named in honor of Elgin Heinz for his commitment to educating students about Asia as well as for the inspiration he has provided to the field of pre-collegiate education.

Related articles:

• Spring session of Stanford e-Japan online course begins
• Yanai Tadashi Foundation and SPICE/Stanford University
• Winners announced for the Fall 2018 Stanford e-Japan Award

Americans have witnessed repeated mass shootings. The carnage in Texas and Ohio last weekend claimed another 31 lives and has left the nation stunned and angry.

Many are demanding that members of Congress pass tougher gun-control laws; others blame mental health and violent video games for the rampant shootings.

Stanford Health Policy’s David Studdert — an expert on the public health epidemic of firearms violence — acknowledges that mass shootings are on the rise in the United States.

“It’s been a horrific weekend,” said Studdert, a professor of law at Stanford Law School and professor of medicine at Stanford School of Medicine. “Experts now generally agree that mass shootings are becoming more common — and that a common thread is disaffected young men who have access to high-caliber, high-capacity weapons.”

Both suspects in the Dayton and El Paso shootings fit this profile.

Studdert notes, however, that while mass shootings have become the public face of gun violence, they account for less than 1% of the 40,000 firearm deaths each year.

“So as a public health researcher, I do care about mass shootings and I am interested in understanding and their causes — but the focus of my ongoing research is the other 99 percent.”

Largest investment in firearms research in two decades

It’s that focus the Studdert will be pursuing in a recently-awarded $668,000 grant from the National Collaboration on Gun Violence Research. The private collaborative’s mission is to fund nonpartisan, scientific research that offers the public and policymakers a factual basis for developing fair and effective gun policies.

Studdert, Yifan Zhang, a statistician with Stanford Health Policy, and Stanford political scientist Jonathan Rodden are working with colleagues at UC Davis, Northeastern University and Erasmus University Rotterdam on the Study of Handgun Ownership and Transfer, or LongSHOT.

The team is following several million Californians over a 12-year period to better understand the causal relationship between firearm ownership and mortality. They launched in 2016 with the initial goal of assessing the risks and benefits of ownership for firearm owners.

“The implications of firearm ownership for owners is important because they usually are the ones making the decision to purchase and own,” Studdert said. “But we knew from the beginning that this was only part of the picture. The presence of a firearm in the home may also have health implications for the owners’ family members.”

In the new study, the researchers will identify the cohort of adults in California who live with firearm owners but are not themselves gun owners, and then compare their risks of mortality to a group who neither own weapons, nor live with others who do.

Surprisingly little is known about the “secondhand” effects of having guns in the home.

“Existing studies don’t differentiate between owners and non-owners within households, and that is something we have the ability to look at,” Studdert said. “And a very large proportion of non-gun-owners who are living in homes with guns are women — so this is a group that has really been understudied.”

There is already substantial evidence that a gun in the home is associated with increased risks of suicide. But it is not clear how particular subgroups, such as women who don’t own guns, are affected.

“Because our cohort is so large,” Studdert said, “we will also be able to explore whether gun ownership confers certain benefits, as gun-rights advocates often claim, such as enhanced safety in dangerous neighborhoods.”

Studdert said a better accounting of the risks and benefits that firearm ownership poses for non-owners could help inform decisions regarding gun ownership and storage, as well as policies aimed at improving gun safety.

The politics of federal funding for firearms research

The National Collaboration on Gun Violence Research is funded through private philanthropic donations. It was seeded with a $20 million gift from Arnold Ventures and intends to raise another $30 million in private funding for firearms research.

“It’s the biggest investment in firearms research since the late 1990s,” Studdert said.

Research on the impact and causes of firearm violence was dealt a huge blow in 1996 when the so-called Dickey Amendment was passed by Congress. The law has been interpreted as prohibiting the National Institutes of Health and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention from conducting firearms research.

Studdert said that the growth of research funding from philanthropies like the Arnold Foundation and Joyce Foundation is a welcome development, but that it will take a large and sustained investment to move the science of firearm violence forward.  

