Using administrative data on over 4 million hospital visits, we document striking gender disparities within a government health insurance program that entitles 46 million poor individuals to free hospital care in Rajasthan, India. Females account for only 33% of hospital visits among children and 43% among the elderly. These shares are lower for more expensive types of care, and far lower than sex differences in illness prevalence can explain. Almost two-thirds of non-childbirth spending is on males. We combine these data with patient survey, census, and electoral data to show that 1) the program is unable to fully offset the costs of care-seeking, which results in disparities in hospital utilization because some households are willing to allocate more resources to male than female health; 2) lowering costs does not reduce disparities, because males benefit as much as females do; and 3) long-term exposure to village-level female leaders reduces the gender gap in utilization, but effects are modest and limited to girls and young women. In the presence of gender bias, increasing access to and subsidizing social services may increase levels of female utilization but fail to address gender inequalities without actions that specifically target females.

China’s national health reforms over the past two decades have brought the system closer to the modern, safe, reliable, and accessible health system that is commensurate with China’s dramatic economic growth, improvement in living standards, and high hopes for the next generation.

China’s national health reforms of 2009—continuing many reforms undertaken since SARS (2003)—consolidated a system of social health insurance covering the entire population for basic health services, contributing to a surge in healthcare utilization while reducing out-of-pocket costs to patients – which declined from 56% to 28% of total health expenditures between 2003 and 2017. An expanded basic public health service package, funded by per capita government budget allocations that include a higher central government subsidy for lower-income provinces, provides basic population health services to all Chinese. Now the governance structure consolidates the purchaser role for social health insurance schemes under the National Healthcare Security Administration, with most other health sector functions under the National Health Commission. China’s world-leading technological prowess in multiple fields spanning digital commerce to artificial intelligence—and accompanying innovative business models such as WeDoctor that have not yet been fully integrated into the health system—hold promise for supporting higher quality and more convenient healthcare for China’s 1.4 billion.

However, many challenges remain, from dealing with COVID-19 and its aftermath to other lingering challenges, from promoting healthy aging to the political economy of addressing patient-provider tensions, changing provider payment to promote “value” rather than volume, and deciding which new medical therapies qualify as “basic” for the basic medical insurance schemes. To make China’s investments in universal health coverage and the accompanying rapid medical spending growth sustainable in the longer run, policies need to help the most vulnerable avoid illness-induced poverty, increase health system efficiency, strengthen primary care, and reform provider payment systems.

Background

In an effort to provide greater financial protection from the risk of large medical expenditures, China has gradually added catastrophic medical insurance (CMI) to the various basic insurance schemes. Tongxiang, a rural county in Zhejiang province, China, has had CMI since 2000 for their employee insurance scheme, and since 2014 for their resident insurance scheme.

Methods

Compiling and analyzing patient-level panel data over five years, we use a difference-in-difference approach to study the effect of the 2014 introduction of CMI for resident insurance beneficiaries in Tongxiang. In our study design, resident insurance beneficiaries are the treatment group, while employee insurance beneficiaries are the control group.

Findings

We find that the availability of CMI significantly increases medical expenditures among resident insurance beneficiaries, including for both inpatient and outpatient spending. Despite the greater financial protection, out-of-pocket expenditures increased, in part because patients accessed treatment more often at higher-level hospitals.

Interpretation

Better financial coverage for catastrophic medical expenditures led to greater access and expenditures, not only for inpatient admissions—the category that most often leads to catastrophic expenditures—but for outpatient visits as well. These patterns of expenditure change with CMI may reflect both enhanced access to a patient's preferred site of care as well as the influence of incentives encouraging more care under fee-for-service payment.