In the context of media consumption in Russia, being online usually means having more “liberal” views, opposed to those actively instilled by the government. One of the most popular news sources online have become the Telegram channels that provide the opportunity to read a plethora of different views on the same topic. The level of trust to the Telegram channels is above 30%, being even higher for the younger generation, which is unprecedented for any other independent source in modern Russia, apart from the state-owned TV.

However, as Sergey Guriev and Daniel Treisman have pointed out, mastery over media as the key point of modern authoritarian regimes. Therefore, since the start of the full-scale invasion in Ukraine in 2022, we have seen the rise of manifold propaganda channels on Telegram as an important part of ongoing fight for support in Russia and across the globe. They include many previously known speakers, but also a cohort of so-called war correspondents, who report and analyze the events on the front, providing first-hand information. They usually align with the pro-Russian narratives about the war, strengthening its propaganda network online. The methods they use to report on the war remain diverse and fluctuating. With the rising tension in the Russian society, we have begun to see criticism of the Russian government from “the other side,” the far-right ambassadors of the “Russian World.” They critique Putin from his right for not mobilizing further to win the war. The peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine that started in 2025 at the initiative of Donald Trump have produced many postings and speculations among our target group, illustrating previously made guesses about the field and giving us fruitful ground for analysis.

As for the second part of our research, the rise of Twitter as a central hub for political discourse and content dissemination makes it a critical platform for analyzing the spread of foreign propaganda in the digital age. A striking example of this is the 2024 indictment of Tenet Media, a U.S.-based conservative media company covertly funded by Russia’s state-owned RT.  Through a complex network of foreign shell entities and fabricated personas, RT funneled millions of dollars into Tenet Media to covertly shape American political discourse. Influential commentators with millions of followers across platforms—including Twitter—were recruited under false pretenses, with generous compensation and vague direction to create content on divisive U.S. issues. While these influencers denied knowledge of the Russian connection, the DOJ highlighted how the content served Russia’s strategic interests by amplifying domestic U.S. tensions and weakening opposition to its war in Ukraine.10 This case underscores Twitter’s relevance as a tool through which propaganda can be subtly seeded and amplified to mass audiences.

The strategic use of social media for information warfare is not accidental but rooted in longstanding Russian military doctrine. Russian military theorist Valery Gerasimov emphasized the importance of the “information space” as a battlefield, recognizing social media as both a threat and an opportunity for asymmetrical warfare. Since the Western response to Russia’s 2014 actions in Ukraine, the Kremlin has intensified its efforts to influence global audiences through online disinformation. The Tenet Media operation exemplifies the evolution of these strategies—moving from overt messaging by registered foreign agents to covert infiltration of domestic media outlets. Twitter’s role in this ecosystem is central, given its fast-paced, viral nature and its prominence among political commentators. As such, Twitter is not just a platform for public discourse but also a potent battleground where narratives are shaped, contested, and often manipulated by foreign actors.

Another dimension of our research lies in analyzing content in the context of different platforms. Different affordances from the nominatively-independent and privately owned platforms (with or without algorithms) foster varying styles of posting and formulating narratives. The government’s mastery of the online platforms that were previously seen as “liberating technologies” shrinks people’s access to free, uncensored and truthful information.

Our research therefore concentrates on collecting, understanding and analyzing these peace narratives, as well as the speakers producing them, in order to understand the heterogenous and fluctuating landscape of the Russian propaganda on Telegram. Additionally, we are aiming to compare these narratives to those produced by English-speaking influencers on X (former Twitter) of various political views to see how the pro-Russian political agenda manifests differently across borders and between sources.