“The core funder of large-scale research essentially vacated the space for 20 years,” he said.  “It’s going to take some time to recover. Developing a generation of researchers with expertise will take give to 10 years. But it has to be done — the size of the social problem demands it.”

Every summer, the Draper Hills Summer Fellows Program brings together international leaders who are pioneering new approaches to advance social and political change in some of the most challenging global contexts. The fellows spend three weeks living and taking classes on the Stanford campus, visiting Silicon Valley tech companies and building a network.

Representing business, government and the nonprofit sector, fellows are working on the frontlines of democratic change to combat the global rise of authoritarianism and populism. The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies spoke to five of the fellows about the impact of the Draper Hills program on their work and activism. These are their stories.

Shaili Chopra, India

Shaili Chopra, founder of SheThePeopleTv. Photo: Alice Wenner

Wiem Zarrouk, Tunisia

Wiem Zarrouk, senior advisor to the Minister of Development, Investment and International Cooperation in Tunisia. Photo: Alice Wenner

“I’ve been working for the Tunisian government for three years as an advisor to the Minister of Development, Investment and International Cooperation. I am leading the government reforms to improve Tunisia's ranking in the World Bank Competitiveness Report - Doing Business.

“In Tunisia, we’ve set up most of our democratic institutions, and now we want to improve the business environment to attract more investment in local businesses. Eight years ago, the people went into the streets demanding more jobs. The challenge in Tunisia right now is economic, that’s why economic reforms are important to our government.

“I think the impact of the Draper Hills program will be immediate. I’ve learned a lot here about the link between development and democracies, so it really covers the scope of my work. And it's been great to learn about the theoretical side — the professors are really speaking about things that impact our daily work.” 

Ujwal Thapa, Nepal

Ujwal Thapa, president of the BibekSheel Nepali youth movement. Photo: Alice Wenner

“Bibeksheel Nepali is basically a political startup. It’s a youth-led movement, and we’re focused on changing the norms and mindsets of the culture in Nepal. We work a lot with citizens to instill the values of transparency, empathy and humility because we think democracy needs to be more emotional instead of just logical. I think liberal democracy needs to be understood more in the context of humanity. So it’s an experiment that we're doing in Nepal.

“When we started with the experiment, we decided not to focus only on the state, but thought about a few more components: one is our citizens, another is the society and the third is the government. Nepal recently came out of a violent civil war, and we just built a new constitution that is much more tolerant. Transparency is another value that we want to instill, because of the long isolationist and autocratic dictatorship that has existed in the past.

“Draper Hills is bringing all of these practitioners together who are experimental and innovative. And the world needs better collaboration from people who really believe in the ideals of the 21st century, which are liberal, democratic and more humanistic. That’s one of the strongest aspects of the Draper Hills program.”

N.S. Nappinai, India

N.S. Nappinai, senior practitioner in the Supreme Court of India and Bombay High Court. Photo: Alice Wenner

“Some of the social media platforms had very good reporting mechanisms, whereas it was more hidden on other platforms. So we ensured that this issue was brought to the forefront so that people know that these are things that can be reported and some action can be taken. The whole idea was that as long as you identify such content at the earliest possible time, then you help the victim that much more.

“For me, balancing victims' rights with free speech is very important. This was a big dilemma that I faced, in terms of ‘How much of what I am doing is likely to stifle free speech?’ A lot of discussions at Draper Hills have helped formulate and structure my thoughts, and it's very nice to get the perspective from people from 26 other countries.”

Hinda Bouddane, Morocco

Hinda Bouddane, the first vice president of the elected provincial council of the city of Fez. Photo: Alice Wenner

“Education for girls is really important in fighting discrimination against women. Education empowers women to become financially independent, say no to violence, and to get engaged in the public sphere. Through that, women can be a part of the democratic process not only by voting, but also by taking part from within and running for office.

At Draper Hills, we're deepening our knowledge about topics like the rule of law, democracy and human rights, and hearing many different perspectives. And importantly, we are building a great network to connect many intelligent people from around the world, and we will work together to foster democratic values.”

