Politicians who openly display anti-democratic traits can attract substantial electoral support, even among voters who value democracy. This paper argues that the very behavior that makes a politician objectionable can also reassure voters that the politician will remain independent of political elites. Voters whose preferred policies lie far from elite interests worry that the candidates they elect will be captured by elites once in office. Because capturing a politician mired in scandal is costly for elites, scandalous behavior can credibly signal that a candidate is beyond elite reach. Where elites are democratically committed, displays of anti-democratic intent become an efficient way to generate such a scandal. Voters may elect these candidates even though they are more likely to manipulate elections once in office, an outcome costly for voters and elites alike. Elites who can perfectly anticipate which politicians will subvert elections have no credible way to communicate this to voters. A reanalysis of existing experimental data is consistent with the model's central prediction. Unlike existing accounts of anti-democratic voting, this theory explains why citizens who value democracy may still elect an anti-democratic candidate, even when a democratically committed candidate offers the same policy platform.

ABOUT THE SPEAKER

Alain Schläpfer is a social science research scholar at Stanford University’s Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL), and a lecturer in Stanford’s Ford Dorsey Master’s in International Policy. His research lies at the intersection of political science and economics and focuses on cooperation, political institutions, and intergroup relations. His current work examines how cooperation can be sustained across political and social divisions, why voters support anti-democratic politicians, and how institutions and social norms shape political behavior. His research combines formal theory with experiments and observational data. He holds a PhD in Economics.