Dead Hand of Revenge: Decapitation Threat and the Design of Nuclear Command and Control System | X Zhang
Dead Hand of Revenge: Decapitation Threat and the Design of Nuclear Command and Control System | X Zhang
Tuesday, April 21, 202612:00 PM - 1:15 PM (Pacific)
William J. Perry Conference Room
About the event: How would the leader of a nuclear-armed state respond if they believed themselves to be the target of a decapitation strike? This project examines how fears of leadership targeting shape policy choices between pre-delegation and the automation of launch authority. Zhang argues that choices over command-and-control design are driven by three forces: a tradeoff between revenge and deterrence, domestic politics, and national risk cultures. These factors jointly determine whether a state gravitates toward pre-delegation or automation. Empirically, he analyzes the Soviet Perimeter system, known in the West as the “Dead Hand,” developed between 1974 and 1985 when Soviet leaders feared that the United States was acquiring the capability and the doctrine to eliminate them in a decapitation strike. Zhang then compares this to U.S. efforts to cope with similar fears of decapitation, such as the Emergency Rocket Communications System (ERCS), an American analogue to Perimeter, and the emphasis on Continuity of Government (COG) procedures. These case studies shed light on how states respond to the threat of nuclear decapitation, when they choose pre-delegation or automation as solutions, and how those choices shape the stability or volatility of nuclear deterrence. More broadly, the project contributes to research on the determinants of nuclear command-and-control design, its implications for strategic stability, and the broader debate over automation versus human-in-the-loop design.
About the speaker: X Zhang is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. Zhang received a PhD in political science from the University of Wisconsin–Madison, and their research examines the political psychology of international security, with a focus on interstate conflict, public opinion, and the domestic foundations of foreign policy. Zhang is also a Hans J. Morgenthau Fellow at the O’Brien Notre Dame International Security Center.
All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.
No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.