David M. Lampton gave a talk titled “Chinese Power and Rail Connectivity in Southeast Asia” before the Stanford China Program audience on February 6^th. He addressed three issues in particular: the scope of his research project, conducted in partnership with two co-authors based in Singapore and Malaysia; the long genesis of this railroad construction idea from Southeast Asia to China; and, third, the overarching question of whether China can effectively implement the gargantuan feat – technologically, financially, and politically. The high-and conventional-speed rail project will span seven Southeast Asian countries, plus China, Lampton highlighted.  This project is not only geographically forbidding, but the political terrain, and its socio-economic variety, is an even greater challenge.  Lampton’s talk comprised part of Stanford China Program’s 2019 Colloquia Series, “A New Cold War?: Sharp Power, Strategic Competition, and the Future of U.S.-China Relations.”

Lampton began by clarifying that the vision of rail connectivity through Southeast Asia into China is not the brainchild of either China’s leadership or Xi Jinping. This idea has a long history, he stated, beginning with the British and the French in the 19^th century when they were occupying Burma and Indochina, respectively; and even during World War II when Japan further entertained building railroads from the Korean Peninsula to Singapore to advance their military ambitions. In contemporary times, ASEAN had articulated a plan in 1995 to develop a rail line from Singapore to Kunming city, P.R.C. In 2010, ASEAN again put forth a master connectivity plan for 2025 where railroad development comprised a prominent part. Only in the aftermath of these many plans and proposals did Xi Jinping, in 2013, officially announce China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an infrastructure initiative with a scope far greater than simply Southeast Asia. The idea of infrastructural connectivity in the region, in other words, has a long history that predates China entering the picture as a major actor. Only recently has China amassed the technological capacity and financial wherewithal to realize this enormous project, with economic, diplomatic, and strategic military implications.

Next he described the key role that Beijing’s industrial policy has played in the rapid development of China’s high-speed rail. From a nonexistent industry in 2001, China has built a sector that is now an international powerhouse in high-speed rail technology. As of 2014, China boasted four trunk lines, North and South; and four trunk lines, East and West, crisscrossing the P.R.C. China’s industrial policy has clearly delivered striking results (as well as some setbacks) not only with respect to high-speed rail but also in other industries.  In light of this, Lampton opined that China is not likely to yield to U.S. demands for major structural reforms in onoing trade talks with China. 

Lampton described the progress in high-speed and conventional-speed rail construction with partners in Southeast Asia (ASEAN) that the Chinese have made, with Laos and Thailand furthest along in implementation. Nonetheless, Beijing also has met with significant resistance due to the complicated political situation in various regions. Lampton described, for example, the drawn-out financial negotiations between Singapore and Malaysia with respect to the rail line connecting Singapore to Kuala Lumpur; and the jockeying among various heads of Malaysia’s federation of local states. The election of Mr. Mahathir in 2018 also put an at least temporary halt to the construction and planning of two rail projects for many reasons, including the corruption of the preceding regime of Najib in Kuala Lumpur. Although Lampton expressed overall confidence that the rail lines will get built to Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok, for example, in the not-too-distant future, the political complexities of the region and China’s ability to successfully navigate them are still open questions.

He also described the competing world views regarding infrastructure construction and economic development. There are powerful constituents in China – now backed by Xi Jinping himself – who believe that infrastructure development drives growth: i.e., “if you want to get rich, build a road.” By contrast, the U.S. and entities such as the World Bank are more cautious, seeing all the negative social and environment extenalities such massive projects create. They also want to see greater assurances of projected returns from these infrastructure projects before devoting resources. Having said this, both multilateral financial and development institutions, and the United States Government, are gradually adopting a more supportive posture on large infrastructure projects, in part not wishing to abandon the commercial and strategic battlegrounds of the future to the PRC.

