THE INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION INITIATIVE (IEI) ANNOUNCES IEI WORKSHOP

The IEI workshop will provide a forum for graduate students and young researchers working in international education to present their research to other graduate students and faculty members.

Friday, January 23, 2014
1:15PM – 2:30PM
Encina Hall East Wing, 5th Floor, Falcon Lounge
Lunch will be served.

Is the high school admissions process fair? Explaining inequalities in elite high school enrollments in developing countries
Henry Shi
Rural Education Action Program, FSI

Endogenous Institutions: Evidence from Public Sector Collective Bargaining Laws in the United States
Agustina S. Paglayan
Department of Political Science

Contact: Hannah Myers (hmyers@stanford.edu)

IEI is a new cross-campus initiative to increase dialogue and collaboration around international education at Stanford.

Sponsored by: Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford Graduate School of Education, Rural Education Action Program, Center for Education Policy Analysis
THE INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION INITIATIVE (IEI)
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Endogenous Institutions: Evidence from Public Sector Collective Bargaining Laws in the United States

The widespread belief that public sector collective bargaining increases the costs of government is based on cross-sectional studies that do not consider the possibility that deep-rooted historical factors may explain both the emergence of bargaining institutions and the level of public spending. Using a new longitudinal dataset, I show that those U.S. states that require collective bargaining with local teacher unions tend to employ more teachers, pay higher salaries, and spend more on education, but that they already did so before collective bargaining came into existence. Moreover, in analyses that exploit the staggered introduction of state laws requiring collective bargaining with teachers, I find no support for the claim that these laws increase the costs of government. My results suggest that collective bargaining institutions are less consequential than commonly believed, and that these institutions are a consequence of the same social, political, and economic forces that shape public finance decisions.

Is the high school admissions process fair? Explaining inequalities in elite high school enrollments in developing countries

Researchers typically explain inequalities in access to elite high schools by looking at gaps that appear before the high school admissions process. However, even when disadvantaged students reach the stage of high school admissions with identical qualifications as advantaged students, mechanisms particular to the high school admissions process may prevent disadvantaged students from accessing elite high schools. The overall goal of this paper is to examine the degree to which the high school admissions process deters disadvantaged students from accessing elite high schools. To fulfill this goal, we analyze longitudinal, administrative data on approximately 24,000 students in one region of China. In this setting, according to our data, the rural-urban gap in elite high school attendance can be larger than 50 percentage points (even though rural students comprise well over half of the high school student population). Our results show that the five subject exams of the high school entrance exam (HSEE) are biased against rural students. If the HSEE dropped two of the most biased subject exams from the HSEE, access to elite high schools among rural students would increase by 4 percentage points (or 8 percent). Furthermore, conditional on HSEE scores, rural students are 13 percentage points less likely than urban students to apply for elite high schools. Finally, conditional on HSEE scores and application choices, the existence of an alternative admissions channel that charges extra admissions fees further reduces rural access by 18 percentage points.