Lastly, Lampton debunked the notion that the BRI is a unified, top-down “plan.” Rather, he described it as Beijing’s “umbrella policy” that “creates a predisposition [among Chinese entities] to build infrastructure.” It incentivizes “entrepreneurial SOEs, provinces, localities, overseas Chinese . . . to push their pet projects . . . onto . . . the national largesse.” This being the case, Lampton described the BRI as a dynamic, chaotic and, sometimes, even a rapacious process for the transit countries. Yunnan Province, for example, started a rail line even before the central government had approved it; and Guangdong Province began developing its own special economic zone and port construction in Malacca all without central approval. As Lampton stated, the “BRI isn’t just about Xi Jinping and Beijing . . . . [I]t’s about local initative, and how Beijing can or cannot control or . . . under what circumstances, it chooses to control [its local actors].”

The recording and transcript are available below.  

“Win support from the people,” Yuhua Wang, Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard University, repeated the words from one of Xi Jinping’s speeches that was given to justify China’s massive anti-corruption campaign. The exact scope and motivations for President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is, as yet, unknowable, Wang stated; but clearly, a major public aim of CCP Chairman Xi Jinping was to build regime support by cracking down on bad actors in the government.

Prof. Yuhua Wang gave a talk titled “Why Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Campaign has Undermined Chinese Citizens’ Regime Support?” at the Stanford China Program on November 12^th, 2018, based on a national-level survey analysis that he had conducted with his co-author, Prof. Bruce Dickson at George Washington University. Rather than focusing on Xi’s motivations for undertaking his crackdown, however, Wang and Dickson tried to measure the impact of Xi’s anti-corruption campaign on public perception of the central government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Did the campaign, in other words, shore up public support for China’s central government and Party, as Xi hoped it would – or did it, in fact, undermine regime support?

Professor Wang first offered some background on how this anti-corruption campaign got started around 2012-2013, shortly after Xi Jinping became Chairman of the CCP. A staggering 261 vice-ministerial officials and 350,000 officials had been investigated to date; and, even those at the highest levels of China’s leadership – former Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee members, for instance –were not immune from scrutiny. And, equally unprecedented, media coverage of these corruption cases – from Bo Xilai to Zhou Yongkang and Xu Caihou – were extensive, exposing their lavish lifestyles and illicit dalliances on social and traditional media. Wang speculated that such lurid publicity most likely shocked the public, potentially turning citizens against even the central government, which consistently enjoys significantly higher levels of public trust than local governments in China. He decided, therefore, to explore with his co-author what the effects of such exposés might be on public perception of the central regime.

Replicating the same questionnaire and sampling design, Wang and his co-author took a national random sample in two waves – one before the anti-corruption campaign in 2010 and a second one during the campaign in 2014. They interviewed approximately 4,000 people across 25 provinces in China in order to measure potential shifts in people’s attitudes towards the regime over those four years. The findings were, indeed, illuminating:

First, Wang stated, increasing frequency of corruption investigations in a locality was correlated with a greater drop in popular regime support (defined as trust in central government or support for the CCP) in that locality. Higher volume of corruption investigations in a locality was also negatively correlated with people’s perception that government officials were generally honest and clean. The corrosive effects of the campaign, furthermore, proved strongest on those who had initially believed in the integrity of government officials; but for those who were already cynical about official corruption, the campaign had a smaller effect. Lastly, higher the survey respondent’s use of social media like WeChat, stronger the negative effects on his/her support for the regime. The authors also took into account how the chilling effects of the campaign may be negatively impacting local economies and how that slowing economy may actually be the primary cause behind decreasing public regime support. To account for this potentially confounding effect, Wang looked for evidence as to whether the campaign had contributed to a slowdown in China’s economy by 2014. Perhaps because 2014 was still early on in the campaign, he stated that they found no evidence of slower GDP growth rate, growth rate per capita GDP, etc., in the regions where they had undertaken their surveys.

Overall, Wang’s research calls into question whether Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign is, in fact, advancing one of his main goals– i.e., to increase people’s faith in the central regime – or whether it is actually proving counterproductive to his aim. In fact, Wang’s research seems to indicate that the more Chinese citizens are exposed to evidence of government corruption, the more the central regime appears to suffer a loss in credibility. Wang was careful to point out, however, that they were barred, due to political sensitivity, from asking any questions regarding respondents’ attitudes towards Xi Jinping himself. Thus, it is still an open question whether popular support for Xi Jinping himself is increasing even though public trust in the regime might be decreasing.

The recording and transcript are available below.  

Following a sustained period of program growth, an expanded leadership team and remodeled facility will greet new and returning students in the fall.

When current and incoming students in Stanford University’s Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy (MIP) program arrive to campus this fall, they will be the first to experience the new face of the program. 

Renovations on a modern new academic space, outdoor courtyard and gardens will be complete, and Professor Francis Fukuyama, one of the most well-known and respected social scientists in the world, will be the program’s new director.  

“I am grateful for this opportunity to lead the Ford Dorsey MIP program,” said Fukuyama, who is the Mosbacher Director at the Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI). He noted that, “This is a critical time to prepare our students to be policy leaders in government, civic society, and the private sector. Our curriculum aims to be among the best in international policy education, and continues to get stronger with new faculty, courses, and terrific students.”

The Ford Dorsey Master's in International Policy is a two year, full-time, professional graduate degree program administered jointly by the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and the School of Humanities and Sciences. The just graduated Class of 2019 included nineteen students, 15 women and four men, from 10 different countries.

Under the leadership of Michael McFaul as director and Kathryn Stoner as deputy director over the last two years, the MIP program has changed and grown significantly. The core curriculum was completely revamped, a new, very popular specialization track on cyber policy was added, and a greater number of FSI faculty have begun to teach in the program. The number of applications has risen 67% over the past 2 years.  Both McFaul and Stoner will continue to teach in the MIP program.

“Since redesigning MIP two years ago, we have committed to optimizing and improving this unique, innovative program at FSI,” said Professor McFaul.  “Convincing Francis Fukuyama to assume leadership of MIP is the natural next phase in the program’s growth and development.”

Stoner served as Director of the program for 8 years before becoming Deputy Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Under her leadership, the program increased faculty involvement from FSI in teaching in the program, developed a new curriculum in conjunction with FSI faculty, added an exchange program between the program and the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, increased student funding opportunities through research with FSI faculty, and grew the program staff to better support student career services, alumni outreach, program recruiting, student academic advising, and admissions. 

“Our students are well positioned to assume leadership roles over the course of their careers,” said Professor Stoner. “We are meeting the demands of the shifting policy landscape with innovative new courses and graduates who dare to think differently. In this sense the program is quintessentially Stanford.” 

Alongside Professor Fukuyama, Dr. Chonira Aturupane, a senior research scholar at the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law at FSI, and long-time lecturer in international economics in the MIP program, has agreed to serve as the Associate Director for Academic and Student Affairs in the MIP Program.

“Mike McFaul and I leave the leadership and administrative team of this program in good hands. Francis Fukuyama is a dedicated policy scholar, and teacher and I am thrilled that he is taking the helm,” said Stoner. “We know Chonira Aturupane will be as outstanding a contributor in this new administrative role as she has been as an instructor,” she added.

Professor Fukuyama has long been passionate about the teaching of public and international policy at the graduate level. He came to Stanford in 2010 from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where he led, expanded, and redesigned the International Development coursework for the SAIS master’s program. 

Fukuyama has also been deeply involved in the redesign of the MIP curriculum at Stanford, and has spearheaded a national effort for innovation in public policy teaching.  He will continue to teach in the program, including the new practicum experience with Professor Jeremy Weinstein of Stanford’s Department of Political Science, and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at FSI next year. 

“To prosper in today’s global society, institutions must continually adapt at both the leadership and policy level,” said Fukuyama. “It’s something I’ve spoken about for years and now here I am living this change together with our students. I can’t wait for us to get started.”

Media Contact: Ari Chasnoff, Assistant Director for Communications, chasnoff@stanford.edu, 650-725-2371